Authors: Ankit K and Dr. Aparna Varma*
India’s geopolitics is currently undergoing three concurrent challenges. The United States has turned trade into leverage against India’s Russian energy purchases, and US President Donald Trump’s decisions on invoking a hefty fee on H1B visas have complicated India’s choices. China is leveraging the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit to signal its willingness to work with India after the crisis along the Line of Actual Control. Pakistan remains a security challenge after the Pehalgam terrorist attack, followed by military escalation from both sides. Amongst these, Russia’s role as energy supplier, security partner, and SCO anchor is central to how India calibrates its moves.
The bilateral relationship with the United States is extensive but is undergoing strain as trade has become a security variable. In August, the White House announced additional tariffs on India due to its continued purchases of Russian oil, raising tariffs on Indian exports up to fifty percent. Trump subsequently claimed that India had offered to cut tariffs on United States goods to zero and paired this with the social media line about having lost India and Russia to China. The fact is that tariff policy is now tied to New Delhi’s energy choices. In addition, the sharp $100,000 fee hike on H-1B visas reflects significant recalibration in India-US relations, reflecting broader shifts in US domestic priorities and global power competition. This policy only constrains the mobility of highly skilled Indian professionals and undermines the longstanding strategic economic interdependence between the two nations.
Security cooperation with the United States continues despite the current friction. The US cleared the sale of 31 MQ-9B drones to India in 2024, an initiative to deepen maritime domain awareness and intelligence surveillance capabilities between the two countries. The tech cooperation under the iCET framework also moved forward in early 2025, even as trade tensions rose. Despite the tariff ruckus, these strands are indicative of intertwined dependence, where strategic collaboration and economic disputation can naturally coexist.
China is the immediate military competitor, yet the SCO summit signaled Chinese de-escalation. In Tianjin, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping met and committed to addressing border issues, resuming flights, and broadening exchanges. This actually signals not for the resolution of the Line of Actual Control problem but to compartmentalize disputes while testing selective cooperation.
Pakistan remains a persistent variable. A terrorist attack in Pehalgam in April killed 26 civilians and triggered several days of strikes and counter-strikes in May before a ceasefire took hold. While India officially admitted that Operation Sindoor is still ongoing, alleged Chinese assistance poses a direct two-front threat to India. For India, the Chinese assistance during Operation Sindoor reinforced that any cooperation with China does not rule out a two-front war if a Pakistan crisis escalates.
Russia is the indispensable outlier that ties these strands together. In energy, Russia has become India’s top crude oil supplier. Statistics show that India bought about 1.3 million barrels per day of Russian crude between January and July in 2025, accounting for more than a third of total imports. At the SCO summit, Russia and India also discussed defense cooperation and the possibility of additional S-400 air defense unit imports. The energy and defense links explain why tariff coercion from Washington may have limited traction.
India’s arms sourcing has diversified, but Russia remains first among suppliers. The latest SIPRI data indicate that from 2020 to 2024, Russia provided about 36% of India’s major arms imports, down from 55% in 2015 to 2019 and 72% in 2010 to 2014. Pakistan, meanwhile, drew 81% of its imports from China in the same period, which reflects the deepening of China-Pakistan military cooperation that remains a cause of concern for India.
The SCO summit gathered leaders from China, India, Russia, Pakistan, and others and became a stage on which India balanced several fronts at once. Engaging with Chinese Premier Xi Jinping was a crucial step to stabilizing the border issues. In addition, keeping a visible personal rapport with Vladimir Putin also underscored that SCO remains a platform where India can advance counter-terrorism efforts and connectivity while resisting initiatives that are against its interests. In this sense, the SCO was an important signal in terms of multipolar engagement for India.
Two key concepts in international relations can help make sense of the complexity India is facing. First is hedging. It is an approach that combines selective alignment with simultaneous engagement to reduce risk from any single power. India’s behavior fits this logic. It expands defense and tech cooperation with the United States, even while it refuses to cut Russian oil and probes limited accommodation with China in aviation and border management.
Strategic autonomy, which is also referred to in the Indian context as Nonalignment 2.0, is a crucial guide for India. For India, it certainly does not mean being equidistant. It advocates for practical cooperation with the United States and Europe, where interests converge, and it defends the right to secure energy and security needs from Russia. In addition, it is important to manage China through deterrence, dialogue, and economic caution. This was evident in India’s engagement in the Tianjin meeting.
In all these complexities, what are the Indian choices then?
Emphasizing establishing deterrence on both fronts with sustained capital outlays is important to prepare for any military confrontation. India’s recent defense budget rose to about 6.81 lakh crore rupees, with only about 1.98 trillion rupees reserved for modernization. India, therefore, needs to keep steady capital for modernization to keep pace with China, consequently deterring Pakistan as well.
Building on economic resilience by separating negotiations on tariffs and technology is key to ensuring immunity to any further tariff pressures. It can be done by using iCET to harness the advantages of the supply chain and semiconductor while pursuing a pragmatic trade policy that treats energy security as a separate area to look into. Central to this is to prevent any future episodic tariff spikes from derailing long-term cooperation in sectors like technology and digital infrastructure.
Russia must be kept closer while diversifying cooperation with other countries. A secure payment mechanism for buying crude oil can be through third-country currencies. Use of defense cooperation strategically for technology where cooperation with the West is not yet available should be an area of priority. The long-term path still runs through countries that transfer technologies or produce them jointly.
While amongst larger geopolitical concerns, Pakistan’s problem must be downplayed and should not be prioritized, it can be dealt with through intelligence, surveillance, and precision strike capacity while keeping international support aligned after any terror incident. The May conflict is a reminder that escalation control depends on both capability and robust diplomacy.
The United States remains India’s most consequential technology and security partner. China remains the pacing military challenge. Pakistan remains the most immediate disruptor. Russia remains an important energy and defense partner for India. Hedging and strategic autonomy are therefore more than concepts to guide a practical way forward. The SCO summit and Trump’s remarks simply made visible what has been true for some time. It is therefore India’s responsibility to take steps that preserve growth and deterrence together.
*Dr. Varma is Dean of Research and Publications at the Rashtriya Raksha University.
