After three years of continuing heightened tensions, the United States (US) and Russia have formally initiated negotiations aimed at ending the war in Ukraine. In this context, President Trump and President Putin recently met in Alaska, pledging to resolve the issue through a comprehensive agreement, rather than a temporary ceasefire. The protracted Ukraine war has not only threatened the global security landscape but also strained US-Russia relations to an unprecedented extent. As it is the only intact bilateral arms control treaty between the US and Russia, New START, has been deferred. Moreover, the New START is set to expire in February 2026, raising further concerns for the future of US-Russia arms control. However, the reopening of formal communication channels and the initiation of peace talks mark a notable improvement in bilateral ties. This emerging thaw could create conditions for the revival of arms control efforts between the two Cold War rivals. The following article examines prospective scenarios for future US-Russia arms control, considering ongoing peace talks and the forthcoming expiration of the New START.
The first possible scenario could be that both states continue to comply with the treaty limits of New START, as they are currently doing, but unilaterally and through a mutual understanding. However, for the verification of the limits, both states are obliged by the treaty to rely on and assist the other party on data exchanges, on-site inspections, and the use of National Technical Means (NTM). At present, neither side is currently allowing verification as required by the treaty. Once the treaty expires, there will be no treaty-bound obligation on the parties to assist each other in the verification process. In that case, if both parties continue only to comply with the treaty limits without any formal verification arrangement, it would be difficult for any side to believe that the other side is following the limits on its strategic arms stockpile.
Even after the instigation of the Ukraine war, when Russia announced that it was suspending its participation in the treaty, it promised that it would adhere to limits capped in the treaty. However, the US alleged that Moscow was neither adhering to the treaty’s promised limits nor allowing American inspectors for the on-site verification. It is the verification that either side can be certain about the other’s capabilities. And if the verification process does not exist, then merely declaring that a party is complying with the treaty limits of New START or any other treaty will not serve the primary purpose of the arms control arrangement. Thus, this scenario will be an impediment to improving US-Russia relations.
The second scenario could be another extension of the New START. In 2021, just two days before the expiry of the New START, the US and Russia decided to extend the treaty under Article XIV, which provides only a one-time five years extension to the treaty. However, Article XV of the treaty simultaneously allows amendments. If both parties want an extension beyond February 2026, they can amend Article XIV under Article XV to permit further extensions for the number of years that both can agree upon. However, any amendment under Article XV requires a formal agreement between both countries. This arrangement would be a valuable addition and would strengthen US-Russia bilateral relations.
However, both sides have certain reservations regarding the other side’s capabilities, which were developed or inducted after New START was negotiated. For instance, the US has reservations regarding the Russian Avangard Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HSGV), Poseidon nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed autonomous torpedo, and Burevestnik nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed cruise missile. Simultaneously, Russia has concerns about the American Aegis missile defence system, space-based sensors, missile defence interceptors, and potential anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. Since the Ukraine conflict, these reservations have gained prominence and could adversely impact the treaty’s extension.
There are a few recent geopolitical realities and developments that might also impact the second scenario, as the statement of French President Macron about giving a nuclear umbrella to the European Union (EU), Poland’s desire to host American nuclear weapons on Polish soil, possible Ukraine’s membership of NATO, the deployment of Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW) also known as Battlefield Nuclear Weapons (BNW) in Belarus, and the recent revision of Russian Nuclear Doctrine.
Therefore, a new treaty, as a third scenario, would be a better option. The new treaty will supersede the New START, the way it superseded the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT). The new arrangement could even address evolving security anxieties, including non-nuclear strategic weapons (NNSW), new offensive cyber capabilities, space weaponization, and perhaps conventional military imbalance in Europe, along with the bilateral concerns on the recent geopolitical shifts. Simultaneously, this new treaty could also have enhanced transparency, a stringent verification regime and a clause for the continuance of verification measures even if a crisis erupts between the parties. Such a comprehensive arrangement would not just strengthen the US-Russia strategic stability, but rather, by having a holistic and updated arrangement, lead to a new era of arms control.
Thus, the Trump-Putin Alaska summit has opened a window for reviving arms control between Washington and Moscow. However, as the expiration of New START in 2026 approaches, the choices before both capitals remain stark: either allow the collapse of the last pillar of bilateral arms control and eventually risk a renewed arms race or take bold steps toward a more comprehensive and future-oriented arms control framework. Moreover, the future of US-Russia arms control will depend on how both parties address the issue of verification, transparency, emerging technologies and shifting geopolitical anxieties. The path forward will not be easy, but if both Cold War rivals can seize this moment, they may still avert a dangerous and uncontrolled arms race.
