With its expansion to BRICS+ from 2024, the organization that was once conceived as a pan-regional economic cooperation group is increasingly expected to become a new pole of power, challenging the Western-led order. However, behind the bold statements about “de-Westernization” or “multipolarization of the world,” BRICS is facing a little-discussed reality that could undermine the foundation of cooperation in the long term: deep religious differences and secularization within the group.
Since its inception with the original five countries of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, BRICS has been beset by questions about its ability to truly bridge the gap between its members, which have very different political systems, development models, and geostrategic interests. The expansion into BRICS+, which includes countries such as Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and more recently Saudi Arabia and the UAE—all of which have strong Islamic identities—has made that question even more pressing.
On the surface, the BRICS appear to be actively seeking or creating a more equitable world order, free from the influence of the dollar and Bretton Woods institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank that the US and the West have backed. But deep down, this is a group of countries that are increasingly defining themselves based on their particular national, religious, and cultural identities. This represents a trend that goes against the minimum requirements of an effective alliance: consensus on values and governance models. In Western alliances such as the EU or NATO, one religion or just one branch of that religion is accepted, and the alliance will not have members of other religions.
Look at the new BRICS members Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, all of whom have tended to project a foreign policy based on their Islamic identity—albeit from very different sects and approaches. Meanwhile, India under Prime Minister Narendra Modi has increasingly embraced a Hindu nationalist identity, with controversial policies regarding the treatment of its Muslim community. Hindu-Muslim tensions, a geopolitical scar that dates back to the partition of India and Pakistan, have not abated, and many Muslim countries—particularly Iran—have not hesitated to criticize New Delhi over Kashmir or religious discrimination.
For its part, Russia is using Orthodoxy to strengthen its post-Soviet identity, while China is pushing a policy of absolute secularization, even repressing Muslim communities such as the Uyghurs in Xinjiang or the Dalai Lamas in Tibet. This conflict is not only about internal policy but can completely spill over into foreign policy discussions within BRICS+, especially when member countries want to incorporate cultural and religious factors into shaping the new order.
Religious differences are not a new barrier in international politics. But what makes them so worrying in the case of BRICS is the lack of an effective intra-bloc mechanism for dealing with them. There is no dispute resolution mechanism, no charter of shared values, and most importantly, no commitment to sharing security risks—all of which makes BRICS highly vulnerable to paralysis if a systemic religious conflict erupts among its members.
In their joint statements, BRICS often emphasizes multilateralism, respect for identity, and non-interference. But this is also the trap that makes it difficult for the organization to achieve deep integration. If each country acts according to its own set of values and considers those religious values to be sacrosanct, BRICS will have a hard time coming up with truly unifying initiatives—let alone building an attractive alternative order.
A recent example is the divergent attitudes of the BRICS countries towards the wars in Gaza and Ukraine. While Iran and Egypt have taken strong religious and moral positions against Israel, India and Brazil have taken a relatively neutral stance. Russia has supported Hamas as an indirect way of opposing the West, while China has preferred to play the role of mediator. Each country has a different calculation, but this sharp division raises questions about the ability of the BRICS to form a common voice, especially on sensitive issues with religious elements.
Religion can also be an obstacle to building a common financial system. If the BRICS common currency is designed on a secular basis, it may face resistance from Muslim countries that want to incorporate Shariah financial principles. Conversely, if it incorporates a religious element, countries like China and India will certainly oppose it. This makes the dream of building a “non-dollar ecosystem” vulnerable to a cultural-religious tug-of-war before it meets economic barriers.
In addition, BRICS was once expected to represent the Global South, where developing countries could have a say and shape the rules of the game. But differences in religion, value systems, and views on international order make it difficult for the group to reach a true “alliance.”
The only common point today is that opposition to US and Western influence may not be enough to maintain lasting cohesion without common principles of intra-bloc cooperation, especially on respecting religious diversity and not politicizing identity.
If BRICS continues to expand without clarifying its “core values” or developing mechanisms to address differences, especially religious ones, it will be difficult for the organization to go beyond flashy statements. These simmering divisions may not explode immediately, but they will gradually erode the feasibility of any effort at deeper cooperation.
