On August 26, Monday, during the meeting with South Korean President Lee Jae-myung at the White House, Trump threatened China to impose 200 percent tariffs when he said to the reporters that “they have to give us magnets; if they don’t give us magnets, then we have to charge them 200 percent tariffs or something.”
Beijing introduced an export control system of rare earths on April 4, in retaliation for Trump’s ‘liberation day’ tariffs on China on April 1. However, after the two rounds of talks (in Geneva in May and London in June), China’s rare-earth magnet exports have risen significantly, surpassing levels not seen since April, when Beijing imposed export restrictions. The U.S. imports have seen a remarkable surge, with volumes increasing by 660 percent in June alone and another 76 percent in July. China dominates rare-earth magnet production, controlling about 90% of the global supply and refining the minerals used.
This article focuses on the American military weapons systems and their dependency on China’s rare earth minerals. United States-based Govini, a defense software company, published a report titled “From Rock to Rocket: Critical Minerals and the Trade War for National Security” on U.S. military dependence on China’s critical minerals. The report disclosed that America’s military dominance increasingly relies on China.
China’s dominance in rare earth minerals (REEs) poses a direct national security threat to the U.S. defense weapons system. In response to President Trump’s ‘Liberation Day tariffs’ on China, China’s Ministry of Commerce imposed export restrictions on seven REEs and magnets in the defense, energy, and automotive sectors. These minerals include samarium, gadolinium, thorium, dysprosium, ruthenium, scandium, and yttrium. Previously, China had imposed export controls on gallium and germanium in July 2023, tungsten and tellurium in February 2024, and bismuth, molybdenum, and indium in August 2024.
The report unveiled the vulnerability of the U.S. military-industrial complex to Chinese-controlled REEs, which poses a significant strategic risk for U.S. high-end weapons. For instance, the report stated that these minerals are present in a staggering 80,006 components across nearly 1,908 U.S. military weapons systems. It is said that these minerals comprise 77.7 percent of Department of Defense (DOD) platforms. The situation is particularly concerning for specific service branches. For instance, the U.S. Navy’s 739 weapons systems are impacted by 91.6 percent of these minerals, while the Marine Corps’ 292 weapons systems are affected by 61.7 percent. Similarly, the Army’s 302 weapons systems are impacted by 70.03 percent, and the Air Force’s 302 weapons systems are affected by 85.1 percent of their systems.
To understand the vulnerability, a recent report by CSIS on the requirements of REEs for high-end military products unveiled the total requirements for its weapons production. For instance, the F-35 fighter jet incorporates over 900 pounds of rare earth elements (REEs). Similarly, the Arleigh Burke-class DDG-51 destroyer needs roughly 5,200 pounds of REEs. A Virginia-class submarine uses around 9,200 pounds of rare earth elements. The production of these highly sophisticated military weapons would be vulnerable in the context of China’s export control of REEs.
China’s recent export restrictions have had a profound impact on the market. In just three months, the average prices of components containing restricted minerals experienced a significant increase of 5.2 percent. Gallium rose by 6 percent, antimony by 4.5 percent, and germanium by 1.6 percent. Unlike restricted minerals, non-restricted materials only saw a modest 1.4 percent increase, underscoring the direct correlation between access restrictions and cost volatility.
China’s dominance in extractions and processing, including midstream stages, particularly refining and processing, multiplied the problem. Even when minerals are mined in U.S. allied countries, they are often sent to China for refinement since China owns more than 90% of refining capacity, making true independence elusive. For instance, China supplies 60% of the global antimony market and processes nearly one-third of all refined material worldwide. Only 19% of the antimony used by the U.S. originates from sources outside Chinese influence. This systemic bottleneck exposes invisible dependencies that cannot be addressed solely by diversifying raw material sources.
China’s influence expands globally, with state-affiliated companies operating in Ghana, Russia, Tajikistan, the DRC, and Kazakhstan. This gives Beijing leverage over mineral flows, shaping market dynamics and potentially delaying or raising costs for resources not mined domestically. U.S. defense planners may mistakenly believe they source from neutral nations when critical supply chain stages remain under Chinese control. The U.S. must invest in domestic processing and refining infrastructure to mitigate this vulnerability. Over 35 crucial minerals extracted in the U.S. or allied nations are currently sent to China for processing, which is unsustainable.
The DOD has invested heavily in critical mineral production to support domestic refining capacity. For instance, in 2024, the National Defence Industrial Strategy set a goal to develop a complete mine-to-magnet REE supply chain that can meet all U.S. defense needs by 2027. Since 2020, DOD has allocated $439 million towards building a domestic supply chain of REEs. In 2020, the Pentagon awarded MP Materials $9.6 million for a light REE separation facility at Mountain Pass, California. In 2022, DOD invested $35 million in a heavy REEs processing facility. These facilities are the first of their kind in the U.S. to fully integrate the REE supply chain from mining, separating, and refining.
In addition, in February 2024, DOD invested $59.4 million in Idaho for antimony reserves, which are promising but need scaling. Positive momentum is evident in tellurium, where domestic sourcing increased from 5 percent to 25 percent due to U.S.-Canadian efforts and reduced its foreign reliance from 95 percent in 2019 to 25 percent in 2023. However, minerals like gallium and germanium remain dependent on foreign processing. To address this, partnerships with trusted allies like Australia and Canada must be expanded and coordinated to ensure secure refining channels.
Many critical minerals are byproducts of commonly mined resources but are overlooked due to economic and regulatory barriers. Projects like Perpetua Resources received up to $59 million under the Defense Production Act to redevelop an abandoned mining site. Texas’ Round Top deposit offers a unique opportunity to access multiple critical minerals from a single site, which could be pivotal if federal investment is prioritized.
The report exposes future vulnerabilities in strategically essential minerals like magnesium (China controls 90 percent), graphite (China controls nearly 80 percent), and fluorspar (China accounts for 62 percent). These materials are crucial for aircraft, missiles, batteries, and advanced optics, yet the U.S. is unprepared for potential restrictions. China’s dominance in these sectors underscores the urgent need for a long-term strategic response.
To conclude, the military weapons systems of the United States rely heavily on Chinese-controlled rare earth minerals and magnets. The entire U.S. military’s weapons are exposed to Chinese critical minerals. Fighter jets, missiles, radar systems, and submarines of the U.S. weapons system are vulnerable to Chinese dominance in REEs. Securing access to antimony, gallium, germanium, tungsten, and tellurium is critical to ensuring long-term mineral independence and safeguarding U.S. defense capabilities.
