On a crisp February 2017 night, the world was introduced to a new brand of precision warfare. As a US drone sliced through the sky over Idlib, Syria, it released upon the world the most precise weapon the US armed forces had in its arsenal: the Hellfire AGM‑114R‑9X. The missile’s sights were set on Abu al Khayr al Masri, the deputy leader of Al-Qaeda responsible for the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.
But unlike Al Masri’s brand of explosive, indiscriminate violence, his death befell him via cold mechanical precision. The missile pierced the roof of his Kia sedan, deploying six rotating blades mid-flight, killing him instantly. There was no blast, no crater, no collateral damage. He was surgically removed from the neighborhood with little disturbance to the street around him.
There were no boots on the ground. No firefight. No bombs dropped or pilots far from home. The individual who killed al-Masri most likely never left their chair, thousands of miles away in a climate controlled room on American soil.
This was the first documented combat use of the AGM‑114R‑9X, colloquially referred to as the ‘Flying Ninja’ or ‘Flying Ginsu’. Its debut marked not just a technological milestone, but is part of a larger trend in how America wages war: a sanitized, surgical approach that aims to morally separate policy makers, citizens, and even combatants from the human toll of war.
But beneath this precision lies a troubling illusion that has befallen our counter-terror practitioners— that surgical strikes, such as those performed by the Flying Ginsu constitute a doctrine, not a tactic. The war against terror must be focused on hearts and minds and creating efficient democratic governance in conjunction with surgical strikes on leadership and the ham-stringing of terror networks.
The employment of drone-based precision munitions such as the Flying Ninja may achieve tactical victories, but it will be the combination of the ideological struggle over hearts and minds, humanitarian aid and counter-radicalization efforts that will win the war.
Surgical Strikes and the Ethical Illusion of Clean War
Crucially, it is important to note that the Flying Ninja missile has seen limited use in combat, with only six confirmed uses between 2017-2022. However, the AGM-114R-9X exemplifies a troubling trend within the arena of modern warfare; the sanitation of war.
Over time, technological advancements have increased the distance, physically and psychologically, between the warfighter and their target. Meanwhile, the precision of said combat has increased and the risk to American soldiers has decreased. This has led to decreased casualty numbers compared to other irregular wars such as Vietnam, but more than traditional albeit limited wars such as the Gulf War. However, the psychological price that our operators pay has diminished little with said distance, with studies showing that nearly half of Reaper and Global Hawk drone operators suffer from psychiatric symptoms that affected their personal and professional lives.
In a 2021 Interview with PBS, General Mark McKenzie, commander of CENTCOM from 2019-2022 stated, “Combat, and particularly close-infantry combat, as occurs in a lot of these things, is an inherently messy, imprecise, bloody business. And we would like for it to be antiseptic. We would like for it to be perfect”. However, no matter how ‘antiseptic’ we seek to make modern warfare, flesh is unyielding, it cannot tell the difference between a bullet and a blade. Pain is pain. Even the RX9, one of the most precise weapons in our arsenal, is not free of civilian casualties. With each erroneous strike we make, or civilians we kill in the crossfire, we sow the seeds of resentment in the hearts of the populace.
This risk is further heightened during drone warfare. In many theaters, such as Syria, where US presence is limited combined with limited US aid and, until recent weeks, crushing sanctions, strikes serve as prime recruiting material for groups such as the Islamic State. There is no American voice to counter the narrative of ‘imperial aggression’ that these groups seek to push, creating an environment ripe for propagandization.
Drone Warfare Doctrine: From the CIA to the DOD
This trend towards drone warfare began in earnest during Obama’s first term in 2008. A key campaign promise of his was ending the war in Iraq and moving the GWOT towards the Al-Qaeda strongholds of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Drone warfare allowed him to achieve these goals. Over the course of his two terms in office, he ordered 542 strikes which resulted in the deaths of roughly 3,797 individuals, including 324 civilians.
While Obama was not the first President to utilize drone warfare, he did create the basis for modern drone doctrine. Under the previous Bush administration, drone strikes were conducted solely by the CIA, shrouding them in secret, and a lack of accountability, as they all were classified as Title 50 covert actions. While this provided his administration plausible deniability, it ceded crucial strategic communication advantages to organizations such as the Taliban and Houthis. For example, they blamed airstrikes conducted by Saudi Arabia or even themselves on the United States, which it could not confirm nor deny.
However, Obama decided to split drone warfare between both the CIA and DOD. This allowed the most critical or high-risk strikes to be protected by Title 50, while creating a framework of accountability and strike protocols via the DOD. While increasing transparency and public trust the shift to the DOD created an unintended consequence; normalization. Drone warfare was now considered a conventional weapon akin to fighter jets. Strikes and their fallout are now public knowledge. In sum, while transparency and oversight of their use was increased, drone strikes themselves also massively increased from the Bush to Obama administration.
While the Biden administration sought to limit drone warfare, the Trump administration largely maintained the infrastructure Obama set up, and has made it a mission of his second term to greatly expand America’s drone warfare capabilities. In recent weeks, he has made Executive Order 14307 to cut red tape on domestic drone production. Furthermore, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has decided to go above and beyond Executive Order14307 and greatly expand the Pentagon’s drone warfare capabilities, primarily in the arena of cheap attack drones. He hopes to integrate drone warfare into combat training, including force-on-force drone warfare by next year.
Peace Through Strength: A New Way Forward
From the days of Bush to now the dawn of Trump’s second term, drone warfare has only become more normalized, widespread, and accepted by the defense community as a cornerstone of COIN and counter-terrorism. Indeed, drone warfare, employing precision weapons such as the R-9X does cut down on civilian casualties and physical risk to warfighters. It also is an incredibly effective way to decapitate terrorist organizations and strike at a moment’s notice. Therefore, drone warfare should continue, and precision weapon systems like the AGM‑114R‑9X should continue to be utilized. However, drone strikes should be viewed as a tactic, not a doctrine or solution to terrorism.
The best prevention is cure. The long term cure for terrorism and insurgency is not kinetic strikes alone. Rather, it consists of humanitarian aid, economic revitalization, and building bridges between American forces and the local population. For example, a study by the University of Chicago showed that during the surge in Iraq every dollar per capita of CERP (Commanders Emergency Response Program) spending noticeably reduced insurgent violence. Notably, CERP funding focused on small, community based humanitarian projects, maximizing its effectiveness and building relationships between soldiers and the local population.
These projects also served another crucial purpose- creating economic opportunity and fostering trust amongst the local population. Oftentimes, individuals turn to terrorist organizations not out of ideological fervor, but out of need for strong local governance or simply work. For example, according to a 2015 interview conducted by the European Institute for Peace, 27% of Al-Shabab recruits joined for economic reasons, and only 15% cited religious reasons as a motivator. For example, the Taliban established regional councils, shuras, which often performed more efficiently than the local government. They also infiltrated the Afghan government with members serving in government ministries and universities. This model, first and most successfully used by Hezbollah, has also been employed in recent years by groups such as HTS in Syria. In order to effectively combat these organizations, it is essential we fill the economic and governmental voids they exploit.
Conclusion
Precision drone-based munitions such as the AGM‑114R‑9X provide Washington with a crucial relatively low-risk option. Indeed, they have served an essential purpose in the GWOT, decapitating the leadership of various terrorist groups. However, these strikes should be viewed as a tactic not a complete doctrine. However, when combined with targeted humanitarian efforts and economic aid focused on the most at-risk areas, it forms a concrete strategy. Unfortunately, with the downsizing of USAID along with cuts to Countering Violent Extremism programs under the current administration, our country is in grave danger. As drone technology advances, so must our commitment to the populations we serve. Our survival depends on it.
