Myanmar military leader Min Aung Hlaing was perhaps the only ruling elite in the world with an elated response to US President Donald Trump’s letter threatening a tariff of 40 percent on exports to the US. Min Aung Hlaing’s military regime was among the world’s most isolated governing elites after staging a military takeover from an elected civilian government headed by Aung San Suu Kyi. To this day, the US government and diplomatic corps do not officially engage with and recognize the junta as the legitimate government of Myanmar.
Despite being among a branch of nearly indistinguishable letters sent out to various world leaders, Trump’s tariff letter nonetheless represented a public recognition of the junta’s status as a de facto ruler and thus a generous “gift” to the junta. In his multi-page reply, delighted Min Aung Hlaing even drew an analogy between the 2020 elections in Myanmar and the US, in which perceived “electoral fraud” and “irregularities” occurred, thereby implicitly courting Trump’s support for the regime. The Trump administration’s act of sending the letter to Min Aung Hlaing, rather than the National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG), the parallel government consisting of the elected MPs from the 2020 general elections and representatives from the civil society and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), represented a further diplomatic setback for the NUG’s pursuit of legitimacy.
President Trump’s “America First” foreign policy approach is also echoed in the State Department’s cable to US diplomatic offices abroad, guiding them not to issue statements on foreign elections unless there are compelling American national interests at stake. The guideline explicitly stressed the need to align with President Trump’s position of respecting the sovereignty of all foreign nations.
For many decades, the US State Department has been critical of the legitimacy and representativeness of elections in authoritarian countries, including Myanmar. Despite the questionable efficacy in influencing the regime, the administrations of President Bill Clinton and President George W. Bush actively pushed for democracy in Myanmar (Burma) through strong advocacy for pro-democracy figures, rhetorical condemnation, international isolation against the junta, and economic sanctions.
The US Treasury also lifted sanctions on some of the Myanmar junta’s allies and military-affiliated companies, including arms brokers and military contractors. According to a US Treasury spokesperson, the act was conducted “in the ordinary course of business” without giving any further elaborate reasons. In other words, the second term of President Trump marks a clear break from previous administrations, shifting away from rhetorically promoting democratic norms—even when tempered by pragmatism—to an explicitly tangible interest-based approach both in a practical and rhetorical manner.
Meanwhile, the Myanmar military junta is pressing for holding general elections with the pro-military political parties in December 2025 or January 2026. Ahead of the planned election, the military regime of Min Aung Hlaing has enacted a new electoral law under which anyone disrupting the electoral process through speech, organization, incitement, or violence against election officials and candidates could face prison sentences of three years to life. In addition, the law introduces a death penalty for any such obstructive conduct that ultimately causes a fatality. For many people in Myanmar, the law serves as nothing more than a tool to normalize and institutionalize the military praetorian role in Myanmar politics since popular political parties, particularly Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD), have been banned, and their leaders were detained and tortured with no independent and credible press to monitor the transparency and fairness of the elections.
While it remains to be seen whether Min Aung Hlaing himself aims to secure the presidency through this sham election, mirroring Thailand’s Prayut Chan-o-cha or Egypt’s al-Sisi, such an election will serve as a useful exit strategy for the military regime plagued with war, economic destitution, and international isolation. The US hands-off pivot in foreign elections will solidify Min Aung Hlaing’s position and the military’s grip on Myanmar politics. This trend is likely to be compounded by the military’s recent territorial gains and operational advancements in resistance-held territories, such as in Shan State against the EAOs like the TNLA and the MNDAA.
For Myanmar’s neighbors and states in the region, the upcoming general election is likely to give a superficial sense of stability and negative peace, at least in the junta-held territories. In the aftermath of the election, the military domination in Myanmar politics, with the lingering threats of a coup, can effectively be normalized, reminiscent of Myanmar’s short-lived democratic transition in the 2010s spearheaded by general-turned-politician Thein Sein. The critical distinction is that contemporary Myanmar for the would-be “elected” government is a world apart from what Thein Sein inherited.
For any resistance groups and parallel governments seeking to challenge authoritarian regimes, attaining legitimacy and international recognition as a true representative of a particular state in question is crucial. The extent to which such pro-democracy resistance forces are able to gather these critical elements of legitimacy and recognition profoundly shapes the trajectory of their democratic struggle—from the efficacy of international pressure exerted on the authoritarian regimes, setting the stage for consolidated democracy, to the impact-driven and effective delivery of international humanitarian assistance to civilians in dire need. The latter is particularly vital in light of the devastating earthquake in Central Myanmar in March, after which the military regime’s obstruction of aid, politicization, and the resulting international community’s concerns about committing maximal provision of aid and assistance severely inhibited the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance to millions of people in Myanmar.
Considering the US non-interference stance and the EU’s strategic shift to domestic expenditures and defense—underscored by the recent aid cuts to Southeast Asia owing to critical geopolitical developments like the Russian invasion of Ukraine—the strategic adjustments of external engagements will be imperative for the Myanmar opposition. This means that Myanmar’s key regional neighbors within the ASEAN, particularly states having substantial regional power and/or influential sway over different Myanmar stakeholders, such as Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, as well as the Asia-Pacific democracies like Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand, will be significant external actors for the Myanmar opposition. On the whole, the US and the EU strategic realignments indicate a wake-up call not only for the Myanmar opposition but also for the broader pro-democracy movements across the Asia-Pacific region.
