The year 2025 will be marked as the year of shifting shadows – uncertainty and reckless horizons. In a move on July 3, Russia accepted the new credentials of the Afghanistan ambassador, becoming the first country to recognize the Taliban government. This is not the first time. Following the Third Anglo-African War of 1919, the Soviet Union was the first country to accept Afghanistan. Afghanistan has always been crucial to Russia in terms of security and infrastructure.
What is concerning is the recognition of the “Taliban government.” Ironically, the very existence of the Taliban emerged against Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and they were “boys” of America. The Afghan jihad was one of the proxies of the Cold War that was a final blow for the disintegration of the great Soviet Union, bashing the imperialist motives of the USSR. The Geneva Accords and 9/11 significantly changed geopolitical dynamics. Now, after three decades, Russia has recognized those boys that are staunchly critical of any former invader. Following the withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan in August 2021, the Taliban seized power. In 2022 and 2024, this group visited Russia. The country was also the first to sign an economic deal with the Taliban, where they agreed to supply oil, gas, wheat, etc. to In July 2024, Vladimir Putin called the Taliban “allies” against terrorism.
This move of Russia carries a strategic significance.
Moscow-Kabul Nexus:
The Moscow-Kabul Nexus has paved the way for the New Silk Bridge, connecting Russia to South Asian markets. The Silk Route was a network of trade routes active from the 2nd century until the 15th century. Afghanistan’s cities—Balkh, Herat, and Kabul—were important stops along this network. Afghanistan lies at the true geographical pivot of Eurasia. This gives Russia a foothold in “Heartland” (Mackinder’s famous geopolitical theory). Cooperation with Afghanistan offers Russia the shortest land corridor to Pakistan’s Gwadar and Karachi ports, which are gateways to the Indian Ocean. Moreover, India and Pakistan have become major consumers of Russian oil and wheat in recent years. Afghanistan strives to become a pinnacle of connectivity hub between not only north-south but also east-west. Afghan imports of wheat and fuel from Russia surged in 2022 (1 million tons and 200,000 tons, respectively). Bilateral trade is expected to reach $3 billion by 2025.
Afghanistan has an estimated $1 trillion in mineral wealth that includes rare earths, lithium, and copper—all essential for modern electronics. While Russia and China maintain a “gentleman’s agreement” over respective spheres of influence, this does not extend to Afghanistan. This shifting reliance will help Russia to manage the Chinese rare earth monopoly. China’s BRI invests in Central Asia and Pakistan and has begun inviting Afghanistan into this initiative. Through oil extraction and exploitation of Afghanistan’s lithium reserves, Beijing is establishing a foothold in Afghanistan. Afghanistan could provide an alternative or complementary corridor, giving Moscow more leverage in Eurasia. NTC Protei (a Russian company) has installed a 4G mobile communication system in multiple regions across Afghanistan.
Afghanistan is in persistent threat of terrorism. Following the Islamic State Khorasan Province attack in Moscow, Russia has expanded its counter-terrorism efforts. In November 2024, the Russian Security Council secretary visited and extended cooperation with Afghanistan.
Russia views Afghanistan as part of Central Asia and applies the same policies. One of the clearest demonstrations is labor migration. Approximately 4.5 million Central Asian migrants currently reside in Russia (2.1 million from Uzbekistan, 1.2 million from Tajikistan, etc.). These migrants not only contribute to domestic growth but also foster a positive image of Russia. In 2024, Russia hoped to attract agricultural specialists to regions of Tatarstan, Dagestan, Krasnodar Krai, and Chechnya.
From the Middle East to Central Asia: the shifting interests of Russia
For more than a decade, the Middle East has been a strategic location for Russia, but this moment appears distinctively momentary for today’s Russia. To the world’s surprise, Russia didn’t prevent the downfall of Bashar Al-Assad in Syria, who was a key Moscow ally in the Middle East. Now, in view of the Iran-Israel war, Russia has been careful in offering his services as a neutral mediator. Though the 12-day war has ended, there are still high risks in the region, as Israel couldn’t achieve its main goals (to halt Iran’s nuclear program and to change the regime). Moreover, direct US involvement in war by attacking nuclear sites of Iran indicates high US stakes in Iran. Moscow’s largely rhetorical approach towards its Middle Eastern allies could be taken in view of Israel-US extending operations, keeping Russia away from escalating tension between key drivers of international politics. Russia neither has the will nor the capacity to indulge in Middle Eastern politics. Moscow and Tehran signed a security pact in January 2025, and recently, after Israel’s attacks on Iran, Abbas Araghchi visited Moscow and thanked Russia for condemning Israel’s attacks, but he returned empty-handed. Over the past two years, Russia has maintained a dual approach between Iran and Israel. Moscow has demographic, economic, and cultural relations with Israel. About 1 million Russians live in Israel, and the Russian language is widely spoken.
Iran’s proxies are operating covertly across the Middle East and surrounding regions that are beneficial for Russia. An example is the incident of October 7 that initiated Israel’s genocide in Gaza and left strains on US domestic politics, as evidenced in tensions in the US before elections. Moreover, any disruption in the Middle East will hike oil prices, which is beneficial for Moscow, as asserted by Ukrainian President Zelenskyy.
It is important to note that during the Israel-Iran war, the world diverted its attention from the Ukrainian war to the Middle Eastern war. Israel has been reluctant in sending aid to Ukraine, and under Trump, military assistance for Ukraine has been declined. This could be taken as ‘great-power politics’—Russia stepping back from Iran, handing the Middle East to the US and Israel, while the US steps back from Ukraine, handing Kyiv to Moscow. Russia also refused the S-400 missile system to Iran, which Moscow has transferred to Turkey and Saudi Arabia—Iran’s regional rivals. Russia’s Su-35 was supposed to be supplied to Tehran earlier this year but was not seen in Iran’s defense system during the war. Volodymyr said on June 9 that the US had changed its decision to supply 20,000 anti-drone missiles to Kyiv. As documented by Al Jazeera, any arms supply to Tehran by Moscow could antagonize Trump, who has shown a doubtful leniency towards Russian aggression in Ukraine.
So one stance is clear: Iran is not going to trust Europe’s bear. It is demonstrated by increasing Tehran’s efforts to get advanced military hardware from China that Russia failed to deliver. So to secure its buffer zone, Russia has recognized Talibans that are not traditional allies to Tehran. This will allow Russia to keep an eye on Iran’s nuclear program and any instability in the Middle East.
Soviet former satellite states and European Balkans:
In addition to European Balkanism, Eurasia has its own version of the Balkans—a vast and diverse area driven by ethnic divisions, religious fragmentation, and regional instability. What is more volatile about this region is that, unlike the Middle East, where power divisions are visible, there exists a true power vacuum in this region. After the Soviet collapse, Russia sought to preserve its influence on newly independent states through the Commonwealth of Independent States. It combined diplomacy with military presence in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. The Soviet-drawn borders deliberately kept the region divided to prevent a unified “Turkestan” that Central Asian states once proposed. The Eurasian Balkans consist of six Central Asian states along with Afghanistan, Armenia, and Georgia. The Afghan Jihad against Soviet invasion introduced radical Islam in Afghan politics, tying its fate to Eurasian Balkans.
Afghanistan shares a border with three former Soviet states: Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. The 75 km rail-line running from Hairatan (Uzbekistan-Afghanistan border) to Mazar-I-Sharif was opened in 2011. Since 2021, upgradation and expansion have continued, and the Taliban and Uzbekistan have both agreed to keep this line functional. This connects Uzbekistan’s national grid to Afghanistan’s northern area, which in turn connects Kazakhstan and Russia.
Lapis Lazuli Corridor is a multi-modal trade route that was launched in 2018. Its starting point is Herat, and this passes through Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan (Baku port) into Georgia to Turkey and Europe. Russia could use this port to reach Black Sea and European markets as an alternative to routes exposed to Western sanctions (e.g., Belarus). Russia could also link its southern networks to this route, integrating itself into the Eurasian Economic Union’s transit infrastructure. Similarly, CASA-1000 is a $1.2 billion electricity transmission line designed to transfer surplus hydropower from energy-rich Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to energy-poor South Asia via Afghanistan. By encouraging investments in these projects and by influencing energy sectors where Russian companies like Inter RAO or RusHydro could dominate, Russia can shape who gets power and on what terms. These projects are capable of uniting Russia and former satellite states under the banner of economic cooperation, similar to the EU model.
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan fear infiltration by Jamaat Ansarullah, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic State Khorasan (ISIS-K), and fractions of Al Qaeda. These groups are dominant in northern Afghanistan. The Taliban has been fighting with ISIS-K since 2015. Any serious disruption in Afghanistan will have spillover effects on Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, which share a combined 2000 km border with Afghanistan. According to the UN report of 2024, thousands of Al-Qaeda members still operate under the Taliban’s shadow, and the TTP operates in Pakistan via Afghan soil. By recognizing the Taliban, Russia could develop an image of being the savior and protector of peace in Central Asia, giving the Taliban legal legitimacy to counter these terrorist factors. ISIS-K and IMU are primary threats to Russia and Central Asia (2024 Crocus City Hall Massacre). The Taliban previously hosted the IMU. Russia could give incentives and demand the Talibanexpel or ban IMU fighters. Russia has military bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. By recognizing the Taliban, Russia now could develop joint intelligence sharing.
By recognizing the Taliban, Russia gains a buffer against Western and Chinese influence, reattains its historical ties with Afghanistan, and manages the power vacuum in Central Asia. It’s a high-reward gambit.
