In the shifting tides of maritime geopolitics, Southeast Asia finds itself at the delicate intersection of history, national pride, and international law. Few cases capture this complexity like the Ambalat sea block dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia which is a disagreement simmering since the early 2000s over a resource-rich patch of the Celebes Sea. While tensions have cooled compared to the height of naval stand-offs in 2005 and 2009, the underlying question remains unresolved so who is truly owns Ambalat?
According to the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2024), Indonesia maintains its claim based on the 1969 continental shelf agreement, reinforced by historical fishing activities and administrative control over nearby islands such as Sebatik and Nunukan. Malaysia, on the other hand, leans on its 1979 map, which controversially extended its maritime boundary to cover Ambalat. The block itself is no minor patch; estimates by Petronas and Pertamina suggest reserves of up to 764 million barrels of oil equivalent, highlighting what’s at stake beneath the water.
Since the ICJ’s 2002 decision awarding the nearby Sipadan and Ligitan islands to Malaysia for basis on grounds of “effective occupation”. Indonesia has moved cautiously, wary of losing yet another strategic territory. Still, unlike the public flare-ups of the early 2000s, recent diplomacy has been quieter. Both nations in 2023 reaffirmed their commitment to settle boundaries through bilateral technical meetings, facilitated in the spirit of ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) signed in 1976.
To outside observers, ASEAN’s response might seem muted. There have been no grand summits dedicated solely to Ambalat, no joint patrols under an ASEAN flag, and certainly no unified statements explicitly naming the dispute. Yet, as scholars like Thuzar (ISEAS, 2023) note, ASEAN’s approach is rooted in “quiet diplomacy” and conflict de-escalation, rather than arbitration or adjudication.
The TAC and the ASEAN Charter emphasize principles of non-interference and consensus. Critics argue these norms prevent the organization from acting decisively. Yet, they have created a diplomatic culture where, despite historical grievances, Indonesia and Malaysia remain committed to talking rather than fighting. This is not a small feat in a region where economic interdependence like Indonesia-Malaysia bilateral trade surpassed USD 21 billion in 2022, so makes conflict an unattractive option.
The ASEAN Coordinating Council has, behind closed doors, provided a platform where both Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur exchange views without the heat of media attention. Informal track-two dialogues, like those organized by the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS), also contribute by nurturing understanding among policymakers and academics. The result? Ambalat is not yet resolved, but it has not escalated. In Southeast Asian diplomacy, “not escalating” can be a quiet form of success.
Contrast this with the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute between South Korea and Japan which a conflict frozen in a different geopolitical climate. Dokdo, a pair of rocky islets in the Sea of Japan (East Sea), is currently administered by South Korea but claimed by Japan. Historical documents are fiercely debated: Korea points to records like the 512 AD mention in the “Samguk Sagi,” while Japan references the 1905 incorporation of Takeshima.
Unlike Ambalat, the Dokdo dispute is entangled with the deeper wounds of Japanese colonialism, making compromise politically radioactive in Seoul. The South Korean Coast Guard maintains a permanent presence, and every symbolic act which from the erection of statues to the annual Dokdo Day that reinforces sovereignty in the public consciousness. According to a 2023 Gallup Korea poll, over 90% of Koreans see Dokdo as indisputably Korean that becoming a domestic consensus so strong that any government proposing shared administration would face political ruin.
Attempts at bilateral dialogue repeatedly stall. Japan in 2023 renewed its claim in the Diplomatic Bluebook, triggering Seoul’s strong protest. Unlike in Southeast Asia, there is no equivalent to the ASEAN framework that both countries are bound to. The Northeast Asia region lacks a multilateral security community; instead, security is structured around U.S.-led alliances. The result is less space for quiet, informal diplomacy and more room for nationalism to shape foreign policy.
What does this comparison reveal? First, ASEAN’s often-criticized “soft institutionalism” helps prevent maritime disputes from becoming national obsessions. Ambalat rarely surfaces as a major electoral issue in Indonesia; Dokdo, on the other hand, is a litmus test of patriotism in Korea. ASEAN’s consensus model, informal meetings, and economic integration quietly nudge member states toward restraint.
Second, the ASEAN framework indirectly manages internal conflict risks. Indonesia itself is an archipelago of over 17,000 islands and more than 1,300 ethnic groups. Maritime disputes could easily inflame regionalism, yet national narratives are kept balanced. Malaysia, too, avoids letting Ambalat disputes spill over into domestic tensions between peninsular and Bornean states.
Third, economic interdependence acts as ballast. Intra-ASEAN trade reached USD 810 billion in 2022 (ASEAN Secretariat), making peace more profitable than confrontation. Even as the South China Sea disputes continue, no ASEAN claimant has directly clashed militarily with another ASEAN member.
Further, It would be misleading to romanticize ASEAN’s role. The Ambalat dispute remains staggering yet resolved with joint management for the territory between Indonesia and Malaysia. Before that, the critics came rightly point out the lack of concrete progress. Yet, compared to Dokdo, where sovereignty disputes deepen nationalist sentiment and limit diplomatic creativity, ASEAN’s architecture keeps disputes like Ambalat contained.
Moreover, the Ambalat Block dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia illustrates ASEAN’s cautious yet stabilizing approach to internal maritime conflicts. Centered on competing claims over hydrocarbon-rich waters in the Celebes Sea, the dispute intensified after both nations granted overlapping oil concessions in the early 2000s. Despite repeated naval confrontations, it never escalated into open conflict, thanks to ongoing bilateral negotiations and ASEAN’s core principles of non-use of force and respect for sovereignty. Yet, the issue remains unresolved; ASEAN itself acts more as a diplomatic forum than a direct mediator, reflecting its preference for consensus over intervention.
Comparatively, the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute between South Korea and Japan, though similarly involving small, resource-adjacent islands, is far more nationalistic and emotionally charged. Historical grievances stemming from Japan’s colonial rule fuel public sentiment in Korea, making compromise politically risky. Unlike the Ambalat case, where ASEAN helps temper escalation through dialogue. Then, there is no equivalent regional mechanism in Northeast Asia to defuse tensions over Dokdo.
Internally, ASEAN faces broader geopolitical strains: competing maritime claims in the South China Sea, economic asymmetries, and diverging external alignments among members. These challenges test ASEAN’s unity and its ability to act decisively on security issues. Nonetheless, the Ambalat case highlights ASEAN’s quiet success in preventing conflict, in stark contrast to the Dokdo dispute, where entrenched nationalism and the absence of multilateral frameworks keep tensions alive. Ultimately, ASEAN’s balancing of national interests with regional dialogue offers a pragmatic, if limited, conflict management model, even on Myanmar or Thailand-Cambodian conflict.
In coclusion, as energy demand rises like the IEA projects Southeast Asia’s energy demand will grow by 60% by 2040 so the strategic value of maritime blocks like Ambalat will only increase. The real test for ASEAN is whether it can evolve from merely preventing escalation to facilitating settlement. For now, ASEAN’s quiet diplomacy may not grab headlines, but it prevents headlines of conflict fairly like a delicate matter, often invisible achievement that might hold lessons for a Northeast Asia still searching for its own multilateral platform.
