Nuclear negotiations between Iran and the United States have entered a sensitive and complex stage. Four years after the diplomatic efforts of 2021 and navigating through periods of heightened tension, both sides have returned to the negotiating table with different approaches. After two rounds of talks and indirect consultations in Muscat and Rome, a group of analysts from various Western media outlets and think tanks — including the Carnegie Endowment, Middle East Institute, Stimson Center, Responsible Statecraft, and The National Interest — who identify with a realist perspective, assess the current situation as distinct from previous periods.
In their view, on one side, the United States — now under leadership mindful of the Trump administration’s legacy — seeks to avoid a costly and consequential military conflict and is pursuing a diplomatic path. On the other side, Iran, facing diminished regional deterrence capacity and severe economic crises, has adopted a softer stance towards nuclear negotiations. This article, through the lens of this analytical current, evaluates the variables, challenges, and opportunities of the ongoing talks across five key areas, shedding light on the intellectual trajectory and strategic direction this school of thought seeks to promote.
Technical Developments and Verification Challenges
From the perspective of this school of thought, one of the main distinctions between the current negotiations and the original JCPOA talks lies in Iran’s significant advancements in nuclear technology. Following the United States’ unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, Iran rapidly expanded its enrichment capacities and production of fissile material. These technical developments — particularly in high-purity uranium enrichment — have raised serious concerns about Iran’s “nuclear breakout time,” a threshold that appears to have shortened and now necessitates a revision of monitoring frameworks.
In this view, the revival of an effective verification regime, utilizing modern monitoring technologies, is deemed essential for any future agreement. At the same time, Iran’s rights as a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) must be safeguarded within the framework of peaceful nuclear use.
International Cohesion and the Use of Diplomatic Language
According to this analytical trend, one of the key elements behind the success of the original JCPOA was the cohesion among global powers and the complementary roles played by regional mediators such as Oman and Japan. Maintaining such cohesion is considered vital for the new round of talks — especially in a context where China and Russia, as actors with independent and sometimes conflicting interests with the West, are involved. Building a minimum consensus around shared interests has thus become even more critical.
These analysts advocate for a step-by-step approach that favors gradual trust-building over insisting on an immediate comprehensive agreement. In this approach, the language of diplomacy must shift away from threat-based frameworks and create a space for mutual understanding, legitimate interests, and the prevention of misinterpretations.
Reassessing the Libya Experience: A Persistent Warning
A key component of this school’s thinking is revisiting the experience of Libya’s nuclear disarmament and its implications for Iran. The “Libya model,” promoted by certain political factions in the U.S. and Israel as an ideal template, is viewed with skepticism and concern in Tehran. The fall of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime following the complete dismantling of Libya’s nuclear and missile capabilities is seen by Iran as evidence of the West’s unreliable security guarantees and the fragility of diplomatic agreements. Thus, this historical lesson logically influences Iran’s strategic calculations, prompting Tehran to preserve deterrence leverage and adopt a more cautious negotiation posture. From this perspective, the Libya model serves not as inspiration but as a cautionary tale for Iran.
Washington’s Phased Strategy: Soft Deterrence or Opportunity Creation?
This group of analysts believes that the new U.S. administration is adopting a phased approach, using symbolic military pressure while keeping the diplomatic channel open to steer Iran toward a new agreement. The deployment of B-2 bombers and limited airstrikes against Iranian regional allies are interpreted within this framework. However, the removal of the demand for Iran’s complete nuclear dismantlement from the Oman draft proposals can be seen as a sign of realism in the new U.S. policy. This shift potentially opens the door for an agreement that simultaneously addresses Iran’s strategic and security interests.
Strategic Opportunities and Considerations Ahead
This analytical school argues that the current nuclear talks could present a critical opportunity to ease external pressures and improve Iran’s internal situation. However, success hinges on both sides moving away from confrontational approaches, unilateral maximalism, and threat-based language. Iran requires an agreement that not only preserves its technological capacities but also provides tangible security guarantees. For the United States, achieving a lasting agreement will necessitate a return to the language of understanding, effective verification, and genuine multilateralism.
Conclusion
In examining the views of the pragmatic realist school outlined here, it can be inferred that the Iran-U.S. nuclear negotiations stand at a potential turning point in regional and global relations. If both sides, learning from past experiences, can approach the new phase with a realist mindset and a mutual understanding of each other’s security and economic imperatives, the foundation for a sustainable agreement could be laid.
If we categorize this intellectual current as “pragmatic realists” oriented toward crisis management and preservation of the status quo, it becomes clear they aim to theorize a third path beyond the binary of “JCPOA or war”: phased negotiations, relative guarantees, technological verification, and regional engagement. Their primary goal is not to fully resolve the nuclear issue, but to manage and contain it, preventing escalation toward military confrontation. This school of thought seeks to move the negotiations away from the “pressure-surrender” paradigm and into a model of “bargaining-balance-deterrence.” In this sense, they aim more to manage the crisis while preserving leverage for both sides, acting as a moderator of the negotiation pace — preventing sudden explosions while avoiding fragile and short-lived agreements.
