As the three-year-long conflict between self-determination and irredentist policy in Ukraine seems to be reaching its conclusion, International Relations connoisseurs are now reminded of a similar conflict in the South China Sea (SCS)—one between the island state of Taiwan and China’s formidable, ever-growing power. At the epicenter of the ongoing systemic transition toward multipolarity, the final step to China’s hegemonic ascent will inevitably involve addressing the dilemma of Taiwan’s reunification. Taiwan is not merely a distant island on the horizon but the missing link to China’s ultimate socio-political transformation—the linchpin of its ‘Da Guo’ (Great Power) development within the system.
For those who viewed China’s rise as the emergence of a new ‘evil empire’ and foresaw it as the ‘high church of Realpolitik,’ the question has no longer been whether a war in the SCS will occur, but when. Xi Jinping’s (XJP) aggressive Wolf Warrior diplomacy and China’s global heist suggest that in time, the rising dragon may soon set ablaze the free world of Western democracies.
Before the self-fulfilling prophecy of the most realist scholars and the complacency of the most idealist thinkers lead us into the next Thucydides Trap, scholars should examine the condition of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) legitimacy and domestic stability, and rearticulate the expected utility of conflict according to: 1) strategic pressures applied by the international system’s power transition, 2) the complex inter-related nature of Taiwan relationship to China’s nationhood, and 3) the supreme principle of Confucian domestic stability in Chinese politics. The Taiwan dilemma comprises a combination of geo-strategic, global, political, ideological, nationalist, and cultural factors that collectively define the nature of Chinese grand strategy. The articulation of a model of Chinese decision-making toward Taiwan must distinguish between three fundamental paradigms of this grand strategy—the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly—to elucidate the conditions for conflict in the Strait.
The Ugly.
China is a revisionist power that operates aggressively following Realpolitik, with its foreign policy driven by the ‘power of the gun.’ According to Wang’s hypothesis, China’s strategy is determined by its level of power: during periods of relative weakness, it engages in internal balancing and defensive posture, during periods of strength it shifts to hard balancing and assertive policies. For Mearsheimer, China’s ambitions are unlimited and undeterrable; it will act offensively and opportunistically until it achieves hegemony, making war whenever the opportunity arises to consolidate its dominance. In this regard, Confucianism and historical narratives are mere myths, as raw power remains the primary determinant of state behavior. Demographic lateral pressure, the encroachment on China’s territorial integrity with Taiwan, the U.S.’s mini-NATO neo-containment in Asia-Pacific, and the regional security dilemma are inescapable casus belli for China.
The failure of this Realpolitik paradigm lies in the power transition theory‘s inability to predict China’s long-overdue confrontational shift and its use of force over Taiwan. Over the last three decades, Beijing has adopted a conciliatory, defensive approach toward Taiwan, refraining from threats and buying time for peaceful reunification. Contrary to China’s non-aggressive and defensive posture, power-level indicators fail to account for its active participation and preservation of the international order, its consistent 2% GDP military spending since the 1990s, its non-expansionist and weak naval arsenal, its counterintuitive defensive strategy, and its use of accommodationist, delaying hybrid strategies over the past 50 years. Contrary to Wang’s hypothesis and the power transition theory’s assumption of war propensity in parity, China exhibits greater aggression when perceived as weak, while disputes and crises become less likely as it approaches its neighbors, indicating that its behavior is not driven by the structural power constraints but by deeper domestic factors.
The Bad.
Since China has regained its imperial status and become self-aware of its unbounded power, its policies are now focused on re-establishing the Da Guo status quo ante: recovering the lost territories of the Qing Empire, re-establishing a system of tributary states, and rectifying the humiliation of the 19th Century of Shame. This policy is driven by a revanchist and hawkish nationalism seeking to repair the trauma caused by Japanese occupations, Western looting, the Opium Wars, and more, building on this foundation to restore historical truth and national unity; since China is no longer communist, it must be even more ‘Chinese.’ Historically prescribed and ideologically motivated, China’s goals are aggressive and highly undeterrable but limited to its territorial claims and regional hegemony. However, the claim over Taiwan represents the most crucial legitimizing national and civilizational function for China today, as well as an unbearable continuation of Western imperialism’s humiliation of its sovereignty and dignity. As XJP says, “unification between the two sides of the strait is the great trend of history.”
China will not embark on a Confucian crusade or attack Taiwan out of the blue. Taiwan is an intra-national sovereignty issue that doesn’t pertain to the cosmology of the Qing Empire. PLA’s white papers show a strong level of deference to the boundary agreement signed in 1949 (which includes Taiwan). Chinese claims are limited to areas populated by ethnic Chinese, such as Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. Just as Han Wu Ti was concerned about the empire’s vulnerability to territorial expansion and multiethnicity against external threats, XJP is also averse to the Western imperial notion that “if the empire is not expanding, it is dying.” It becomes increasingly relevant considering that China has the highest number of nuclear neighbors of any country, as well as the most extensive network of alliances. China has made ‘norms of territorial integrity and against conquest’ its most precious position on the international stage, whether in Ukraine or elsewhere. The stark resurgence of the Century of Humiliation and hostile nationalism in XJP’s discourse coincides not with an aggressive resolve to recover Taiwan, but with mounting internal and external systemic threats that converge through Taiwan: democratization and liberalization, a rising middle class and social transformation, a national identity crisis, the West’s decline since 2008, the U.S. pivot to Asia, the ‘China Threat’ hypothesis, and the endowment of China’s newfound power-role in the system. This apparent aggressiveness is not purely driven by tributary-nationalistic expansionist goals amplified by China’s power, but rather as a means to maintain domestic stability and legitimacy in the face of growing threats.
The Good.
The relationship between China’s external power and aggressive nationalism with its internal affairs is not hierarchical but shaped by Hobson’s concept of agential power. State leaders exercise agential power when they can “make domestic or foreign policy and shape the domestic realm, free of domestic social-structural requirements.” Effective policymaking—both international and domestic—relies on accommodating internal constraints. In China, a performance-based social contract of competency for legitimacy enables it to assert influence while maintaining domestic stability.
The main goal of China’s political strategy, guiding foreign policy and internal affairs across dynasties, has been the preservation of Confucian domestic stability: social order, unity, respect for higher authority, harmony, legitimacy, credibility, and prosperity. This Confucian foundation of politics compels leaders to eschew balance of power or hegemony in favor of stability and the perpetual pursuit of peace. This Confucian form of ‘Oriental despotism’ is in constant warfare against external threats that can exploit internal weaknesses (e.g., Tiananmen 1989), particularly when “disunity and disorder at home invite foreign aggression and result in the loss of Chinese identity.” China’s chaos phobia has shaped its Confucian-Mencian military strategy: (1) maintaining national unity, stability, and order; and (2) a heightened threat perception focused on external dangers that could exploit domestic vulnerabilities. The Wu martial principle of defense and order is exemplified by history’s most striking example—the 15th-century destruction of Zheng He’s fleet, the largest ever to sail the globe, in favor of constructing the world’s largest structure, the Great Wall—prioritizing defense and stability before anything else.
XJP’s rule inherits the same socio-political conditions of Chinese policy—domestic stability as a prerequisite—and the use of force for self-defense only, following the exhaustion of Xianli Houbing (peaceful means), to maintain unity, as has been the case for 93% of China’s wars throughout four millennia. Evidence shows that levels of military interstate disputes are inversely related to China’s internal unrest. Thus, as long as the Taiwan issue remains a threat to domestic stability, the use of force will always be secondary, even if it involves defending and unifying Taiwan, as the cost of domestic chaos is too great. This so-called ‘strategic ambiguity’ on Taiwan reflects Confucian mastery of Ying-Yang, or more strategically, the Quanbian (absolute flexibility)—balancing the cost of domestic stability against the cost of war, momentarily settling for the least-preferred strategic outcome, while retaining regime legitimacy.
China’s Internal & External Crisis.
More importantly, Confucianism has served as the socio-political glue that legitimizes authoritarian rule under ‘Chinese conditions’, resisting Western influences like democratization and liberalization. Since XJP has anchored his political rule in the civilizational heritage of the Chinese nation, the CCP must strive to be even more Chinese. Hence, Taiwan—the ultimate national issue of sovereignty, identity, and international history—becomes central, representing a Tiananmen-style combination of internal and external threats. The intense securitization of Taiwan through aggressive nationalist ideology under XJP’s “Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation” reflects deeper internal weaknesses, instability, and a crisis of legitimacy facing the CCP. As XJP navigates China’s final stage of domestic and international development in the 21st century, he must also manage the core tenets of Mencian security strategy: (1) domestic order and (2) protection against external threats.
For years, authoritarianism has driven modernization while denying democratization. Growth at all costs, ‘whatever the color of a cat’, has provided regime legitimacy through material benefits like welfare, but neglected the underlying political development that shapes national identity and ideology. After monumental economic progress, XJP now must complete an even greater political development to ensure the regime’s survival. As predicted by Zhengji Kunju’s solicitationdilemma, when the non-material political needs threaten the regime’s performance-based legitimacy, XJP reverted to near-totalitarian authoritarianism in an effort to carve his regime in a Confucian Chinese way. Expectedly, liberal nationalism, embodied by the rising middle class, has emerged as the ideological consequence of China’s economic boom, filling the ideological vacuum left by political pragmatism. Taiwan, in this context, represents the Pandora’s box of China’s regime legitimacy.
Given the agential nature of Chinese power, XJP must also establish its legitimacy on the international stage while guarding against external threats. Just as Han Wu Ti’s successful spread of Confucian values and tributary allegiance provided him an irrefutable source of legitimacy among his people, XJP’s Zhongguo Meng (“Chinese Dream”) seeks to assert China’s great power status, define its role in the international system, and foster a new national identity under the PRC’s Da Guo flagship. Claiming its place and performing its responsibilities as a great power is the most fundamental source of legitimacy and stability, helping to avoid the pitfalls of power-role seeking seen in Germany during WWI and post-Cold War Russia. This development does not face Mongol or Japanese external threats, but rather the U.S.’s geo-ideological neo-containment. ‘Geo’ refers to China’s complete maritime encirclement in the region, including the first and second island chains, the Malacca Strait, and the mini-NATO military alliances of QUAD and AUKUS. ‘Ideological’ refers to the democratic composition of U.S.-led state alignments in the region, as well as the self-reinforcing relationship between democracies, making it extremely difficult for China to counterbalance the U.S. unipole in its own waters. Furthermore, the dichotomy between the West, seen as ‘good’ and the East as ‘bad,’ with China embodying the new Soviet Union, has reinforced the geopolitical divide beyond trade tariff wars.
Taiwan The Pandora’s Box of China’s Two-Faced Crisis.
Today, Taiwan serves as the prism through which China’s internal and external developmental challenges converge, allowing external threats to exploit domestic vulnerabilities and create the very social chaos China fears.
First, the existence of a prosperous, democratic, and non-authoritarian China represents a direct denial of the agreement among the Chinese about the unique Confucian authoritarian model for modernization and prosperity upon which the CCP is based. As XJP seeks to consolidate China’s political development, the existence of another China erodes its social contract and performance-based legitimacy. The demonstration of democracy in Taiwan, alongside its geographical, ethnic, and cultural proximity, acts as a catalyst for regime change, particularly among the rising generations and middle class. If we consider Taiwan as already Chinese, according to XJP’s discourse, then Taiwan is already a democracy within Chinese territory. The U.S. and the West’s support of Taiwan’s Democratic Party serves as the pressure point, the gateway for G.F. Kennan’s ideological containment.
Second, Taiwan is not only a threat to China’s national identity but also a challenge to its sovereignty and to those who claim control over it. Taiwan’s reunification bears the very condition of the CCP’s establishment, born out of the end of the civil war, a legitimacy over a unified China. Since China’s unification, maintaining Han territory has been the determining test of a dynasty’s legitimacy. It would be seen as illegitimate for XJP to claim the great power status of China and invoke nationalism for unity and development if the country is not physically unified.
Third, Taiwan is China’s unsinkable aircraft carrier, enabling the PLAN to deploy a blue-water navy beyond the continental shelf, extend its global reach, and achieve the final step toward hegemony—the control of the oceans. As the world’s first commercial maritime power, the largest trading power, and soon the world’s largest economy, it is crucial for the ‘hegemon’ to ensure control and protection of global trade. China is on the brink of achieving its nationalist dream of rebuilding a prosperous and powerful nation, and Taiwan is the last obstacle standing in its way. Resolving the Taiwan dilemma would remove the unbearable strategic ambiguity that has kept China and East Asia trapped in escalating militarization and security dilemmas, complicating international relations in the region since the 21st century.
To what extent can China’s Da Guo today compromise power for security, especially when Taiwan is both a function of power and a source of insecurity?
Rearticulation of the Paradigms.
The nationalist paradigm (the Bad), fueled by XJP, echoes dangerously over the Taiwan dilemma, as it is directly tied to domestic unity, stability, and the defense of the Chinese nation’s identity. However, it is not an ideological command that dictates China’s foreign policy but rather a tool employed by pragmatic leaders to maintain domestic stability in the face of internal and external crises. Indeed, the survivability of communist authoritarian regimes has been attributed to their pragmatic use of nationalism to rally support, imprint the CCP’s legitimacy onto China’s history, create ad-hoc conditions for unity in response to shifting threats, and provide an ideological framework that fulfills non-material needs amid development. The CCP pragmatically wields nationalism to stoke its waning legitimacy, reframing past humiliations and current weaknesses as a collective struggle yet to be overcome. Zhao Suisheng argues that nationalism is used to “bolster the faith of the Chinese people in a troubled political system and to hold the country together during its rapid and turbulent transition from a communist to a post-communist society.” This nationalism, “assertive in form but reactive and defensive in essence,” is not an end but a means of preserving stability. Thus, the intensity of the nationalist paradigm in political discourse has historically been inversely related to domestic stability and legitimacy. As XJP navigates China’s ongoing crisis of faith (Jingshen Zhizhu) since 1989, nationalism has reached an all-time high. Anchoring political legitimacy in ideological nationalism is a skillful move—easily assimilated by the majority, regardless of age or political leaning.
Committed to peaceful means, the absolute threat Taiwan poses to national development is externalized and concentrated in nationalism. Through nationalism, the CCP maintains social and political unity even in the face of the Taiwan crisis, while seeking more stable ways to balance a potentially violent reunification with fragile domestic stability. Rather than fostering cohesion and unity through confrontation, as in Jervis’s diversionary war theory, China prioritizes domestic stability—using nationalism to strengthen unity and loyalty should it pursue a Confucian-Mencian war of self-defense and unification. The nationalist buffer has been observed to be coupled with both soft and hard accommodationist military strategies, navigating the gray zones of confrontational thresholds.
While the pragmatic intensification of nationalism has made China more assertive, it has not led to irrational or inflexible behavior. Although China has a strong history of using nationalism pragmatically, it remains to be seen how far the CCP can rely on diversionary nationalism to maintain legitimacy and domestic stability, as well as mitigate Taiwan separatism in the face of mounting internal and external pressures. More importantly, XJP must be cautious: by wielding the nationalist sword against Taiwan, he may soon realize its double-edged nature—nationalism is both a means and an end.
