The Tatmadaw under General Min Aung Hlaing seized power in a coup on February 1, 2021. Nearly, 3 years have passed and ASEAN, still has not found a viable consensus on how to deal with the continuing conflict. ASEAN leaders agreed to a 5 point consensus in April 2021 at the Emergency ASEAN Summit. Since taking up arms against the junta Ethnic Armed Organizations have steadily been gaining ground defeating the Tatmadaw. At present the SAC government control only 30% of the country and has largely lost control of Myanmar’s borders as the military has continually withdrawn towards the ethnic Bamar heartlands of the central lowlands of Myanmar. Thailand recently hosted an Extended Informal Consultation on Myanmar in the Thai capital on December 20, 2024, the insider fragmentation of ASEAN member state positions will be the focus of this article.
The Bangkok Extended Informal Consultation, December 2024
The EIC was hosted by the Thai FM as well as the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Laos, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines and Senior Officials from Cambodia, Vietnam, Indonesia and Brunei. All parties reiterated their support for the SAC government and called for a ‘Myanmar-led, Myanmar-owned’ peace process, noting there was no military solution to the conflict. This was nothing new, becoming standard fare of the past 3 years. However, Singapore has begun to fear that Myanmar could turn into an Afghanistan or Syria with rebels overthrowing the government in Naypyidaw. Clearly, Laos ‘quiet diplomacy’ during its year as ASEAN Chair did not pay dividends.
While the ASEAN Chair put on a brave face afterwards noting that the 5-point consensus remains the primary diplomatic reference, the meeting yielded a fractured ASEAN. Cambodia and the Philippines noted that the 5-point consensus may no longer be relevant given the changes of the previous 3 years. The Philippines posited that a change in approach to the 5-point consensus which is ‘more efficient’ should be used. ASEAN representatives even went so far as to broach allowing external parties to help with the process as long as ASEAN was in the lead, maintaining ‘ASEAN Centrality’. It should be noted, that it remains unclear what external party is currently willing to expend political and diplomatic capital on Myanmar with Western powers having their hands full in Ukraine and the Middle East. That being said Myanmar Telecom, Mytel was just added to the sanctions list in Washington DC.
A more efficient 5-point consensus was made clearer by Malaysia’s intent to appoint Tan Sri Othman Hashim as ASEAN Special Envoy to Myanmar. Mr. Hashim is a career Malaysian diplomat, retiring as Secretary General of the Malaysian MFA after working for the MFA in Geneva and on Malaysia’s human rights Universal Periodic Review. He also served as a Chairman of SUHAKAM, the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia and is well versed in human rights and humanitarian affairs. It appears PM Anwar Ibrahim is serious about bringing a humanitarian focus to Malaysia’s year as ASEAN Chair as Mr. Ibrahim also reappointed human rights lawyer Edmund Bon Tai Soon as AICHR representative. Anwar is also looking to tap regional senior statesmen such as Thaksin Shinawatra, George Yeo, Retno Marsudi and possibly even Hun Sen to help guide and network Malaysia’s 2025 ASEAN Chairmanship.
Upcoming elections organized by the SAC
The junta SAC government plans to hold elections in late 2025 as a pathway towards. Observers have labelled this is a scam and window dressing for the junta to save face and their own skins. The intent of elections is not known to this author. However, behind the curtain of ASEAN unity there is quite a bit of discord.
Thailand and Vietnam noted that ASEAN needs to have a formal unified position regarding the elections so as to provide legitimacy to the upcoming polls. However, Singapore and Malaysia were of the view that elections were not the way out for the SAC government. Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam noted that elections must be inclusive, especially along border areas to ensure buy in. Cambodia and the Philippines supported election monitors being sent to Myanmar to oversee and ensure the integrity of any polls.
The last two points are salient given the contradiction currently at play. The SAC government has lost control over the border areas yet there is a view put forth by ASEAN members that these areas outside of government control need to be included. The last views of Cambodia and Philippines are of particular interest as ASEAN would be inserting itself into internal affairs not seen since the Paris Peace Accords of the 1990’s. in the absence of a government supervised election to deescalate violence, could ASEAN be the bridge by monitoring elections so the SAC government can save face? Time will tell.
The above is to say and demonstrate that after 3 years of engagement and ever escalating violence, ASEAN is hardly unified and still searching for ways to effect influence. Oddly enough, the primary agenda item of the EIC was not violence in Myanmar but transnational crime including drug smuggling, online scams and call centers which are impacting the region and being amplified by the unrest. Ripples of Myanmar’s instability are being felt far away and ASEAN does not have a clear answer.
ASEAN Centrality?
ASEAN member states have prided themselves, and rightfully so, on not having large scale violence in the region since 1967. They have also rightfully prided themselves on keeping Southeast Asia relevant by being the default node of diplomatic and political connectivity between great powers. The credibility which ASEAN members signal to the world by their ability to take care of issues in their own backyard without external interference is not looking well. This is not to denigrate or say that solving a civil war or internal political problems is easy, they are not. ASEAN norms and principles militate against formality, legalism and interference in internal affairs
This does not bode well for the region or for Myanmar and its people. Vietnam will host Track II diplomacy in February 2025 at the ASEAN Future Forum (AFF) to try and informally buttress Malaysia’s efforts to try and talk some sense into the generals in Naypyidaw. ASEAN Centrality is being challenged and stress tested in ways the bloc has not seen since the Cold War. In 2021 Vietnam used its non-permanent seat on the UNSC to support the junta government. At the recent EIC some ASEAN members suggested an external party could ‘assist’ with ASEAN as a lead facilitator. The EIC demonstrates that the limits of ASEAN influence have been tested and found wanting in the face of the internal dynamics of civil war and China’s ever increasing influence with the generals in Naypyidaw.
