Authors: Leivon Albert Lamkang and Leivon Victor Lamkang*
Following Sheikh Hasina’s resignation as prime minister of Bangladesh, a new government, has formed under Muhammad Yunus’s leadership due to the recent student uprising against the Bangladeshi government over the “reservation” issue. This incident might present a significant shift in its foreign policy from India. These developments posed setbacks to India, particularly to the Northeast of the country, which has benefitted somewhat from the relationship. Bangladesh shares a border of 1,879 kilometres with the states of Assam, Tripura, Meghalaya, and Mizoram in Northeast India. Regarding trade, communication, water management, insurgency, and security, the connection between Bangladesh and North East India is mainly intricate and multifaceted, comprising good historical relationships.
Understanding Northeast-Bangladesh relation
North East India and Bangladesh’s relationship is often complex and shaped by historical, political, economic, and cultural factors. Some critical relationships that Bangladesh and North East India share are crucial for North East India’s development due to the North East Indian state’s geographical isolation and rigid mobility from the rest of India. These aspects cause North East India to be heavily dependent on Bangladesh and its routes to Southeast Asia. Thus, the states of Assam, Meghalaya, and Tripura depend on having access to the sea via Bangladesh’s Chittagong port. Initiatives for connectivity, like the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project and the Agartala-Akhtar Rail Link, demonstrate geopolitical ties.
In terms of Economic ties, Bangladesh has diverse commercial connections with North East India. According to data from Bangladesh’s Assistant High Commission in Guwahati, trade between the two areas has been growing, with examples of TK 367 crore worth of goods sent from Bangladesh to the Northeast region. In a similar vein, Bangladesh’s thriving food processing industry receives support from North East India, which has a comparative edge in agricultural supplies and a market for its processed foods. Reduced perceived and non-tariff barriers are crucial in cutting costs and boosting commerce between the two regions.
Further in the Cultural ties, Bangladesh and India share cultural ties from the instances of Ethnic groups like Bengalis, Chakmas, and Gary’s straddle both sides of the border, fostering strong people-to-people ties. Moreover, shared history, particularly during the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War, when India’s North East Played a crucial role in aiding the refugees and the Mukti Bahini, further cements the Bond.
Projects and relationships at stake
Bangladesh’s current foreign policy appears to be moving away from India, negatively impacting the Northeastern region. The bilateral relationship may suffer due to the different connections and agreements between the two regions; the economic and cultural linkages were addressed in addition to the implications for geopolitics. Ongoing projects, like the rail links or the transshipment facilities that pass through Bangladesh, will likely be slowed down due to a perceived shift in foreign policy. Security concerns stem from the ways that internal security, illegal immigration, and insurgency are affecting diplomatic relations in the Northeast; economic projects like the Tripura-Bangladesh Power Projects suggest that the supply of electricity to Bangladesh from Tripura may need to be reevaluated; and strategic projects include the development of deep-sea ports and special economic zones designed to enhance trade in North East region could be affected.
On the issue of insurgency and security
North East India is home to 140 insurgent organizations and varied separatist movements. Bangladesh acted as a haven for many of these rebel groups in carrying out their operations. However, during Sheikh Hasina’s term, the security challenges in the border area that affected the Northeast region were limited by the close cooperation between Bangladesh and India. For example, the varied treaties and agreements that fostered this are the ‘Extradition Treaty of 2013’, to strengthen mutual trust on security concerns. Another example is the ‘Land Border Agreement’ signed in 2015 to debar insurgent camps inside Bangladesh territory.
Further, a study conducted by “Community Security in North Bengal: A Youth Perception Survey” suggests the spread of small arms and drugs mainly in the border regions of Bangladesh and North East India, which Sheikh Hasina’s government eventually clamped down by applying the strengthening oversight mechanism in border areas to arrest any smuggling of illegal consignment for the insurgent groups. Instances of other security cooperations, such as the handing over the top leader of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) 18 years after his arrest in Dhaka to India.
Therefore, this agreement and instances witnessed the efforts of insurgency activity mitigation that prevented the insurgent organizations from carrying out their varied operations in Northeast India. However, a new concern has emerged as the new government in power observed signals of different policy approaches to India, signifying a discontinuity, eventually upsetting regional counter-insurgency initiatives.
Who is at a loss?
The shifts and strain in the relationship between India and Bangladesh raise the question of who will be at a loss and who will benefit more. However, the answer lies with no one, as the ties between the two regions vary, but the losses may vary, for instance, in the case of the Northeast. Due to its geographical isolation and rigid mobility, it depends on Bangladesh for connectivity with lesser travel distance from other parts of India. Trade disruptions might occur in the North East with souring relations that could lead to increased tariffs and restricted access to Bangladesh, with security being the main concern with successful counter-insurgency efforts through the prevention of insurgent groups operating from Bangladesh and border areas. However, the mentioned factors are at stake, as the deterioration of security cooperation would lead to increased cross-border terrorism and insurgency operations.
Further, in the case of Bangladesh, India is one of the largest trading partners, with the Northeast contributing a considerable factor. This deteriorating relationship will hamper Bangladesh’s economy as bordering areas of Bangladesh engage significantly, including formal and informal trade through border hats Bangladesh’s heavy dependency on the Tripura Palantan power plant. A policy shift could disrupt this and lead to shortages and India’s heavy investment in Bangladesh’s infrastructure to increase connectivity with North East India; this slowdown might affect Bangladesh’s infrastructural growth.
Strategic Alternatives for North East India
As Bangladesh’s relationship with India deteriorates, North East India can explore several other strategic alternatives towards its neighboring South East and South Asia countries where few are undergoing projects, with some under relationship building. For instance, the case of connectivity alternatives: The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, this project provides an alternative sea route to the east connecting Kolkata to Sittwe port in Myanmar and inland through waterways roads to India; The India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral highway could be given a much faster development as this connects Northeast India to Southeast Asia through Myanmar and Thailand.
Regarding Economic alternatives, North East India, also called the gateway to the East, has been a major factor In India’s ‘Act East policy’ in its endeavors to enhance trade, security, and cultural ties with Southeast Asian countries. In Forums like ASEAN, India could further integrate Northeast into broader Southeast Asian trade networks. As Bangladesh shifts away from its ties, India could enhance its relations with other BIMSTEC partners like Myanmar and Thailand. Moreover, Japan has invested heavily in the North East in the past few years, and the partnership could deepen and extradite its development efforts. Further, the Southeast Asian market, fostering economic ties with Thailand, Vietnam, and Singapore, could help the North East explore other trading partners’ options as these countries are part of India’s Act East policy.
In the case of security alternatives, the control of insurgency in the region has been very successful due to the cooperation between the two states. Security alternatives from Bangladesh find a complex spot for India’s North East, as Bangladesh could be a haven for Northeast Insurgencies to operate their activities. However, a few alternatives are available, such as increasing patrolling in the border areas. India’s Northeast could also embark on further cooperation through the ‘Act East Policy’ fostering information sharing. Moreover, existing counterinsurgency methods, such as the Armed Forces Special Power Act (AFSPA), could be innovated.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the relationship between North East India and Bangladesh is deeply intertwined. However, the recent political shift in Bangladesh under the leadership of Muhammad Yunus presents significant challenges, especially for India’s Northeast. With potential setbacks in crucial projects and counter-insurgency measures, both regions face consequences. At the same time, Northeast India may explore alternatives, including deeper engagement with Southeast Asia and more significant investment in regional infrastructure. Nevertheless, the disruption in the Indo-Bangladesh relation underscores the delicate balance of geopolitics in this region, with future hinges emphasizing the need for strategic adaptation on both sides.
*Leivon Victor Lamkang is a Post-graduate Student at the Department of Politics and International Studies, Pondicherry University.
