KDP and PUK: Outdated Political Party Model

After the establishment of the Kurdistan Region’s de facto state in 1991, and following the 1992 parliamentary and governmental elections in the Kurdistan Region, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) needed to evolve their party models. However, the two parties have continued to govern the Region with the same outdated party structures for over three decades. This article discusses why and how the KDP and PUK’s party models have become outdated and why they cannot meet the new demands of the people.

KDP and PUK are Obsolete

The party models of the KDP and the PUK are traditional and revolutionary. From several perspectives, these models have become outdated for contemporary Kurdistan Region politics:

Party Function and Responsibility

During the era of the liberation movement, the primary responsibility of the KDP and PUK was to struggle against national oppression and the occupying and oppressive regimes of Iraq, especially in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. However, after the establishment of the Kurdish de facto state in 1991, and the establishment of the first National Assembly and the Kurdistan Regional Government in 1992, the role of the parties shifted from leading a national revolution to establishing a lawful authority. In this new role, the KDP and PUK have failed. Over their three-decade rule, they have not been able to establish a strong legal authority in the Kurdistan Region. Contrarily, the judiciary and legal institutions are under the control of both parties. Consequently, in terms of responsibilities and duties, the KDP and PUK’s party models have become outdated and need to be updated.

Legitimacy

During the armed revolutionary period, the main source of legitimacy for the KDP and PUK was based on “revolutionary legitimacy” and military power. After the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government and the other governing institutions, the KDP and PUK needed to shift from revolutionary legitimacy and reliance on armed forces to governing the country based on democratic legitimacy and elections. However, throughout their three decades of governance, the KDP and PUK have primarily relied on revolutionary legitimacy and military power, rather than democratic legitimacy and elections. The clearest evidence of this is the suspension of elections in the Kurdistan Region and the way local elections for provincial councils and municipalities are conducted.

Even when elections are held, the KDP and PUK conduct them to consolidate their power, not to perpetuate their authority legitimately through elections. the KDP and the PUK have several obvious authoritarian features, the most outstanding are:

• Family Dominance: The Barzani family leads the KDP, while the Talabani family leads the PUK.
• Control Over Security Forces: Each party has its own Peshmerga forces.
• Suppression of Dissent: There are reports of repression of opposition and political dissent.
• Media Control: Both parties exert significant influence over media outlets.

Outdated Party Structures in Government Institutions

It is clear that the historical formation of the KDP and PUK as parties predates the establishment of governmental institutions in the Kurdistan Region. After the establishment of the governing institutions—executive, legislative, and judicial—the KDP and PUK needed to act as parties within the framework of these governmental institutions, operating within a legal system. However, the three branches of government, including the parliament, are directed by the KDP and PUK according to their instructions and guidance, within the limits set by these two parties. In other words, the KDP and PUK have transferred their party nature into the governmental institutions of the Kurdistan Region. This has hindered the development of strong institutions and good governance in the Region. Moreover, this approach has caused significant harm to the nation-building and state-building projects in the Kurdistan Region. Consequently, loyalty to the KDP and PUK has replaced loyalty to the nation. The loyalty and allegiance to these two parties have played a pivotal role in gaining party and governmental positions based on material and immaterial privileges, rather than patriotism and merit.

In summary, the KDP and PUK’s continued reliance on outdated party models, revolutionary legitimacy, and the integration of party structures into government institutions have prevented the development of strong, democratic governance in the Kurdistan Region. This has resulted in the weakening of national and institutional integrity and has hindered the progress of nation-building efforts.

 KDP and PUK Are Still Closed Parties

Since 1991, the KDP and PUK have held five elections for the Kurdistan Parliament. This is in addition to the elections for provincial councils and municipalities, as well as participation in all of Iraq’s general elections. However, these two parties have not fully opened up. Instead of moving further towards individualism and social freedom and the promotion of democracy, the KDP and PUK continue to operate under a dictatorial system as described by Nawshirwan Mustafa, the General Coordinator of the Goran Movement, in his book “We and They: Our Disagreements.” This system infiltrates all aspects of social and individual life on a daily basis, even extending into sports, arts, and scientific research. Nawshirwan Mustafa states that the political system in the Kurdistan Region resembles the totalitarian system of Eastern Europe during the rule of the Communist parties more than the democratic systems of Western Europe or even the semi-democratic systems of Asian countries like India, Pakistan, and Malaysia. The KDP and the PUK have several obvious authoritarian features, the most outstanding are:

• Family Dominance: The Barzani family leads the KDP, while the Talabani family leads the PUK.
• Control Over Security Forces: Each party has its own Peshmerga forces.
• Suppression of Dissent: There are reports of repression of opposition and political dissent.
• Media Control: Both parties exert significant influence over media outlets.

 From Rulers to Capitalists

After the public uprising in the Kurdistan Region in 1991 against the Iraqi oppressed regime, instead of serving the people and providing the best public services to the oppressed people of the Kurdistan Region, the officials of the KDP and PUK have become a new class of privileged rulers among the people. As Nawshirwan Mustafa says, “They want all material gains and all good things for themselves, believing that the people exist to serve them.” Consequently, instead of the KDP and PUK and their political leaders taking on the duty of state-building and nation-building, and establishing good governance in the Kurdistan Region, the KDP and PUK have become two large economic companies.

Party Objectives

Prior to the Kurdish uprising in 1991, the KDP and PUK were clearly defined as Kurdish revolutionary parties with objectives centered on the struggle for independence, self-determination, and taking control of governmental institutions in the Kurdistan Region. However, after achieving these objectives post-uprising, especially after the fall of the Iraqi regime in 2003, the KDP and PUK no longer have clear party objectives and have lost their direction.

Armed Parties (Guerrilla-based party)

During the liberation movement, the KDP and PUK needed to have armed forces as they were engaged in an armed struggle against the Iraqi regime. However, after the uprising and particularly after the fall of the Iraqi regime in 2003, the necessity for party militias ceased to exist. Despite multiple efforts to unify their armed forces, the KDP and PUK remain as two armed parties. This contradicts the nature of political parties in democratic political systems, where parties are expected to function as civil organizations.

Recommendations for Reforming the KDP and PUK Party Models

1. Transition to Democratic Governance

• Implement Democratic Practices: The KDP and PUK should fully commit to democratic principles by ensuring fair and transparent elections at all levels of governance. This includes provincial councils, municipal elections, and the Kurdistan Parliament. Elections should not be manipulated for political gain but should genuinely reflect the will of the people.
• Separation of Powers: Establish a clear separation between party structures and governmental institutions. The influence of political parties over the judiciary, legislative, and executive branches should be minimized to uphold institutional independence and effectiveness.

2. Modernization of Party Structures

• Adopt Modern Party Models: Shift from traditional revolutionary models to modern political party structures that emphasize accountability, transparency, and participation. Introduce internal party reforms that promote meritocracy, inclusivity, and responsiveness to constituents’ needs.
• Openness and Transparency: Increase transparency within party operations, decision-making processes, and financial management. Public access to party policies, activities, and expenditures should be guaranteed to foster trust and accountability.

3. Promotion of Civil Society and Democratic Culture

• Support Civil Society Organizations: Encourage the growth and empowerment of independent civil society organizations (CSOs) that can act as watchdogs and advocates for democratic governance, human rights, and social justice.
• Promote Democratic Education: Invest in civic education programs to raise awareness among citizens about their rights, responsibilities, and the importance of democratic participation. This includes education on electoral processes, civic engagement, and democratic values.

4. Economic Reform and Anti-Corruption Measures

• Combat Corruption: Implement robust anti-corruption measures within party structures and governmental institutions. Strengthen oversight mechanisms, whistleblower protections, and independent auditing processes to prevent misuse of public funds and resources.
• Economic Diversification: Shift focus from party-controlled economic enterprises to policies that promote economic diversification, private sector development, and job creation. Encourage entrepreneurship and investment in key sectors to foster sustainable economic growth.

5. Engagement with International Standards

• Alignment with International Standards: Align party practices, electoral processes, and governance standards with international best practices and norms. Seek technical assistance and collaboration with international organizations to support capacity-building and institutional reforms.
• International Engagement: Strengthen diplomatic relations and engagement with international stakeholders, including neighboring countries, international organizations, and foreign governments. This includes promoting Kurdistan’s interests, securing investments, and fostering regional stability.

6. Commitment to Peaceful Coexistence and National Unity

• Promote Inclusivity: Emphasize inclusivity and respect for diversity within party platforms and policies. Promote dialogue and reconciliation efforts among different ethnic and religious groups to build social cohesion and national unity.
• Peacebuilding Initiatives: Support initiatives that contribute to peaceful coexistence, conflict resolution, and reconciliation within the Kurdistan Region and beyond. Foster dialogue between political parties and civil society to address underlying grievances and promote stability.

Conclusion

After thirty years of governance, the KDP and PUK have largely failed to transition from their traditional guerrilla-based party model to a modern and civil political party model. This outdated party model has prevented the KDP and PUK from evolving into modern political entities that align with the contemporary standards of political parties, even within the Kurdistan Region.

This traditional party model has hindered political progress, the establishment of an advanced democratic culture, the creation of effective government institutions, and economic development in the Kurdistan Region. Consequently, the position of the Kurdistan Region within the Iraqi, regional, and international contexts has weakened. As a result, with their current outdated party model, the KDP and PUK are unlikely to provide effective governance for the Kurdistan Region.