The prospects of a joint communiqué emerging from the G 20 summit in September in India are becoming dim, notes Kanwal Sibal, a former Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, Ambassador to Turkey, Egypt, France and Russia.
The G20 meeting of the Finance Ministers/Central Bank Governors as well that of the Foreign Ministers ended with the Chair’s summary and not a joint document because no consensus could be reached on how the Ukraine conflict should be reflected in it. The West remains determined to include language condemning Russia in all joint statements whereas Russia, with China’s support, has hardened its position and is no longer willing to accept the language it had agreed to at the G 20 summit at Bali, in part because of India’s constructive diplomacy.
Since Bali the situation on the ground has become more destructive rather than the doors of dialogue and diplomacy being slowly opened.
The West’s strategy remains one of arming and financially aiding Ukraine not only to sustain its resistance but to enable it to launch a counter offensive to recover enough of the Russian annexed territory to force Russia to come to the negotiating table. Ukraine’s appeals, backed vociferously by Poland and the Baltic states, for more lethal arms, including artillery, tanks and now fighter aircraft, have found increasing support. In the background of the expanding militarisation of the conflict in the months after Bali, it is not surprising that positions on both sides have become harder.
US Secretary of State has warned that at the New Delhi G20 summit the West will not relent on its demand to condemn Russia. He foresees the G20 summit failing to issue a joint statement because of Russian and Chinese opposition, though that, in his view, will not lead to the collapse of the G20 process as there will be agreement on a whole host of other issues.
This is being unduly sanguine, as a failure at the summit level will expose the limitations of G 20 format to deal with various pressing issues of development, financial stability, economic growth, climate change and the like that the international community faces.
Other than this, if one of the objectives of the G20 is reviving multilateralism, the divisions within the G20 between the G7 and Russia and China in particular will in fact deal a further blow to multilateralism, as a format larger than the UN Security Council without any veto provisions would also have proved ineffective.
If the goal of the West is to isolate Russia, that is not being achieved.
Russian diplomacy in Africa and West Asia is active. Russia has just organised a Russia-Africa parliamentary conference in advance of the Russia-Africa summit in July 2023. Israel is being cautious in not aligning fully with the West’s position. Russia’s role in Central Asia is unaffected. The SCO processes are proceeding uninterruptedly, with the SCO summit to take place in India later this year. India is maintaining its close ties with Russia, with Minister Jaishankar stressing recently their steadiness over the yeas and their current economic expansion. Russia’s ties with China are being strategically consolidated further.
Chinese diplomacy has achieved a visible success in brokering an agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia on restoration of their diplomatic ties, which fits into Russia’s close understandings with Saudi Arabia and Iran.
With Russia, Iran and India working on boosting the International North South Corridor, trade flows with Russia will increase. Russia as a permanent member of the UN Security Council cannot be isolated, as on many issues member states have to reach out to it diplomatically. Russia is a major arms supplier, as well as a major space power.
Being a major nuclear power it has an important role to play in the IAEA, for instance, as also in the area of peaceful nuclear cooperation in which it is cooperating with a few countries.
On the Ukraine issue, the US and NATO are putting open pressure on China not to supply lethal military arms to Russia. This ignores the fact that Russia itself is a major arms supplier to China, including the S400s. If the West can supply lethal arms to Ukraine to counter Russia, why is it wrong in principle for China to supply such arms to Russia? Why is it that China is being asked to be neutral and prove its neutrality while the West can fight a proxy war against Russia?
If India can pursue a degree of independence in its foreign policy despite open pressures from the US to dilute ties with Russia, why should one assume that Russia will not exercise its independent judgment on its relations with India and will yield to any Chinese pressure?
If Russia is satisfied with our neutrality on the proxy war between it and the West in Ukraine, why should we not be satisfied if Russia is neutral on issues between India and China?
We should take a balanced view on such matters, recognising of course the need to navigate very carefully in the choppy waters ahead. Our expectations from a successful G20 summit need to become much more realistic, concludes Kanval Sibal.