The Israeli intelligence apparatus, particularly the Mossad and Shin Bet, faces a growing challenge stemming from the Chinese strategy of its State Security Service (MSS). The MSS acts as China’s foreign intelligence agency, aiming for soft Chinese penetration of Israeli civil society, human rights groups, and liberal circles. This strategy exploits internal divisions within Israeli society in the face of the hardline right-wing Israeli government. Subtle shifts in Chinese engagement with Israeli civil society, human rights groups, and liberal academia have been observed, especially amidst escalating tensions such as the potential war with Iran and the passage of controversial laws like the execution of Palestinian prisoners. The gap between China and the Israeli right-wing government has widened due to differing stances on the death penalty law. The Knesset’s passage of this law in late March 2016 created an indirect point of convergence between Chinese rhetoric and liberal human rights demands within Israel, specifically regarding criticism of the legal principle behind the death penalty for Palestinian prisoners. The Chinese Foreign Ministry has called for any legislation to adhere to the principles of equality and justice and non-discrimination based on race or religion. This aligns with the reservations of Israeli human rights and liberal organizations, which have described the law as discriminatory. China has called for the protection of the legitimate rights of Palestinians, and the Chinese have demanded respect for and protection of the rights of the Palestinian people, a discourse used within Israeli liberal circles opposed to the extreme right-wing Israeli policies.
This Chinese penetration is not limited to the economic sphere alone, but extends to exploiting political and social contradictions to weaken internal cohesion within Israel. International relations and intelligence operations in the Middle East are highly complex. When discussing China’s role with Mossad, Israeli civil society, human rights groups, and liberals, we find that the situation unfolds along several strategic and psychological tracks, most notably China’s soft power and digital diplomacy. China adopts a discourse that supports the two-state solution and criticizes Israeli military operations, a discourse that resonates with liberal currents and civil society organizations in Israel, which fear international isolation. This alignment It’s not necessarily direct manipulation, but rather a convergence of interests aimed at weakening the extreme right wing. Here, China is working diligently to try to attract Israeli elites by strengthening its ties with liberal Israeli academics and politicians who see China as an alternative economic partner or a bargaining chip against the US policy aligned with the right wing. This creates internal pressure on Israeli intelligence agencies – both foreign and domestic – and the military, such as the Mossad (acting as the external intelligence agency), the Shin Bet (acting as the internal intelligence agency in Tel Aviv), and Aman (acting as the internal intelligence agency in Tel Aviv), to adopt more balanced positions.
China is also working to exploit the internal contradictions within Israeli society to weaken the Israeli extreme right wing and its racist and extremist policies, especially after the Knesset passed the law authorizing the execution of Palestinian prisoners at the end of March 2016. Here, China is capitalizing on the division between the ruling right wing, which adopts a hardline security discourse, and the Israeli liberals, civil society, human rights activists, and academics, who tend towards economic and human rights openness, as evidenced by China’s efforts to build bridges with liberal Israeli circles. Beijing seeks to portray itself as an indispensable economic partner and utilizes media and official channels to clarify its positions, thus limiting the ability of the Israeli far right to form a united front against the Chinese threat. Currently, China is attempting to capitalize on the international isolation of the ruling far right in Israel, particularly in light of international criticism of the Israeli right-wing government’s policies. China presents itself as a balanced alternative or mediator, attracting segments of Israeli civil society seeking a more balanced approach to foreign relations.
China’s engagement with liberal and human rights circles in Israel relies on what is known as “parallel diplomacy.” It attempts to build bridges with Israeli liberal civil, human rights, and academic forces as a form of balance to counter the acute tension with the hardline Israeli right-wing government and its racist policies. This Chinese strategy aims to create alternative channels to circumvent official Israeli political restrictions through research, technological, and humanitarian cooperation. Israeli civil and human rights organizations are working to improve China’s image within Israeli society, especially after Israeli opinion polls showed that a majority of Israelis view China as an unfriendly or hostile power.
On the other hand, we note the widening intelligence gap between the Chinese Ministry of State Security, which acts as the Chinese intelligence agency, and the Israeli intelligence agencies. The Israeli focus of the Mossad and Shin Bet is currently on Iran and Gaza, which may give China space to strengthen its economic and technological influence within Israel and to exploit the division over controversial laws, such as the law to execute Palestinian prisoners, to portray the right-wing government in Israel as a radical government that threatens regional stability, through the Chinese rapprochement with Israeli liberals and Israeli civil and human rights society that support its positions rejecting war with Iran and the law to execute Palestinian prisoners issued by the Israeli Knesset at the end of March 2026. However, on the other hand, any Chinese rapprochement with Israeli civil society raises concerns and tensions with the United States. This is a strategic Chinese objective: to create a rift in the US-Israeli alliance by supporting internal Israeli voices calling for an end to the war and a focus on the diplomatic track.
The intelligence gap between China and Tel Aviv revolves around the nature of their objectives and methods. While Mossad traditionally focuses on direct security threats, such as the Iranian nuclear program, Hamas tunnels, and the arming of Palestinian factions, China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) pursues a long-term strategy based on intelligence gathering through investment. China has poured approximately $15 billion into Israel’s high-tech sector (artificial intelligence and autonomous driving), in addition to gaining control over Israeli infrastructure through the participation of Chinese companies in major Israeli strategic projects, such as the Haifa port. This raises Israeli and American intelligence concerns about the possibility of Chinese eavesdropping or monitoring joint military operations with the United States.
Due to these intelligence contradictions between China and Tel Aviv, the Israeli Mossad finds itself in a precarious position, caught between conflicting priorities: confronting direct threats to Israel through a policy of pressure to pursue immediate regional threats that drain human resources. Technology is at play in Tel Aviv, and there’s the issue of monitoring China’s subtle infiltration into the fabric of Israeli society. The director of the Israeli Shin Bet (internal security) explicitly warned that Chinese investments pose a security threat. However, the Israeli Mossad is finding it difficult to monitor this influence, which is disguised under the guise of legitimate business deals and academic agreements. Due to continuous American pressure on Israel to limit its cooperation with China, Israeli intelligence is facing a test of its loyalty: balancing its need for Chinese technology with maintaining shared information security with Washington and maintaining its relationship with its American ally and Chinese partner.
Finally, despite these Chinese attempts to forge closer ties with Israeli civil society, human rights groups, liberals, and academics, Chinese influence within Israeli civil society faces significant obstacles. The most important of these is their connection to Washington, as the United States remains the strategic ally and primary supporter of liberal institutions in Israel, thus limiting the political impact of the Chinese alternative. This is in addition to Israeli security concerns, regarding China’s intentions, which are viewed with suspicion by many Israeli elites, who perceive China’s biased neutrality and refusal to directly condemn Iranian attacks as undermining its ability to gain the full trust of Israeli liberal civil society. Chinese influence within Israeli civil society, human rights, liberal, and academic circles was impacted by the recent Israeli war with Iran. The direct confrontations between Israel and Iran in 2015 and 2016 further complicated this influence. Despite this, Chinese companies continued operating in Israel even during periods of conflict, unlike other international companies that suspended their activities, thus strengthening China’s presence in infrastructure and civilian sectors. Consequently, a division has emerged among Israeli liberals regarding relations with China. While Israeli liberal elites see Iranian-Chinese cooperation as a threat to the liberal international order, they simultaneously view China as a potential mediator capable of calming tensions due to its close ties with Tehran.
Based on the preceding analysis, we conclude that China is not waging war. By proxy, it invests in internal Israeli contradictions to weaken the united front of the ruling hardline right wing, placing the Israeli Mossad in a difficult position between pursuing direct security threats and monitoring the soft power penetration of major powers, such as China.
