Thirty years ago, I was negotiating the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) pipeline – later expanded into the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline – one of the most ambitious energy infrastructure projects of its time. The premise was simple and widely accepted across Western capitals: diversify energy supply to reduce vulnerability and prevent its use as a geopolitical weapon. Governments, development finance institutions, and international companies were aligned behind that goal.
That consensus has collapsed.
Over the past two decades, Western governments have steadily abandoned diversification in favor of a zero-sum vision of decarbonization – one that treats hydrocarbons not as strategic assets to be managed, but as liabilities to be eliminated. In doing so, they have recreated the very dependencies they once worked to dismantle, without building a more resilient system in their place.
The shift began in Europe. Russia offered Germany cheap, reliable gas while systematically building political influence and using pricing to pressure Central and Eastern Europe. Germany’s decision to phase out nuclear power accelerated the shift. Russian gas imports rose from roughly 20 percent of European demand in 2000 to more than 40 percent by 2022, and close to half in some markets.
The invasion of Ukraine should have been a strategic turning point. It was not. Europe responded with short-term substitution rather than structural reform. Decarbonization policies remained largely intact, continuing to discourage investment in hydrocarbons. By 2026, Germany had replaced one dependency with another – shifting toward Qatari liquefied natural gas and exposing itself to a different, but equally concentrated, supply risk.
Germany is not alone. Italy and other European countries have followed a similar path. As Italy reduced its reliance on nuclear power and accelerated its net zero policies, it too shifted toward greater dependence on gas from the Gulf. More recently, Italy has sought to increase investment in existing Algerian gas capacity. While this may provide short-term relief, it does not address the central problem: it does not increase the number of suppliers. It is substitution, not diversification.
This is the critical point. Europe is not expanding its energy base – it is reshuffling it. The risk is clear: the same strategic mistake is being repeated. The question is whether European policymakers can break this cycle of short-term adjustment and zero-sum decarbonization and return to a genuine diversification strategy.
Dependence, in other words, has not been reduced. It has migrated.
At the same time, as Western policy narrowed, China expanded its global energy footprint, but not in a way that strengthened systemic resilience. Beijing pursued opportunistic acquisition, securing long-term supply agreements across Central Asia, Africa and South America, while concentrating processing and industrial value within China.
This was not diversification in the broader sense. It did not expand the number of independent supply centers or distribute value chains more widely. Instead, it reinforced concentration, anchoring control, processing and pricing power around China itself. At the same time, China deepened its reliance on a narrow set of upstream suppliers, particularly Russia and Iran.
The result was not a more resilient global system, but a different configuration of dependency. As Western investment retreated and diversification stalled, China’s model accelerated a system in which extraction was geographically dispersed, but control was increasingly centralized. Combined with China’s reliance on Russian and Iranian supply, this contributed to a more fragile global energy architecture, not a more stable one.
I saw this shift unfold firsthand across Central Asia, South-east Asia and East Africa.
In Central Asia, the TAPI pipeline was designed to break the Russian-Iranian constraint on Turkmen gas exports by opening routes to South Asia. It had strong commercial backing and policy support. But as Western focus shifted, momentum dissipated. China stepped in, secured the gas and redirected flows eastward, reinforcing concentration rather than diversification.
In Timor-Leste, following independence, the government pursued a different model: combining extraction with onshore processing to capture value domestically. The potential was transformative – billions in revenue, thousands of skilled jobs and the foundation of an industrial economy. But as hydrocarbons were recast as climate liabilities, Western financing disappeared. External pressure favored exporting raw gas for processing abroad. Timor-Leste successfully resisted, but the opportunity cost has been substantial.
In Tanzania, substantial gas reserves offered the prospect of electrification, industrialization and export growth. Yet financing constraints intensified as global policy turned against hydrocarbon investment. Projects that could have strengthened both domestic development and global supply diversity were delayed. Progress continues with strong support of the Tanzanian authorities, but more slowly, and with fewer partners than would otherwise have been possible.
In each case, the constraint was not commercial viability. It was policy.
Developing countries are not passive actors in this system, and many are increasingly dissatisfied with the available models. China’s approach delivers capital and speed, but it often remains extractive, with much of the value-added processing and industrial benefit captured outside host economies. At the same time, Western disengagement has removed the alternative.
There is clear demand for a different model. A Western approach that combines resource development with local processing, infrastructure and skills transfer would not only diversify global supply but also unlock far greater economic value in the developing world. Properly structured, energy development becomes a catalyst for industrialization, not merely extraction – supporting growth, employment, and long-term stability. The opportunity exists.
Instead, the current trajectory has produced the opposite outcome.
Recent geopolitical shocks, including conflict involving Iran, have exposed the consequences. As investment declined, supply became more concentrated. When Russian gas exited the European system, dependence did not disappear, it shifted to the United States and the Gulf. Price volatility increased, and renewable expansion – while essential – proved insufficient to offset constrained supply.
The consequences extend far beyond energy markets. Higher energy costs feed directly into fertilizer production and food prices. For developing countries, this translates into rising costs of basic goods, food insecurity, and increased economic vulnerability, particularly for the poorest populations. These pressures were not inevitable. A more diversified global energy system would have reduced both price volatility and systemic risk.
The system has become more exposed, not less.
At the same time, the failure to develop new sources in the developing world has reduced global flexibility. Countries capable of contributing to supply remain underdeveloped, even as demand continues to grow. Had diversification remained the guiding principle, the outcome would likely have been lower volatility, greater resilience and broader-based global growth.
The problem is not decarbonization. It is how it has been pursued.
Net zero has been framed as a zero-sum objective, displacing the broader goals of energy policy rather than advancing them. This reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of how energy systems evolve. Renewables are not, at least for the foreseeable future, substitutes for hydrocarbons at scale, they are complements.
For developing countries, the pathway is coexistence: hydrocarbons alongside renewables. Gas-to-power supports industrialization. Local processing captures value. Infrastructure builds the platform for eventual transition. A blanket financing freeze on hydrocarbons does not accelerate decarbonization, it entrenches underdevelopment and concentrates supply in the hands of a limited number of producers.
A course correction is both necessary and urgent.
Development finance must be reset to prioritize diversification, resilience and economic development alongside climate goals. Targeted support should be expanded for gas-to-power and related infrastructure. The United States, Europe, Japan, and Korea should jointly support strategic energy corridors in Central Asia, East Africa, and Southeast Asia – building new supply, not simply reallocating existing flows.
Above all, diversification must be restored as a central objective of energy policy.
The resources exist. The projects are viable. The partners are ready.
The question is whether Europe can break the cycle of short-termism and zero-sum thinking that has defined its energy strategy for the past decade. And whether Japan and South Korea will move beyond rhetoric and recognize the urgency of building real resilience into the global system.
The time for discussion has passed. What is required now is action.
Without it, the consequences – economic, political and humanitarian – will continue to deepen.
