Egypt’s Shadow War: Partnering with China to Curb Mossad’s Influence Across Africa

In early 2026, the Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate in cooperation with the Chinese Ministry of State Security launched a broad security and diplomatic campaign across the African continent to counter Israeli intelligence activities.

In early 2026, the Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate, under the leadership of Major General Hassan Rashad, in cooperation with the Chinese Ministry of State Security (the de facto Chinese intelligence agency), launched a broad security and diplomatic campaign across the African continent to counter Israeli intelligence activities, specifically those of the Mossad, which were described as “harmful to both Egyptian and Chinese interests.” This campaign coincided with deepening Egyptian intelligence and technological cooperation with China to monitor Mossad activities in Africa. Both Egypt and China are pursuing a strategy of “exerting pressure against the Mossad,” with Chinese intelligence developing a strategy to support Egyptian efforts aimed at curbing Mossad’s ambitions in the region to ensure the stability of Egypt’s borders and protect Chinese interests. This was also revealed by the Israeli newspaper “Israel Hayom,” which reported on intensive Egyptian efforts to counter what it described as “Israeli expansion” in Africa, particularly in Libya. The Israeli newspaper “Israel Hayom” reported that a senior Egyptian intelligence official, specifically Major General Ahmed Abdel-Khaleq, exerted significant pressure to obstruct the expansion of relations between Israeli security agencies and the sons of “Khalifa Haftar,” the commander of eastern Libya, who hold prominent leadership positions within their father’s forces. Major General Abdel-Khaleq’s visit to Libya included a warning against broadening communication between Israeli security agencies and Haftar’s sons (Saddad and Khaled), who lead security apparatuses in the region. The Israeli newspaper also revealed “extensive activities and secret visits undertaken by a team headed by a senior Egyptian intelligence official to several African countries,” referring to Major General Abdel-Khaleq’s visits to various African nations to hinder, restrict, and limit the activities of the Israeli Mossad there.

The details of Egypt’s moves in Africa, with Chinese assistance, can be summarized in the following points: (Egyptian General Intelligence, in cooperation with China, is leading an undeclared campaign to limit Mossad’s infiltration into sensitive regional issues). Among its most prominent features are: First, regarding the Sudanese file: Cairo, in cooperation with China, detected Mossad activities related to the Sudanese crisis, particularly concerning support for the “Rapid Support Forces” (RSF). This prompted Egypt and China to take security measures to contain this role. This was highlighted by Major General Ahmed Abdel-Khaleq’s visit to Sudan at the end of January 2016, where he met with the Sudanese army commander and the head of the Sovereignty Council, “Abdel Fattah El-Burhan,” in addition to meeting with senior military and security officials to coordinate efforts to monitor the activities of Israeli intelligence and the Mossad in Sudan. Egypt and its General Intelligence Directorate believe that Israel supports Hemedti’s militia forces, in addition to other issues related to the recognition of the breakaway region of Somaliland, the Nile River water dispute, and Israel’s role as a party to the dispute, which is seen as opposing Egyptian interests in the vital Nile River basin.

As for the second file, related to the Horn of Africa and the Nile Basin: Israeli and Taiwanese recognition of Somaliland, in addition to Israel’s assistance to Taiwan in developing the Taiwanese air defense system “T-DOM” and linking it to the Israeli Iron Dome system, increased the tension in relations between Beijing and Tel Aviv in the Horn of Africa and East Africa region, which is sensitive to Chinese interests and to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, and the roads, waterways, and straits that are of utmost importance to the flow of Chinese supply chains in the region, Africa, and around the world. For this reason, the visit of the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, to the legitimate Somali capital, Mogadishu, and the Horn of Africa region at the beginning of 2026 came as a direct warning to Israel and the breakaway region of Somaliland for their actions against Chinese interests in the region. Also, Major General Ahmed Abdel Khaleq, who is responsible for the Palestinian file in the Egyptian General Intelligence, made shuttle visits that included Uganda in January 2026 to counter Israeli attempts to interfere in the issues of the Nile Basin. In Uganda, Egyptian security official Major General Ahmed Abdel-Khaleq conveyed several warning messages to local Ugandan officials after observing meetings between Israeli and Ugandan officials that addressed the Nile Basin issue, which is crucial for both Egypt and the Nile Basin. Major General Abdel-Khaleq, the head of Egyptian General Intelligence’s Africa office during that period, also visited several other important and sensitive countries for Egyptian interests: Rwanda, Uganda, Libya, Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan. It’s worth noting that his appointment to lead the Egyptian diplomatic and intelligence mission to Africa was primarily due to his extensive experience dealing with Israeli officials, gained through years of managing the Gaza and Palestinian files.

This context led to joint Chinese-Egyptian support for Somaliland and its legitimate capital, Mogadishu. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi affirmed in February 2026 Egypt’s full support for Somali unity and its rejection of any actions that infringe upon Somali sovereignty, a clear reference to Israeli activities in the breakaway region of Somaliland.  On the Libyan front, China cooperated with Egypt to maintain stability within Libya. This coincided with a visit by an Egyptian intelligence delegation to eastern Libya to warn local parties against expanding contacts with Israeli security officials, emphasizing that Egypt would not allow an Israeli intelligence presence on its western border, a position on which China and Egypt agree.

Regarding China’s role and joint intelligence cooperation with the Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate, led by Major General Hassan Rashad, the period between 2025 and 2026 witnessed a strategic shift in the relationship between Egyptian intelligence and the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS), which functions as the Chinese intelligence agency.

This shift involved working together to counter and limit the influence of the Israeli Mossad in Africa and the Middle East through a Chinese-Egyptian technological partnership. Chinese intelligence cooperation with Egypt moved from an economic framework to an intelligence and technological partnership aimed at reducing Israel’s qualitative edge in the areas of espionage and aerial reconnaissance. Furthermore, China provided Egypt with advanced radar and electronic warfare systems, granting it a high capacity to detect aerial threats independently of systems technically linked to the United States or Israel.  Chinese cooperation with the Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate (GID) to protect waterways: The two sides coordinated to protect vital waterways (the Suez Canal, Bab el-Mandeb, and the Gulf of Aden) to limit Israeli and American actions that could harm China’s regional interests and its Belt and Road Initiative.

The period between 2025 and 2026 witnessed a strategic shift in the level of coordination between the Egyptian “GID” and the Chinese Ministry of State Security. This cooperation emerged as a key tool to limit Israeli (Mossad) activities targeting Egyptian interests in Africa.  The most prominent features of these moves and cooperation are, as follows: joint Egyptian-Chinese intelligence cooperation to contain Israeli activities in the African continent, coinciding with covert Egyptian-Chinese security and intelligence operations. The Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate, under the leadership of Major General Ahmed Abdel-Khaleq (responsible for vital files), launched a series of unannounced security and diplomatic initiatives in several African countries to counter Israeli intelligence activities deemed harmful to Egyptian national security. This coincided with similar Chinese field visits aimed at hindering Israeli expansion and influence in Africa. Here, Egyptian and Chinese intelligence efforts focused on limiting Mossad’s infiltration of the Sudanese and Libyan crises, as well as the sensitive region of East Africa and the Horn of Africa, particularly in areas where Israeli support for conflicting parties is believed, such as the breakaway region of Somaliland. Additionally, China, in cooperation with Egypt, strengthened military partnerships with countries like Somalia to secure the entrance to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, which are crucial to Chinese interests and its Belt and Road Initiative.

This intelligence cooperation between China and Egypt has deepened into technical and intelligence collaboration. Israeli reports have accused Egypt of coordinating with China to use advanced surveillance technologies for air superiority and reconnaissance, such as the Chinese KJ-500 early warning aircraft, to penetrate or test Israeli air defenses and monitor troop deployments. In addition to the joint Egyptian-Chinese “Eagles of Civilization” exercises (April-May 2025), Egypt and China conducted their first-ever joint air exercise in April and May 2025, aimed at unifying combat concepts and exchanging intelligence and technical expertise. This raised significant concerns within Israeli security circles. Furthermore, the Egyptian-Chinese intelligence and military agreement to localize Chinese defense technology in Egypt included the signing of memoranda of understanding between the Egyptian military and Chinese companies of a military and defense nature, such as Norinco & Shadow Wings.

These agreements aim to localize sensitive defense industries and develop Egyptian defense systems, such as the Raad-300, using Chinese technologies. This reduces reliance on Western sources, which may be susceptible to Israeli pressure.

The most prominent features and objectives of the joint Egyptian-Chinese intelligence strategy lie in countering the Israeli Mossad’s infiltration of the African continent through the theory of breaking the Israeli “belt-tightening” strategy. Egypt, with the help of Chinese economic and security influence, seeks to thwart Israel’s old strategy known as the “alliance of the periphery” or “belt-tightening” strategy, which aimed to encircle Egypt through strong relations with neighboring African countries. This is coupled with utilizing the Chinese “Belt and Road Initiative” projects as an alternative: Egypt leverages massive Chinese investments in infrastructure and communications in Africa as a development alternative that reduces the need for African countries to cooperate with Israel in security or technology. Furthermore, the growing space cooperation between Egypt and China strengthens Egyptian cyber, digital, and technological capabilities to counter the Israeli Mossad’s infiltration of vital cyber and digital sectors within the African continent. China is the main investor in the Egyptian space program, which enhances Egypt’s surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities over the African continent and the region, something Israel considers a threat to its intelligence superiority there.

Accordingly, these joint intelligence moves between Egypt and China aim to obstruct and restrict the influence and activities of Mossad in Africa. This comes at a time when Cairo seeks to regain its role as a regional “center of gravity” with Chinese assistance, through a combination of soft power and military cooperation with major powers like China. This aims to counterbalance strategic challenges within the African continent, particularly in East Africa and the Horn of Africa, due to their ability to control maritime routes and straits, including the Suez Canal, which is of paramount importance to Chinese interests in the Middle East and Africa. Furthermore, 2026 was declared the “Year of People-to-People Exchanges between China and Africa” ​​at the African Union headquarters to solidify this Chinese presence in cooperation with Egypt.

Dr.Nadia Helmy
Dr.Nadia Helmy
Associate Professor of Political Science, Faculty of Politics and Economics / Beni Suef University- Egypt. An Expert in Chinese Politics, Sino-Israeli relationships, and Asian affairs- Visiting Senior Researcher at the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies (CMES)/ Lund University, Sweden- Director of the South and East Asia Studies Unit