Think of the person you call when your servers melt down. The one who reads your logs, knows where backups live, and can boot systems back to life. Now imagine that person sneaks a backdoor into your environment and sells access to a ransomware gang. That is this week’s headline: U.S. prosecutors allege several cybersecurity professionals worked with the ALPHV, also known as BlackCat, ransomware group. This is not hypothetical. It is a direct hit on the idea that expertise always equals trust.
Insider threat used to mean sloppy users or careless admins. That definition is stale now. Today, insiders can be highly trained defenders who know how to erase traces and how monitoring works. They can exploit update servers, privileged accounts, or vendor relationships to scale a breach. For small and large companies alike, that means thinking differently about access. Limit privileges, log everything, rotate credentials, and protect global communications with a reliable VPN. Do these basics right and you cut a lot of the easy paths an insider can take.
When the person fixing your systems knows how to break them, trust becomes the most expensive thing you own.
Why this is worse than ordinary insider risk
Skilled insiders bring two unfair advantages. First, access. They often have standing credentials and admin tokens that let them move laterally without raising typical alerts. Second, knowledge. They know which logs to edit, which backups to wipe, and which controls the team ignores. Combine that with modern ransomware-as-a-service models and you get a short, quiet route to massive impact. The recent indictments are a clear signal that expertise can be weaponized.
At the same time the legal story unfolded, security teams saw a technical landmine explode. Researchers and vendors reported active exploitation and mass scanning for a critical Windows Server Update Services vulnerability, CVE-2025-59287. WSUS servers are meant to help you push patches. If attackers own the update service, they can push code to many machines at once. That makes patch infrastructure an attractive target.
A compromised update server is more dangerous than a vulnerable endpoint. It can turn your defenders’ tools into the attackers’ delivery vehicle.
How these trends combine into real risk
Imagine an insider who can reach your WSUS box or who has keys to vendor consoles. They can create a maintenance window, disable alerts, and let an exploit run. Or they sell access to an affiliate who already has exploit code queued. Recent scanning and proof of concept exploits for WSUS show attackers are actively searching for these exact openings. That is the fusion of human and technical risk: a person with privilege plus a live exploit equals a fast, high-impact breach.
The scale of the problem is not small. Independent trackers estimate global cybercrime damage will reach roughly $10.5 trillion by 2025. That number is big enough to change boardroom behavior. Risk is now an enterprise and national security discussion, not just an IT one. Major institutions and governments are watching, and so are regulators.
What leaders should focus on right now
You do not need perfect tech to make real progress. You need targeted controls that assume people fail and systems get broken.
• Tighten privileged access. Use least privilege, session brokering, and just-in-time elevation. Make it routine to revoke and audit credentials.
• Isolate update infrastructure. Put WSUS and similar services on segmented networks with strict egress and ingress rules. If you must run WSUS, monitor its syncs and file activity closely. If a vendor issues an out-of-band patch, apply and verify it quickly.
• Require session recording for privileged work and keep immutable logs. If you cannot prove what happened, containment and response take longer and cost more.
• Vet third parties the same way you vet employees. Contractors and consultants often get wide access. Background checks, contractually limited permissions, and session auditing reduce supplier risk.
• Build an evidence-first incident response plan. Capture forensic images and preserve logs early. Legal, PR, and security need a practiced choreography for breach notification and containment.
Regulation is closing the loop
Regulators are not asleep. Lawmakers have asked agencies to probe companies that run mass surveillance or critical data services after reports of sloppy account hygiene and stolen credentials. When a vendor handles personal data at scale and has weak controls, the fallout is both legal and public. Expect more scrutiny, mandatory disclosures, and pressure to show security certifications or audit results.
That means vendor security will be a procurement question going forward. Ask for SOC reports, red team results, and proof of strong multi-factor enforcement. If a vendor cannot provide reasonable evidence of hygiene, rethink the relationship.
Final word
Insider risk is not new. What is new is the mix: highly skilled people with deep system knowledge, automated exploit tools, and a global marketplace for access. The fix is not a single product. It is a set of sensible controls, honest culture, and the discipline to rotate, log, and limit. Treat your guardians like a valuable but fallible asset. Verify what they can do and watch what they do. That alone will cut the odds of the kind of headline we saw this week.