In recent decades, the Western Balkans have become a key crossroads where historical legacies and modern geopolitics meet. Among external actors, Türkiye has played a special role based on deep cultural and religious ties. However, after the failed coup attempt in 2016, Ankara’s regional strategy began to change significantly. What once relied on soft power and shared identity has shifted into a complex network of political influence, security concerns, and informal connections. This change has altered how both sides see cooperation and trust.
Following the controversial ‘coup night’ of July 15th in Türkiye, the primary focus of relations between the Western Balkans and Türkiye shifted from culture (religion) and economy to security and politics. Moreover, Ankara’s ongoing campaign to reduce the influence of the Gülen-inspired Hizmet movement, active in the region since the early 90s through educational networks, has led to unprecedented security concerns. The tense relations peaked when Türkiye, a strategic partner for those countries, conditioned North Macedonia’s NATO membership on the deportation of 86 Hizmet activists.
This development marked a decisive shift in Türkiye’s approach toward its Balkan partners. Instead of fostering cooperation through cultural diplomacy and investment, Ankara began using coercive diplomacy aimed at eliminating perceived internal enemies abroad. Western Balkan governments, striving for Euro-Atlantic integration, found themselves balancing between democratic commitments and the political pressure of Turkish expectations. This not only strained bilateral relations but also exposed the fragility of local institutions under external pressure.
While Turkish state actors continue to expand their influence through diplomatic pressure, non-state actors are alarmingly growing organized crime in the region. Some have even helped Balkan countries score higher on global organized crime rankings. One of the most notable cases involving the region was the Sedat Peker case, where the ultranationalist Turkish mafia mob in exile publicly admitted to some crimes and accused senior Erdogan government figures of involvement. After leaving Türkiye in 2020 to avoid prosecution, Peker sought refuge in the Balkans. He met with many high-ranking politicians, businessmen, and other elites in the region and continued his activities, with some being promoted as businessmen. In an online leak, Peker claimed to have met with former North Macedonian Prime Minister Zoran Zaev at his private residence. The most scandalous event during his stay was when he and 214 of his associates were granted citizenship by the North Macedonian authorities. When this scandal became public, authorities revoked their citizenships, arrested nine police officers, and claimed Russia’s involvement in the case. Meanwhile, Emre Olur, known as the PR of Sedat Peker, is charged with being involved in criminal activities in both Türkiye and Albania.
The Peker affair underscores how political influence and organized crime often intersect in areas with weak governance. His presence in the Balkans not only embarrassed local officials but also demonstrated how criminal figures can exploit diplomatic and political gaps. For Türkiye, such figures sometimes operate in the gray area between exile and informal representation, allowing the state to maintain indirect influence. The incident also reveals how criminal networks connected to Türkiye have become part of regional power structures, increasing corruption and undermining the rule of law.
Another emerging area of interest for Turkish non-state actors in the region is the energy sector. Turkish investments in the Balkan region from 2013 to 2022 totaled USD 20 billion, with the energy sector accounting for 35% of foreign direct investment. However, field observations indicate an alarming corrupt relationship between Turkish companies and the region’s political elites. This organized crime scheme, combined with donations of kamikaze drones from the company owned by Erdogan’s son-in-law, creates fertile ground for Turkish state actors to establish a ‘paternal relationship,’ further impacting regional security.
Energy investments have thus become both an economic and political tool. By participating in large-scale infrastructure and defense-related projects, Turkish firms create long-term dependencies on Ankara’s goodwill. The merging of business and politics in this sector reduces transparency and often bypasses local accountability mechanisms. This pattern reinforces the idea that Türkiye’s economic influence increasingly serves geopolitical rather than purely commercial goals, expanding its reach under the guise of partnership.
Besides the energy sector, controversial non-state actors from Türkiye are heavily involved in football clubs in the region. Over the past eight years, seven of thirteen main league football clubs in North Macedonia have shifted ownership from local to Turkish investors. This trend is quickly spreading to Bulgaria and Montenegro. Shvercerat, one of the largest fan groups of a club in North Macedonia, recently revealed how their favorite team, FC Shkupi, is being exploited by the Turkish owner for fixed matches in Türkiye to facilitate gambling. This money laundering scheme, orchestrated by Turkish owners, has become common in many leagues across the region.
The Turkish capital’s infiltration into regional football goes beyond sports—it mirrors wider socio-economic trends. Football clubs, with their deep community ties and emotional importance, act as effective channels for laundering money and forging political networks. These investments serve both as business ventures and tools of social influence, allowing investors to gain public legitimacy while moving illegal funds. Consequently, sport has become another route for transnational corruption and political manipulation.
Türkiye has historically built constructive partnerships with Western Balkan countries based on its founding leader Atatürk’s ‘peace at home, peace in the world’ principle, which advocates for non-interference in other states’ internal affairs. However, with the rise of the AKP government, Turkish foreign policy underwent a paradigm shift that caused fluctuations in relations with Western Balkan nations. The initial phase was characterized as ‘Atlanticism,’ during which Türkiye strongly supported the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western Balkans. Later, under Davutoglu, it shifted toward an expansionist political Islam approach, mainly through strengthening ‘soft power’ mechanisms. After Davutoglu’s ambitions to create a ‘Balkan hinterland’ collapsed, Türkiye’s foreign policy toward the Western Balkans has now become marked by ‘illicit affairs’ among elites. The growing vulnerabilities of corrupt leaderships in the region against undemocratic practices and activities add to the fragile landscape of hybrid threats, hidden behind a ‘façade aspiration’ to adopt Euro-Atlantic norms and values.
This evolution shows how domestic political changes in Türkiye have directly affected its regional behavior. The AKP’s consolidation of power has blurred the line between national interests and party goals, extending the same approach outward. Consequently, Türkiye’s engagement with the Balkans reflects not only strategic interests but also an effort to export its internal governance style—centralized, transactional, and dependent on loyalty rather than institutions.
Türkiye’s changing approach in the Western Balkans reveals a complex blend of diplomacy, economic interests, and informal influence. The move from cultural outreach to politically driven engagement has disrupted what was once a mutually beneficial relationship. As organized crime, corruption, and covert investments grow, Ankara’s influence extends, making the region’s prospects for democratic resilience more uncertain. For the Western Balkans, the challenge is to stay independent while promoting transparent, rules-based cooperation. For Türkiye, regaining credibility may require returning to Atatürk’s vision of peace and non-interference—principles that once made its partnership with the Balkans a model of regional diplomacy.
