Nuclear deterrence has historically relied on the principle of mutual vulnerability. However, advances in quantum computing, quantum cryptography, and quantum sensing could likely alter this equation. These technologies can disrupt established communication security patterns, missile defense, and early warning systems (EWS). On the contrary, this technology can play a proactive role in enhancing communication and defense mechanisms of states that possess and utilize nuclear technology.
Quantum technologies, in particular quantum computing, present significant threats to traditional nuclear deterrence mechanisms by undermining the encryption methods used in nuclear command, control, and communication systems (NC3), which can result in serious vulnerabilities concerning nuclear safety and security. The cryptographic methods used in quantum computing rely solely on mathematical problems that are impossible to solve by classical computers. Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) and Diffie-Hellman, key cryptographic algorithms, are widely used for secure digital communications both for civilian and military purposes. If these systems become vulnerable to cyberattacks, the established nuclear deterrence could be endangered, leading to a potential risk of miscalculation and escalation among nuclear-armed states. If developed to the highest level, quantum computers could break encryption for these algorithms, which serve as the foundation for secure communication and data protection. With these technological advancements, it is imperative to understand the application of quantum sensing.
By increasing the ability to select and acquire targets, a quantum sensor could significantly increase an adversary’s ability to detect and track submarines, stealth aircraft, and even ballistic missile launches. For instance, quantum-powered radars are capable of detecting even the tiniest signals of enemy activity and outwitting current stealth technologies. Therefore, the country that acquires this capability may gain a strategic advantage over its perceived adversary, perhaps shifting the balance of power in its favor. Strategists believe that the acquisition of quantum capabilities will be a strategic imperative for national security and will serve as a force multiplier by ensuring secure and encrypted communication mechanisms for states. A quantum technology would also enhance a state’s geopolitical influence and cyber capabilities, as the victory of future wars would be defined by technological advancement rather than the number of soldiers.
While the world is still transitioning into the quantum age in a subdued manner, most countries have yet to comprehend its far-reaching consequences. The emergence of quantum technologies may impact the credibility of nuclear-powered states, which could adversely affect their command and control systems in crisis situations.
Similarly, quantum key distribution (QKD), which is based on quantum mechanical principles, provides unbreakable security. The absence of quantum communications infrastructure could result in an asymmetrical escalation ladder during times of crisis in which one side is highly secure with tamper-proof communications while the other is susceptible to interruption. As a result, this communication security imbalance could pose a threat to crisis stability. For averting miscalculations during times of heightened tension, reliable and secure communication channels are essential. A unilateral quantum-secure communication advantage would distort strategic signaling and increase the risk of inadvertent escalation.
As a matter of fact, quantum technologies may eliminate the survivability of second-strike capabilities. The presence of quantum-enabled missile defense systems would allow countries to easily detect and preempt an adversary’s deterrent capabilities, which would lead to a serious strategic setback. Thus, such a scenario would result in the abolition of the strategic ambiguity that sustains nuclear deterrence.
The strategic calculus in nuclear deterrence is changing globally. To enhance military capabilities and avoid future threats, the nuclear-powered countries need to develop an appropriate national quantum strategy, which should include scientific studies and defense applications. To achieve this, a coordinated effort among academia, defense institutions, and policymakers is required. In such situations, states need to cooperate with their strategic partners for enhancing quantum research to prepare the next generation of physicists, engineers, and cryptographers to excel in quantum computing. Most importantly, quantum risk assessments should be incorporated into nuclear doctrine and command and control structures. The establishment of quantum-based courses and collaboration with foreign partners should be encouraged by universities and research institutions.
In conclusion, quantum technologies present both opportunities and challenges. Enhancing the ability of quantum sensors to select and acquire targets could significantly improve a state’s ability to detect and track submarines, stealth aircraft, and even ballistic missile launches. This is not just an inventive perspective but a pressing issue in the age of technological advancement. Quantum computing can jeopardize secure communication mechanisms and second-strike capability by its ability to detect and neutralize the counterstrike forces. In addition, advancement in quantum technology is a national security issue that requires a timely response.
