Adjusting the approach compared to the “Trump 1.0” era
US military exercises in Southeast Asia in the first half of 2025 have shown a shift in strategy to respond to security challenges under President Donald Trump’s second term. Although the Trump 2.0 administration has not changed its goal of making competition with China in the Indo-Pacific the highest priority, Trump 2.0 has a different approach than Trump 1.0 of nearly a decade ago. Through the recent 22nd Shangri-La Dialogue, the Trump 2.0 administration has openly promoted a new force-building method that is more focused on developments on the ground and has a more specific deterrence goal than the first term. Tactical combat assets with long attack ranges, such as HIMARS missiles, Navy-Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship Interdiction Systems (NMESIS), or Typhon systems, have been deployed more densely in recent exercises, along with increased combat training content along with amphibious operations and island control scenarios.
This suggests that the US presence in Southeast Asia will likely include the establishment of garrisons on islands near the South China Sea. The goal is not only to demonstrate commitment to allies but also to test capabilities in the context of potential conflicts. Evidence of this is the Balikatan 2025 exercise. In contrast to Balikatan in 2017 under Trump 1.0, which was aimed at logistics and humanitarian relief, Balikatan 2025 is the largest, featuring real-world firepower and the participation of many partners outside the region. This is a shift from “risk prevention” to “deterrence,” reflecting a change not only in the approach to new military exercises but also in the preemptive thinking of hawkish security officials in the White House.
In short, military exercises in Southeast Asia under Trump 2.0 have become a clearly oriented strategic tool with a real deterrent goal, serving to reshape the military balance in the Indo-Pacific region. This is a departure from the Trump 1.0 term and shows the formation of a strategy in which military presence and action capabilities are prioritized over traditional alliance models.
Is an Indo-Pacific Strategy 2.0 in the Making?
Before and during this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue, new US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth delivered two keynote speeches that marked the first Trump 2.0 policy statement for the Indo-Pacific region. Hegseth’s speech seemed to reveal a more robust US approach to the regional security architecture. The Trump administration is currently busy dealing with conflict hotspots, but a Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy 2.0 (FOIP 2.0) document may be released in 2026. However, some pillars of this new strategy will change significantly, reflecting a shift in how the US shapes its role and presence in the region. The Trump 2.0 administration is expected to maintain the principle of “Peace Through Strength,” while reducing extensive commitments to multilateral or sub-multilateral mechanisms, focusing on strengthening bilateral relations with each important partner.
First, the FOIP 2.0 strategy still aims to narrow China’s space for action, especially in the context of the country’s increasing military and political activities in areas such as the East Sea and the Taiwan Strait. To achieve this goal, the US has adjusted its alliance methods to enhance combat capabilities with key partners. While previous freedom of navigation patrols (FONOPs) were only meant to demonstrate strength and create political pressure, under Trump 2.0, the US has gradually reduced symbolic activities, instead focusing on developing combat capabilities and the ability to deploy quickly, ready for real-life scenarios. Typically, large-scale, highly practical exercises such as Balikatan 2025 in the Philippines demonstrate preparation for possible conflict situations. At the same time, the deployment and training of Philippine soldiers to use the Typhon medium-range missile system from 2024 has contributed to building tight defense capabilities and enhancing deterrence.
Second, in addition to traditional exercises, FOIP 2.0 is expected to expand the form of military presence through more flexible measures. One of the important plans is to deploy a short-term military presence instead of building fixed bases. The US will establish a rotational military presence in key locations, which will control financial resources, reduce the risk of political confrontation, and maintain rapid response capabilities. Flexible tactical training activities and intensive exchanges such as the Combat Casualty Care Exchange program in the Philippines or the Tiger Balm 2025 exercise in Singapore have shown that this form of deployment is designed to increase short-term presence.
Third, FOIP 2.0 will not pursue a binding political alliance system but rather a more flexible partnership, with partner countries cooperating on a sector-specific basis and with a flexible level of commitment. This model allows the United States to adjust quickly to each country’s political and security situation while reducing the legal and political burdens associated with traditional alliances. This approach both protects US strategic interests and encourages partners to self-adjust their capabilities. Specifically, FOIP 2.0 focuses on increasing training and transferring defense technology to potential partners through initiatives such as FMS (conditional military sales) and EDA (excess weapons transfer). These tools not only enhance the defense capabilities of partners but also create long-term technological and tactical dependencies, thereby consolidating influence more effectively. In addition, economic measures such as tariffs can be used to force countries in the region to choose sides with the US.
Overall, under Trump 2.0, the Indo-Pacific strategy aims to be more closely aligned with regional realities. The Trump administration emphasizes the role of military capabilities and the ability to project power to maintain stability and prevent conflict. Current US moves focus on strengthening deterrence to prevent China from changing the regional status quo, especially through the use of force.
