The Indo-Pacific is generally regarded as a US construct covering the Indian Ocean from the African coast and the western and central Pacific Ocean to the seas and straits connecting the two oceans. As such, the Indo-Pacific includes nations such as Korea and Japan, down to Australia, Southeast Asia, India, Pakistan, and the Persian and Arabian Gulfs. China features in the center of the Indo-Pacific, and as such the Indo-Pacific paradigm is used as a template to view contested primacy. Former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe’s speech in 2007, around the time when the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) began. The term became commonly used during the Trump 1.0 presidency.
US foreign and defense policy within the Indo-Pacific has been based upon the perception of US primacy within the region, in tandem with its allies, including Japan, South Korea, and Australia. It’s only in this generation that US primacy is challenged by the rise of China into the South China Sea. This began in 2013, when the Tianjing dredger was sent to Cuarteron Reef to reclaim land to build a military base. A number have been built since around the Spratly Islands and surrounding reefs, reflecting the Nine-Dash Line protruding as far south as the coast of northern Borneo, which is seen by China as within their sphere of influence.
As the People’s Liberation Army has been rapidly growing and enhancing capabilities, the Chinese have been able to challenge US primacy in the region. This has resulted in numerous local incidents with nations that share coasts along the Nine-Dash Line, including the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam. Over the last decade, US forces have entangled themselves with PLA forces on “freedom of navigation’ exercises from one of the many bases surrounding coastal China.
China and the United States have different views about their respective presences within this region. China may see itself as a patriarch of the group of nations around Southeast Asia. China espouses coexistence, trade, and cultural interaction. China views its military presence as a need to protect its trade routes in the South China Sea and straits vital to free passage. This is the ancient Silk Road, which is being manifested into modern trade by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to create multiple routes for China-world trade. China supports this with soft power, cultural relations, and trade relations.
This continues on from the traditional Chinese presence that has been within the region for centuries, interrupted only by the 1949 revolution and self-imposed isolation until the late 1970s.
In contrast, the United States has taken a strategic Cold War view of China. China is seen as a potential threat of a growing superpower within the Cold War paradigm. This is a carry-on from US doctrine during both the Korean Conflict and the Vietnam War. Militarily, the US has continued a containment position, while economically, the US economy has become integrated with China. A policy dissonance.
However, the concept of containment still exists for the US, with military bases in Korea, Japan, Guam, the Philippines, Singapore, and Australia. This has been going on for more than 70 years. Rhetoric, such as China wishes to take over Taiwan by force, serves US purposes to justify its current policy approach.
Both the US and Chinese views of the region fuel the flurry of engagements occurring on a daily basis in this region. This is the catalyst of the AUKUS agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the US to focus on the containment of China. This is also dragging the United Kingdom, with its dwindling military capabilities, into the Indo-Pacific and forcing the hand of Australia to invest in extremely expensive strategic platforms when there is a great need for cheaper tactical platforms closer to the coastlines and shipping routes around Australia.
The weakness of Australia’s AUKUS strategy was clearly seen with the recent flotilla of Chinese People’s Liberation Navy ships and a possible nuclear-powered submarine circumnavigating Australia and conducting live-fire drills near commercial airspace in the Tasman Sea between Australia and New Zealand. It took almost two weeks into the Chinese voyage before the Australian naval frigate HMAS Stuart was able to commence monitoring of the Chinese vessels in the Great Australian Bight. Australia does not need nuclear-powered submarines; it needs highly agile coastal defense systems.
This puts focus upon other long-standing agreements in the region. There is perhaps a lot of misunderstanding about what the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (known as the Quad) really represents. The Quad is more a diplomatic grouping than any security partnership. The Quad, made up of the United States, Australia, India, and Japan, has found it very difficult to be relevant, especially when its members have diverging interests. The Quad is more a relic of the beginning of the millennium, emerging out of the 2004 tsunami as a means of response to Indo-Pacific emergencies.
Although there were once some shared military exercises amongst the members of the Quad, the organization has been very spasmodic in its sense of purpose. The US wanted to consolidate military relations with India, using the Quad as a platform, but India has shown more independence in its defense policy since. Of late the Quad has become more a forum for issues of climate change, disaster response, maritime security, infrastructure security, and cybersecurity.
India has been more concerned with its role within BRICS and strengthening its relations with Russia. India is primarily supplied with military equipment by Russia and supplies Russia with light arms used in the Russian-Ukraine war. The Quad cannot be seen as a military grouping and may not even survive the decade as an organization, having once been put into mothballs already.
While China has been focused on building trade and cultural links with the region, the Southeast Asian nations have, in the majority, tried to maintain neutrality between China and the US. As the Indonesian puts it, “sailing between two reefs.” However, just the rumors that Trump was going to place tariffs on Asian countries brought much apprehension, even before they were formally announced. There was a general view that tariffs would force much of the region into an unnecessary recession.
It would be an understatement to say that the new tariffs imposed by US president Trump on countries within the region have damaged US-regional relations. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand are now moving even quicker than before within the economic orbit of China. China’s President XI just made a goodwill visit to Cambodia, Malaysia, and Vietnam.
The White House may see many Asian nations heading to the State Department to make new trade agreements as a big win. However, the Trump administration is blind to the enhanced goodwill China is receiving through the tariff issue. Trump’s tariffs have been the biggest US foreign policy debacle for over a century. Chinese influence is now filling the vacuum Trump just created.
Certainly, the Chinese are skilled at the art of diplomacy and soft power and exhibit nuances that the region feels comfortable with. In contrast, US diplomacy changes direction every five years, creating grave concern. President Obama promoted the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement during his pivot to Asia 15 years ago, then Trump just withdrew from it, destroying all the goodwill and trust Southeast Asian nations had in the US. Now BRICS provides the positive aspirations leaders of the region are looking for, and the US has nothing to compete with. Indonesia just became a full member of BRICS earlier this year, and Malaysia and Thailand became BRICS partners late last year.
It’s difficult to see how much influence the US can exert in the current India-Pakistan conflict. The current US administration is finding it difficult to come up with a solution to the Russian-Ukraine war and has contributed to the genocide in Gaza. The bombing of Yemen appears nonsensical with no strategic value to the US. US strategists make a big issue out of Taiwan, which may not be in the danger the Pentagon espouses at all. US diplomats just don’t seem to have the appreciation of the region’s history, culture, and geography and just don’t see the reality on the ground in Asia today that one would see walking around the streets of any major Southeast Asian city.
US strategic competitiveness in the region may be more like a ‘paper tiger’ than reality. There are issues in question about the efficacy of US arms in battle. It’s more propaganda that props up the US image. Sooner or later, Pax Americana must accept the new realities of a multipolar world and go back to the drawing board to create a new doctrine where it can coexist with today’s realities.
This should become a serious issue for discussion by academics and think tanks during the rest of this decade.