Amid regional tensions and just two months after the Saudi-Pakistan Mutual Defense pact (SMDA) on September 17, 2025, the sale of 48 F‑35 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia could alter the security balance in the Persian Gulf. Given SMDA and the political weight that Pakistan gains from Riyadh’s growing military strength, Islamabad is emerging as a “security broker” in the region. Meanwhile, in addition to the Persian Gulf, these developments, notably the F-35 sale and the SMDA, have political and geopolitical implications for China, India, and South Asia, which this article analyzes. The article asks how the F‑35 sale to Saudi Arabia reshapes regional order in the Persian Gulf and indirectly affects South Asia.
The recent trip of Mohammed bin Salman to Washington on November 18, 2025, signaled more than Riyadh-Washington relations; it was linked to ongoing regional developments and carried significant implications. He carried a letter from Iranian officials for president Trump, discussed regional developments and the Gaza crisis, and even requested the US intervention in Sudan. Clearly, Saudi Arabia appears to be positioning itself as a regional security manager, exercising a form of broker-style leadership through brokerage, coordination and steering regional processes (Broker Leadership). A clear example of this is its willingness to mediate between Iran and the US. Most importantly, Saudi Arabia’s request for 48 F‑35 fighter jets from the United States, valued at approximately $142 billion, represents a development that not only reshapes Riyadh-Washington military relations as a non-NATO member but also alters Persian Gulf security order and has indirect geopolitical consequences for South Asia.
It should be noted that despite deep political and military ties between Islamabad and Riyadh, Pakistan will not have direct access to F‑35 technology. The system will be tightly controlled by the US, as it is part of the US command and control, operational coordination, and intelligence support ecosystem. The U.S. typically provides F‑35s to countries that can integrate into its security governance network. Therefore, Pakistan’s operational role will be limited (training, personnel support) and cannot fully replace U.S. forces. If Washington imposes conditions or restrictions on Saudi Arabia, Pakistan might not fully reap the political benefits. From a political and deterrence perspective, however, this enhances Pakistan’s strategic weight in South Asia through perceived increase in deterrence among regional rival.
For Saudi Arabia, having F‑35s increases its demand for skilled personnel, training, maintenance, and operational experience. Pakistan, as a traditional partner with extensive experience in air force and Saudi Arabian military training in 1967, can play a supporting, but limited role. Strategically, Riyadh views Pakistan as a security arm, leveraging it to stay aligned with Saudi priorities. Riyadh sees Islamabad as a key country in the Sunni security architecture. Closer Riyadh-Washington security ties may reduce Islamabad’s incentives to lean further toward Beijing, especially, in certain circumstances, the US wants more of Pakistan alignments with its strategies in South Asia. Accordingly, Pakistan’s behavior aligns with Saudi priorities, whether in competition with Iran, coordination with the U.S or leadership within the Sunni world. However, preventing closeness with Qatar or Turkey.
As far as India is concerned, this sends message: Pakistan can now play a more active role in a “Gulf security axis.” It seems New Delhi may need to carefully calibrate its defense relations with Gulf countries. However, it should not be overlooked that India views its relations with Gulf Arabs primarily through the lens of China and energy economics rather than Pakistan. India’s trade with Gulf countries reached over $178 billion in 2024–2025.
Regarding China, the U.S. is extremely concerned that Beijing could access sensitive F‑35 data through Riyadh-Islamabad cooperation or other channels. According to the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) on November 14, although such data transfer is high risk, it is possible. Gen. Charles Wald, former Deputy Commander of EUCOM, noted that while Saudi Arabia is unlikely to disclose F‑35 information, China might still obtain technical details and potentially leverage them in its own fifth-generation fighter or other aerospace or defense programs. China maintains strong influence through $288 billion in trade with Gulf Arab states (four times the U.S. figure of $77 billion) and regional investments in energy, infrastructure, and technology. This influence is unlikely to be diminished by the presence of F‑35s in Saudi Arabia.
Impact on South Asian and Persian Gulf Security Order
The combination of “U.S. (leadership), Saudi Arabia (F‑35) and Pakistan (security partner)” could create a new regional security order, maintaining the US as its main architecture while Pakistan plays a strategic deterrent role. This new order will most likely be to counter China and Iran, with a focus on air deterrence and shared security rather than a simple military alliance.
Realistically, the F‑35 deal alongside the Saudi-Pakistan mutual defense pact represents a significant shift in the geopolitical balance of the Persian Gulf. The importance of this issue becomes clear when we consider that the mutual defense agreement was likely created in coordination with the US to establish its desired order in the region, the same function that the Abraham Accords serve. Pakistan emerges as a “security broker of the Persian Gulf” with a complementary, though non-decisive, role in the new regional order. For China, this poses a notable military-layer challenge without compromising its economic influence.
The impact on South Asia is indirect, but since Saudi Arabia enters the U.S. security umbrella with the F‑35, it is positioned as a senior non-NATO partner. Close security ties with Islamabad, particularly through the September 17 agreement, allow Riyadh to influence Pakistan’s behavior. This represents a shift in soft balance rather than structural balance in South Asia.
In conclusion, contrary to common perception, the F‑35 sale is unlikely to transform Saudi Arabia’s aerospace industry or provide decisive air superiority. Its operational capacity remains limited, and the jets alone do not shift the regional balance. The deal’s strategic importance lies in deepening Washington-Riyadh military and security ties, creating shared intelligence and operational networks, and fostering strategic alignment with Israel under the U.S. security umbrella.
The F‑35 sale is thus not merely a weapons transaction but a demonstration of deep U.S.-Saudi coordination, enhancing U.S. airpower in the region and potentially positioning Saudi Arabia as an operational partner in regional missions. Simultaneously, it serves to curb Saudi leaning toward China. Its impact on South Asia, though limited, is significant, as the political and military linkages can indirectly pressure Pakistan. This also seems to prompt India to review and strengthen its diplomatic and security engagement with Persian Gulf States, paying closer attention to maritime and intelligence security in the Persian Gulf.
