Political crisis is engulfing Bangkok in the middle months of 2025 when Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra faces the risk of losing her seat after the leak of a shocking audio recording with Cambodian Senate President Hun Sen. The 17-minute conversation, published in full by Hun Sen’s own Facebook account, shows an unusual level of intimacy between the two countries’ leaders and reveals many sensitive information, especially related to the role of the Thai military.
The incident quickly triggered a series of negative reactions within the ruling coalition, drawing criticism from the military, the press, and the public, and throwing Thai politics into a state of uncertainty. While some analysts have described it as a “diplomatic accident,” the reality is that the incident has exposed inherent weaknesses in the country’s power structure and political culture. The question is not whether Ms. Paetongtarn will lose her seat, but when and how.
To understand the gravity of the situation, it is necessary to look back at the political landscape in Thailand after the 2023 elections. The Pheu Thai Party, the legacy of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, returned to power after nearly a decade of being ousted by military coups. The election of Thaksin’s daughter, Paetongtarn, marked a dramatic revival for the Shinawatra family. However, this victory was achieved only through a fragile alliance with royalist parties and tacit compromise with the military, which had overthrown her father’s government. This was the government’s biggest weakness: its questionable legitimacy, its unstable coalition, and its dependence on forces that saw her as a symbol of a populist counter-trend. In short, the Thai people and some opportunistic opposition parties were unhappy with the Shinawatra political family’s continuous succession in power.
Adding to the frustration of partisan politics is the deterioration of the Thai economy, once the most powerful in Southeast Asia. The Thai economy is facing a combination of internal and external pressures . GDP growth in 2025 is forecast to be only 1–2%, well below the regional average of 2.7–6% for Southeast Asian countries. Stimulus policies are weak amid a 2026 budget of up to 3.78 trillion baht ($115 billion) that is being delayed due to political tensions.
That context makes any mistake a potential spark for a political crisis. The leaked audio recording with Hun Sen was such a catalyst. In the conversation, Paetongtarn affectionately calls Hun Sen “uncle” and agrees with him in ignoring criticism from a Thai army general who opposed the closeness between the two leaders. More seriously, she also said that the military was just “playing cool” to show its stance, implying that it was not influential enough. These statements were seen as insulting to the military, an institution that has always been deeply involved in Thai politics and has historically played a leading role in overthrowing civilian governments.
The reaction from all sides was immediate. The Bhumjaithai Party , the second-largest partner in the coalition, announced its withdrawal from the government on June 19, 2025, citing “the government’s serious damage to national honor.” The move left the government without a majority in the House of Representatives and in a minority, opening the door to a possible coalition or dissolution of parliament. Meanwhile, top generals, including the commander-in -chief of the Royal Thai Army , told the media that “the military cannot be treated as a personal political tool” and stressed that they “will not stand idly by while national honor is trampled.” Such language is often a sign of preparation for an institutional response that could include pressure to resign, or a soft coup in the name of national security.
What makes Ms Paetongtarn’s situation worse is the lack of trust both at home and abroad. The public image of a civilian prime minister who appears to be dependent on personal relationships with foreign leaders is deeply offensive. Internationally, she is considered incapable of handling sensitive diplomacy, while putting national security at the mercy of external forces, especially when Cambodia has a complicated relationship with Thailand over borders and migrant workers.
Thailand’s political model, with its “dual axis” structure where elected power must be reconciled with the unelected power of the military and the monarchy, requires any Thai prime minister to be able to maintain a delicate balance between “internal” and “external”. Ms. Paetongtarn, despite winning a democratic election, represents a political trend that conservative forces have seen as a direct threat to the traditional order. Therefore, any mistake can be easily exploited to overthrow her, and the leaked audio recording is a “golden opportunity” for opposition forces to do so. Mr. Hun Sen’s release of the recording, even under the pretext of “transparency” after the shortened version went viral, is still considered a calculated act. It made Ms. Paetongtarn unable to deny the content and had to publicly apologize to the Thai military on June 20, through a statement read on national television.
In addition to the internal political crisis, the incident also had significant foreign policy consequences. Thai-Cambodian relations, which have experienced periods of tension reaching their peaks such as the dispute over the Preah Vihear temple that has lasted since 2008, are now at risk of cooling down. The Thai Foreign Ministry said that there are no plans for bilateral contacts in the third quarter of 2025, and has suspended interagency meetings on border cooperation. For ASEAN, the incident has caused further embarrassment as one member publicly disclosed confidential information related to another head of state without taking any concrete action.
The systemic impact is inevitable. The incident has shaken strategic trust among member states, while the ASEAN institution, which has been criticized for being “loose” and lacking binding mechanisms, has no tools to handle the crisis. It also raises a warning about the trend of personalized diplomacy, when national leaders handle strategic issues on their own without going through the official channels of their foreign ministries or taking advice from their cabinet advisers. This is a typical manifestation of the “crony politics” model that is prevalent in Southeast Asia, where policy relationships are dominated by personal networks rather than professional democratic institutions.
The Paetongtarn-Hun Sen affair is a vivid illustration of the risks of personalized politics in a semi-democratic environment. It has not only led to the collapse of a democratically elected government, but also raised questions about the sustainability of Thailand’s political system. With the military still wielding considerable soft power, the ruling coalition crumbling, and public trust eroding, the odds of Paetongtarn remaining in power are increasingly tilted in a negative direction. The scenarios that many commentators have come up with include: (1) resignation under increasing political pressure, (2) a no-confidence vote in parliament if the opposition and royalist parties muster enough votes, or (3) facing military intervention in the form of “stabilizing the situation or restoring national honor.” Whatever happens, the incident will have long-term consequences for both Thailand’s democratization process and foreign policy, and a period of crisis of confidence in international relations in the Southeast Asian region in the coming years.
