India surprised the world on 11 May 1998 by conducting three nuclear underground explosions at the Army’s Pokhran test range, about 150, Km from Pakistan border. The nuclear devices denoted were 15 Kiloton Fission, a two Kiloton low yield, and 45 Kiloton thermo nuclear. Two more tests in sub kiloton ranges were conducted on 13 May. The PM of India very proudly announced that we have become sixth nuclear Weapon state and should be treated by the world. At the same time, Indian stance towards Pakistan became aggressive. The senior Indian hierarchy started giving provocative statements. The Indian home Minister L.K Advani made a statement of Indian intention to cross the LoC under the pretext of Hot Pursuit. The Corps Cdr in Indian Illegally Occupied Kashmir (IIOK) held an unprecedented news conference and advocated his plans to attack Azad Kashmir across the LoC. As a declared nuclear state and almost negligible international reaction, India was clearly placed in a better position than Pakistan. To justify the tests, the Indian PM wrote to the President of USA that this has been done because we share borders with an overt nuclear state which committed armed aggression against us in 1962. Moreover, there are suspicions that this state has helped our Western neighbor to become a covert nuclear state. The Indian government by playing the Chinese card had tried to win over the US favors.
The PM, Nawaz Sharif was on official visit to Kazakhstan on 11 May. He talked to Gen Jehangir Karamat, Chairman JCSC and COAS, it was decided to hold meeting of Defence Committee of Cabinet (DCC) upon his arrival. However, according to Naeem Salik, (The Genesis of South Asia Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistan’s Perspective p141) Gen Karamat’s account of the event is little different. The PM called General and told him to start preparations for the tests. He suggested the PM to return to Pakistan as soon as possible, and then the decision would be taken after deliberation in DCC, the institution designed to deliberate and take such decisions. It is relevant to clarify speculation about whether the decision was taken by political leadership or was it thrust upon it by the military. The DCC meeting was convened on 13 May Chaired by the PM, attended by Foreign Minister, Finance Minister, Interior minister, Chairman JCSC, and services Chiefs. In addition Dr. A Q Khan and Dr. Samar Mubarakmand attended as reps of KRL and PAEC respectively. A lot of deliberations had taken place to decide appropriate response. The opportunity provided by India to become nuclear state and the economic challenges were pondered comprehensively. The meeting was like a war cabinet taking the decision in a crisis mode where the DCC members were evaluating all the implications of testing, under tremendous economic and international pressures. It was virtually an undeclared emergency situation. Armed forces were alerted for extra safe guards of the sensitive areas. The test tunnels prepared at Ras Koh have to be provided extra security which was entrusted to Corps Cdr at Quetta, Navy augmented the sea patrol and PAF flew Combat Air Patrol (CAP). On political front all the opposition parties were for the nuclear detonation. A unanimous resolution was passed in Senate for an effective response to the Indian tests. In accordance with Gohar Ayub, the foreign minister (Testing Times, p35), General Jehangir Karamat, views were, we could match India, but the decision to do so would have to be political.Dr Samar informed the DCC that PAEC will take 10 days to conduct the tests. Later when Dr. Ishfaq, Chairman PAEC returned from abroad gave the positive reply about the preparations. The cabinet committee meeting was called on 14 May, which supported the option of going for nuclear. Also Finance Minister was tasked to evaluate the effect of sanctions and for development of contingency plan in consultations with the concerned ministries and the state bank. He later proposed conversion of foreign currency accounts into Rupee at official exchange rate (About $ 7bn). Banks to offer attractive rates on these rupee accounts. The PM gave the final go ahead on 18 May to Chairman PAEC to carry out tests. All parties conference was called on 24 May by PM to inform about the decision of detonation which was unanimously supported (CISS Insight Special Issue on Youme e Takbeer p27-30).
The President of USA Bill Clinton had telephoned the PM, a few times and offered lucrative economic packages in case Pakistan foregoes the option. At the same time he elucidated the difficulties to be faced in case of economic sanctions. In addition President of USA, sent a delegation headed by Mr. Strobe Talbot former Deputy Security of state, and General Anthony Zinni, head of US Central Command to persuade Pakistan not to respond. The delegation was initially declined but later allowed to visit Pakistan. It met several times the PM, his ministers, Gen Jehangir Karamat but was unable to convince them not to carry out the nuclear test(Daily Dawn, June 6, 2004, Sharif Government refused to receive US- delegation). Seventeen days before the nuclear devices were detonated, were very difficult, for the PM, Ministers and Army chief to sustain external pressure not to detonate especially from USA. On 27 May a day before tests US president called the PM about 5 times not to carry out tests and used carrot and stick (Sartaj Aziz, Between Dreams and Realities, p194). In the decision making process, the government sought the views of retired defence, and economic experts as well. According to Air Marshal Asghar Khan (We Have Learnt Nothing from History p243), Nawaz Sharif sent one of his minister to seek my advice and I advised him not to do so.
On 28th May 1998 a presentation was given by National Defence College (NDC) now NDU, by participants of the War Course (1997-98) on the pros and cons of nuclear explosion, which was attended by the PM, Chairman JCSC, Services Chiefs and other senior government officials. The participants very strongly recommended to go nuclear. The members of the course and I being one of them, assessed from the expressions of the PM, other senior officials and the prevalent joyous atmosphere that Pakistan will carry out nuclear explosion very soon. At 3:15 PM the same day, the button was pressed by saying “Allah-o-Akbar” by a member of the team headed by Dr Samar Mubarakmand in the presence of Dr AQ Khan. After about 35 seconds the jolt was felt and the mountain peak started changing colour and the temperature rose to 3000 degrees Celsius. A total 5 bombs were exploded, one main and four sub kiloton. Soon after the tests, the Prime Minister announced that Pakistan has become the Seventh Nuclear Power. The sixth was exploded on 30 May, hence a befitting response. The 28th May is remembered as Youme – e- Takbeer in Pakistan. The decision making process was painstakingly contemplated taking into account all facets. However, the nation was not sufficiently prepared that it will face tremendous financial hardships due to financial sanctions nor the opposition whole heartedly supported the government after the blasts. The decision regarding foreign currency accounts (FCAs) did not augur well amongst the masses especially business men, and international community. Even today when there are financial crises people think that restrictions may be imposed on FCAs. This impression needs to be dispelled. Moreover, military especially Army has not been able to take the advantage of nuclear deterrence. The all-out war has not taken place between the two nuclear states after WW-II. The example of Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, which was a direct and dangerous confrontation between USA and erstwhile USSR when both came to nuclear threshold. The world perceived that the nuclear war is imminent but it was evaded considering nuclear devastation. The standoff between the Armed Forces of Pakistan and India has been in the past at few occasions but full fledge war did take place mainly because of nuclear deterrence. However, border skirmishes are continuing and possibilities of limited war cannot be ruled out. As a nuclear state, Pakistan military (especially Army), needs to reconsider its conventional forces development strategy in order to acquire qualitative edge over the arch adversary for limited operations under the nuclear hang over instead of maintaining quantative ratio which was before becoming a nuclear power. The nuclear capabilities of Pakistan should have been given an economic opportunity by lessening defence expenditure. Now when we are under economic pressures defence expenditure needs to be curtailed to create fiscal space.
