The day of May 13 saw India and Iran sign an important contract over the geopolitically significant port of Chabahar. As per the contract signed between Port and Maritime Organisation (PMO) of Iran and India Ports Global Ltd (IPGL), the latter would operate the Shahid Behesti terminal of Chabahar and invest approximately 120 million USD in equipping the port and even offer a credit window equivalent to 250 million USD for mutually identified projects aimed at improving the port infrastructure. The deal allowing Indian operation of the terminal for 10 years as well as automatic extension of the same at the end of the contract, is a right step in providing impetus to the much-delayed utilization of the strategic value of Chabahar vis a vis India’s interests in the Arabian Sea, Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia.
Firstly, the above agreement on Chabahar could be utilized as an opportunity to further strengthen and bolster Indo- Iranian relations. This is in the backdrop of the increasing convergence between New Delhi and Tehran on issues such as dealing with the Taliban regime, the reemergence of terrorism in the Af- Pak (Afghanistan Pakistan) region, and the need for bolstering connectivity with Central Asia and further. The importance of Iran for India can be further gleaned from S Jaishankar’s visit to Tehran in January 2024 in the backdrop of the Red Sea Crisis and its effect on global maritime shipping and the resultant adverse implications for India as well as the safety of Indians sailors traversing the conflicted waters. Considering the above, the newly bolstered Indian active interest in Chabahar could provide a pathway to utilize the potential of a strengthened Indo- Iranian relationship. The view of India as a credible partner in Chabahar was already established by IPGL’s earlier handling of Phase 1 of Shahid Beseti terminal since 2018 during which it saw the handling of 4.8 million tonnes of bulk cargo, including transshipments from Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Germany, Russia and the UAE; one could even say that the above contract is a reflection of Iranian confidence and willingness to utilize Indian expertise in port handling. This confidence could be further expanded to bolster connectivity routes to Afghanistan and Central Asia− the major objective behind the Indian interest in Chabahar in the first place. The Chabahar could also play a great role in energizing India’s Connect Central Asia policy or New Delhi’s outreach and active engagement with the Central Asian Republics (CARs). At the same time, the re-vitalization of the Chabahar port has also provided the much needed impetus to connectivity projects such as the International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC)− a multimodal corridor involving rail, road and sea lines encompassing India, Iran, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, Belarus, Oman, and Russia. Along with the INSTC, this revitalization could also jumpstart discussions on the Armenia proposed Persian Gulf- Black Sea Corridor which would offer Indian traders an alternative route to Russia involving Iran, Armenia, Georgia and Greece bypassing Azerbaijan who in recent years has developed close relationships with Pakistan and Turkey− countries who are in adversarial terms with India in the current era. Most importantly, the revitalisation of Chabahar and along with it the above two corridors allow India to overcome the traditional geographical hindrance posed by Pakistan in fostering New Delhi’s access to Central Asia and Eurasia.
Another major opportunity provided by Chabahar port is its proximity with the port of Duqm located in the southeastern seaboard of Oman, overlooking the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. As part of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between New Delhi and Muscat in 2018, Indian naval vessels have been allowed to dock and access the strategically located port for maintenance and logistical support. Combining the Indian presence (non-military) in Chabahar with the naval visit in Duqm could allow New Delhi to counter Chinese strategic designs in the Arabian Sea through the port of Gwadar. Moreover, in recent years Chabahar has also emerged as a site of Sino- Indian competition given Beijing’s interest in the port as well as growing strategic partnership between the latter and Tehran. Hence, it has become more urgent for India to step up its presence in Chabahar in order to prevent the port from falling under Chinese influence.
The strategic linkage between Chabahar and Duqm can be bolstered by utilising the stable and often cordial ties between Oman and Iran. This becomes all the more important given the latter countries’ location as well as those of Chabahar and Duqm on both sides of the crucial Straits of Hormuz− critical for India’s energy imports and security. In this regard, India and Iran can go back to the New Delhi Declaration of 2003 outlining the areas of cooperation between both the sides including defence, especially in areas such as joint naval exercises and sea- lane control and security. New Delhi should pursue strengthening naval cooperation with Tehran with regard to ensuring stability in the Arabian Sea and Straits of Hormuz through measures such as joint naval exercises between the Indian Navy and the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN) and increasing port calls by both sides. Along with this , India can also take part in the Iran- Oman naval rescue and relief drills in order to bolster New Delhi’s strategic presence in the crucial chokepoint. Given the recent Omani interest in defence collaboration with India, New Delhi could synergize the above with its pursuance of robust defence cooperation with Iran in order to bolster the unexplored potential of the latter. Such efforts could also lead to the emergence of a strategic India- Iran- Oman trilateral focused on the stability of the Straits of Hormuz.
All of the above, especially the strengthening of the linkage between the Chabahar and the Duqm ports as well as a more robust Indian presence in Chabahar and the Straits of Hormuz sit well with New Delhi’s Necklace of Diamonds strategy designed to counter China’s own String of Pearls of maritime encirclement of India in the Indian Ocean. The Necklace entails strengthening Indian presence in locations such as Chabahar and Duqm abutting the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca respectively and bolstering ties with countries such as Japan, Vietnam, Australia, Oman, and Indonesia. As part of the strategy, the Chabahar could also linked with the port of Sittwe in Myanmar whose operations were recently taken over by IPGL last month. The linkage between Chabahar and Sittwe could help the landlocked Central Asian countries and Southeast Asia as well as the landlocked India’s Northeastern states to gain access to each other’s markets while solidifying India’s role as a central node in the maritime networks stretching from Eurasia to Southeast Asia. However, the above can only be realised after the return of stability in Myanmar, especially in the Rakhine state nearby Sittwe.
The recent border skirmishes between Iran and Pakistan in January 2024 and the resultant tensions between Tehran and Islamabad could be channelised by New Delhi and Tehran to ensure and fast track the development of the Chabahar as a viable and better alternative to Gwadar for Central Asian countries seeking to reduce their dependence on the latter in search of a warm water port. Moreover, the resultant momentum of cooperation from Chabahar could further cement Indo- Iranian ties and positions on common challenges posed by Pakistan such as border skirmishes and terrorism.
Finally, a major hindrance to realising the potential of the new Chabahar deal is the threat of ‘potential risk’ of US sanctions on ‘any entity, anyone considering business deals with Iran’. Despite the waiver offered to Indian involvement in Chabahar under the Iran Freedom Counterproliferation Act (IFCA) 2012, the 2019 ‘Maximum Pressure’ campaign by the Trump administration and the increasing US- Iran conflict put the status of Chabahar in limbo. The recent announcement of sanctions by Washington immediately after the signing of the Chabahar deal, although without specifically naming India, does point to hardening of attitudes in Washington vis a vis Iran given the latter’s role in the recent West Asia crisis− a fact which New Delhi have to take into account given its own increasing strategic partnership with US. This explains New Delhi’s response to the US highlighting the importance of Chabahar for regional connectivity and asking Washington to be ‘appreciative of the larger relevance of the port’. However, should the US continue with its insistence on sanctions, India should not be deterred but instead hold on to the resolve of realising the strategic benefits accrued by Chabahar for its own interests. This would also bolster New Delhi’s image as a reliable partner in the eyes of Iran, thereby putting more resolve to bilateral ties. On its part, Washington should avoid pushing India to an edge and instead realise the value of a more robust Indian presence in Iran and Arabian Sea vis a vis China.
While events such as the tragic demise of Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi and its ramifications in the politics of West Asia might have some spillover in Chabahar, yet India must stand tall and ‘make up its mind’ to ensure that ‘the distance between Kashi and Kashan is only half a step’− a couplet attributed to Ghalib which was repeated by PM Modi in 2016.
