The shocking death of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash on May 19th has pushed the nation into a sudden succession crisis, with potential ramifications for the neighborhood and beyond.
Raisi, was known as a trusted figurehead to represent establishment interests, displaying a hardline stance in putting down the 2022 protests, was considered a possible successor of the 85-year-old Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
His death, along with that of Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian and several other officials, comes at a critical moment of regional and domestic tension.
Iran is not typically a country where presidential deaths occur by accident. However, it is a nation where aircraft failures are not uncommon due to deteriorating infrastructure and the scarcity of parts and technology related to the raft of sanctions against the country. In the past, similar crashes have claimed the lives of at least two cabinet ministers and two high-ranking military commanders in 2006 and 2011.
President Raisi’s helicopter, which also carried Iran’s foreign minister and two top regional officials, was flying through a notoriously foggy and mountainous region in northwestern Iran, with weather so challenging it took the rescue crews many hours to locate the crash site.
Though there is no reason to doubt the accidental nature of the crash, it is inevitable that the public will develop theories. Historical air incidents that claimed the lives of high-ranking political figures in China (1971), Pakistan (1988), and Poland (2010) remain subjects of speculation. In this instance, as in those cases, a key question will likely fuel the conjecture: Who stands to gain politically from Raisi’s death?
Raisi’s demise would shift the dynamics among factions within the Islamic Republic. As per the Iranian constitution, his vice-president, Mohammad Mokhber, would step into the presidential role. Additionally, a council comprising Mohammad Mokhber, Mohammad Qalibaf, and judiciary chief Mohseni Ezhei would be responsible for arranging new elections scheduled for June 28.
The prospects for Iran’s political structure are far from promising. The hard-liner establishment around Khamenei’s increasingly personalistic rule prevents the country from conducting necessary reforms to end its prolonged international isolation, achieve peaceful international relations in the Middle East, and enhance the liberties and welfare of the Iranian people.
In particular, the regime’s indifference to the Iranian people’s deepening socio-economic problems and demands for more liberties does not seem sustainable, both for the Iranian people and the regime itself. There remains a significant gap between the aspirations of the youth and the entrenched powers. Hence, a reformist president might ease both the domestic and international tensions strangling the country. Although unlikely, Khamenei’s support for a moderate candidate still remains an option on the table.
In the moderate/reformist camp, Hassan Rouhani, Ali Larijani, and Javad Zarif seem to be the most prominent candidates.
Hassan Rouhani, who served as president from 2013 to 2021, was a moderate reformist who advocated for Iran’s opening and signed the JCPOA, or the ‘nuclear deal.’
Ali Larijani was the Parliament Speaker from 2008 to 2020 and an ally of former President Rouhani who played a key role in passing the nuclear deal.
Javad Zarif, the former Foreign Minister from 2013 to 2021, is one of the most popular politicians in Iran. His views on foreign policy, including the need for a deal with the US, and his negotiation skills in reaching the pact in 2015, contributed to his popularity.
However, prominent reformist figures such as Hassan Rouhani, Ali Larijani, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, and Javad Zarif, as well as hard-liners like the legendary Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, were either banned from the presidential race in 2021 or have been ousted from the top official positions by the hard-liner establishment.
In the conservative/hard-liner camp, Mohammad Qalibaf, and Saeed Jalili appear as the likeliest candidates to succeed Raisi.
Qalibaf’s aspirations are widely known; he has pursued the presidency multiple times since 2005. More inclined towards technocracy than ideology, Qalibaf served as a commander in the IRGC during the Iran-Iraq War and is likely to garner support from within its ranks. His extensive tenure as Tehran’s mayor from 2005 to 2017 demonstrated both competence and instances of alleged corruption.
Saeed Jalili, a prominent member of the principlist camp, served as the chief nuclear negotiator from 2007 for several years. Known for his radical stance, he opposes any interaction with the US and agreements with Washington. He made two unsuccessful attempts to become president in 2013 and 2021.
Qalibaf or Jalili’s leadership would mean inferiority and total obedience to the Supreme Leader, resulting in the continuity of the status quo.
In terms of regional implications, a reformist government would likely turn inward to focus on addressing grave economic problems and justice to restore welfare and domestic stability.
On the other hand, a potential hard-liner government would not be more confrontational than before but would nonetheless continue its disruptive actions in the Middle East through proxies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen.
Now, it appears we are on the verge of witnessing a limited power struggle in which different factions will showcase their strength. Since individuals must undergo scrutiny by the Guardian Council before becoming official candidates, the fundamental direction of Iranian policy is unlikely to shift significantly with the president who succeeds Raisi.
The real power struggle, and a potential change of direction, may only occur after Khamenei.
