Authors: Prof. Kashif Hasan Khan and Marin Ekstrom
In the past two decades, China and India have ascended to the positions of the world’s second and fifth-largest economies, respectively. These two Asian powers have focused on international corridors, especially in the Indian Ocean region, to bolster their influence in terms of trade and security.
The Indian Ocean region includes 28 countries spanning three continents, including some of the most rapidly growing economies in the world. The region possesses some of the world’s most valuable natural resources, such as 16.8% of the world’s oil reserves and 27.9% of global natural gas reserves.
China has pursued a “Strings of Pearls” maritime strategy to protect its Indian Ocean strategic interests. The first dimension of the strategy seeks to expand the Maritime Silk Road via the Thai Canal, and subsequently circumvent Singapore’s Strait of Malacca. Given how the US and India possess strategic footholds in the strait, the Thai Canal could allow China to disrupt this status quo by providing access to its navy for deploying ships between its new South China Sea base and the Indian Ocean. This new passageway would significantly reduce transit time, as Chinese ships have usually had to travel an additional 700 miles south to pass Malaysia.
The second component of the String of Pearls strategy involves major investment in the construction and long-term lease of ports in coastal South Asian and African countries like Bangladesh, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Tanzania. One of the most notable outcomes of China’s port investment strategy is Bab al-Mandab: in January 2016, China signed a 10-year deal with Djibouti to build a support station for the Chinese navy near this port.
In response to China’s engagements in the Indian Ocean region, India has established its own “Necklace of Diamond” strategy to bolster naval cooperation, engagements, development aid, and investments with Indian Ocean nations.
It is a component of Prime Minister Narenda Modi’s larger “Act East” plan, which intends to strengthen ties with ASEAN and address concerns about China’s maritime dominance. India has established facilities in Duqm Port, Oman; the Mozambique channel; the Strait of Malacca; Sunda Strait; Lombok Strait; and the Changi naval base. It also gained military access to Indonesia’s Sabang Port in 2018.
Furthermore, India has placed a significant emphasis on the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) alliance it shares with the US, Japan, and Australia, as these countries utilize this forum to cooperate in strategic intelligence and military exercises.
Perhaps the most visible arena of Sino-Indian competition in the Indian Ocean are the dual port projects of the China-driven Gwadar port in Pakistan and the India-led Chabahar port in Iran.
With regard to Gwadar, China is highly protective of the port to secure its trade route and maritime vulnerabilities. It has loaned Pakistan billions of dollars to not only gain indirect control over the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), but also to secure ownership of Gwadar port for at least 40 years and gain access to a 3,021-kilometer strategic crude oil pipeline from Gwadar port to Xinjiang.
Gwadar symbolizes the mutual advantages gained by Sino-Pakistan cooperation, as Pakistan’s infrastructure, high-tech sector, market potential, and standard of living benefit from Chinese energy resources and connectivity opportunities. Nevertheless, the project has also faced backlash within the country– especially amongst sub-national Baluchi communities near Gwadar- due to perceived notions of Beijing’s exploitation and Islmabad’s corruption and complacency.
Meanwhile, India has utilized Chabahar, an Iranian port located 80 km from Gwadar, to counter the Sino-Pakistan alliance. Chabahar not only strengthens ties with Iran and Afghanistan, but also opens up Indian markets to Central Asia.
The March 2021 Suez Canal blockage demonstrated how Chabahar port could serve as an effective alternative to fast and cheap international shipping. Its role in the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a multimodal network linking India, Iran, and Russia, could expand interregional trade to markets as wide-reaching as Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Europe. Washington even lifted US sanctions on Chabahar as a means of promoting regional trade and stability, with hopes that it could help ease tensions in volatile Afghanistan. Chabahar has also served as a forum for interregional cooperation: India, Afghanistan, Iran, and Uzbekistan created a working group to use the transport hub jointly. The Chabahar port expansion is critical to India’s connectivity strategy, especially since it grants it leverage over China through Chabahar port and Iran.
However, China has also attempted to gain an upper hand in Chabahar, as it has proposed using the port to construct a railway connection from China to Iran via Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan to Tehran. Given the sheer potential of Chinese financing- especially compared to the more fickle nature of Indian investment- Iran may lean more towards China if it feels Beijing can better provide for its national interests.
Sino-Indian strategic rivalry in the Indian Ocean will define a major zone of competition in the ensuing decades, with Gwadar port and Chabahar port being core areas to keep an eye on. Given the vital geostrategic nature of the region- in terms of national make-up and natural resources- the outcome of China, India, or perhaps other emerging actors gaining the strategic edge in the Indian Ocean will have critical global ramifications.
