Border Escalation Reveals Another Dimension of Iran-Pakistan Relations

In January this year, Iran and Pakistan exchanged missile strikes inside each other's border territories in Balochistan — a region located at the crossroads of the Middle East, South Asia, and Central Asia.

In January this year, Iran and Pakistan exchanged missile strikes inside each other’s border territories in Balochistan — a region located at the crossroads of the Middle East, South Asia, and Central Asia. This unprecedented development has highlighted the Baloch dimension in the relations between the two supposedly “brotherly” and “friendly” neighbors.

On January 16, Iran carried out strikes on what it described as militant bases in the Sabz Koh area of Panjgur district in the southwestern Balochistan province of Pakistan. Two days later, Pakistan responded by carrying out strikes on alleged militant hideouts in the Saravan area in Sistan-Baluchestan province in southeastern Iran. The strikes killed at least 11 people and marked the highest level of tensions ever witnessed between the two states.

For long, Iran and Pakistan each has alleged that the Baloch militant groups active in its Balochistan province have sanctuaries across the border in the other part of Balochistan from where they carry out attacks inside its territory. Also, this is not the first time Iran has carried out strikes inside Pakistan. Cross-border attacks by Iran have been taking place repeatedly since 2009. However, for the first time, Pakistan has retaliated with strikes inside Iranian territory.

Balochistan is a country divided between Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Iran and Pakistan share a history of conflict and strained relations with their respective Baloch populations since the annexation of their parts of Balochistan in 1928 and 1948 respectively. The demands of Baloch nationalists range from autonomy to independence — both include the element of self-rule.

Last week, Tehran claimed to have targeted bases of Jaish al-Adl (Army of Justice) inside Pakistan, and Iranian sources boasted to have destroyed its headquarters. Similarly, Pakistan claimed to target terrorist hideouts used by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) and the killing of several terrorists. On the other hand, all three groups refuted these claims.

Jaish al-Adl is a religiously motivated Baloch-Sunni insurgent group in Iran that claims to struggle for the national and religious rights of the Baloch-Sunni minority and aims to overthrow the Shiite theocratic regime of Iran. The BLA and the BLF are nationalist armed groups active in Pakistan who define their goal as being the independence of Balochistan.

Contrary to the claims made by both states, most of the victims of their strikes came out to be women and children. Iranian strikes killed two Baloch children, while the retaliatory strikes conducted by Pakistan resulted in the killing of at least 9 Baloch, including three women and four children. The targets in both strikes appear to be homes of Baloch dissidents, instead of militant bases.

After Iranian strikes inside its territory, Pakistan termed the attacks as a blatant violation of its sovereignty. It recalled its ambassador from Iran and asked the Iranian Ambassador not to return to Pakistan. Similarly, when Pakistan retaliated by launching strikes inside Iran, Tehran condemned them as unbalanced and unacceptable. Yet, the tension in the relations between the two states de-escalated in the same dramatic way in which it had risen.

The next day, foreign ministers of both countries talked on a telephone call and agreed to de-escalate the situation. As a result, diplomatic ties were restored, and their ambassadors reassumed offices in the respective capitals on January 26. This was followed by a visit of the Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian to Pakistan on January 29, at the invitation of his Pakistani counterpart. During his visit, the top Iranian diplomat met with the highest-level officials of Pakistan, and both sides agreed on the immediate appointment of military liaison officers in each other’s country to improve security and intelligence cooperation. In his press talk, Abdollahian blamed “third countries” for leading and supporting militants located in the border regions of Iran and Pakistan.

Two days before the Iranian foreign minister’s visit to Pakistan, unidentified gunmen killed nine Pakistani workers in Saravan area — the district where Pakistan carried out missile strikes — of Iran’s Sistan-Baluchestan province. However, this could not damage the spirit of mending the ties between the states, though it might have provided a leverage to Pakistan during Abdollahian’s visit.

Interestingly, even at the peak of tensions, both states did not blame each other for mala fide intentions and continued to refer to each other as “brotherly” and “friendly” countries. They only condemned one another’s attacks and complained about the presence of militant sanctuaries in each other’s territories — without alleging state patronage to them. It signaled their desperation to restore ties as soon as possible to set a record in de-escalation in the Guinness World Records.

Tehran and Islamabad have opted to suppress the Baloch question by force. Iran has been extremely sensitive to curbing even a semblance of Baloch nationalism. The erstwhile Pahlavi monarchy of Iran was apprehensive of any progress toward Baloch autonomy even in Pakistan. In several instances, the Shah influenced the Baloch policy of Pakistan by pressurizing and aiding Islamabad to suppress the Baloch. It historically led to cooperation between Tehran and Islamabad on the Baloch problem. However, in the new circumstances, both are suspicious of each other.

The equation of Pak-Iran relations transformed after the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. The rise of a Shia theocracy in Iran that desired to export its ideology and expand its influence across the region alarmed not only the countries in the Middle East but also Pakistan, the Sunni-majority neighbor of Iran with a significant Shia population. Pakistan’s close ties with the Arab states and the necessity to maintain a calm western border with Iran have led it to maintain a delicate balance in relations with Iran. On that account, Pakistan helped Iran in arresting quondam Jundullah (Soldiers of God) leader Abdolmalek Rigi, arrested and handed over his brother Abdolhamid Rigi to Iran, and killed Mullah Omer who was considered by Iran as a senior leader of Jaish al-Adl. Pakistan has also downplayed the repeated cross-border strikes carried out by Iran from time to time.

Similarly, Iran downplayed the recent Pakistani strikes by emphasizing that the victims were “Pakistani nationals”.

Ideally, both states would still desire to cooperate to eliminate the Baloch question since both have been facing armed insurgencies in Balochistan for decades now. Similarly, China has important stakes in this region in the shape of the multibillion-dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor in Pakistan and the 25-year strategic cooperation agreement with Iran. In June 2023, China, Pakistan, and Iran held trilateral security consultations in Beijing and exchanged views on regional counter-terrorism situations and “joint efforts to crack down on cross-border terrorists”. However, in Pak-Iran relations, some variables lie out of their bilateral equation — mainly in the Iran-Arab relations — which restrain several prospective areas in their mutual ties.

The dilemma of the Baloch is that they are vulnerable to cooperation as well as conflict between Iran and Pakistan. In the case of cooperation, they have historically been the target, and in conflict, they become the ultimate victims – as depicted during the recent escalation.

In future engagements between Iran and Pakistan, each would seek to press the other for cooperation in dealing with its difficulties in Balochistan. But it would require finding out ways and means within their existing bilateral equation. In another scenario, the exchange of cross-border strikes may continue if Iran perceives that course to be manageable.

However, what Iran and Pakistan need to realize is that their difficulties in relations with the Baloch are a creation of their own. To resolve the Baloch problem, instead of looking across borders, both states need to change their oppressive policies and colonial approach towards the Baloch by addressing their grievances and recognizing their right to self-rule.

Samand Muhammadshahi
Samand Muhammadshahi
Samand Muhammadshahi is a researcher based in Balochistan. He holds an M.Phil. in Government and Public Policy. He can be reached on X (former twitter) @SamandKhan.