Reexamining the Sino–Pyongyang Nexus: Ambivalence and Economic Interdependence

Sino-North Korean relationship, once described as “close as lips and teeth,” reached an unprecedented low point in 2017.

Since the crucible of the 1950–53 Korean War, the Sino–Pyongyang entanglement has been intricately woven and characterized by ambivalence. Even though China is clearly uncomfortable with the close nuclear threat that North Korea poses, the Middle Kingdom does not want to hasten the collapse of its neighbor’s government. This reluctance stems from Beijing’s strategic calculation, according to which North Korea takes on the role of a geopolitical fortress against the US, whose significant military presence in South Korea is conspicuous. Meanwhile, China becomes the central pillar of North Korea’s economic relations and is by far its largest trading partner. This economic mutualism not only supports the Kim Jong UN regime, but it also functions as a strong disincentive to the application of harsh international sanctions. Beijing’s strong opposition to harsh measures is motivated by its deep desire to prevent the North Korean regime from collapsing, which could trigger a massive flood of refugees across the long 870-mile Sino-Korean border. A backdrop of strategic complexity and deft diplomatic maneuvering sets up the delicate dance between these geopolitical actors. The proposition suggests that the isolated Kim administration may be more willing to explore economic prospects, most likely through bilateral cooperation and foreign investment with its neighboring state.

Furthermore, the Sino-North Korean relationship, once described as “close as lips and teeth,” reached an unprecedented low point in 2017. This low point came at the same time as Pyongyang’s hostile posture toward the US reached a fever pitch, bringing the Korean Peninsula dangerously close to war. Beijing’s strong warnings and support for tightened U.N. Security Council sanctions against North Korea were a sharp break from their previously cordial relations. Beijing saw North Korea’s apparent disregard for China’s strategic interests. Therefore, U.S. officials claim that a number of Chinese citizens are allegedly involved in covert operations ranging from money laundering to obtaining supplies for North Korean weapons, while a large number of North Koreans are allegedly employed by purported Chinese front companies. Beyond labor relations, this mutually beneficial partnership extends to North Korea’s purchases of restricted commodities and technology, which are heavily dependent on China’s financial system and businesses. Records indicate that access to the international financial system and the purchase of US dollars are made easier by Chinese intermediaries.

A paradigm shift and a realignment in geopolitics can be seen in the reestablishment of relations between China and North Korea. The US will be less dependent on China to spearhead this campaign as a result of this fundamental shift, undermining the long-held assumption that Beijing will always support tighter sanctions and pressure on Pyongyang. With better ties to North Korea, China is attempting to take the lead in negotiations for a potential peace regime on the Korean Peninsula or the end of the Korean War. With this calculated action, the US military’s rationale for its involvement in Korea is intended to be aligned with that of China and North Korea. Similarly, China’s diplomatic outreach has proven extremely beneficial to efforts aimed at stopping North Korea’s nuclear program. China’s economic involvement reveals a two-pronged approach, ostensibly motivated by a desire to solidify strategic superiority over North Korea. While it operates under the assumption that international economic strangulation would not affect North Korea’s nuclear pursuits—which are safeguarded by the regime—even in the event of a famine, it simultaneously aims to increase its influence.

Lastly, the efforts of Washington to force Beijing to apply more economic pressure to Pyongyang by means of North Korea’s nuclear and missile development have taken the form of specific sanctions on organizations and individuals involved in the North Korean nuclear program. The actions include prohibiting North Korean money from being deposited into Chinese banks, examining the mineral and metal export sectors that are essential to Sino-Korean trade, and punishing Chinese companies that are suspected of encouraging North Korean money laundering against sanctions. Whereas, China’s main goal, within its broader purview, is to protect its interests as a nation by taking the lead in any future settlement pertaining to the Korean Peninsula. Even though it is still unclear how much influence China actually has over North Korea’s behavior, the recent return of high-level talks between the two regimes confirms China’s indisputable importance in this intricate geopolitical environment.

Nadir Ali
Nadir Ali
Nadir Ali is associated with the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI). He has written for Pakistan Today, Pakistan Observer, Global Affairs, and numerous other publishers. He tweets at @hafiznadirali7 and can be reached at hafiznadirali7[at]gmail.com