This essay focuses on analyzing how the currently ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war could possibly become one source of threat to the Arctic indigenous people’s human security, especially in regards on how said war manages to destabilize the Arctic Council (AC) as the region’s main inter-governmental cooperation body. On 24th February, 2022, Russia officially announced its military aggression towards Ukraine (Al Jazeera, 2022), which started a post-Cold War open warfare that has been going on for more than 10 months. This war, not only destabilizing both domestic and foreign affairs of its belligerents, also influences other actors, nation-state or not, around the globe. One of the non-belligerents that certainly gets hit by the impact of this war is the Arctic indigenous people. Ever since the war began, news about the discord and schism inside the Arctic indigenous communities has been popping up (Last, 2022), further exacerbating the security threat caused by the COVID-19 pandemic (Arctic Council, 2020b). This phenomenon thus raised a question: is there a link between the commencement of Russo-Ukrainian war and the human security of Arctic’s indigenous population?
Rethinking Human Security: The Arctic and its Many Insecurities
To answer that question, this essay employs the concept of human security proposed by Gary King and Christopher J.L. Murray in Rethinking Human Security (2001) journal article. In said article, King and Murray argue that the perspective of what constitutes as ‘security’ is currently ongoing a transition from its traditional, nation-state dependent conventional definition; if the definition focuses solely on the integrity of national territory, ‘human security’ focuses more on the fulfillment of human security on the individual level. This focus on individual human security, King and Murray also argue, will also contribute to realize the fulfillment of human security for the whole community (King & Murray, 2001:606). In order to formulate the extents of human security that is intended to be fulfilled, King and Murray provide two indicators (King & Murray, 2001:592-595): 1) Domains of wellbeing, that is, attributes that are deemed vital for human survival, in which King and Murray categorize indicators such as income, health, political freedom, and democracy (King & Murray, 2001:598); 2) Generalized poverty, the threshold of domains of wellbeing’s deprivation for human individuals. Based on such indicators given by the concept, there are a few urgent human security problems that could be observed in the Arctic indigenous people’s daily live, experienced across the Arctic territories in all eight Arctic littoral states.
The first threat to the indigenous Arctic population is mental disorders, specifically those that cause suicidal tendencies. This threat is directly connected to the ‘health’ indicator of domains of well being that King and Murray posits. According to STAT, a US-based health topic-related news website, suicidal tendencies are often observed specifically among the Sami people, with most of them residing in Sweden (Schreiber, 2016): around half of the adult population suffer from anxiety disorder and four time more likely to have suicidal thoughts than their non-indigenous counterparts. The representative of the Inuit people that reside in Alaska, Canada, Greenland, and Russia also complained that suicide already becomes a sort of ‘pandemic’ in the Artic indigenous community, even before their life conditions worsen because of COVID-19 (Arctic Council, 2020). Mental health disorders are also identified in the Arctic indigenous populace living in the rest of Arctic littoral states (Rönkä, 2022).
Other than that, the rate of unemployment also becomes a big problem for the Arctic indigenous people, especially since the occurrence of the COVID-19 pandemic. Even though the general unemployment rate of the indigenous Arctic populace across the seven littoral states is no more than 2-3% (Turunen, 2019b), there is a staggering exception: in Canada, indigenous Arctic population’s unemployment rate already reached 16.8% per August 2020, 5 percents higher than their non-Arctic counterparts. It is said that such an exorbitant unemployment rate is a by-product of structural barriers applied in Canada’s whole society that make it more difficult for Arctic indigenous people to gain employment (Benning, 2020). Such inequality of employment chance between various Arctic indigenous people groups that live across the territories of eight nation-states really drives home about the urgency of establishing inter-governmental organization in order to keep the Arctic indigenous people’s needs and interests heard and realized; income gain is one of the indicators of domains of wellbeing proposed by King and Murray, after all.
Then, the main problem that possibly has the most widespread damage to the indigenous Arctic population’s overall fulfillment of domains of well-being are environmental and living space problems of Arctic indigenous people, which included but not limited to climate change, various kinds of pollution, and indigenous people-government conflict over natural resources exploration and management. The last kind is especially damaging, especially when considering the possible multi-dimensional damage that inappropriate handling of natural resources could cause in both short and long term. However, that does not mean that the other aforementioned threat is any less important. According to a report from the Russian Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring written in 2022, there has been 5 Celsius-degree temperature increase at the span of Russian Arctic coastline since 1998 (Devyatkin, 2022). The climate change is caused by rampant pollution in the Arctic region (Mead, 2022) propagated by irresponsible practices of natural resources extraction (Macalister, 2011). This phenomenon becomes a legit security threat because of its impact on the environment, especially its contribution in raising the sea level (Technical University of Denmark, 2019), a condition that could drown indigenous peoples’ settlements. At the end of the day, the practice causes threat of eviction for Arctic indigenous people, with governments removing them from their traditional living space (Mirovalev, 2022). Thus, this problem affects all components of Arctic indigenous people’s domains of wellbeing.
The Arctic Council and Arctic People’s Human Security
Then, what role the AC plays regarding the problems of human security threats that Arctic indigenous people face? AC is currently the only inter-governmental organization in said region, established by eight Arctic littoral states, built and operates with a set of unique rules and norms that enable it to navigate many issues in Arctic between the involvement of big actors: other than eight Artic littoral states, AC also acknowledges the membership of six non-nation state groups of Arctic indigenous people’s representatives in the AC, giving the local communities a say in the AC’s policies (Arctic Council, 2015). This membership for six representative groups is a fixed attribute of the organization, in which this is done to ensure the fair representation of Arctic indigenous people (Arctic Council, 2015). In practice, these six representational organizations are always involved in the processes of formulation and implementation of the AC’s Arctic policies (Arctic Council, 2021).
For 25 years since its inception in 1996, AC already exercised its duty as an indispensable ‘channel’ for Arctic indigenous people to expand their communities’ capabilities to improve many aspects of their life, in which through this process they also become better at fulfilling their domains of well-being (Arctic Council, 2021). A few of the newer programs that the AC already did are: 1) ‘Local2Global: Circumpolar collaboration for suicide prevention’, a special forum to enable discussions and research regarding suicidal tendencies suffered by people from the community of Arctic indigenous people (Arctic Council, 2020); 2) ‘Arctic Resilience Forum’ as a continuous workshop facility to train the Arctic people’s youth to be future leaders of their respective communities (Arctic Council, 2021:35-37); 3) Cultural preservation through immortalizing the languages of Arctic indigenous tribes (Arctic Council, 2021:38-41); 4) Preservation of Arctic culinary culture in order to create a sustainable economic cycle and living space for Arctic indigenous people, while ensuring a sustainable Arctic ecosystem (Arctic Council, 2021:46-49).
Then, what does the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war have to do with the Arctic Council, more specifically about how it affects its work in ensuring Arctic indigenous people’s human security? As already described above, The AC already put a great deal of effort through its many programs and initiatives to increase awareness and move forward in fulfilling the Arctic indigenous people’s domains of wellbeing. Through elaboration in the previous paragraph of this writing, it is evident that AC is a principal political entity in the mission of enhancing the local populace’s human security, as this regime is the only channel for Artic indigenous people’s representatives to influence the littoral Arctic states’ handling of the region through negotiation chances provided through their status as permanent members of the organization. The existence of said regime as an official representative of the region’s interests becomes even more important for the indigenous people as researchers keep finding profitable natural resource wells hidden beneath Arctic ancestral lands (Rowe, 2022), which might become initiative for various actors to exploit the region. This chance to negotiate is also included in one of the domains of wellbeing indicators, which regrettably still find difficulties to be fulfilled in every single littoral Artic states individually (Arctic Centre, 2022). Because of those reasons, when AC experiences a crisis that could impede its day-to-day operations and endanger the solidarity of its member states to cooperate, the damage would also be felt by the Arctic indigenous people, especially in the matter of their human security.
Arctic Council in a Stalemate: Threats to Human Security
Unfortunately, that very scenario is currently unfolding in the Arctic; not long after Russia announced its decision to launch a military aggression to Ukraine, the United States (US) and its Arctic allies immediately show opposition to such decision: per 3rd of March, 2022, the US, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Iceland issued out a joint statement to boycott Russia’s chairmanship of AC and all of its activities in said organization as a ‘payback’ for the Russian aggression to Ukraine (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Moreso, they also issued out an agenda to form a new Arctic regime separate from the AC without Russia in it, but invited the six Arctic indigenous people representative organizations to join (U.S. Department of State, 2022). This could potentially become a substantial threat to the Arctic indigenous people’s human security because of a few reasons.
The first reason is that the AC’s consensus-based mechanism of decision making (Arctic Council, 2015) makes it impossible for Russia as the AC’s current chairman to proceed with either existing or planned future AC programs because of the other seven littoral Arctic states’ boycott. Even though said Arctic states is currently trying to “look for a modality that will enable a limited form of cooperation through AC’s programs” (Global Affairs Canada, 2022), up until now there has not been any Arctic states that tries to resume cooperation in the Arctic with Russia as AC’s chairman. Meanwhile, there has been no initiatives from the Russian side either to start a restoration of good relations with the other AC member states in order to restart the progress of AC’s programs; instead, Russia issued out a threat to the other AC member states regarding the consequences of their action to boycott AC’s activities (The Arctic, 2022). Because of that, up until this day activity in the AC is still stagnant, shown through the AC’s official news that has not been updated since 1st of March 2022 (Arctic Council, 2022).
Second, such stagnation then creates problem, because the US and other six Arctic littoral states’ agenda to build another regime in the Arctic without Russia’s cooperation is simply unrealistic. Even though there are seven out of eight Arctic littoral countries that are on board with this plan, a good relationship with Russia and its help is vital to deal with various complex Arctic issues. Out of all Arctic littoral states, Russia has the largest Arctic territory, both land and sea (Bonikowsky, 2012; Wang & Roto, 2019), second largest Artic indigenous people population after the US (The Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON), 2021), and possessing one of the biggest Arctic natural resources reserves in its national territory, especially the infamously lucrative petroleum, coal, and natural gas (Turunen, 2019). Other than that, Russia also one of the countries that already showcases its readiness to explore said region. This commitment is mostly apparent through the staggering amount of ice breaker ship in Russia’s possession which amounts to more than 40 vessels, far surpassing all other Arctic littoral states’ vessels combined even including the US (Pane dan Romaine, 2021). This enables Russia to monopolize the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which is planned as a big new trade route in the North area and prophesized to be the main connector of the Arctic region with the world at large (The Economist, 2018). Based on those advantages that Russia has, it is nigh impossible to imagine a concrete, coherent Arctic cooperation without the Kremlin’s involvement.
Third, the longer the Arctic region’s current vacuum of power continues, then the region’s stability would become more compromised, thus diverting the focus and priority of Arctic actors from the Arctic indigenous people’s human security to the more traditional concern about national security of each Arctic littoral states. This condition then would ‘invite’ outside players and further threatening the region’s stability. One of the most apparent said threat is the possibility of a few opportunistic AC observer states to benefit from AC’s stagnation and its uncertain future. This is due to the observer states’ position as non-littoral Arctic states that are given roles by the AC only to help the permanent members of the regime to conduct their Arctic policies, but not to decide how the policies would be formulated and implemented (Arctic Council, 2015).
The indication of this latent threat getting ever closer to become a reality could be seen from the emergence of Russia’s attempts at cooperation with two AC observer states, China and India, outside of the AC’s institutional frame (Khorrami, 2022; Staalesen, 2022). These two observer states have a national interest that has very close link towards the abundance of natural resources in the Arctic region (Stephen dan Stephen, 2020; Koshy, 2022), and this interest aligns perfectly with Russia’s interest. Some of the recent cooperations that Russia had with those two countries are the construction of floating power unit at Chukotka (one of Russia’s Arctic territories) with China (BRICS, 2022) and cooperation in scientific projects with India (Chowdhury, 2022). Because those cooperations are done outside of the AC’s institutional frame, they would be done in a manner that disregards the components of human security already agreed upon by both Arctic littoral states and Arctic indigenous people’s six representative groups; there has been ongoing cases of pollution rampant in the Arctic ancestral lands (Borshchevskaia et.al., 2022) and threats of eviction from said ancestral lands directed towards its original inhabitants (Mirovalev, 2022) that becomes increasingly out of control since the Russo-Ukrainian war (Borshchevskaia et.al., 2022).
Based on arguments already delivered above, this essay concludes that the longer ongoing AC activity and power vacuum continues due to the Russo-Ukrainian war, the risk of Arctic indigenous people losing their human security gets even higher. This essay comes to this conclusion because AC has an indispensable role as the sole institutional channel of representation for the Arctic indigenous people to fulfill their domains of wellbeing when each Arctic littoral states’ domestic institutions fail to do said role. If the activity vacuum of the AC happens, Arctic indigenous people’s communities will become more vulnerable to not only neglect of, but also active threats to their human security through various actors’ interference in the region to maximize the extraction of Arctic natural resources. This process will consequently degrade their domains of wellbeing potentially passing the generalized poverty threshold, if left without further actions.
BRICS Cooperation Mechanism Gives Hand to Global South
The 15th BRICS summit has kicked off in Johannesburg, South Africa, on August 22, and the following year will bring the summit to Kazan, the capital of Russia’s Tatarstan region.
As of now, more than 40 countries openly demonstrate their willingness to join the informal grouping, as the current BRICS host South Africa recently stated. In this respect, it’s worth asking what the BRICS is and what the BRICS is not.
The BRICS that started as a grouping of fast-growing economies not only withstood the test of time, but also fully transformed its identity since the first summit in 2009. Remaining an informal exclusive group, the BRICS pushes forward discussion on more than 30 distinct topics including several ones not presented in the agenda of the G20, namely regional security, tourism, and culture. It does not make the BRICS an alliance of any kind—it lacks formality including any form of sanctioning in a case of non-compliance with the decisions made on annual summits.
Neither the BRICS is a club for groundless discussions, as most of the multilateral decisions are implemented quite successfully, according to the results of a multi-year study conducted by a joint collective of Russia-Canada think-tanks, indicating average compliance surpassing 75 percent.
Also it would be too much to think of the BRICS in general and the BRICS-inspired multilateral institutions such as the New Development Bank—the group has never claimed to replace any of global organizations. The idea here is not to substitute but to compensate some of the most significant drawbacks of the international order.
The BRICS cannot promote obligatory decisions, but it has great potential in formulating the common ground in some spheres of high importance. I assume that the BRICS might be a suitable place to formulate new approaches to the Internet governance system reform, since the discussion on its key aspects (cybersecurity in particular) stagnates.
The abovementioned study shows that since the introduction of information technologies-related agenda to the BRICS in 2015, the average compliance score has surpassed 90 percent, indicating willingness of the member states to cooperate. China and Russia are the leading parties in this respect, contributing the most to the agenda development.
Taking into account a growing interest towards the BRICS from other countries of the world, it’s worth discussing the establishment of a new global partnership on the Internet governance reform with some “BRICS characteristics.” The BRICS might give a hand to those who would inevitably become the emerging forces in the Internet governance in decades to come, thanks to continuing economic transition and population growth—African and Latin American countries.
The brand-new partnership presents an attractive alternative to previously launched exclusive formats that mostly ignored the interests of the developing world. Voices from the Global South would grant recognition and support to the BRICS multilateral initiatives, among which might be the reform of some of the key Internet governance institutions including the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers and the Internet Society, making them more transparent and accountable.
Also, the information security agenda might flourish without direct interference from the Western parties which intend to keep their privileged negotiation position during talks on cybersecurity and cyberwarfare.
Any tangible result is achievable if only the discussed agenda becomes the main working track within the broad BRICS agenda. South Africa’s presidency this year and forthcoming Russia’s presidency in 2024 will be a high time to start.
From our partner RIAC
How Putin’s Coup-Proofing Measures Have Undermined Russia’s War Effort in Ukraine
Authoritarian leaders like President Vladimir Putin are faced with a dilemma: they require their military forces to competently conduct campaigns against external enemies, but these same capabilities make them more capable of successfully initiating coups to remove the incumbent leader. Putin, like other leaders of his ilk, is forced to balance policies which promote competence in the armed forces with measures that ensure regime survival. The latter are referred to as ‘coup-proofing’ measures, the implementation of which, to some extent explain the underperformance of the Russian war effort in Ukraine.
Counterbalancing and Parallel Forces
The coup-proofing measure of most consequence to Russia’s military performance in Ukraine is ‘counterbalancing’. This involves the introduction of new security forces to counterbalance the military and each other. A splintered security sector filled with various armed groups are in competition with each other for funding, recruits, and supplies, as well as the ruling autocrat’s attention, which is ultimately vital for attaining the aforementioned resources.
Counterbalancing confers three advantages. Firstly, it promotes loyalty by encouraging competition and distrust between militarized factions who must demonstrate allegiance to the leader to secure resources. Secondly, it deters coups because the officers and senior figures distrust their counterparts in other organizations; and thirdly, it prevents the likelihood of a coup succeeding as it is more difficult for military and security forces operating under disparate chains of command to coordinate and cooperate effectively.
To quote, a 2017 paper appearing in the Journal of Conflict Resolution, ‘If coups are akin to coordination games, counterbalancing can be understood as an effort to add additional players to the game – actors who lack the incentive to move in concert with the others.’
Counterbalancing is rarely used in isolation and may be combined with other coup-proofing measures. For example, authoritarian leaders frequently favour loyalty over meritocracy when selecting staff for senior military and security positions.
Mercenaries as Parallel Forces
Several parallel armed groups exist outside of the Russian military’s chain of command. The most high-profile example is the use of mercenaries from Wagner Group, formerly led by Yevgeny Prigozhin until his demise in August 2023. Wagner Group employs an estimated 50,000 soldiers, 40,000 of which are believed to be released prison convicts. For Putin, the introduction of mercenaries to the war in Ukraine conferred several benefits including a degree of plausible deniability, less domestic blowback from casualties, and an alternative source of manpower which was especially valuable prior to the partial mobilization in September 2022.
From a coup-proofing perspective, the introduction of a private military company (PMC) with overlapping responsibilities to the regular military promoted greater competition between senior leaders. This rivalry was exacerbated by the contest for vital resources like ammunition, supplies and personnel.
The feud between Wagner’s late leader with Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov was especially bitter. Prigozhin frequently levelled scathing criticism at the two men, and other senior military officers for their handling of the war, accusing them of stealing the credit for Wagner’s battlefield successes in Ukraine, and even attempting to sabotage the PMC’s efforts by withholding vital ammunition.
For a time, this suited Putin. Prigozhin was careful to avoid directly criticizing the Russian president himself which helped to deflect any blame Putin might receive from the public onto his generals. Moreover, Prigozhin’s actions appeared to fit a preestablished pattern in Russian politics whereby senior figures jostle against each other to secure the president’s favour.
There are several Russian PMCs in addition to Wagner Group. Konstantin Pikalov, once thought to be Prigozhin’s right hand man and the head of Wagner operations in Africa, heads his own mercenary group called ‘Convoy’, which were founded in occupied Crimea in Autumn 2022. Another group is ‘Redut’, which was likely formed to provide security for Russian-owned facilities in Syria, but it believed to have been one of the first PMCs to provide personnel during the invasion of Ukraine in February last year.
The Russian energy giant Gazprom also has mercenaries in the guise of ‘private security organizations’, which energy companies were permitted to create after a new law was passed by Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin in February 2023. It is unclear whether the various groups associated with Gazprom subsidiary Gazprom Neft will exclusively guard the company’s energy facilities or whether they will take on active combat roles in Ukraine.
Other Parallel Forces
Mercenaries are not the only parallel forces at play. In 2016, Putin formed the Rosgvardiya (National Guard) under the leadership of Viktor Zolotov, the president’s former bodyguard. The formation of the Rosgvariya entailed the reorganization of preexisting internal security forces into a new agency which directly reports to Putin. Ostensibly, the Rosgvardiya’s responsibilities largely concern public order, policing, and counterterrorism, but the 300,000 to 400,000 strong force certainly acts as a deterrent to would-be coup-plotters. The Rosgvardiya has also reportedly seen action in Ukraine.
Similar examples of counterbalancing can be seen in the intelligence sphere. Three of the country’s most important intelligence services, the GRU, the SVR, and the FSB, each have their own elite special forces contingents. Competition and mutual distrust between the three is rife due to a high degree of overlapping tasks and low degree of cooperation. The FSB have attracted a particularly high degree of rancour from the GRU and SVR because of its increasingly proactive role conducting operations beyond its domestic remit. Additionally, counterintelligence officers from the FSB are embedded directly within the armed forces to monitor signs of dissent.
Finally, there are parallel forces provided by the Russian republics. Just two days after the invasion of Ukraine, Ramzan Kadyrov, the Kremlin-appointed leader of Chechnya, confirmed that the 141st Special Motorized Regiment – better known as the Kadyrovites – were operating in the country. The Kadyrovites are essentially a paramilitary organization loyal to Kadyrov, functioning as his private army.
Like Prigozhin, Kadyrov has been highly critical of the Russian military leadership but avoided levelling such critiques at Putin. By emphasizing the effectiveness of Chechen fighters over regular Russian forces, Kadyrov may have been hoping to make himself appear more indispensable to Putin.
How Coup-Proofing Degrades Military Effectiveness
The introduction of several players incentivized to hold each other in mutual suspicion is not conducive to an effective and unified war effort, as events in Ukraine have demonstrated. As explained by James M. Powell, coup-proofing ‘undermines the fighting capacity of a military by creating coordination challenges in the field.’ Unity of command is necessary for a coup to be effective, but it is just as necessary for conducting a war. The absence of unified command has thus jeopardized the entire Russian war effort.
The lack of a unified command structure was evident in the early stages of the war. In the first months following the invasion, Western and Ukrainian intelligence agencies and analysts were unable to identify a single overall commander of the Russian forces in Ukraine. Instead, it was believed that separate formations were drawn from each of Russia’s four military districts and placed under the command of senior officers from each district, with Putin taking on an oversized role, sometimes reportedly giving orders to field formations. Last April, Army General Aleksandr Dvornikov was finally named as overall commander but there have been at least three reshuffles at the top since then.
Wagner’s increasing share of frontline duties further undermined unity of command, with Prigozhin and his mercenaries not subject to the authority of the regular armed forces. Tensions between Prigozhin and the miliary leadership culminated in Wager Group’s mutiny in June. A civil war or coup seemed momentarily possible in Russia until a deal was brokered by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. Prigozhin was later killed in a plane crash in August removing him from the chessboard altogether, but his insubordination was a clear sign that Putin had miscalculated and allowed the rivalries simmering between the members of his inner circle to burn too hot.
Beyond Prigozhin’s dramatic rebellion, Coup-proofing has created other unintended consequences which have hindered Russia’s military efforts. An overemphasis on loyalty at the expense of competence coupled with fierce competition between the security and defence services have created incentive structures that have undermined honesty and integrity, inter-service cooperation, and professionalism.
These trends were identified by analysts as being particularly pervasive in the Russian intelligence community even before the invasion of Ukraine. For example, a 2021 Congressional Research Service report noted that ‘Agencies compete with each other for greater responsibilities, budgets, and political influence, often at the expense of other agencies.’ As Mark Galeotti puts it, ‘The competition for presidential approval is especially strong and has led to a perverse competition to tell the boss what they think he wants to hear, not what he needs to hear.’ This culture likely incentivised the Russian intelligence community to provide briefings to Putin prior to the invasion that confirmed his preconceptions that Ukraine would offer little resistance.
It is equally questionable if the most competent officers have been granted the responsibility to lead Russia’s war on Ukraine. Sergei Surovikin, a veteran of several conflicts and broadly considered to be capable officer by most military analysts, was made the overall commander of Russian forces in Ukraine in October 2022. However, Surovikin was replaced in January the following year by Valery Gerasimov, despite the latter having already attracted much of the blame for implementing a faulty strategy in his role as the Chief of the General Staff. In August, Surovikin was then stripped of his role as the commander of the Russian aerospace forces due to suspicions that he was linked to the Wagner rebellion.
Other officers have met similar fates. On July 12, Major General Ivan Popov, who led the 58th Combined Arms Army stationed in Ukraine’s southern Zaporizhzhya region, disclosed that he had been relieved of his command after he made complaints to Gerasimov regarding the lack of troop rotations. He also highlighted issues his soldiers were having with counterbattery radar and artillery reconnaissance. Popov’s dismissal indicates that senior military personnel are seemingly unable to report the facts on the ground to their superiors without facing charges of disloyalty or disciplinary action. Such a culture, especially within the Russian military’s highly hierarchal command structure will make it increasingly difficult for commanders to make informed decisions based on accurate information.
Thus far, Putin’s coup-proofing strategy has succeeded in fragmenting the Russian security elite sufficiently to secure his hold on power, despite Prigozhin’s short-lived insubordination. However, these same measures which have enabled Putin to safeguard his rule have seriously undermined Russia’s war effort in Ukraine. The constituent parts of Russia’s defence and security apparatuses fail to act as a whole and there is ample evidence that senior leaders have been promoted on the basis of perceived loyalty over competence. A culture of competition and distrust has hindered cooperation, coordination, and honesty, which has led to poor decision-making, the results of which have played out on the battlefields of Ukraine since February last year.
XV Congress of the International Association of Teachers of Russian Language
The XV Congress of the International Association of Teachers of Russian Language and Literature “Russian Language and Literature in a Changing World” began on September 13 in St. Petersburg. Outstanding Russian philologists from all over the world took part in the world congress. The objectives of the event and its significance for promoting the Russian language abroad were discussed at a press conference in TASS by the chairman of the congress program committee, adviser to the President of the Russian Federation, president of MAPRYAL and ROPRYAL, chairman of the supervisory board of the Russkiy Mir Foundation Vladimir Tolstoy, co-chairman of the congress program committee, rector St. Petersburg State University, member of the presidium of the Russian Language Council under the President of the Russian Federation, co-chairman of the Russian Language Council under the Government of the Russian Federation, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences Nikolai Kropachev and president of the Leo Tolstoy Institute in Colombia Ruben Dario Flores Arcila.
The XV Congress of MAPRYAL is the largest event in the life of world Russian studies, in which about 600 delegates from 63 countries of the world take part: specialists in the field of scientific description and teaching of the Russian language, literature, theory and practice of translation, lexicography and other aspects. During the congress, 418 reports will be presented, which will present a whole range of international studies of Russian studies – from teaching methods to translations of literary texts and analysis of phraseological units.
As the President of MAPRYAL and the Association of Teachers of Russian Language and Literature, Chairman of the Supervisory Board of the Russkiy Mir Foundation Vladimir Tolstoy noted, today MAPRYAL has 130 collective and 65 individual participants, and interest in the study of the Russian language and Russian literature is only growing around the world.
“This year, new colleagues from Argentina, Venezuela, Qatar, Kenya, Nigeria, Lebanon, Peru, Senegal, Tanzania, Ecuador, as well as our old friends from the CIS countries, Asia, the Balkan region, countries of Eastern and Western Europe joined the work of the congress . We are grateful to St. Petersburg State University for its active participation in organizing the congress,” said Vladimir Tolstoy during a press conference.
The XV Congress is being held in Russia for the first time in 20 years, and St. Petersburg is becoming its capital for the second time in the history of the event. In 2003, it was held in St. Petersburg on the initiative of the outstanding Russian scholar, rector and president of St. Petersburg State University Lyudmila Alekseevna Verbitskaya, who is the author of more than 300 scientific and educational works in the field of Russian and general linguistics, phonetics, phonology and methods of teaching the Russian language , as well as the significant project “Let’s speak correctly!” As part of the “zero” day of the congress, a sculptural portrait of Lyudmila Alekseevna Verbitskaya was unveiled at St. Petersburg State University, which will greet philologists and linguists every day.
Today, St. Petersburg University pays great attention to the study of the Russian language and its promotion abroad. The University has 112 Russian language centers, represented in 50 countries. In 2023, St Petersburg University opened Russian language centers in Indonesia, Malaysia, South Africa, Kenya, Algeria and Paraguay.
“SPbU has traditionally become the most popular university in Russia among foreign applicants. Citizens from 105 countries come to study at the University; the competition among foreign students is 21 people per place. Young people come to St. Petersburg University to learn Russian and study in Russian. St Petersburg University also teaches more than 100 world languages, including rare ones spoken in two or three countries. We teach our students not just foreign languages, but culture, history, economics, and law in these languages, because language does not exist separately from other areas of human life. I believe that today the Russian language is so popular and strong, partly because our country is open to all languages of the world. And it will always be like this,” said Nikolai Kropachev.
As the participants of the press conference noted, the rules for using the Russian language as the state language of the Russian Federation require special attention today. Rector of St. Petersburg State University, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences Nikolai Kropachev noted that the changes made on behalf of Russian President Vladimir Putin to the Law on the State Language established new requirements for consolidating the norms of the Russian language, which must be observed in areas of compulsory use of the state language. Such norms must now be enshrined in normative dictionaries, reference books and grammars, the list of which will be approved by the Government. The normative dictionary must also define those foreign words that have no analogues in the Russian language and therefore can be used in the areas of use of the state language.
Associate Professor at the National University of Bogota, President of the Leo Tolstoy Institute Ruben Dario Flores Arcila spoke about the motivation for foreign students to learn Russian. In Colombia, Russian has been taught since 1944, when the Institute of Friendship with the USSR was founded. According to him, the first foreign articles devoted to the study of the work of the Russian writer Leo Nikolaevich Tolstoy were written in Colombia, Cuba.
“I am confident that Russian literature and the Russian language are special cultural codes that help foreigners understand the identity of Russia and better recognize the culture of this unique country,” said Ruben Dario Flores Arcila.
As part of the events of the XV MAPRYAL Congress, experts will pay attention to the methods of teaching Russian as a foreign language, various aspects of translating the works of Russian writers and poets into different languages of the world, discuss issues of reflecting cultural changes in language, and much more.
According to the director of the MAPRYAL secretariat, Alexander Korotyshev, the list of participants and topics of reports indicate that in order to competently teach and study the Russian language, you need to know a lot about both the culture and history of the country. “Modern methods of teaching the Russian language strive for accuracy in conveying linguistic facts and are literally “tuned” to the cultural and linguistic characteristics of different national audiences. The number of congress delegates suggests that interest in the Russian language in almost all parts of the world continues to grow,” added Alexander Korotyshev.
It should be noted that from September 1, 2023, on the basis of St. Petersburg University, with the support of the Government of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation, the online school of St. Petersburg State University began its work. A unique educational project allows schoolchildren from different countries to undergo training in Russian according to an approved educational program for grades 5–11 and receive a standard certificate. As the rector of St. Petersburg State University Nikolay Kropachev noted, the project already in the first year of its existence showed that studying in Russian is important in different parts of the world: the University received applications from schoolchildren from 44 countries.
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The XV Congress of MAPRYAL was organized by the International Association of Teachers of Russian Language and Literature together with St. Petersburg State University with the support of the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation and the Russkiy Mir Foundation.
The first MAPRYAL congress was held in 1969 in the USSR, and since then it has traditionally been held once every five years in different cities around the world. Since 1969, MAPRYAL congresses have been hosted by Moscow, Varna, Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Budapest, Regensburg, Bratislava, St. Petersburg, Shanghai, Granada, Astana.
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