The Problem of “jihad” and the Power in the Taliban

The situation within and around Afghanistan continues to evolve actively. Unfortunately, political and social processes have negative dynamics, which can lead to degradation and decline of the situation, both within the country and along its borders. Thus, in May, the UN UNAMA mission called on the Taliban movement controlling the country to stop flogging and public executions immediately. The UN papers note that convicted persons for theft, homosexuality, alcohol consumption, fraud, and drug trade were publicly flogged. It is worth noting that such critical statements by international organizations against the Taliban have become much more frequent in recent months. “After seizing power in Afghanistan, the Taliban regularly carry out public executions, floggings, and stoning. In the last six months alone, 274 men, 58 women and two boys have been publicly flogged in Afghanistan. Most of the punishments were related to convictions for infidelity and running away from home,” the UNAMA report says.

During the first Taliban rule in Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, public corporal punishment and executions were regularly carried out against convicts at large squares, such as sports stadiums, and at busy city intersections, the authors of the document recall. According to them, the first public flogging after the Taliban returned to power was recorded in October 2021 in the northern province of Kapisa. A woman and a man convicted of adultery received 100 blows each in the presence of religious leaders and representatives of local authorities. In December 2022, the Taliban executed an Afghan convicted of murder, the first public execution since they came to power again. The execution, carried out with a rifle gun by the victim’s father, took place in the western province of Farah in the presence of hundreds of spectators and senior officials of the movement. The Taliban began using corporal punishment and public executions despite initial promises of a more moderate rule than during their previous term, UNAMA states.

Gradually, they tightened restrictions concerning women, prohibiting them from visiting public places such as parks and gyms, under their interpretation of Islamic laws, the document states. These restrictions caused an international resonance, increased the country’s isolation during the economic crisis, and aggravated the humanitarian crisis. In April, the Taliban informed the UN that Afghan women working on its mission would no longer work there. Humanitarian organizations operating in Afghanistan have stated that these measures will negatively affect the provision of urgent assistance throughout the country. In turn, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres called the ban on women’s work an unacceptable violation of human rights.

In addition to the constant growth of political violence based on the radical ideology of the Taliban and their specific ultraconservative interpretation of Sharia, there is an inevitable diffusion of power within the movement. The specific of the Taliban movement is that this structure was initially totalitarian. The power of the spiritual leader of the Taliban has always been untouchable, and there was no serious opposition capable of challenging the leader significantly. The theory of political science has a consensus opinion regarding such totalitarian ethno-religious organizations. Unity of command and the indisputable sending of a leader is an integral characteristic of the functionality of such structures. Since the founder of the Taliban, Mullah Omar, had absolute power, his orders were considered binding, and these were the will of Allah. A separate but crucial topic is the publication of doctrinal documents of the Taliban, which were distributed as a guide to the management of tactical units of the organization.

However, the movement’s evolution led to a new Taliban. In the world media, the term Taliban 2.0 has been used more and more often. This term has logic and, to a certain extent, correctly shows the deep transformations that have taken place within the movement. The modern Taliban has become much more intelligent, flexible, and diversified. In fact, in the last years of the war in Afghanistan, the United States and NATO had to confront a network organization led by dozens and hundreds of field commanders who only coordinated their operations but no more. The Central command gave only general orders and impacted the promotion of certain provincial leaders and “night” governors. The Taliban gradually became like the Haqqani Network.  

However, a subversive and terrorist war against US and NATO forces is one issue, and the management of the state, bureaucracy, and government system is an entirely different one. In totalitarian political systems, network management is impossible. Opposition to the central government leads to its erosion and subsequently to the aggravation of the political power crisis. Political science knows no examples of network management in totalitarian or authoritarian political societies. Therefore, there is a dilemma of academic and theoretical nature. How will the political system of Afghanistan develop? Or, how will the distribution of power take place inside the Taliban? The question was raised at the time by the classic of political science Talcott Parsons concerning developed democratic societies. 

Since we have already written in detail about latent conflicts within the Taliban leadership, we will not return to this topic. In short, the Taliban is split into two elite groups. One led by the leader Mawlawi Hibatullah Akhundzada. The Defense Minister and the son of the founder of the Taliban, Mullah Yaqoob, and the Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, the son of the founder of the Haqqani Network, head the second one. This general and schematic picture has yet to be studied and investigated in detail. For obvious reasons, it is impossible to conduct such studies within the framework of the social sciences methodology now.

Following the above, the problem of the distribution of power and the dilemma of power arises in the language of political theory. It is also worth noting that tension between the Taliban and their main sponsors and mentors, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, escalates occasionally. This factor further complicates the situation. Given the political and economic crisis in Pakistan, which has become a lure, this country cannot maintain order among its radical clients by the system. 

There is a danger of the illusion of a lasting systemic order in Afghanistan. Moreover, among the top leadership, the temptation is to solve their personal problems of competition for power by exporting energy outside Afghanistan.

So, recently, the Taliban leader said that establishing Sharia in Afghanistan is only the first stage of a successful Taliban jihad. According to him, in the future, the Taliban and the Afghan ulema must lead the whole world to Sharia leadership. Thus, the leader of the Taliban made it clear that the jihad would not be limited only to the territory of Afghanistan. “The success of the Afghan jihad means not only pride and glory for Afghans but also glory for all Muslims. It is the desire of Muslims all over the world,” Maulavi Haibatullah Akhundzada said in his speech to religious scholars from Kabul. “Therefore, your responsibility is not only to establish Sharia in Afghanistan but also that the scientists of Afghanistan are obliged to lead the whole world to the regime of Sharia.”

In his speech, Mawlawi Akhundzada also made it clear that the international community’s expectations of an “inclusive government” in Afghanistan are in vain. Representatives of the United Nations, the United States, Russia, India, China, Iran, European countries, and Central Asian republics have been trying to convince the Taliban regime of this for more than a year and a half from different sides. Mawlawi Akhundzada made it clear that all these hopes were in vain. Thus, the stability issue in Afghanistan remains relevant, and it is unlikely that the international community should forget about the political dynamics in this country.

Georgi Asatrian
Georgi Asatrian
Georgi Asatryan, associate professor, Lomonosov Moscow State University and Plekhanov Russian University of Economics.