If a nation aspires to attain global power status, any location across the globe can assume strategic significance for that nation. Undoubtedly, at different historical junctures, Vietnam, Cuba, and other locations have garnered significant significance within the framework of United States’ interests. Nonetheless, following the culmination of the Second World War, Europe and the Middle East assumed a paramount position in American foreign policy.
The significance attributed to Europe stemmed from two primary factors. Firstly, Europe served as the domain wherein the United States fostered its closest alliances. Secondly, Europe confronted an imminent threat posed by the Soviet Union, which stood as a global adversary to American leadership. Had the United States not undertaken the defense of Europe through the establishment of military bases and other forms of support, Western and Southern European nations might have met the same fate as their Eastern European counterparts, potentially succumbing to becoming Soviet satellites.
The significance attributed to the Middle East also emerged as a paramount priority for the United States, driven by three key factors. The first factor pertained to the region’s abundant oil reserves. During the Cold War era, more than half of the world’s oil and gas resources were concentrated in the Persian Gulf, thus rendering the security and stability of Middle Eastern energy supplies critical for Western industries. Secondly, the establishment of a strategic buffer zone in the Middle East and the Islamic world aimed at containing the Soviet Union and impeding its access to warm sea routes played a crucial role in sustaining American global leadership. Lastly, the indispensable nature of the Middle East for the United States stemmed from the imperative of ensuring Israel’s security. These three strategic considerations have rendered Middle Eastern affairs the most prominent focal point of American foreign policy for several decades. Consequently, American policymakers have dedicated substantial energy and effort to managing relations with key Middle Eastern actors such as Lebanon, Iran, and Palestine.
The profound ramifications of the Iraq War and subsequent Afghan retreat following the traumatic events of 9/11 have significantly undermined the self-assurance of the United States as a superpower, fostering a surge in isolationist inclinations within the corridors of power in Washington, D.C. The perception of American global leadership also suffered from the notion that the country, which reached its apex in the 2010s, was in a state of decline, further exacerbating its negative impact. Consequently, the United States began perceiving itself as considerably weaker than its actual capabilities. The Trump era further solidified the notion that America had transitioned into an ordinary power, leading to the prevailing belief that maintaining a widespread military presence worldwide was wasteful. President Trump, operating under the paradigm of running the state akin to a corporation, argued that the allies of the United States were enfeebling the country by burdening it with the majority of defense expenditures. He particularly singled out Germany and Japan, urging them and others to assume responsibility and augment their defense budgets to at least 2 percent of their respective GDPs.(1)
Within academic and think tank circles, a prevailing notion emerged regarding the unnecessary expenditure of energy and resources by the United States in the Middle East. Questions arose regarding the purpose and reason of American soldiers sacrificing their lives in the quagmire of the Middle East. The significant financial losses incurred by America in the region also came under scrutiny. Despite the assumption that the inauguration of Joe Biden as President on January 20, 2021 marked the end of the Trump era, many of Trump’s perspectives persisted and gained influence within American discourse, permeating various domains. One such idea entailed the diminishing power of American global leadership, suggesting that it would no longer suffice to extend its influence over every region
CHINA: RISE OF DRAGON
The perception of inadequacy regarding the capacity of American power to extend influence across all regions was primarily bolstered by the unprecedented economic ascent of China, which stands as the most significant contributing factor in history. Over a span of 23 years, China’s GDP surged from a mere 1.2 trillion dollars in 2000 to approximately 20 trillion dollars, marking a remarkable sixteen-fold increase. In contrast, the US GDP only grew 2.6 times during the same period, reaching 26.8 trillion dollars. In 2000, the US economy surpassed the Chinese economy by a factor of 8.5. However, as of 2023, the US economy stands at a mere 1.3 times the size of its Chinese counterpart. Economists assert that if this trajectory persists, it is merely a matter of time until China surpasses the United States as the world’s largest economy. The disconcerting transformation evident in GDP figures is not the sole cause for concern, as alarming data pertaining to US leadership emanates from nearly every sphere of the economy. During the pandemic period, a discernible weakening in the hegemony of the US dollar, which represents a paramount source of American power, became evident as its share among world reserve currencies dwindled to 59 percent by 2023. Notably, the process of dedollarization has favored China’s currency, the yuan, as the primary beneficiary. China’s influence now extends across diverse regions, from Brazil to the depths of Africa, challenging the United States at every turn. China engages in treaty negotiations, fosters reconciliation between previously hostile nations, and most significantly, conducts extensive trade with nations across the globe. Presently, there are only a handful of countries that do not count China as their largest trading partner. The growth in China is not limited to its economic and trade prowess; its military and defense capabilities are also expanding. China presently ranks as the second-largest country in terms of defense expenditure globally, with a defense budget surpassing the combined defense budgets of Britain, Germany, France, and Japan. These figures raise concerns for the United States, given the realization that no nation would allocate nearly $300 trillion towards armaments solely for the protection of its trade interests.
UKRAINE WAR AND RISE OF THE AMERICAN SENSE OF INADEQUACY
Amidst mounting concerns surrounding American global leadership, the eruption of the Ukraine War in February 2002 rendered the European continent a battleground once again. Despite the passage of a year, neither party involved in the conflict in Ukraine managed to achieve a decisive advantage. This prolonged stalemate has led experts to express concerns regarding the potential protraction of the war, with apprehensions mounting over the prospect of its spillover into other European nations. Throughout this period, the United States extended considerable support to Ukraine, offering military aid amounting to tens of billions of dollars, establishing itself as Ukraine’s primary benefactor. While there appears to be no significant opposition within America to this support provided to Ukraine, numerous experts in the field of International Relations argue that as the Chinese dragon strengthens its presence in the Asia-Pacific region, it would be ill-advised to unnecessarily fragment American power between engagements in Ukraine or the Middle East with Asia-Pacific. For instance, according to John Mearsheimer, a professor of political science at the University of Chicago, the United States should refrain from depleting its power in the Ukraine War or any other conflict, urging a swift shift in focus towards China. (2)
In alignment with Mearsheimer, Elbridge A. Colby, a former US Assistant Secretary of Defense, the contention arises that the United States lacks sufficient and appropriate military capabilities to effectively address all the threats that impinge upon its interests. Colby asserts that it is imperative for America to prioritize the mitigation of the China-induced threat within the Asian region. According to Colby, Asia stands as the “decisive theater” on a global scale, with China indisputably representing the preeminent formidable state worldwide. (3)
In conclusion, Republican politicians and realist political scientists posit that the United States has experienced a decline in energy and power due to its entanglement in Europe’s inefficient rivalries, exemplified by the ongoing Ukraine War. In contrast, they argue that China is poised to exceed the United States in the global leadership competition. Henry Kissinger, the former Secretary of State, coined the term “the necessity for choice” to describe such circumstances, emphasizing the importance for decision-makers to prioritize based on their country’s strength. (Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, 1994). Under these circumstances, what type of regional emphasis should the United States prioritize? Would traditional focal points of American foreign policy, namely Europe and the Middle East, now take a backseat in this regard?
If the United States diverts a portion of its influence from Europe towards the Asia-Pacific region, it is conceivable that US allies and partners such as Britain, Germany, and France could fill the resultant power vacuum in Europe. However, can a similar scenario be anticipated for the Middle East? However, in the event that the United States withdraws from the region, would American allies and partners regain dominance in the Middle East?
THE MIDDLE EAST: NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO AMERICA?
According to Ambassador Martin Indyk, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the United States has unnecessarily suffered huge and unnecessary losses in the Middle East. In his article featured in the Wall Street Journal, Indyk asserts that the objectives set by the United States in the Cold War era no longer hold relevance in the present day. For example he contends that the United States’ dependence on Middle Eastern oil has reached its conclusion, and emphasizes that Israel has achieved a level of capability to ensure its own security. (4)
According to Indyk, neither the Palestine problem nor Syria should be the problem of the Americans anymore. “After the sacrifice of so many American lives, the waste of so much energy and money in quixotic efforts that ended up doing more harm than good, it is time for the U.S. to find a way to escape the costly, demoralizing cycle of crusades and retreats,” Indyk says.
According to Indyk, both the Palestinian issue and Syria should no longer be the concerns of the United States. Indyk argues that after the significant sacrifice of American lives and the squandering of substantial resources and efforts in misguided endeavors that ultimately resulted in more harm than good, it is imperative for the U.S. to seek a means to extricate itself from the costly and demoralizing cycle of crusades and withdrawals.
Indyk‘s perspective finds resonance among others who share similar viewpoints. They posit that the Middle East no longer holds paramount importance for the United States, and that the American economy is no longer reliant on oil from the Persian Gulf. Even among a diminishing minority in Washington who continue to emphasize the significance of the Middle East, the prospect of ceaseless Arab disputes, Arab-Israeli conflicts, and conflict-ridden regions such as Lebanon, Syria, Libya, and Iraq evoke aversion and reluctance. Numerous political analysts and scholars now grapple with comprehending the purpose of America’s presence in the Middle East.
The distressing failures in Iraq and Afghanistan loom large in the minds of policymakers in Congress and the White House. These unnecessary wars resulted in the loss of thousands of American lives and the expenditure of trillions of dollars, yielding minimal returns for such sacrifices. Moreover, these endeavors failed to contribute positively to the region, leaving behind a trail of hundreds of thousands of casualties and devastated cities.
It can be said that the trend that the Middle East is not a priority for America started in the Obama era, accelerated during the Trump presidency, and became clearer in the emerging Biden Doctrine. (5)
In recent months, there has been a growing chorus advocating for the United States to disengage from the Middle East, with some experts asserting that this withdrawal has already been accomplished. The Newsweek news magazine, in its commentary on March 5, 2023, went so far as to proclaim that the American century in the Middle East has come to an end and that the United States has exited the region. (6) The question arises: has the United States truly departed from the Middle East? As the United States seeks to rebuild its global leadership, has it relinquished the Middle East to concentrate its power exclusively on Asia, particularly China? Can one effectively assume the role of a global leader without exerting dominance in the Middle East? This essay aims to explore these inquiries and provide insights.
THE MIDDLE EAST OR THE CENTER OF THE WORLD
To address the question of whether the United States should withdraw from the Middle East, it is imperative to first examine the region’s strategic and economic significance. In a historical context, it is noteworthy to mention that astronomer Charles Piazzi Smyth suggested in 1864 that the Great Pyramid of Giza (30°00′N 31°00′E) in Egypt represented the center of the world based on his calculations of the Earth’s landmass. However, in 1973, physicist Andrew J. Woods utilized a digital global map and employed mainframe systems to determine coordinates, concluding that the center of the world was located at 39°00′N 34°00′E, near the district of Kırşehir and Seyfe Village in present-day Turkey, approximately 1,800 km north of Giza. Alternatively, there exists another perspective proposing that Mecca, which holds symbolic importance as a religious site, is considered the center of the world, akin to the significance attributed to the Earth’s two poles.
The precise identification of a geographically central town or village remains uncertain; however, upon examining the world map, it becomes apparent that the region commonly referred to as the Middle East occupies a prominent position at the global center. It serves as the converging point, or even collision point, of three ‘old’ continents: Asia, Europe, and Africa. Egypt represents the junction of Africa and Asia, with a portion of its territory situated in Asia and the remaining part in Africa. Observing the Sinai Peninsula on a map, one might perceive it as a piece of land that Asia and Africa have claimed for themselves, unable to share it. Similarly, the continents of Asia and Europe intersect through the nation of Turkey, where the Thrace region lies within Europe while the Anatolian lands extend into Asia. Spanning across Istanbul, one of the world’s most densely populated cities, the Bosphorus strait bisects the city into distinct European and Asian sectors. There is no other city in the world on two separate continents.Given the geostrategic significance of the Middle East, it becomes readily apparent why numerous major powers throughout history, ranging from the Hittites aspiring to exert dominance across Asia, Africa, and Europe, to the ancient Greeks, Pharaonic Egypt, and the Roman Empire, sought to seize control of this region.Historical evidence demonstrates the formidable challenge faced by a state aspiring to achieve and sustain “superpower” status in the absence of a dominant position in the Middle East region.
The Middle East region serves as a vital nexus, connecting not only continents but also the world’s most significant waterways and seas. Positioned amidst the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Indian Ocean, it encompasses a strategic location. The region is intersected by critical maritime passages and bodies of water including the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman, Turkish Straits, Aegean Sea, and Black Sea, scattered throughout its expanse. These waterways hold immense importance for global maritime trade and military operations.
The Middle East occupies a central position in the world, encompassing not only its geographical significance but also its profound cultural and historical influence. While other regions were still inhabited by cave-dwelling societies, it was in the Middle East where the Sumerians made notable advancements, such as the development of writing, the introduction of the calendar system, and the initiation of foundational mathematical calculations. As the birthplace of humanity’s earliest civilizations, including the Assyrians, Babylonians, Akkadians, ancient Egyptians, and Hittites, the Middle East stands as the cradle of human civilization.
Furthermore, it is within the Middle East that the three prominent monotheistic faiths—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—found their origins and thrived. This region bears immense importance as the spiritual birthplace and focal point of these religious traditions. Revered cities like Mecca, Medina, Jerusalem, and Ephesus persistently attract countless devoted pilgrims, serving as profound hubs of religious reverence and cultural legacy.
To sum up, given the geostrategic and cultural significance it embodies, it would not be an overstatement to assert that sustained global leadership is unattainable for any power that fails to exert dominance over the Middle East region in the long term.
CENTER OF OIL AND PETRO-DOLLARS
Following the discovery of oil in the early 20th century, the Middle East gained increased significance for major global powers. Notably, oil production commenced in substantial reserves in Iran in 1908, followed by Iraq in the 1920s, and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in the 1930s. As the prominence of the oil-based industry grew, industrialized nations became heavily reliant on Middle Eastern oil. The escalating utilization of natural gas for residential heating and electricity generation further solidified the West’s indispensable dependence on the region. While oil initially served as fuel, its applications in modern society have expanded significantly over time. Petrochemicals, encompassing plastics, synthetic fibers, rubber, solvents, paints, detergents, fertilizers, and pharmaceuticals, as well as lubricants, asphalt, bitumen, and other petroleum-derived products, permeated various aspects of daily life. Presently, petroleum products find widespread utilization, spanning from cosmetics to automobile components.
The possession of this invaluable resource naturally enriched the countries of the Middle East. Nevertheless, during the initial years, Arab nations grappled with the question of how to manage their newfound petrodollars and opted to deposit their earnings in Western banks. The West, in turn, purchased oil with dollars, while Arab and Iranian nations, who exchanged oil for dollars, deposited their funds in Western banks or imported consumer goods from Western nations. Ultimately, both money and oil predominantly resided in the hands of the West. Following bitter experiences, this arrangement underwent a transformation, leading Arab nations to diversify their sources of income. Presently, oil-rich Arab countries own numerous Western companies. Moreover, wealthy individuals from Arab nations, bolstered by petrodollars, have invested in symbols of Western culture such as sports clubs like PSG and Manchester City. Gulf states such as Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Kuwait have also effectively succeeded in attracting the world’s wealthy to the region by constructing entertainment and grandiose shopping centers in the world’s tallest buildings next to oil wells…
In summary, as a result of capital accumulation derived from oil and gas exports, numerous Middle Eastern nations have emerged as significant importers and foreign investors on the global stage. The Arabian Peninsula accommodates nearly 20 sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), responsible for overseeing approximately $3.7 trillion in assets, which accounts for roughly one-third of the total state fund assets globally. For instance, the Kuwait Investment Authority stands as the sixth largest government investor worldwide, managing assets worth $769 billion as of 2022. As a result, Arab funds and investors represent coveted capital owners that each country seeks to attract to its domestic market. Similarly, the commercial cities of the Gulf have assumed a pivotal role in the global economy. Consequently, it becomes evident that any global power incapable of exerting influence in the Middle East would be excluded from highly consequential economic opportunities.
LAND OF TERROR OR OPPORTUNITIES?
Presently, if an average American or English individual were to be queried regarding their perceptions of the Middle East, their associations may encompass terms such as “terrorism” or “conflict,” portraying the region as a domain inhabited by adversarial forces. Nevertheless, over the course of the 20th century, the Middle East has significantly contributed to the economic and security realms of Western nations. Every impartial and non-ideological assessment unequivocally acknowledges that the Middle East has undergone a transformation, emerging as a region that mitigates the burdens on the United States and Europe, instead of serving as an additional source of obstacles or challenges across diverse domains. I do not find it realistic that the U.S.’s regional interests during the Cold War years are no longer valid in the new world order. If the U.S. still claims global leadership, it has and always will have vital interests in the Middle East.
Following the 9/11 attacks, President George Bush issued a cautionary statement that “America is addicted to oil” and advocated for a substantial reduction in imports from the Middle East. Since then, there has been a significant decline in U.S. imports from the Middle East; however, a complete reset has not been achieved. Nevertheless, refraining from importing oil specifically from Middle Eastern countries does not imply a lack of dependence on Middle Eastern oil. Irrespective of the source of oil procurement, oil carries a price like any other commodity, with oil prices predominantly influenced by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), comprising primarily Middle Eastern nations. Consequently, all nations worldwide, regardless of whether they import oil from the Middle East or elsewhere, remain reliant on the Middle East for oil, and this scenario shows no signs of imminent alteration. In fact, the U.S. President, seeking to curb escalating oil prices resulting from the Ukraine War, appealed to Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia as the largest global oil producer. However, the Arab oil producers did not heed these requests, and oil prices soared once they collaborated with Russia. The surge in oil prices impacts every facet of the economy, given that oil serves as a fundamental raw material for numerous end products and constitutes a substantial portion of transportation and distribution costs. High oil prices have been one of the main contributing factors to the global inflation observed in recent years.
IS THERE A GLOBAL LEADERSHIP POSSIBLE WITHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST?
For a state to uphold its claim to global leadership, it will face significant challenges if it fails to establish a presence in the Middle East, given the region’s strategic location, abundant natural resources, and financial power. Moreover, a global power that attains influence over the Middle East does not merely shoulder new burdens, but rather discovers numerous sources of material and spiritual power that augment its influence in the region. The intentional or inadvertent creation of a substantial power vacuum by the United States in the Middle East has been recognized by China, which has discerned the region’s importance and fertility in global competition.
When China hosted the inaugural Sino-Arab Summit with Arab states in December 2022, the international media primarily emphasized the political aspect of the event. Similarly, when China successfully brokered reconciliation between long-standing rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia in February 2023, global public opinion centered on China’s potential political and military objectives in the Middle East. While it would be incorrect to assert that China’s new policies toward the Middle East lack political motivations, Beijing’s primary objectives for engaging with the region are driven by economic interests and energy security, rather than purely political ambitions. China’s annual crude oil imports from Middle Eastern countries exceed $170 billion, with Saudi Arabia alone exporting approximately $65 billion worth of crude oil to China in 2022. If China intends to sustain its economic growth, establishing a presence in the Middle East becomes imperative.(7)
Furthermore, the combined GDP of Middle Eastern countries surpasses $5 trillion, exceeding the combining GDP of both Japan and Germany. In essence, the Middle East region represents a prosperous market for Chinese goods. Notably, oil and natural gas-rich nations within the region possess investment funds worth trillions of dollars, as well as companies capable of making foreign investments. For instance, Saudi Arabia’s Aramco, a prominent petrochemical giant, has invested over $10 billion in refinery projects in China and is engaged in ongoing negotiations for further investments. As China currently serves as the Middle East’s largest trading partner, it aims to expand its sales to the region, increase oil purchases, and attract the trillions of dollars amassed within the region, which predominantly flow to Western markets, to the mainland Chinese economy.
In summary, China views the Middle East through an economic lens rather than a political one, offering a cooperative approach that benefits all participating nations. Unlike US-Middle East relations, this cooperation does not entail mutual political expectations between the involved parties.
Middle Eastern countries are presently content with China’s interest in the region, as it presents an alternative power capable of balancing Western policies in favor of local powers. Leveraging the global competition between China and the United States, local states will strive to assert their desires upon the major powers.
CONCLUSION
In order for the United States to uphold its position of global leadership, it appears impracticable to relinquish the Middle East to its adversaries. This is because the power that exercises dominance in the Middle East not only enhances its own power but also assumes a decisive role in global economies. It is evident that the United States has encountered a crisis of self-confidence in the region following its setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nevertheless, what is expected from the United States is not to repeat the mistakes of its past experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, but rather to approach the region by assimilating lessons from those failures.
In his book titled “Grand Delusion” (Penguin, 2023), Steven Simon elucidates why America has sustained losses in the Middle East over a span of four decades. He identifies the crucial factor as Americans’ lack of comprehension regarding the region. If Washington desires to secure success in the Middle East, it must abandon its unilateral impositions and instead prioritize listening to its allies in the region.
NOTES:
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(1) “President Trump Reportedly Wants Allies to Pay Full Cost of Hosting U.S. Troops Abroad ‘Plus 50%’”, Time, 8 MArch 2019.
(2) Steve Kraske, Zach Wilson, “Why one political scientist says the U.S. should focus on China instead of Russia’s war in Ukraine”, NPR, February 22, 2023, https://www.kcur.org/podcast/up–to–date/2023-02-22/why–one–political–scientists–says–the–u–s–should–focus–on–china–instead–of–russias–war–in–ukraine
(3) Elbridge A. Colby, “The U.S. Must Support Ukraine, But China Must Be Our Priority”, Time, 27 February 2022; Elbridge A. Colby and Alex Velez-Green, “To Avert War with China, the U.S. Must Pprioritize Taiwan over Ukraine”, The Washington Post, May 18, 2023.
(4) Martin Indyk, “The Middle East Isn’t Worth It Anymore”, Wall Street Journal, 18 January 2020.
(5) Jonathan Panikoff, “Shifting Priorities: The US and the Middle East in a Multipolar World”, The Atlantic Council, 12 July 2022.
(6) Tom O’Conner, “The End of the American Century Begins in the Middle East,” The Newsweek, 3 May 2023.
(7)
“All the world’s a stage,” proclaimed the hero of a Shakespearean comedy. If we follow this metaphor, presidential elections in America are always a multi-act drama, often turning into a melodrama with elements of tragicomedy and even farce. Major and minor characters perform on the political stage, sudden plot twists are punctuated by various special effects, and culminate in a colorful extravaganza in November of each leap year.
The audience watching the play from inside the theater can only follow the actors’ performances, trying to keep up with the rapid unfolding of the plot’s intricacies, and wonder how the show will end. But unlike the conclusion of a Shakespearean comedy, much depends on the outcome of the US election. So, even if the opening of the show doesn’t herald a stunning display of stagecraft, the world’s attention will be focused on the American political scene in one way or another.
Two categories clearly stand out among audiences of this theater. The first can be conventionally described as political romantics. This group does not demand a reading from the actor, but a complete death in earnest. The romantics always talk about the “historic choice,” about the critical “bifurcation point” in the development of the US, and about the “fateful” significance of this electoral cycle both for America and for the rest of humanity.
Another category are the conventional skeptics. They assume that, for all its splendor and even pomp, the process will make little difference to the lives of Americans, let alone to all the other inhabitants of our planet. Mark Twain, who clearly belonged to the skeptical camp, is credited with perhaps the most emphatic credo of the latter: “If voting made any difference they wouldn’t let us do it.”
These two categories are certainly present in Russia. Our romantics always hope that a change of team in the White House will open up new opportunities in relations between our two countries. Today, they assume that there can be no one worse for Russia than the incumbent US president. They remind us that, since Richard Nixon, it has always been easier for Moscow to deal with pragmatic Republicans than with ideological Democrats. They also pay tribute to Donald Trump, generously quoting his recent reassuring statements about Russia.
Skeptics, for their part, stress that American foreign policy has always been bipartisan and that there is a strong negative consensus against Russia in the American political establishment. They also often bring up Trump, but only as a clear illustration of the fact that even a US president who is generally favorable to Moscow is inevitably powerless in the face of the all-powerful ‘deep state’.
Probably both romantics and skeptics have their own truth. But if the skeptics are right in general, the romantics may be sometimes correct. Indeed, there is now a broad and enduring anti-Russian consensus in the US – broader and more enduring than even a similar anti-China consensus. The White House and Congress, the Pentagon and the State Department, the leading media and influential think tanks generally have, if not unified, then very close positions on Moscow, and these positions are unlikely to change even in the medium term.
Nevertheless, any new team in Washington has to distinguish itself from the old one and prove its undeniable superiority over its predecessors. This means new nuances in foreign policy. For example, the Republicans will not abandon military support for Kiev, but they will have to take into account that foreign aid programs have never been popular with voters, especially conservative ones.
It is therefore reasonable to expect that the Republicans will seek to tighten control over how US military and other aid to Ukraine is spent. We can also expect them to push for a “fairer” distribution of the burden of military support for Ukraine between Washington and its European allies.
Moreover, US approaches to Russia should be seen in the broader context of US foreign policy. For example, Democrats have traditionally been much more concerned than their Republican opponents about promoting liberal values around the world. This fixation wins Joe Biden points in predominantly liberal Europe, but creates problems with such important “illiberal” or “not quite liberal” US partners like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, or even India.
A Republican victory would be enthusiastically welcomed in these countries, but would pose a serious challenge to fragile transatlantic unity. These differences, though not radical, need to be taken into account by all international actors, including Russia.
As always, the Republican elephant in opposition today demands change, while the Democratic donkey in power wants things to hold firm. A victory for Biden in next November’s election would mean another four years of the status quo, unless the aging president is forced to leave office before January 2029. A victory for any Republican candidate would trigger a process of revision of policy, creating both new opportunities and new challenges for America and the rest of the world.
From our partner RIAC
The deterioration of US-China relations has long been a generally recognised trend. Contradictions on specific issues, such as human rights, have been accumulating since the boom in trade between the two countries in the 1990s and 2000s. During the presidency of Barack Obama, the outlook for bilateral ties gradually began to darken against the backdrop of the US pivot to Asia, the situation in the South China Sea, and several incidents in the digital environment. Donald Trump took an even tougher line toward Beijing, directly voicing Washington’s entire list of claims against China.
The high-tech sector has become a key front for containing China. The general line of Washington is to limit the access of Chinese companies to the technologies of the United States and its allies. Such technologies can solve dual-use problems and lead to the subsequent modernisation of the PRC in both the military and civilian sectors. President Joe Biden has continued the prior administration’s protectionist course, which confirms the absence of critical inter-party differences on the issue of relations with China. Another indicator of China’s containment in the field of high technologies is President Biden’s new Executive Order “On Addressing United States Investments in Certain National Security Technologies and Products in Countries of Concern.”
The new Executive Order introduces a National Emergency due to the fact that individual countries use access to US civilian technology to develop their military-industrial complex. In the annex to the Order, China is named as such a country, as well as the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau. The very concept of the National Emergency concept has its own specifics. More than four dozen states of emergency are simultaneously in effect in the United States with regards to various foreign policy issues. The president imposes them on the basis of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA), which gives the US Commander-in-Chief the ability to use economic sanctions to counter existing threats. That is, a state of emergency is introduced on a selective issue, and serves as the basis to exercise individual powers.
The Executive Order implies at least two innovations. First, the Administration, represented by the State and Commerce Departments, must create a list of foreign persons who are individuals or legal entities from a particular Country of Concern. In this case, from China. Such persons must be connected in one way or another with high-tech transactions mentioned in the Order. In other words, we are talking about creating another list, which, most likely, will name large Chinese technology and industrial companies and, possibly, their leaders or individual employees. Second, US citizens will be required to notify the authorities of certain transactions with these individuals. In addition, a number of other transactions will be prohibited. The list of such transactions must also be determined by the Administration and periodically subject to revision.
The new legal mechanism gives the Administration wide room to limit Chinese companies’ access to US high-tech firms. The flexibility of the mechanism will be determined by the ability to revise the categories of transactions, technologies and foreign entities that are subject to restrictions. At the same time, the mechanism is likely to provide more opportunities, in comparison with the norms that already exist.
Among the previously-imposed restrictions, one can note the prohibition of Americans from buying or selling securities of “Chinese military companies”. The ban was introduced by Donald Trump in November 2020. Biden modified it somewhat, but without major changes. The appendix named the largest Chinese companies in the field of telecommunications, aircraft manufacturing, electronics, etc. Even earlier, in May 2019, Donald Trump declared a National Emergency due to threats to the US telecommunications sector (Executive Order 13873).
The Chinese telecommunications company Huawei and a number of its subsidiaries were included in the Entity List of the US Department of Commerce — it was forbidden to supply certain goods in the field of electronics, including manufactured outside the USA using American technology. In addition, a number of Chinese companies have been placed on the Military End User List (MEU-List). These companies are prohibited from supplying certain items on the US Department of Commerce’s Commerce Control List.
Such restrictions have a negative background: separate legal mechanisms for sanctions against Chinese persons in connection with the situation in Hong Kong, the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR), etc. In addition, members of Congress periodically propose sanctions bills against China in connection with a variety of reasons, starting from the already familiar topics of human rights and ending with sanctions for possible cooperation with Russia. During the presidency of Joe Biden, none of these projects became law, which does not exclude the adoption of those and other bills in the future.
However, the intensity of US sanctions against China is incomparable to the volume of US restrictions on Russia. So, for example, the number of Chinese persons under blocking US financial sanctions can be measured in the dozens, while the number of Russians already exceeds 1,700. This does not include those persons in respect of whom the so-called “Rule of 50%” is in force, extending blocking sanctions to subsidiaries and controlled enterprises. The same can be said about export controls.
Restrictions against Huawei, the creation of a list of Chinese military companies, and the replenishment of the list of military end users by Chinese enterprises create a media response. But compared to the restrictions against Russia, the sanctions against China are still negligible. It is forbidden to supply almost all dual-use goods, hundreds of industrial goods and “luxury goods” to Russia, including consumer electronics and appliances. Large-scale restrictions on Russian imports and transport sanctions complete the picture. In addition, the United States has managed to build an impressive coalition of sanctions allies against Russia, while it is much more difficult to create such a coalition against China.
However, there is no guarantee that Beijing will not face a similar scenario in the future. Back in 2016, publications cautioning about possible US sanctions against China presented an unlikely scenario. However, the situation in the early 2020s is already significantly different from that reality. The United States and China assume the irreversibility of confrontation, but for their own reasons, they delay its escalation. This does not mean that sooner or later there will not be a landslide fall in relations. Predicting exactly the timing and scale of such a fall is as difficult as was predicting a crisis in relations between Russia and the West. In the meantime, there is a gradual accumulation of restrictive measures, one of which was Biden’s new Executive Order. The creeping nature of the escalation gives Beijing time to prepare for the worst-case scenario.
From our partner RIAC
Quad foreign ministers met in New York for the second time this year and the seventh time since 2019. The four-nation grouping’s ambit of cooperation has clearly expanded and diversified over the years. What were the key talking points this time? I analyse.
The foreign ministers of India, Japan, Australia and the United States – four key maritime democracies in the Indo-Pacific – met on the sidelines of the 78th annual session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in New York on September 22. This was their seventh meeting since 2019 and the second of 2023. Notably, exactly four years ago, this four-nation Quad was raised to the foreign ministers’ level amid a UNGA session. Earlier in 2023, the ministers met in March on the sidelines of the G20 ministerial in New Delhi and in May, this year, the Quad leaders’ summit was hosted by Japan on the sidelines of the G7 summit. Having met twice in 2022 as well, the ministers congregated six times in person and virtually once so far.
The previous ministerial in New Delhi saw the four-nation grouping making a reference to an extra-regional geopolitical issue for the first time – Ukraine – and also the initiation of a new Working Group mechanism on counter-terrorism, a key agenda item for India and the United States, among other themes of discussion. Following the seventh meeting, India’s foreign minister Dr S. Jaishankar tweeted, “Always value our collective contribution to doing global good”, while U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken remarked that the grouping is “vital to our shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific, and together we reaffirmed our commitment to uphold the purposes and principles of the UN Charter”.
Diversifying ambit of cooperation
The ministers have clearly doubled down on the commitments taken during their previous deliberations, particularly to improve capacity-building for regional players. The joint statement that followed the meeting read, “The Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness is supporting regional partners combat illicit maritime activities and respond to climate-related and humanitarian events.” Similarly, the Working Group on maritime security promised “practical and positive outcomes” for the region. Prior to the recent ministerial, the Working Group on counter-terrorism conducted a Consequence Management Exercise that “explored the capabilities and support Quad countries could offer regional partners in response to a terrorist attack”, the joint readout mentions.
Later this year, the U.S. island state of Hawaii will host the Counter-terrorism Working Group’s meeting and tabletop exercise, which will focus on countering the use of emerging technologies for terrorist activities, while the Working Group on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) will be convened in Australia’s Brisbane for its second tabletop exercise. Earlier in August, this year, all four Quad navies participated in Exercise Malabar for the fourth consecutive year, off Sydney, the first hosted by Australia. However, as in previous meetings, the ministers didn’t specifically mention Russia or China with regard to the situations in Ukraine and maritime east Asia respectively.
On the Ukraine question, the ministers expressed their “deep concern”, taking note of its “terrible and tragic humanitarian consequences” and called for “comprehensive, just, and lasting peace”. In a veiled reference to Russia, the ministers rebuffed the “use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons”, underscoring the respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, and called for the resumption of the UN-brokered Black Sea Grain Initiative, which allows for the export of food grains and fertilizers from Ukraine to world markets via a maritime humanitarian corridor, amid the ongoing conflict with Russia.
Similarly, in another veiled reference to continuing Chinese belligerence and lawfare in maritime east Asia, the ministers stressed upon the need to adhere to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and to maintain “freedom of navigation and overflight consistent with UNCLOS”, reiterating their “strong opposition to any unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo by force or coercion”, including with respect to maritime claims in the South and East China Seas. Going further ahead, the ministers expressed their concern on “the militarisation of disputed features, the dangerous use of coast guard and maritime militia vessels, and efforts to disrupt other countries’ offshore exploitation activities”. The joint readout also had mentions of North Korea and Myanmar.
The evident and the inferred
Today, almost all the areas of cooperation of Quad countries happen to be the areas of strategic competition with China, the rapid rise of which necessitated the coming together of the four nations, even though this is not openly acknowledged. In this new great game unfolding in the Indo-Pacific, the U.S.-led Quad is trying to balance China’s overwhelming initiatives to capture the support of smaller and middle powers in the region and around the world. Placid initiatives such as the Open Radio Access Network, the private sector-led Investors Network, Cybersecurity Partnership, Cable Connectivity Partnership and the Pandemic Preparedness Exercises should be read in this context.
With the rise of Quad in parallel with the rise of China and other minilateral groupings in the Indo-Pacific such as the AUKUS (a grouping of Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States), the existing regional framework based on the slow-moving, consensus-based Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was put to test. However, allaying all doubts, Quad deliberations at both the ministerial and summit levels continued to extend their support to ASEAN’s centrality in the region and also for the ASEAN-led regional architecture that also includes the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum. Despite somewhat differing regional outlooks, the Quad likes to see itself as “complementary” to the ASEAN, rather than an “alternative” to its pan-regional influence.
India, the only non-ally of the U.S. in the Quad, will host the fourth in-person Quad leaders’ summit in 2024. The Asian giant is often dubbed as the weakest link in the grouping, owing to its friendly ties with Russia, but other members intent to keep India’s bilateral equations with other countries away from the interior dynamics of the grouping, signalling an acknowledgement of India’s growing geopolitical heft in the region and beyond. This seems to be subtly reflected in the stance taken by individual Quad members in the recent India-Canada diplomatic row, in which they made sure not to provoke New Delhi or to touch upon sensitive areas, even though a fellow Western partner is involved on the other side.
| Quad Foreign Ministers Meeting | Month & Year | Venue |
| First | September 2019 | New York |
| Second | October 2020 | Tokyo |
| Third | February 2021 | Virtual |
| Fourth | February 2022 | Melbourne |
| Fifth | September 2022 | New York |
| Sixth | March 2023 | New Delhi |
| Seventh | September 2023 | New York |
NB:- All three Quad ministerials in New York were held on the sidelines of the respective annual sessions of the UN General Assembly i.e., the first, the fifth, and the seventh meetings.
On the multilateral front, the four ministers reaffirmed their support for the UN, the need to uphold “mutually determined rules, norms, and standards, and to deepen Quad’s cooperation in the international system, and also batted for a comprehensive reform of the UN, including the expansion of permanent and non-permanent seats in the Security Council. While China and Russia, two powerful permanent members of the Security Council, continue to denounce the Quad as an “exclusionary bloc”, the Quad ministers and leaders tend to tone down any security role for the grouping.
However, a recent comment made by Vice Admiral Karl Thomas of the U.S. Navy’s Seventh Fleet during this year’s Exercise Malabar is noteworthy. He said the war games were “not pointed toward any one country”, rather it would improve the ability of the four forces to work with each other and “the deterrence that our four nations provide as we operate together as a Quad is a foundation for all the other nations operating in this region”. Even in the absence of a security treaty, in a way he hinted at the grouping’s desire to cherish its collective strength across all fronts and to check on hegemonic tendencies that may manifest in the region from time to time.
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