On March 8, 2023, a young boy was presented as the 10th Khalkha Jetsun Dhampa Rinpoche or the 10th Jebtsundamba Khutuktu of Gelug lineage of Khalka Mongols, one of the highest-ranking leaders in Tibetan Buddhism. Media reports indicate the eight-year-old child is one of a set of twins named Aguidai and Achiltai Altannar. He was born in the United States in 2015 and comes from a family that is well-established in the political and business realms, having been introduced by none other than the 14th Dalai Lama himself in a ceremony attended by approximately 600 people in Dharamsala, India.
The boy will act as the leader of Tibetan Buddhism in Mongolia, the country’s majority religion. And in the case that the current Dalai Lama would pass away suddenly, he would then become an even more important figure. After all, the legitimacy of the second-highest religious authority after the Dalai Lama, the Panchen Lama, is denied by Tibetans since China’s abduction and replacement of his eleventh incarnation with its own hand-picked candidate in 1995.
This shift in Mongolia’s Buddhist leadership holds the potential to profoundly determine the direction of the country’s relationship with China. The move also reverberates more widely in terms of the future of Tibetan Buddhism at large, especially when it comes to the selection of the next Dalai Lama. It is yet another reminder to Beijing that the Tibetan resistance movement is alive and well—and it now has a fresh new figurehead who holds meaningful religious authority. As one political analyst predicted in a 2022 article, “Since…2012, Mongolia has walked a geopolitical tightrope with China on one side and Dharamsala on the other. When and how the Jebtsundamba Khutuktu reincarnates will give one side much more power over the future of Tibetan Buddhism, with significant geopolitical consequences.”
The lama link
Mongolia holds critical importance when it comes to Tibetan Buddhism, both today and historically. In fact, the word “dalai” is a Mongolic world meaning “ocean,” “vast,” or “great.” In 1913, Mongolia and Tibet signed a treaty declaring friendship, independence from China, and mutual recognition, with both parties pledging to “work by joint consideration for the well-being of the Buddhist faith.” More recently, in a BBC interview, the Dalai Lama again emphasized the nation’s significance in this domain, stating that his future will be determined by “the Himalayan Buddhists of Tibet and Mongolia.”
The Mongolian government itself has not yet commented on this latest announcement, perhaps to avoid upsetting China, as Beijing has repeatedly punished Mongolia for previously hosting the Dalai Lama throughout the past decades. Following a visit the spiritual leader made to the country in 2002, China closed a border crossing with its neighbor, and after a 2006 visit, flights were suspended to Mongolia from the Chinese capital. The most recent and dramatic retribution China doled out to Mongolia regarding a visit made by the Dalai Lama occurred in 2016. That year, it is said that the Dalai Lama identified the 10th Khalka Jetsun Dhampa Rinpoche’s reincarnation, but stated it was too soon to formally introduce him to the world due to his young age.
China reacted with rage. It demanded that the Mongolian government release an apology and forced the nation to promise it would never again host the Dalai Lama, threatening diplomatic consequences if he were to return. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told the Mongolian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tsend Munkh-Orgil, “The Dalai Lama’s furtive visit to Mongolia brought a negative impact to China-Mongolia relations.” In a statement, Wang Yi added, “We hope that Mongolia has taken this lesson to heart.”
Beijing did not merely hit Mongolia with a scolding and stern words, but real, practical consequences as well. One week after the Dalai Lama’s visit, China imposed fees on Mongolian commodity imports and extra transit costs on products crossing into Inner Mongolia. Moreover, Beijing closed a key border crossing with Mongolia, leading to congestion and serious traffic jams and leaving truck drivers stuck in freezing temperatures for days on end. China also halted negotiations with Mongolia for a loan worth 4.2 billion USD. Such obstacles do not come lightly for Mongolia, who relies heavily on China economically, with Beijing being responsible for 60 percent of its imports, over 80 percent of its total exports, and over 40 percent of its GDP.
In response to the 2016 fiasco, the Mongolian government stated, “Mongolia firmly supports the one China policy, consistently holds that Tibet is an inseparable part of China, that the Tibet issue is China’s internal affair.” Mongolia also claimed that the Dalai Lama’s trip was the result of an invitation from Mongolian Buddhists, not the Mongolian government. This reaction, along with Mongolia’s serious financial dependence on China, underscores the considerable degree of influence that Beijing has over the country.
Chinese interference
Beijing does not only leverage the economic power it has over Mongolia, but also actively meddles in the country’s religious affairs. As a way to consolidate its control, China facilitates exchanges with Mongolian Buddhist clergy; more specifically, it does so by targeting and supporting sects that are hostile towards the Dalai Lama, and there are claims that China has financially backed Mongolian abbots that hold this view. After a controversy within the Gelug school of Tibetan Buddhism that began in the 1970s, it is rumored that the CCP started to invest in Mongolia’s anti-Dalai Lama Shugden sect. Interestingly, an NGO called the International Shugden Community, known for staging protests during the Dalai Lama’s international visits, disbanded in 2016 following a Reuters investigation that revealed CCP links to the organization. The accusations of being too close to Beijing can sometimes create problems of legitimacy for Mongolian clergy members hostile to the Dalai Lama, especially as the majority of the country’s Tibetan Buddhists do support him—but China can wield its financial power over these individuals to ensure they do not become too close to Dharamsala.
Today, China is making concerted efforts to integrate Tibetan Buddhism within the framework of its Belt and Road Initiative as part of what’s been called Buddhist diplomacy. Party secretary at the High-level Tibetan Academy of Buddhism, Wang Changyu, has said as much. He explained that the institute’s training of Tibetan Buddhist monks “help[s] countries and territories along the ‘Belt and Road’ satisfy their demand for religious specialists and scriptures,” adding that these exchanges can promote “the results of our Party and country’s ethnic and religious policies, displaying the healthy heritage and development of Tibetan Buddhism [in China, while minimizing] the Dalai clique’s space of activity, upholding national sovereignty.”
This topic is so pivotal to China-Mongolia relations that if one accesses the website of the Chinese embassy in Mongolia, a section dedicated entirely to Tibet is immediately visible on the homepage. The page, entitled “China’s Tibet in the eyes of Mongols” contains reports compiled by Mongolian researchers who traveled on organized visits to Tibet, after which they were instructed to produce material showcasing a positive image of Tibet’s “development and progress” under the PRC. This state-sponsored method—subsidizing trips in exchange for propaganda dissemination—has been used to recruit from other countries as well, such as Nepal.
Another factor to consider is China’s concerns surrounding the ethnic factor in Mongolia. In fact, there are actually more Mongols inside China than in Mongolia, presenting Beijing with another layer of tension to manage. The CCP’s response to this perceived problem has been to crack down on Mongol culture in Inner Mongolia, for instance, by passing a law in 2020 prohibiting teachers from using the Mongolian language—a policy reminiscent of the one instituted in the so-called night-stay schools in Tibet— as part of an effort to make Han Chinese and Mongol culture indistinguishable. This move led to protests in Inner Mongolia that garnered support from across the border, which the government swiftly suppressed before installing new leadership in the region a year later.
Finding the fifteenth
The Dalai Lama’s presentation of the 10th Khalka Jetsun Dhampa Rinpoche has undoubtedly upset China, who wants to control and approve all reincarnations in Tibetan Buddhism. By hosting this ceremony in Dharamsala himself, the Dalai Lama has sent a strong message to the CCP that directly challenges its claim to authority over the reincarnation process. The CCP argues that the correct technique for handling Tibetan Buddhism’s reincarnation process is known as the Golden Urn, and insists that this responsibility falls within its purview and is historically grounded.
The method, performed under the Qing Dynasty, involves filling a golden urn with several options and then drawing lots to identify the reincarnation. In February 2023, the state media outlet The Global Times released an article explaining the Golden Urn process and why the “Recognition of [the] new Dalai Lama must be conducted in China.” The article asserted that this method “has been supervised by the Chinese Central Government and conducted within Chinese territory since the late 13th century.” Beijing claims that this is how Gyaincain Norbu was chosen as the CCP-endorsed Panchen Lama, though there are assertions that the procedure was rigged in his favor. In 2007, the PRC enshrined the Golden Urn convention into law, allowing them to restrict reincarnations to come only from their own pool of pre-determined candidates. This is how the CCP will select the next Dalai Lama. The 14th Dalai Lama rejects this system entirely, saying it was “only used to ‘humor’ the Qing emperors.”
The manners in which the Mongolian government and Buddhist clergy decide to respond to the Dalai Lama’s introduction of the 10th Khalkha Jetsun Dhampa Rinpoche will be important to watch. Thus far, they have remained quiet, as has China. If Mongolia’s response to this reincarnation announcement does not satisfy China, then the CCP may be further incentivized to expand its presence in Mongolia for the sake of getting a hold on Tibetan Buddhism, a force it considers one of its greatest assets—and foremost threats.
