Russia, on 24th February 2022, invaded Ukraine. Initially, Russia called this invasion a ‘Peacekeeping’ mission but later called it a ‘Special Military Operation.’ Moscow has given many justification in the legal domain to legitimize its military operation in Ukraine, but they all have failed to win the support of international law and the majority of states.[1] According to research conducted by Alonso Gurmendi, an International Law professor at the Universidad del Pacífico Law School in Peru, out of 197 entities (193 member UN States, Taiwan, Palestine and the Holy Sea), 143 entities[2] (72.59%) consider Russia’s actions as ‘act of aggression.’[3] So it is clear that Moscow failed to win the international legitimacy of its ‘special military operation.’ This essay explores from a legal perspective how Kremlin’s actions are unlawful and failed to meet the standards of international laws of Use of Force as the international community calls Russia’s actions an ‘act of aggression’.
Jus ad Bellum
Jus ad bellum is the legal rule which governs when a state can decide to use force against another state. Three laws of the UN charter comprise the Jus ad bellum principle. The first is the UN. Charter. Article 2(4). It prohibits the member states of the UN to ‘use or threaten’ to use force against the other member state of the UN.[4] However, Article 51 presents an exception. It states that UN member states can resort to ‘individual or collective self-defence’ if an armed attack occurs against them.[5] Similarly, Chapter VII (Article 39) of the UN charter authorizes the UN Security Council to permit necessary military actions to ‘maintain or restore the international peace and stability.’[6]
Moscow’s Infringement of Jus ad Bellum
Kremlin gave three legal arguments to prove its obedience to Jus ad bellum: Self-Defense, Collective Defence and Humanitarian Intervention.
Self-Defence
Moscow claims that the presence of the United States and NATO in Ukraine threatened its security. So under Article 51 of the UN Charter, it has the ‘inherent right’ to defend itself from an armed attack. However, there was no armed attack from Ukraine, the United States or NATO, which could have given the right of self-defence to Russia. So Moscow has used “pre-emptive” self-defence, which is not under the umbrella of Article 51.[7] Secondly, according to this article, a state exercising its right of self-defence must immediately report to the UNSC. Russia’s representative to the UN informed the UN Security General on the morning of the day when it launched its military operation in Ukraine under Article 51 of the UN charter. Russian representative also sent a letter (UN Doc. S/2022/154). However, the council condemned it and voted 11-1 against Russia. India, China and the United Arab Emirates abstained from voting, but Russia’s veto status in the council saved it from any resolution against it.[8] Lastly, NATO has a limited deployment of forces on the Russian border, which didn’t give NATO any offensive capability to breach the territorial sovereignty of Russia.[9] However, the irony is, Russian forces were at the gates of Ukraine. Kremlin gave “indications and warnings” to Kyiv from its borders, Belarus, and the Black Sea more than NATO gave at the Russian border.[10]
Collective Self-Defence
Moscow claimed it acted under the collective self-defence of Ukraine’s separatist areas, Luhansk and Donetsk regions, under Article 51. Russia recognized these areas as independent only three days before its attack.[11] However, can these regions fulfil the criteria of independent states? Before the invasion, along with Russia, only four states –Syria, Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela- consider these regions independent.[12] So far, only these states have considered these regions independent. According to the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of the States, these regions can’t be regarded as Sovereign States as they lack international recognition.[13]
Even if we view these regions as independent states, three arguments will debunk Russia’s claim of Collective Defense. First, according to Article 51, there should be an armed attack to use the right of self-defence. However, there is no proper evidence that Ukraine authorities launched a military operation on these regions.[14] Second, Article 51 is only for UN member states. Russia’s claimed Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic are not UN member states, so ‘Collective Self-Defence’ under Article 51 does not apply to them.[15] Third, if the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic were in danger of a Ukrainian assault, the Russian forces should have limited themselves to these two regions. Instead, its forces launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine aimed at its ‘demilitarization.’[16] It is against the International Customary Laws of ‘necessity and proportionality’ of the use of force.[17]
Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide?
The third argument that Russia gave was that it is preventing genocide prepared by the regime in Kyiv against the ethnic Russians or the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine. Kyiv applied [18] to the UN International Court of Justice (ICJ) on 26th February 2022 against the Russian claims of genocide under the ‘Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,’ 1948.[19] On 16th March 2022, ICJ gave its verdict (13-2 votes) against Moscow and claimed its aggression as unlawful and asked it to suspend its Special Military Operation in Ukraine.[20] Nevertheless, Kremlin didn’t abide by the ruling of ICJ.
Secondly, Russian actions are also not per the Genocide Convention. According to Article II of the ‘Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,’ vicious acts committed against the part or whole of a ‘national, ethnical, racial or religious group.’[21] However, no evidence suggests Kyiv committed such violent acts on its Russian-speaking population.[22] As there is no evidence of Genocide, it is unlawful for Russia to maintain its forces in Ukrainian territory for humanitarian intervention.
Another reason Moscow gave for its humanitarian intervention was the ‘Rescue of its National.’ Russia has handed its nationality to the Russian-speaking population of its neighboring states, which were once part of the Soviet Union, and Ukraine is one of them. However, such a policy of “passportization” is against the internal laws of the state in which the person resides.[23] So Russia is abusing the internal laws of Ukraine and making it a justification for its invasion. Also, the Ukrainian government has done nothing to the Russian population in Ukraine as they didn’t hold any Russian civilian residing in Ukraine hostage or threaten it with lethal force.[24] Even if Ukrainian forces have fought with the separatist group in the Donbas region, the proportionality of the Russian invasion is much greater. Thus, Russia is violating the internal as well as external sovereignty of Ukraine.
Conclusion
The main argument of this essay was ‘Russia is an aggressor state and has violated the International laws of Use of Force by starting its Special Military Operation in Ukraine.’ This essay looked into this argument from the perspective of jus ad bellum and jus in bello principles. According to the Jus ad bellum principle, Russia has falsely interpreted Article 51 of the UN charter to justify its claims of self-defence and collective self-defence. Moreover, its claims of genocide also don’t meet the standards of the ‘Genocide Convention and ICJ.’ Thus, Russia is an aggressor state and has violated the International laws of the Use of Force by starting its Special Military Operation in Ukraine.
[1] Terry D Gill. 2022. “Remarks on the Law Relating to the Use of Force in the Ukraine Conflict.” Lieber Institute. March 9. Accessed April 28, 2023. https://lieber.westpoint.edu/remarks-use-of-force-ukraine-conflict/.
[2] Out of these 143 entities, 141 states voted for UNGA Resolution A/ES-11/L.1 against Russia and the other two are Taiwan and Kosovo.
[3] Alonso Gurmendi. 2022. “Tracking State Reactions to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: A Resource for Research.” Opinio Juris. March 4. Accessed April 30, 2023. http://opiniojuris.org/2022/03/04/tracking-state-reactions-to-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-a-resource-for-research/.
[4] Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs. 2021. Article 2(1)– (5) of Charter of the United Nations. United Nations, Codification Division, Office of Legal Affairs. March 10. Accessed April 30, 2023. https://legal.un.org/repertory/art2.shtml.
[5] Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs. 2016. Article 51 of Charter of the United Nations. United Nations, Codification Division, Office of Legal Affairs. August 23. Accessed April 30, 2023. https://legal.un.org/repertory/art51.shtml.
[6] Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs. 2016. Article 39 of Charter of the United Nations. United Nations, Codification Division, Office of Legal Affairs. August 23. Accessed April 30, 2023. https://legal.un.org/repertory/art39.shtml.
[7] Jus Mundi. 2022. Implications Of The War In Ukraine Under International Law – Part 1. April 29. Accessed May 1, 2023. https://blog.jusmundi.com/implications-of-the-war-in-ukraine-under-international-law-the-use-of-force-under-international-law/.
[8] Michael N Schmitt. 2022. “Russia’s “Special Military Operation” and the (Claimed) Right of Self-Defense.” Lieber Institute. February 28. Accessed April 30, 2023. https://lieber.westpoint.edu/russia-special-military-operation-claimed-right-self-defense/.
[9] Ibid
[10] Ibid
[11] Valerie Hopkins and Andrew E. Kramer. 2022. “Why it matters that Russia just recognized Donetsk and Luhansk.” The New York Times. February 21. Accessed May 1, 2023. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/21/world/europe/donetsk-luhansk-donbas-ukraine.html.
[12] Mansur Mirovalev. 2022. “Donetsk and Luhansk: What you should know about the ‘republics’.” Al Jazeera. February 22. Accessed May 1, 2023. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/22/what-are-donetsk-and-luhansk-ukraines-separatist-statelets.
[13] Jus Mundi. 2022. Implications Of The War In Ukraine Under International Law – Part 1. April 29. Accessed May 1, 2023. https://blog.jusmundi.com/implications-of-the-war-in-ukraine-under-international-law-the-use-of-force-under-international-law/.
[14] Marc Weller. 2022. “Russia’s Recognition of the ‘Separatist Republics’ in Ukraine was Manifestly Unlawful.” EJIL:Talk! Blog of the European Journal of International Law. March 9. Accessed May 1, 2023. https://www.ejiltalk.org/russias-recognition-of-the-separatist-republics-in-ukraine-was-manifestly-unlawful/.
[15] John B. Bellinger III. 2022. “How Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Violates International Law.” Council on Foreign Relations. February 28. Accessed May 1, 2023. https://www.cfr.org/article/how-russias-invasion-ukraine-violates-international-law.
[16] Stephen P Mulligan. 2022. The Law of War and the Russian Invasion of Ukraine. Washington D.C: Congressional Research Service, March 16.
[17] Marko Milanovic. 2022. “What is Russia’s Legal Justification for Using Force against Ukraine?” EJIL:Talk! Blog of the European Journal of International Law. February 24. Accessed May 7, 2022. https://www.ejiltalk.org/what-is-russias-legal-justification-for-using-force-against-ukraine/.
[18] United States International Court of Justice. 2022. “Allegations of Genocide Under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation).” Application from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Hague.
[19] Jus Mundi. 2022. Implications Of The War In Ukraine Under International Law – Part 1. April 29. Accessed May 1, 2023. https://blog.jusmundi.com/implications-of-the-war-in-ukraine-under-international-law-the-use-of-force-under-international-law/
[20] UN News. 2022. International Court orders Russia to ‘immediately suspend’ military operations in Ukraine. Hague, March 16. Accessed May 3, 2023. https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1114052.
[21] United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect. 2023. Genocide. Accessed May 3, 2023. https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.shtml.
[22] John B. Bellinger III. 2022. “How Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Violates International Law.” Council on Foreign Relations. February 28. Accessed May 1, 2023. https://www.cfr.org/article/how-russias-invasion-ukraine-violates-international-law.
[23] Terry D Gill. 2022. “Remarks on the Law Relating to the Use of Force in the Ukraine Conflict.” Lieber Institute. March 9. Accessed April 28, 2023. https://lieber.westpoint.edu/remarks-use-of-force-ukraine-conflict/.
[24] Ibid
