The restoration of Syrian-Saudi relations was not unexpected, but what is surprising is Saudi Arabia’s leadership in the Arab effort to rebuild ties with Damascus, ultimately leading to Syria reclaiming its seat in the Arab League and finding a permanent resolution to the Syrian crisis. This Saudi stance has raised many questions among those with an interest in political affairs, as well as those who recognize that focusing on the so-called “humanitarian aspect” of “saving the Syrian people” is only a superficial explanation.
The region has begun experiencing a period of “atmospheric tranquility,” resulting from a Saudi-Iranian agreement under Chinese auspices and subsequent reconciliations (Saudi-Syrian, Qatari-Bahraini, Yemeni-Saudi), which are mainly linked to disputes between the two nations. This development was preceded by Egyptian-Qatari and Egyptian-Turkish reconciliations, among others, indicating a regional desire to turn over a new leaf in relations, put the past behind, and adopt a more positive outlook.
This shift is driven by the internal will of these countries, combined with a reduced influence of external factors that were previously “obstructing” them, such as the American and Israeli factors. For many years, the United States and Israel successfully exacerbated regional differences and transformed them into “zero-sum conflicts,” making it nearly impossible to seek political solutions.
Possibly, the key to China’s success in facilitating Saudi-Iranian rapprochement lies in its ability to refocus the dispute on its true origin – a political conflict where the religious dimension has played a role in intensifying it.
What Does the Kingdom Want?
Saudi Arabia started thinking differently several years ago, particularly with the ascension of King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed, the United States’ distancing from the kingdom, and the kingdom’s shift toward Russia and China. The Chinese-Arab summit held in Riyadh in 2022 positioned Saudi Arabia as a leader within the Arab world, especially considering Egypt’s diminished role due to various factors, including its challenging economic situation, which worsened after the events of the “Arab Spring.” This situation led Egypt to make numerous concessions to Arab Gulf states in exchange for economic benefits, such as bank deposits and other incentives. The Gulf countries have since adopted a new policy that avoids providing direct aid, instead offering conditional deposits or acquiring Egyptian state assets, a topic that warrants further discussion.
Following the Ukrainian war, which signaled the emergence of a new multipolar world order and the need for reform in the already fractured United Nations, discussions began about expanding the Security Council’s membership to include additional countries. Proposals included offering a seat to India, one for the African continent, and one for Arab nations. During the US-African summit, President Biden pledged to support the African continent’s efforts to secure a seat on the Security Council, aiming to win the continent’s favor for voting against Russia in the General Assembly. However, granting a seat to Arab nations requires Arab unity and a strong leadership capable of pursuing these aspirations, potentially motivating Saudi Arabia to assume this leadership role, especially given its support from China and Russia, and the absence of an American veto on its involvement.
Saudi Arabia also desires to become a nuclear state, a goal endorsed by the Chinese president during the Arab-Chinese summit. Nuclear technology could be transferred to the kingdom through China, Russia, or Pakistan, and even Iran is prepared to cooperate with Saudi Arabia on this front.
The Saudi strategy is based on the belief that achieving regional security and stability necessitates a balance among the four entities present in the region (Arabs, Iran, Turkey, and Israel), and that only the Arabs currently lack nuclear weapons if Iran possesses them, especially since Turkey is a NATO member, guaranteeing its defense. All these potential benefits increase Saudi Arabia’s desire to resolve Arab-Arab conflicts and revitalize the League of Arab States by taking on a leading role within it.
Where Does Washington Stand in All of This?
This Saudi initiative raises significant questions for many interested parties: did this effort arise from a Saudi conviction to adopt a new policy and a more realistic approach to the Syrian issue and other regional matters? Did the kingdom receive American approval for this initiative, which is also a prevalent assumption among many observers trying to interpret the situation?
To properly understand the situation, its dimensions, and its secrets, it is crucial to acknowledge that today’s Saudi Arabia is no longer the same as it was in 2011, particularly concerning the kingdom’s political leadership and its direction. Similarly, the United States is not the same as it was in 1991, and its interest in the Middle East has waned.
Due to both internal and external factors, the Islamic Republic of Iran has also begun considering alternative solutions to its issues with regional countries and adopting positive positions, which will benefit everyone if achieved. Likewise, Syria, after years of war and devastation, has changed, and perhaps the only constant is its deeply ingrained “Arabism tendencies” within its leadership, people, and foreign policy.
Saudi Arabia’s hard-line stance on the Syrian crisis did not last long, as it shifted its policy in 2015, first halting its efforts to “overthrow the system in Syria” and then proceeding to reestablish relations with it. This led to its pursuit of a solution to the Syrian crisis. The Syrian government’s acceptance of Saudi efforts might stem from its belief that the kingdom has changed, and its leadership now has different inclinations towards Damascus than in the past. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad explicitly addressed this during his recent visit to Moscow.
Furthermore, the Saudi vision for a political solution in Syria no longer centers on Resolution 2254, which Damascus entirely rejects, as it was imposed against its will. The international circumstances surrounding the resolution’s adoption have changed. It is essential to be cautious not to use this as an argument against Syria in the future regarding non-implementation of international resolutions related to the return of the occupied Syrian Golan.
In addition, the joint statement from the meeting between Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal al-Miqdad and his Saudi counterpart emphasized the unity and integrity of Syrian territories. This statement was reiterated at the Jeddah summit, which included countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council as well as Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan (6+3). This indicates an Arab commitment to expelling Turkish forces from the lands they occupy in Syria, aligning with Damascus’ position and its prerequisites for any rapprochement with Ankara.
The Saudi vision for the return of Syrian refugees also aligns with Damascus’ perspective. To facilitate the return of refugees, it is necessary to secure adequate infrastructure and improve living conditions in Syria, which means initiating the reconstruction of Syria by providing Arab and international aid and, most importantly, ending the American veto on this matter. The possibility that the kingdom can play this role more effectively than the Emirates or Oman, thanks to its relationships with Russia and China and the United States’ dependence on it, may encourage Damascus to cooperate with Riyadh.
The kingdom is no longer waiting for the American green light concerning its political direction, as evidenced by numerous factors, including recent OPEC Plus decisions related to reducing oil production, cooperation with Russia and China, rapprochement with Tehran, and issues concerning reduced transactions in US dollars, among others. However, it should be noted that not waiting for the green light does not mean crossing the American red line if one exists, especially since the United States, even if it cannot bring about a political solution in Syria, is undoubtedly capable of disrupting and obstructing it. The kingdom is well aware of this and seeks to send positive messages to Washington periodically.
It appears that the US stance on Syria has softened, as US State Department spokesman Vedant Patel stated in a press briefing: “The US administration is not encouraging anyone to normalize relations with the Assad regime without genuine progress towards a political solution.” This suggests that there are no longer American warnings against engaging with Syria, and the focus has shifted to discouraging action. The United States has also begun to reevaluate its policies towards Syria, as its misguided approach to Damascus prompted Russia to intervene in Syria, establish a Russian base in the Mediterranean, and increase its global influence.
Similarly, the American position on Syria has led to increased Iranian influence within the country while Washington sought to contain and encircle Tehran. The Obama administration, in which Biden served as vice president, had set red lines in Syria that it was unable to enforce.
President Biden aims to end the war in Yemen and views this as a victory for his policy. He is currently in dire need of a victory to present to the American electorate in the upcoming elections. Biden expressed his desire to permanently end the war in Yemen in a statement issued on the first anniversary of the launch of the ceasefire in Yemen, which began on April 2, 2022.
The US administration is also concerned about the potential success of Russian mediation efforts to bridge the gap between Damascus and Ankara, which could put pressure on the US-backed SDF factions. These factors might prompt countries to search for common ground on which to base and serve their interests, thus bolstering the kingdom’s efforts and increasing its chances of success in finding a solution to the Syrian crisis.
If achieved, this solution would establish the kingdom as a leader in the Arab political system, at least in the near future, necessitating cooperation with active states within it, particularly Syria, Egypt, Iraq, and Algeria.
In conclusion, Saudi Arabia’s engagement with Damascus is not an attempt to accept the existing reality but rather a concerted effort to resolve the situation. It is not a tactical move in response to humanitarian needs, but rather an integrated strategic vision, which the kingdom will seek to implement after consulting with Damascus and understanding its concerns.
