Russian war with Ukraine is Europe’s most severe geopolitical crisis after WWII. Yet, after more than 14 months of the war, there are still debates about Russian society. While some try to understand why Russians support the war, others enquire why they do not oppose that war, strong oppressive laws being the most obvious reason. Answers to these questions require an understanding of the ideological components of Russian society.
Strictly speaking, no ideology can be national; all ideologies tend to be universal, not domestic. While there are many more, the three leading contemporary ideological systems are liberalism, socialism, and conservatism. They all tend to be universal, aiming at transnational influence. Even the ideology of nationalism is not society-unique. It can be applied in different countries and cultures. Besides having a universal character, any ideology has two functional traits: it sets some goals and offers methods of achieving them.
In brief, any ideology consists of an assumption (true or false) and some steps to reach it, i.e., functional methods. This is why we can not talk about any nation-specific ideology. But on the other hand, trying to build a society upon an ideology, we would use an open doctrine that could influence other cultures.
And no ideology can be constructed only on aversion or opposition. Suppose a society has no program to reach some common goals. In that case, its uniting factor could quickly become hatred or aversion to something. We can not call such a society ideological.
Communists exterminated the exploiting classes not because they did not like them but because they considered them obstacles to building Communism. In this way, those who oppose Communism do not have an ideology but a civil position. They respond to civil processes that they consider dangerous for their society.
Contemporary Russia is an heir to the Soviet Union. That is what it seems. That is a legal side. That is how people view the situation: the Soviet Union collapsed, giving birth to the Russian Federation (and 14 other independent states). It is hard to see that in fact, the Soviet Union died only legally, but Russia continued many Soviet practices, economy, technology, education, and governance being some of them. But Soviet ideology had to die. There was no place for a communist ideology in the new democratic Russia.
The Soviet Union was built on an ideology that sought to create a classless society and promote the values of equality and social justice. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 left a political and ideological void as the country transitioned to a market economy and a multi-party system. The discrediting of communist ideology also meant that there was no clear alternative ideology to take its place. And Russians had no time for ideology in the 1990s. First, they were too busy to survive; then, they tried to build their new economic reality.
A factor of political pragmatism also prevented Russians from creating adopting a new ideology. Russian leaders have been more focused on maintaining their grip on power and achieving their political objectives (and, of course, on personal richness) than on promoting a coherent ideology. This has led to a tendency towards political pragmatism, which often involves a mix of nationalist and conservative rhetoric and policies, but without a clear ideological framework.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has embraced a market-oriented economic model, which has led to the growth of a wealthy elite and a widening income gap. However, this economic liberalism has not been accompanied by a clear ideological framework, and many Russians felt disenchanted with the current system. Western ideology did not follow Western economic practices. Moreover, the Russian leadership and ordinary Russians also felt suspicious of the West.
It might seem strange that people who were so passionate about building a “new Russia” in the 1990-s, and “new” back then mainly meant a Western type of society, changed so dramatically. Russian history, though, tells us that being anti-Western is quite normal in Russian culture. Indeed, as early as in 1240 Russians fought with the Teutonic Order, a clear representative of the West. Russian history books refer to Teutonic knights as “knights-dogs of the Pope,” picturing them as a collective threat from the West.
Russia had multiple wars with Poland and Sweden in the XVII-XVIII centuries, many of which were disastrous for Russia. Russia lost the Crimean War to a coalition of the Ottoman Empire, France, and the United Kingdom in 1853-1856. Russians explained their loss of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 partially to strong Western support of Japan. Both World Wars were an apparent attempt of the West to destroy Russia, a view of Russian history books. One can say that Russian cultural genotype is anti-Western.
It is effortless for Russians to unite against something negative, like anti-Western critics, because of the fragmentation factor. Russian society is highly fragmented, with deep divisions based on ethnicity, religion, and social class. This fragmentation makes it challenging to promote a coherent ideology that can appeal to a broad range of people. Since Russians can’t unite for something, they need reasons to join against something, hence multiple negative societal narratives.
One of the critical features of Vladimir Putin’s attempt to create a contemporary ideology in Russia is an emphasis on national identity and sovereignty. Putin has sought to promote a vision of Russia as a great power with a unique historical and cultural heritage. This emphasis on national pride is reflected in the country’s foreign policy, which has been characterized by a more assertive stance towards the West and a willingness to challenge international norms and institutions. In short, Russians live in the past, incapable of creating an attractive vision of the future.
As with any other, Russian society has three options for an ideology base. The first is to adopt one of the existing universal ideologies. The second is to create your own. And here, besides an attractive common goal, you need to offer methods of its achievement. The third is the simplest: to replace an ideology with fascism based on a concept of religious or ethnic exclusivity, readily opposing your society to the external world.
The problem of contemporary Russia is not the lack of ideology, though. Multiple sociological and political science research papers show the decline of ideology in the world, describing many societies living without having it shaped. No, the problem of Russia is that it did not bother to produce one after the collapse of Communism. Russia’s society consistently followed different post- and anti-narratives that have no new meanings but stress how different Russia is from the Soviet Union (post-Soviet narrative) or how different it is from the West (anti-Western narrative). In fact, Russia never left the Soviet past dragging many Soviet practices incapable of replacing them with new meanings and ideology. Unable to find new paths and goals, Russians welcomed a replacement for a doctrine from the state, quenching their thirst for some ideology, as they got used to living under a strong one for many years,
Peter F. Drucker wrote in his book “The End of Economic Man,” “Fascism is the stage reached after Communism has proven an illusion.” His words of 1939 are true for Russia of 2023.
Russian society lives without clear goals, without a clear vision of the future. It only hopes that it will not be too much worse than the present. And we can see it everywhere. At the end of January 2023, Putin told the Government to take action to increase the birth rate in the country. And 6 weeks later the State Duma started to discuss a law that would grant Russian citizenship to children born abroad if at least one of the parents has Russian citizenship. It will happen automatically, regardless of the will of the parents (or the children). So, yes, the number of newly-born Russians will increase. However, it is doubtful that these people will ever contribute to Russia as a country.
The absence of a real ideology in Russia can be traced back to a range of historical, political, and social factors. While Putin has promoted a mix of nationalist and conservative policies, no coherent ideological framework underpins these policies. Some political scientists claim that Russia is a failed state. Russia’s search for a new and meaningful ideology becomes very urgent to avoid becoming a failed nation.
