A recent report from a study group organised by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has highlighted concerns over China’s alleged nuclear buildup. The report states that the rapidly growing Chinese nuclear arsenal warrants a rethink of the United States’ nuclear policy. The report advocates expanding the US nuclear arsenal as a preemptive measure to counterbalance Chinese nuclear proliferation.
Another concern is the build-up of two fast-neutron nuclear breeder reactors which are expected to produce 200 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium each year – enough for about 50 nuclear warheads. These developments have raised concerns regarding the accelerated rate of China’s nuclear buildup. While various strategists have called for a policy of aggression in dealing with these developments, the situation warrants a different approach.
In order to analyse recent developments, it is important to understand China’s nuclear doctrine. China’s nuclear conduct since it first detonated a nuclear bomb in 1964 has been the most peaceful among the five Nuclear non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) nuclear weapons states. A central feature of the Chinese nuclear doctrine is an unconditional commitment to the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons. Unconditional no-first-use means China’s nuclear weapons play only the purpose of deterring other states. The unconditionality of its no-first-use policy reflects the purely defensive nature of the Chinese nuclear arsenal. Often referred to as ‘paper tigers’ by the Chinese leadership, nuclear weapons merely act as means of preventing nuclear warfare. Unlike the popularly held conception, especially during the Cold War, rather than indulging itself in securing the means for ‘winning’ a nuclear war, China’s nuclear doctrine, while recognising the danger the nuclear bomb poses, furthers the idea of preventing a nuclear conflict from emerging. The unconditional no-first-use policy also implies China’s reluctance to engage in a nuclear arms race. Historically, China’s foreign policy assessments have not relied on using nuclear weapons as a measure to fulfil its international objectives. While maintaining secure second-strike capabilities in the event of a nuclear strike is important, China believes in keeping its nuclear development at the level of a minimum credible deterrent rather than pursuing a strategy that risks a nuclear arms race.
A major reason for rising concerns among various strategists is the escalation of tensions over Taiwan in recent months. These concerns, although unaccommodating of the entire landscape, are not entirely unfounded. The 2022 Chinese White Paper on Taiwan presents the concerns China holds regarding the presence of the United States in the region. Released in the backdrop of former US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan and the subsequent Chinese military drills, the White Paper stresses the need for unification with Taiwan describing it as “indispensable for the realisation of China’s rejuvenation.” While peaceful unification is defined as the “first choice”, the paper states that China would not refrain from the use of force, reserving the right to use all necessary measures. Cherry Hitkari, in an analysis for the Lowy Institute, points out that while maintaining a confident tone, the White Paper refrains from explicit war-mongering with Washington. This reflects Beijing’s limitations in taking up arms against the United States. It is in this context that China’s nuclear buildup can be analysed as a way of ensuring security and maintaining effective deterrence. Although Taiwan’s unification is seen as an important issue by the Chinese leadership, it is unlikely for China to explore a nuclear route for achieving unification. Hence, the feared nuclear buildup can very well be a defensive measure aimed at the prevention of a nuclear conflict.
While the nuclear challenge arising from China might be a possibility in the future, it is unlikely that the United States will be able to counter the nuclear stockpiles of both China and Russia through an aggressive policy. An increase in the nuclear stockpile by the United States will be met by a similar response from Russia and probably China will also follow suit. Therefore, rather than rethinking its nuclear policy, the United States must look towards diplomatic cooperation for containing the emerging threat. The United States can look towards bringing China into the fold of a stricter arms control regime through diplomatic advances. Once China has been brought into such an arrangement, inroads can be made in bettering US-China relations.
The dearth of trust between the two states is a major reason for the growing anxieties. Speculative assessments must give way to dialogue and cooperation. In this regard, the United States must take charge of shedding its presumptions about China’s nuclear ambitions and actively pursuing the policy of engagement rather than containment.