There is a well-known principle in International Politics that neither friend remains permanent nor enemy; it is the national interest that remains permanent. Realism, the dominant school of thought in International Relations, entails that states are primarily concerned with their security and survival in an anarchic international system where no supervising authority is present. In the absence of any central authority to whom states should resort for their security, states pursue policies that ensure their security. In this regard, states either resort to self-help or forge alliances with major powers against their rivals in order to enhance their security and maintain balance of power. Pakistan, a country that came into being in 1947, inherited a debilitating economy and a relatively fragile military; as a result, there were little chances of its survival as depicted by the then leadership of India. India and Afghanistan, two hostile neighbors, were there on eastern and western front of Pakistan respectively which were an incessant threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of an infant state. This aggravated the sense of “Security Dilemma” among the then policymakers who started pursuing policies that were indispensable to safeguard Pakistan from existential external threats.
Pakistan, a new-born state, unable to strengthen its security fabric in the preliminary years of its independence owing to economic crisis started seeking alternatives and our policymakers realized the security of state in the Western Camp. In order to bolster its defense against the hostile neighbor, Pakistan ratified western defense pacts- Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1955. Our leadership discerned that by adhering to these security alliances under the umbrella of the United States of America Pakistan would be able to stave off imminent Indian aggression in years to come. In the same decade of 1950s Pakistan started advocating for non-proliferation and disarmament. Pakistan firmly supported the United Nations’ resolutions vis-à-vis arms control and disarmament. This indicates that Pakistan adopted purely normative posture with regards to conventional and nuclear proliferation. Pakistan adhered to the same policy of non-proliferation till 1960s, but since then changing geo-strategic dynamics prevailed on Pakistan to readjust its policy posture. Pakistan’s normative approach began to evolve and gradually it shifted its focus from normative posture to strategic approach.
Now the question arises, what made Pakistan to reorient its policy from normative approach to strategic approach? The central principle of international politics delineates the answer: States pursue the policies that serve their interests in the best possible manner and these policies evolve with the changing circumstances. In 1960s and 1970s certain significant events took place that reacclimatized Pakistan’s policy towards security. Being a signatory of ‘Western Security Pacts’ Pakistan expected military and economic support from United States of America and its allies in its war against the rival in the eastern front. But United States of America, instead of assisting Pakistan against India imposed sanctions on Pakistan and proscribed the provision of military equipment and economic aid. This took Pakistani policymakers by surprise who, being the ally of West, were anticipating the U.S support. This single event turned down the decade long policy approach that security of state lies outside its borders. Another significant event in the form of 1971 war that resulted in the disintegration of Pakistan reinforced the fact that the United States of America is a fair-weather friend and it would not back up Pakistan against India.
When India operationalized its so-called peaceful nuclear program in 1974, it proved to be the final nail in the coffin of Pakistan’s normative posture towards nuclear program. The shift from a perspective driven by the norm of non-proliferation to a notion based on purely geo-strategic and realistic calculations materialized after this Indian aggressive move. Pakistani foreign policymakers realized that a regional giant that is belligerent in its posture towards Pakistan if went nuclear, the existing strategic asymmetry would be magnified further in favor of India. Thus, possibility of Pakistan’s adherence to Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) began to dwindle since 1974 as it would become part of the NPT only when India endorsed it. In the backdrop of India’s nuclear program, Pakistan started working to build up its own nuclear program and in coming decades Pakistan and India became nuclear weapon states though unrecognized. When NPT’s review conference held in 1995, there emerged a debate in Pakistan whether it should become signatory of NPT or not. The majority of intellectuals from academia, intelligence, politics, and media vowed that keeping in mind the India’s contentious designs towards Pakistan, it should pursue its nuclear program as it would serve as an effective deterrent against would-be a regional hegemon.
In contemporary times, Pakistan has become more tenacious in its approach that is steered by geo-political realities. Since 2010, Pakistan has conformed to the policy that it would join NPT only as a recognized nuclear weapon state in the backdrop of strategic imbalance in South Asia. In other words, any prospect of Pakistan’s drive towards disarmament has faded away owing to an existing insurmountable gap between the conventional forces of Pakistan and India. Pakistan has adhered to the policy of keeping nukes as a deterrent against regional giant. This regional hegemon which is relatively far superior to Pakistan in its military and conventional technology is kept restraint only due to Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent. Furthermore, in the wake of successive economic meltdowns, Pakistan cannot compete India in arms race. Furthermore, Pakistan disregards NPT due to its discriminatory nature. On the one hand it advocated for non-proliferation; while on the other hand it legitimated the possession of nuclear weapons by recognizing five nuclear states as ‘Recognized Nuclear Weapons States.’ Likewise, NPT has not carried out any substantial effort to implement it provision for disarmament. Another Achilles heel of the NPT is that in recent past United States of America has brokered a nuclear deal with India which is an unequivocal violation of articles 1 and 2 of the NPT which categorically state that no non-NPT state can acquire nuclear weapons technology from any other nuclear state. This obvious disregard of NPT’s provisions on part of great powers indicates that NPT by its very nature is a weak treaty that lacks any strict enforcement force.
As indicated above, Pakistan’s policy evolved from non-proliferation to conditional membership of NPT, but in recent times Pakistan has altogether changed its stance vis-à-vis NPT. The rising economic power of India along with its growing tendencies for advanced conventional and non-conventional weapons is disproportionately disturbing the strategic stability in South Asia leaving no option for Pakistan but to remain stubborn about its nuclear deterrent.
