Days after the twentieth anniversary of the US invasion of Iraq pass, at a time when the Iraqis are reviewing the outcome of this event, which led to the destruction of the foundations and infrastructure of the state, and in turn restored the state of sectarian and national division, which was imposed by the calamities that passed on Mesopotamia as a living nation, weakening at one time and strengthening at another. Like other nations, if the US invasion of Iraq succeeded in overthrowing and changing the previous political regime and failed in bringing down Iraq, however, the political sectarianism that brought about all these transformations sought to bring down Iraq as an entire country, and to erase its historical specificity that history knew and witnessed as a country’s model of harmony between nationalities and religions.
From the beginning, the US succeeded in formulating a sectarian project, through which it strengthened the concept of sectarian division and quotas, as the US presence became a major ally for which the Shiite and Sunni sectarian parties raced, and for which the sectarian princes and the new elite of Iraq fought, at a time when successive US Administrations worked what it can win them over to its favour.
Thus, Iraq’s new leaders became close allies of the “liberator” from overseas. And at a time when the internal struggle raged to win the seat of power in Iraq, the active military and political institutions in the US Administration hastened to put the final touches to complete and implement the chapters of the scenario of the occupation of Iraq. I may not be exaggerating when I say that this fragmentation, which is still witnessing in the Iraqi political arena, and the fluctuations of its politicians and their clinging to power, which have increased in severity and convulsions since the start of the parliamentary elections process, contributed to perpetuating strife and division in the Iraqi social and political component, as is the case in the struggle of the Sadrist movement and the coordination framework. And the crisis of Muhammad al-Halbousi with the sheikhs of the Western Badia. Thus, two decades after the fall of the former Iraqi regime, and as a result of this wrong and deliberate method of rebuilding the state, the difference in visions regarding the relationship of Iraqis with their regional environment still threatens the stability of what is left of Iraq, as religious parties have failed to develop an inclusive system of government for all. Internal sectarian divisions were strengthened as a result of the deliberate insistence on creating a sectarian elite that controls the popular sectarian base, instead of focusing on the importance of the unity of the broad cross-sectarian mass base. State institutions have become centers of conflict between parties competing for power and wealth. And with the increasing American and international interest in these forces, the Iraqi political parties’ attempts to satisfy the influential US hand in order to crown them as leaders of the rule of Iraq increased. Thus, the US succeeded in its game through its convergence with the Iranian sectarian project, which contributed to the escalation of the Iraqi political crisis by allowing the sectarian political religion to dominate the political arena, and thus seizing power by the power of money and weapons, to the extent that most military institutions and teams became a monopoly. On sectarian and ethnic leaders, in a country where security and sectarian elements are the key to control, influence and manipulation of corruption files. Despite the existence of the constitution that regulates the work of many state institutions, the hawks of the ruling parties did not hesitate to control the Central Bank, which is one of the independent bodies linked to the House of Representatives, which the law fortified it from any government interference. Central, controlling the fate of billions of dollars and spending them without account to finance private activities, and transferring them to Iran and some countries in the region, in light of the repercussions of the American-Iranian conflict on the Iraqi arena and the region, and under the cover of the American-Iranian consensus in accepting a new Iraqi political system, whose officials and parties enjoy with Western sponsorship and support, it depends for its continuation and defense of its foundations and sectarian ideology, on armed state militias supported from behind the borders, despite the ruling elite’s knowledge of the importance of the American role in maintaining the legitimacy of the regime internationally on the one hand, and the role of armed groups in supporting the regime at home. This explains the subtleties of this relationship, which can be described as a relationship of interests and a form of clinging to power and playing on the ropes.
The continuity of prevarication and playing on the Iranian and the US sectarian ropes, or what the regime officials in Baghdad call “neutrality”, will collide sooner or later with the reality of the matter, in the event that the US interests require a change of its compass, in line with the upcoming reality of Iraq’s neighbors. And after the end of the need for the sectarian system to fill the void left by the overthrow of the Iraqi state, which was the important option to perpetuate the US presence and its continuity by being the faithful guardian of the Iraqi system that it itself created. Here lies the ability and importance of the US factor as an organized, effective and main party at the heart of the Iraqi political scene, which makes it easier for it to exert political pressure on the ruling parties, and then draw a road map and determine its course according to the local and regional contexts and conditions that the US ambassador in Baghdad may find appropriate to satisfy some. Or alerting others, especially since the Biden administration, as was the case in previous US administrations, still retains its pressure cards on the Iraqi political system, by not allowing the Iraqi political system to cross the red lines drawn for it. And this is what may push the US side to re-vision of things, and a continuous drawing of the shape of the Iraqi political scene, by arranging a new Iraqi political road map that serves the US administration’s strategy and agenda for which it came to Iraq and the region. This is what the Iraqis see clearly in the activities of the US ambassador and the representative of the United Nations and their joint endeavor to contain the active political and armed forces in the Iraqi scene in line with the upcoming internal and regional developments.
