Quick Take: What is the New Start Treaty and Why Hypersonics are not part of it?

Problem:

-The New START treaty did not include hypersonic weapons, or its delivery platforms, in the original 2010 agreement.

-As such, the U.S. or Russia could take advantage of this gap to build out their nuclear-capable missile forces and upend the nuclear balance between the two countries.

-If Russia or the US believes that the other is cheating in an arms control agreement, it can potentially increase the chances that either country will break out and disregard the treaty as a whole, thereby making their relationship more adversarial, hostile, and ultimately, dangerous.

Timeline

-1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was as an arms control treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the limitation of the anti-ballistic missile

-The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty required the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate all of their nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500 to 5,500 kilometers

-Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), was an arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union (and, later, Russia) that were aimed at reducing their arsenals of nuclear warheads and of the missiles and bombers capable of delivering such weapons

-The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), also known as the Moscow Treaty, commits the United States and Russia to reduce their deployed strategic nuclear forces to 1,700-2,200 warheads apiece

New START

-New START is a nuclear arms reduction treaty between the United States and Russian

-It was first signed on 8 April 2010 in Prague and is expected to last until 5 February 2026, after it was extended earlier this year.

-New START’s core articles addressed the complexities of nuclear weapons technology.

  • However, It does not directly limit the number of nuclear warheads either nation may possess, (largely because warheads are difficult to track and account for after a country has developed the ability to create nuclear weapons and in sizeable quantities)
  • INSTEAD, New START focuses on the nuclear warhead delivery systems—ground-launched missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and heavy bomber aircraft—by which these destructive payloads can be carried intercontinental distances.
  • New START limits the number of these systems each nation may possess (up to 800) and deploy (up to 700), as well as the number of warheads that can be mounted on them (up to 1,550).

Hypersonics

-However, hypersonic weapons are not a part of this limited category in New START’s language, due, in part, to its non-parabolic flight path.

  • New START limits apply to “a weapon delivery vehicle that has a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path.”
  • Ballistic trajectories are determined by a projectile’s initial velocity and the force of gravity, which pulls the object down as it travels
  • This means that someone can track and reasonably predict the target of an ICBM based on its velocity and orientation.
  • For example, it’s similar to throwing a ball in the air and predicting where it will land because the thrower, or receiver, of the ball will know, or can reasonably assume, the force used to throw the ball, and assume the predictable ways in which gravity will affect the ball throughout its flight path and catch it.

-However, hypersonics are different, and do not have a traditional ballistic trajectory.

  • Once accelerated to high speeds via a host rocket into earth’s low atmosphere, hypersonic missiles take advantage of aerodynamic forces to generate lift, gliding through the atmosphere like an airplane—or a stone skipping across the surface of water
  • This difference in flight path (from parabolic to elongated and less predictable) is why it’s not considered a ballistic missile and therefore not covered by traditional clauses of New START.
  • To date, the only known hypersonic missile in deployment is Russia’s Avangard, but that uses an ICBM, so it falls within the treaty, but this is not likely to be the norm in the future as Russia and the U.S. continue hypersonic weapons research.

Hypersonic and New START Why Wasn’t it in the treaty?

-First, when New START was negotiated, hypersonics were still ill conceived as both Russia and the U.S. were researching it for military purposes.

-Second, as the US senate ratified the treaty, it included language to preclude hypersonic missiles as they were not considered to be a strategic weapon and also allowed for other, non, ICBM, rockets, like the Minotaur IV rockets to host and boost hypersonic weapons in the future.

-Russia was largely upset at the US decision and “understanding” of hypersonic weapons.  Nevertheless, Russia agreed to proceed with the treaty as it was believed beneficial in the grander context

-Ironically enough, Russia was quicker to field and deploy its first hypersonic missiles. So much in fact, that Mark Esper said wanted New START to include “new Russian strategic weapons”—likely meaning hypersonic weapons. But this did not happen.

-That said, there has been some transparency for US inspectors around the Russian Avant Garde hypersonic missile already.

-There are other discussions planned in the future to discuss

-However, if Russia were to change booster-systems, it would require a new understanding between countries. Meaning though they found semi-agreement today, because hypersonic missiles aren’t codified in New START or other arms agreements, it’s inevitable that Russia or the US will break out and develop hypersonic missiles at greater numbers.

Policy

-To help fix this issue, I propose that the US and Russia—should use New START’s Bilateral Consultative Commission to amend the treaty and include language on hypersonic weapons and delivery vehicles as a part of an arms control agreement.

-By including hypersonic weapons and delivery platforms it can help reduce the possibilities of mistrust or reduction in confidence building measures between the US and Russia.

-Alternatively, Russia and the US can pledge to not allow hypersonic weapons to be dual use weapons and instead keep it as a non-strategic weapon that can be subject to inspections and other transparency measures in the future.

Waqas Jan
Waqas Jan
The writer is a graduate of National Defence University Pakistan. His research interests include Arms Control Verification, Compliance and Enforcement, Humanitarian Arms Control, Export Controls and Disarmament Machinery.