Pakistan’s foreign policy has failed to achieve strategic coherence, clear direction and astute posture due to a combination of domestic, strategic, and policy factors. The country’s dependence on the US, tendency towards strategic drift, and short-term policy decisions have all contributed to its inability to build positive relationships with Russia or the former Soviet Union. Domestically, the political instability and military coups have had a major impact on foreign policy. The frequent changes in government and military leadership have made it difficult for the country to establish a consistent and effective foreign policy. Additionally, the country’s inability to address its internal security issues, such as terrorism and violent extremism , has made it difficult to establish positive relationships with other countries.
Pakistan and Russia have attempted to build trust and establish a lasting strategic relationship in the past decade. However, the relationship has been heavily influenced by historical events and trajectories such as Pakistan’s close ties to the US, the Soviet role in Afghanistan, the Soviet policy of Indo-centrality , and domestic instability in Pakistan. The global balance of power also played a role in shaping Russia’s behaviour towards Pakistan.
Despite these challenges, civilian regimes in Pakistan have attempted to reduce dependence on the West and improve relations with Russia. However, it will take time for the two nations to develop a friendship that will endure despite external factors. The history of their strategic ties illustrates a complex interplay of domestic and structural factors in shaping the relationship.
Systemic bipolarity and the cold war
When Pakistan gained independence in 1947, it sought to establish relations with a country that could provide economic and military support. The new country faced a strategic dilemma due to bipolarity, colonial history, and economic needs. However, the Soviet Union did not respond to Pakistan’s economic needs as they saw post-colonial states as tools of western containment in South Asia. Due to economic hardship, internal insecurity, governance issues, and foreign policy crises, Pakistan shifted away from neutral and non-aligned policies and aligned itself with the West in 1953.
Pakistan’s foreign policy interests were protected by the visit of Liaqat Ali Khans’ visit to Washington in 1950. The shift towards the West was driven by the perceived threat of Indian aggression along the border and the complexity of the Kashmir dispute. Pakistan’s support for the US during the Korean War, and its support for the 1951 peace treaty with Japan solidified its alliance with the US.Pakistan joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 and the Baghdad Pact (CENTO) in 1955, which positioned it against the Soviet Union.
In the bipolar security system, the US used Pakistan’s geographic position to further its own interests by using its territory as a base for gathering intelligence and maintaining surveillance on the Soviet Union and other regional militaries. The downing of a US U-2 spy plane, flown from Peshawar air base in the 1960s, nearly provoked Soviet retaliation. Entangled in the Cold War framework of Great Power rivalry, Soviet Union remained in a retaliatory posture to US protégé Pakistan in international fora — vetoing against its interests, particularly with respect to Kashmir issue, due to the entrenched Pakistan-US strategic connection.
Afghan annexation and Durand
Pakistan played a crucial role in advancing US strategic goals in its backyard over the course of next two decades, at the cost of ties with the Soviet Union. Pakistan was at the centre of America’s containment policy in the 1970s, lobbying for the weakening of the communist-leaning government in Afghanistan which prompted the Soviets to invade Afghanistan in 1980. In addition, Pakistan’s acted as a conduit to facilitate talks between China and Washington during a phase of Sino-Soviet adversarial relationship, which culminated in the US-China diplomatic dialogue (1971). The geopolitical objective of settling the Durand Line dispute with Communist Afghanistan was an immediate one. The soviets were backing the communist government regarding the Durand Line issue during the 1970s and 1980s and Pakistan supported Mujahideen rebels in their attempt to overthrow the soviet-backed regime so that it could achieve its goal of integrating the Khaybar Pakhtunwa and FATA regions. The dismemberment of east Pakistan (Bangladesh) by India in 1971 was retaliation for the west-dominated strategy, for which Soviet external support was critical especially at the sea. Russia sent nuclear submarines to ward off possible US navy assistance, forcing Pakistan’s armed forces into a humiliating submission.
The Soviet Union’s disintegration and the victory of the US strategic order were made possible by Pakistan’s facilitation of the asymmetric struggle to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan. This was seen as a competent policy to limit the Soviet leverage that it had gained post-Bangladesh liberation. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, on the other hand, exacerbated a power struggle between the armed Mujahideen, who posed a serious security threat and were a source of instability for Pakistan.
After contributing to destabilize each other, Pakistan and Russia faced new security concerns. Pakistan was in desperate need of military modernization when its closest ally, the United States, imposed nuclear sanctions. Russia, on the other hand, was economically shaky and preoccupied with solidifying its position in disintegrating nations; thus, both were unable to make meaningful strides in formalising strategic cooperation. On the other side, India used the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (1971) to strengthen its connection with Russia. This meant that Pakistan’s policies had to be redirected in order to preserve its position vis-Ã -vis India while also fearing spillover from Afghanistan, with whom it shared the porous Durand border. The recognition of the Taliban regime in 1996 was another setback to bilateral ties, for Russia believed that it would embolden Chechen insurgents to speed up operations by establishing recruiting channels from Central Asian regions to Pakistan’s tribal areas. The War on Terror in 2001 once again oriented Pakistan with the US strategic alliance, making it a launch pad in the international combat against Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces. Russia was consistent with its internal efforts and maintained a cordial relationship with Pakistan, given that the country backed the US-led campaign in Afghanistan.
Converging interests and the India factor
Amid an exhausting Afghan campaign, Washington began to look beyond Pakistan over disagreements over combat strategy and the prolonging of the conflict. The spillover had tremendously increased homegrown extremist and radical elements, especially in the western region, inflicting heavy costs on the civilian and economic sectors of Pakistan. the new-founded strategic partner, India, signified a shift towards Indian ocean region in the American foreign policy. The US came to recognise India’s nuclear ambitions in 2008 and its rising status internationally. Pushing Russia and Pakistan to converge their interests. In 2010, Russia expressed its renewed desire to engage with Afghanistan, culminating in a summit including Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Tajikistan. This convergence coincided with a deterioration in relations between Pakistan and the United States in 2011, when US Rand missiles killed Usama bin Laden on Pakistani soil, followed by a US attack on the Pakistani military that killed 24 soldiers. These incidents, however, pushed for a policy change in Pakistan to lessen its dependence on the United States. In the following years, Pakistan attempted to exercise independence in its foreign policy, especially toward Russia, and made considerable progress in the areas of counter-terrorism and trade. However, the relationship still seems to be transactional and laden with constraints like Pakistan’s incoherence and oscillatory nature. The India factor has always been a constant in Pakistan’s relationship with Russia, given its diplomatic bargaining capacity.
Lingering domestic impediments in Pakistan
The historical record of Russian-Pakistani relations illustrates the benefits of democratic leadership aimed at reducing dependence on the West in foreign policy. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s democratic socialist coalition made a notable effort to improve relations with the Soviet Union, marking the first time in Pakistani history. Bhutto’s foreign policy sought to detach Pakistan from SEATO and CENTO, and his 1974visit to the Soviet Union enabled both countries to establish agreements on mutual trust, cooperation, technical assistance, and friendship. In striving to enhance ties with the Communist bloc, Prime Minister Bhutto concurrently made a conscious effort to build relations with Russia. The close relationship between Pakistan and the Soviet Union from 1973 to 1979 proved advantageous for both countries.
The democratically elected Imran Khan regime attempted to de-Americanize Pakistan’s foreign policy and engage in reproachment with Russia, America’s rival. However, Khan’s removal at the military’s behest and its strong ties to the US suggest that Pakistan-Russia relations will continue to suffer setbacks, halting progress toward a comprehensive partnership. American pressure for Pakistan to join in condemning Russian military operations in Ukraine suggests that the US opposes Pakistan’s Russia-oriented policy as outlined in the new national security document. Pakistan’s shift toward Russia and China presents a challenge to US hegemony in South and Central Asia. This convergence could prove challenging in the Eurasian region.
At any cost, it cannot allow a frontline state to become a geopolitical impediment in a strategically important region. It can allow Russia to exploit the region to accelerate its outreach to South Asia and create connectivity through the warm waters of the Persian Gulf, creating a strong block connecting Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and China. However, the recent regime change in Pakistan and renewed orientation towards the US has put a renewed strain on growing Russia-Pakistan relations. The change in policy in Moscow can be seen in light of the fact that Russia denied selling crude oil at a discount to Pakistan, soon after Imran Khan’s government changed.
It is imperative that Washington be uneasy with Pakistan’s independent policies. Pakistan has not succeeded in balancing its engagements with the West and Russia. Internal power imbalance and political chaos prevent Pakistan from having independence in foreign policy. In order to improve its foreign policy, Pakistan must re-evaluate its domestic, strategic, and policy decisions and prioritize long-term strategic considerations over short-term gains. Economic progress, strong democratic institutions, and political competence contribute to the formulation of objective foreign policy. Unless Pakistan achieves these parameters, its Russia policy will continue to suffer despite its efforts. Russia can be a long-term partner for weapons, trade, and commerce.
