Connect with us


When Africa Is Just Around the Corner

Avatar photo



Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and South Africa's Foreign Minister Naledi Pandor shake hands during a meeting. Image source: Russian Foreign Ministry Press Service

On January 23, 2022, Maria Zakharova, spokeswoman of the Russian Foreign Ministry, announced Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov was embarking on a new tour of Africa. During the week, the high-ranking Russian delegation paid a visit to several countries on the continent: South Africa being the traditional “mainstay” of Russia’s foreign policy in Africa, the continent’s smallest kingdom of Eswatini, the Russia-friendly Portuguese-speaking Angola, and the little-known Eritrea, which was once even under Russian sanctions. That said, Moscow did not hesitate to announce the terminal point of the visit, the specifics of the secretive Eritrean statehood probably playing a part here.

Exactly six months before that, Sergey Lavrov had already paid a working visit to several African states on July 23, 2022: that tour also included four states (Egypt, Republic of the Congo, Uganda and Ethiopia).

Besides, immediately after the minister’s return to Russia, the Russian Foreign Ministry hosted a meeting between Sergey Lavrov and the Personal Representative of the President of the Republic of the Congo for Strategic Issues and International Negotiations, Minister Francoise Joly.

Such a revitalization of Russian efforts in Africa is not accidental.

Amid preparations for the second Russia–Africa Summit and Economic Forum, which is anticipated in St. Petersburg in July 2023 after repeated postponements, Moscow needs to not only embrace a constructive agenda for the discussions but also ensure a high representativeness of their participants—all that in a more challenging geopolitical situation than it was in 2019.

Arcane backdrop

In our opinion, the complexity of the situation in the run-up to the forthcoming Summit has more to do with the processes within the African continent than by Russia’s ongoing special operation in Ukraine.

Even if we solely focus on Russia’s obvious priorities in the region, it is easy to see that the internal political situation deteriorated in a number of ways in 2022. Thus, in South Africa, literally on the eve of the ANC party conference (the ruling party in the country since 1994), where the president of the party is elected, there erupted a major scandal around Cyril Ramaphosa, the incumbent president of the ANC and the nation. A report published in late November 2022 highlighted the findings of an independent commission that had inquired into the allegation made by the former head of South African intelligence, A. Fraser, who claimed that Mr. Ramaphosa deliberately concealed the circumstances of the theft of several million dollars from his private mansion in the province of Limpopo, because that money had not been declared in accordance with the law. The report’s main conclusion was that the President had committed acts incompatible with the spirit of the South African Constitution, which formed grounds for his impeachment. [1] Despite rumors of Ramaphosa’s possible resignation, he managed to retain his position as the ANC’s head, which most likely guarantees his re-election as President of South Africa a year later, when national elections are to be held. At least, this was the logic that persisted throughout the country’s post-apartheid history.

Yet, things can be different in 2024, as the ANC is losing momentum: in particular, the South African Institute for Security Studies says in one of its forecasts that the inter-faction struggle within the party itself, which is taking place amid socio-economic turmoil, could cause a collapse of the ANC’s approval ratings on the eve of elections, and then the government would have to become a coalition government at best, for the first time in South Africa’s modern history.

For bilateral relations between Russia and South Africa, such an outcome would indicate a need for greater flexibility. Right now, the two sides express satisfaction about the growing contacts between the ANC and United Russia as the two ruling parties—yet, engaging other influential forces in the country should not be overlooked either. Perhaps, at some point, this situation will have to be urgently rectified, so this should be taken into account already at present, when preparing for the St. Petersburg Summit and especially in view of the Russia–Africa Parliamentary Forum, to be held in Moscow in the not-to-distant March.

The turmoil in the corridors of power aggravates the large-scale crisis in the national energy system, which no government has been able to properly address. Currently, the situation is such that the state company Eskom has to reactivate outdated coal-fired thermal power plants, because there is no other way to eliminate constant power outages. While there were 200 days of “load shedding” in 2022 (an anti-record in all the years of the crisis, which began as early as 2007) and up to 50% of all capacity was lost in September because of generation failure, the company admits that things can get worse in 2023. On Monday, President Ramaphosa said that the ANC was contemplating a national state of disaster—prior to that, the same situation had only been provoked by the coronavirus pandemic. This state of South Africa’s energy sector not only affects the daily lives of citizens and leads to mounting discontent (in December, army units were first deployed to protect critical infrastructure from acts of “sabotage, theft, vandalism and corruption”), but also takes a toll on the agricultural and industrial potential of South Africa, a country so far considered the most industrialized nation on the continent. If you add the catastrophic flooding that shook the province of KwaZulu-Natal in April 2022 (damages amounted to 17 billion rand) and recall the dire consequences of the coronavirus pandemic, it becomes clear why the inflation rate came close to 7% for the first time since 2008-2009, the unemployment rate reached an unprecedented high of 34%, with 63% of the population living below the upper poverty line (under $6.85 a day).

Simultaneously, 2022 saw an upsurge of violence sweeping across West Africa. In Burkina Faso, the military led by Paul-Henri Damiba, themselves ascending to power through a coup in January 2022 (having deposed President R. Kabore, who ruled the country for six years), were overthrown in September. A group of junior officers, led by 34-year-old captain Ibrahim Traoré, suspended most political activities. In May, a failed coup attempt was reported in Mali. If successful, it would have been the country’s fourth in the last ten years, with Mali’s transitional president, Assimi Goïta, playing a proactive role in the last two coups (2020 and 2021). Coup attempts also took place in Guinea-Bissau (February) and the Gambia (December). In Sierra Leone, President Julius Bio had a difficult time dealing with bloody mass protests caused by the dire economic situation.

There is a widespread belief in the media that these events play into Russia’s hand (at least, many Western commentators are convinced of this). This is partly confirmed in practice: for example, Prime Minister of Burkina Faso Apollinaire de Tambèla hopes to cement the partnership between the two nations, which received a new impetus with the growth of anti-French sentiment, by opening a Russian diplomatic mission in his country. It is important to note, though, that most states in this subregion are now ruled by a different, younger generation, so Russia’s traditional discourse that largely leaned on the Soviet legacy, may require adjustments. At the moment, however, the logic of having received assistance from the USSR in fighting colonialism perfectly translates into expectations of similar assistance from Russia in fighting neocolonialism. The only question is how pragmatic it would be to build long-term relationships on this basis alone.

On the eve of the presidential elections scheduled for February 25, tensions are also running high in Nigeria. As in the case of South Africa, many of the country’s current challenges are inherited from 2022. In November, for example, the National Bureau of Statistics in Nigeria was forced to admit that the country has an unprecedented inflation rate (above 21%) [2], which causes more and more people to fall below the poverty line—currently the figure is around 63%, indicating some 133 million people in absolute terms. The situation was exacerbated by heavy rains and ubiquitous floods, with at least 1.5 million people badly affected. In the north-western part of the country, terrorist groups are becoming increasingly active, and the federal government has not yet been able to hold them at bay. These events surely overlap with preparations for the presidential elections. Moreover, these are accompanied by a split in the ruling party, the All-Progressive Congress (APC), as well as a general alienation of young people from the ruling elites. One way or another, at the St. Petersburg Summit, Nigeria will no longer be represented by Muhammadu Buhari, like in Sochi 2019, since the constitution bars him from seeking a third term.

Other parts of the continent have their own disturbing trends. For example, the Pretoria agreement envisaging a cessation of hostilities in northern Ethiopia (state of Tigray) was an important step toward fostering stability in the subregion, but that does not resolve the problems of speed and quality of its actual implementation, as well as the more general issue of separatism in Ethiopia, including through the vigorous activities of the Oromo Liberation Front. Although the agreement on the cessation of hostilities with the central government and the removal of the “terrorist” label from the organization was signed back in 2018, on January 23, 2023, the day of Mr. Lavrov’s visit to South Africa, the Front published a manifesto with demands to the official Addis Ababa. The document’s authors demand stopping the persecution of the Front leaders and supporters, stopping the practice of military operations in the state, promoting Oromo to the status of an official language, and including the capital of Addis Ababa in the state. Two days later, on January 25, it was reported that armed clashes between Amhara and Oromo intensified.

Trouble keeps mounting in Central Africa. On account of constant clashes between the national government of the DR Congo and rebels from the March 23 Movement (M23) in the province of North Kivu, relations between the DRC and Rwanda have markedly deteriorated, as evidenced not only by mutual allegations but also by the recent incident with the Congolese Su-25 aircraft that violated Rwanda’s airspace being attacked by the Rwandan air defense. These negative developments affect not only civilians, who are forced to seek refuge in the neighboring countries, but the entire East African Community. So far, no successful solutions to this round of conflict have been found: talks between the leaders of the DRC and Rwanda, which were apparently scheduled for January 23 in Qatar (again, the start date for Lavrov’s African tour), never took place. It might be that getting Paul Kagame and Félix Tshisekedi to participate in the same event could well be one of the challenges for Russian diplomacy during the preparation for the Summit, given the current antagonism between the DRC and Rwanda.

Finally, one cannot but mention an essentially new level of external pressure exerted by all parties on the countries of Africa within the walls of the UN. With the beginning of Russia’s special military operation, the 11th emergency special session of the UNGA adopted a series of resolutions condemning Russia. While most African countries previously managed to avoid adopting active stances on such resolutions (their agenda is obviously far from the real foreign policy priorities of African nations), many of them could not remain neutral now.


Putting all the pieces into a single puzzle, we see that the Russian diplomacy has to expend greater effort in its African track, usually not the most active of all, as at stake—in the run-up to the not-far-off summit—are not only Russia’s practical interests on the continent but also Moscow’s reputation and media image.

A certain reference point, most likely, will be the U.S.–Africa Leaders Summit, also the second in history (held in mid-December 2022). At the level of heads of state or government, 45 countries of the region were represented in Washington D.C., while delegations from Burkina Faso, Eritrea, Guinea, Mali and Sudan were not invited (officially due to the suspended membership in the African Union). More telling, though, is that South Africa—alongside the Gambia, South Sudan and Zimbabwe—was represented at the summit at the level of its foreign minister. With that, President Cyril Ramaphosa’s participation in the St. Petersburg summit is virtually certain.

Obviously, Moscow will seek to ensure that the Summit in July is no less representative. In the very least, it will be important to achieve the same “turnout” as in 2019. The first summit gathered together 43 heads of state and government from the African continent. Representation, of course, is not an end in itself. It is by this, however, that the media will evaluate the success of the Summit, reflecting on Russia’s global isolation. Besides, it is necessary to correlate the media picture of the “growing Russian influence” with reality. So far, if proceeding from the voting record of the states at the UNGA, the level of support for Russian positions is the weakest among West African nations (especially against the background of Southern Africa).

Given the active phase of preparations for the St. Petersburg Summit, Lavrov’s most recent tour of Africa can be considered in the context of the key messages sent by Moscow to the potential participants.

First of all, noteworthy is the parties’ increased focus on economic cooperation. Despite constant statements about it expanding and deepening, it has always been a weakness in Russia’s presence on the continent. For example, Russia’s trade relations with South Africa are not nearly on the same level as the political component of the relationship. Thus, South African exports to Russia amounted to R4.47 billion in 2022, less than 3% of their total volume (by comparison, South African exports to Denmark stood at R5.24 billion). Russian exports to South Africa came in at R8.58 billion, which is also unimpressive when compared to countries like Turkey (R28.1 billion), Italy (R37.3 billion), Thailand (R45.8 billion) or India (R119.5 billion). No point in mentioning the country’s trade volumes with China. This “politics vs. trade” disparity is typical of Russia’s relations with most states on the continent. During his tour, commenting on the first-ever visit of Russia’s Foreign Minister to the Kingdom of Eswatini, Sergey Lavrov himself said quite characteristically: “Main efforts should now be focused on the economic sphere, which is lagging far behind other areas of our cooperation, above all behind the excellent level of political dialogue.” Therefore, it is quite logical that Moscow is trying to put its economic relations with African states into a somewhat more practical channel on the eve of the Summit. Thus, at the joint press conference with South Africa’s Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Dr Naledi Pandor, it was announced that she would co-chair the 17th session of the Joint Intergovernmental Committee on Trade and Economic Cooperation in the first quarter of 2023 (Angola will host a similar event in late April, while a similar mechanism with Eritrea will only be built up in the time to come).

The desire to foster cooperation in the field of energy, the most grievous domestic plight in South Africa, was also mentioned. Unfortunately, cooperation in this area has already encountered pitfalls. In 2014, after an agreement on a strategic partnership in the nuclear power sector was signed with South Africa, Russia’s Rosatom outlined the negotiated arrangements to build up eight nuclear power units in the Western Cape province, but these plans were buried by intense inter-party debates, intra-party squabbles and corruption scandals (the lawsuit against former President Jacob Zuma is still dragging on). Overlaid on top of this was the general media backdrop, with Russia portrayed in a negative light. By the end of 2017, the project had probably been forgotten. It is still a matter of uncertainty whether the Russian side intends to invite the new South African leadership to revisit this issue, given the rapidly mounting crisis in the country’s power supply. It is also unclear how realistic any agreement would be in the current international environment, given that any such agreement would have to be debated in the South African parliament, which could lead to the liberal and pro-Western Democratic Alliance launching another wave of criticism against such plans.

Second, Russia has indicated its willingness to invest in soft power instruments for promoting cooperation with countries on the African continent. In particular, the number of South African students who will study in Russian universities at the expense of the federal budget is to be significantly increased. The same has been done for students from Eswatini and Angola. More importantly, there was expressed a willingness to open new cultural centers in Africa, which are really lacking at present. If their activities were more in line with the “realities on the ground”, rather than limited to exhibitions and ceremonial openings of Yuri Gagarin busts, Russia’s media image in Africa would not only become more recognizable and high-profile, but also more meaningful. And, for sure, African nations are keenly interested in sending their staff to train in Russia: for example, Foreign Minister of Eswatini T. Dladla pointed out that many of the doctors working in the Kingdom’s hospitals are the most visible and pragmatic evidence of Russia’s responsible approach to bilateral relations and people-to-people contacts. Relations with Eritrea are also likely to move in this direction in the near future. For example, the parties are preparing an agreement on the mutual recognition of education, which will allow students from Eritrea to receive scholarships for studying in Russia.

Third, Moscow has consistently promoted the idea that the Russia-proposed model of polycentric world order architecture, rooted in the principles of multilateralism, can best accommodate the interests of African nations and be truly inclusive and equitable. During his African tour, Mr. Lavrov reiterated Russia’s commitment to the enhancement of Africa’s role in the world through a UN Security Council reform, also voicing Moscow’s support for the African Union joining the G20. Recently, as was earlier noted, these propositions have been bolstered by references to the West’s neo-colonial practices [3], which, in the words of Mr. Lavrov, “have never gone anywhere.” And it should be noted that such references were far from unsuccessful, and they resonate with African nations. Thus, Minister N. Pandor pointed out that the tendencies mentioned by her Russian counterpart are especially evident when it comes to the functioning of the Bretton Woods Institutions which do not reflect the interests of the most vulnerable developing states. Besides, she picked up the idea typical of the Russian foreign policy discourse about the inadmissibility of double standards, making an obvious reference to Washington when she spoke about the upcoming trilateral naval exercises of South Africa, Russia and China, whose active phase symbolically begins on February 25, 2023. Another interesting outcome was at the meeting between Minister S. Lavrov and President of Angola J. Lawrence, where the latte proposed to convene a summit of the African Union, where Africa’s place in the emerging world order would be discussed, from both economic (in the first place) and political perspectives.

Fourth, the matter regarded Russia’s assistance in addressing the entire range of security challenges, including through the resolution of deep-rooted African conflicts. Clearly, “export of security” to Africa has already become Russia’s carte-de-visite. Much has been done for the training of peacekeepers, law enforcement and military personnel. According to Mr. Lavrov, all of these will continue. Moscow’s aspiration to back up the high status of political relations judicially seems a new and positive development in this regard. For example, it was announced that work is being done on a draft Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Eswatini. It is likely that its provisions could well anticipate closer coordination on international issues, including at the UN, which is fundamentally important for Moscow in the midst of increased pressure (after the SMO’s commencement) that is being put on the African countries to support the resolutions proposed by the Western bloc.

Fifth, we must mention another traditional area of Russia’s cooperation with African nations, which is geological exploration as well as exchange of technology and experience in the extractive industry. During the tour, this emphasis was particularly apparent during Mr Lavrov’s visit to Angola, and it was this aspect that was stressed by Foreign Minister Tete António at the joint press conference, as he enlarged upon the prospects for economic cooperation.

All these points will obviously be reflected in the agenda of the forthcoming Summit and Economic Forum in St. Petersburg. Already now, we know that the economic program will be divided into four blocks: food and energy security, technology transfer and healthcare. Since 2019, Russia has built up competencies in many of these thematic areas, and the recent visits of Russian delegations to Africa will hopefully help developing the approach to forming a “package of proposals” in a much more nuanced way, taking into account the real needs and demands of the nations of Africa.

Negate and reclaim

The latest visit of Minister Lavrov to Africa certainly did not go without attention and response from the West. Even before his arrival in South Africa, the German Foreign Office had published a scandalous post on Twitter stating that Mr. Lavrov went to Africa “not to see (leopard emoji) but to bluntly claim that Ukraine’s partners ‘want to destroy everything Russian’.” Yet in place of Africa’s articulate alignment with the recent developments around German arms shipments to Ukraine, Germany received a barrage of criticism, including from African Union spokeswoman Ebba Colondo. She saw the tweet as a mockery of the continent and its people.

During the press scrum following the talks, journalists representing the Western media often asked blatantly provocative questions. For example, Minister Pandor was reminded that on the SMO’s commencement date she called on Russia to “immediately withdraw troops from Ukraine,” and was asked whether she repeated this call during the talks. The answer was: “To repeat that statement to Minister Lavrov today would make me appear quite simplistic and infantile, given the massive transfer of arms that has occurred, given the level of conflict that there is and all the developments that have occurred in almost a year a month from now. So no, I did not repeat that particular statement to Minister Lavrov because I don’t wish to appear as if I don’t know what has occurred in the world.” This was the first time South Africa’s position was presented in such a candid way.

One way or another, Africa’s contacts with the Western world, even against the background of the French contingent’s withdrawal from Burkina Faso (which apparently came as a surprise to Paris, where they probably thought that Ouagadougou would not dare taking this step), are not put on hold. On January 27, Pretoria hosted the 15th meeting of the EU–South Africa Political Dialogue at the ministerial level, where Minister Naledi Pandor welcomed Josep Borrell. In the first half of 2023, South Africa should host the eighth South Africa–EU Summit, whose agenda will include not only trade, investment and aid for sustainable development, but also issues related to politics and security. In mid-January, the French and German foreign ministers visited Ethiopia after a long break caused by the internal conflict. Shortly before Lavrov’s tour, Secretary of the U.S. Treasury Janet Yellen had visited Senegal, Zambia and South Africa, while U.S. representative to the U.N. Thomas-Greenfield went to Africa immediately after the beginning of Lavrov’s tour, specifically paying a visit to Ghana, Mozambique and Kenya. Secretary of State Blinken arrived in Egypt on January 29-30. Such activity indicates only one thing: the U.S. and its partners are doing their best to steal initiative from Russia, staking on those states which do not enjoy close ties with Moscow and are influential enough to “confuse the cards” on the eve of St. Petersburg Summit.

Already now, the African dimension of Russia’s foreign policy is becoming more prominent than before. Hopefully, this results not only from the preparations to the second summit of African leaders with President Putin, but also with a greater awareness of the prospects that a closer cooperation with a seemingly distant Africa could yield for everyone. And yet that summit meeting is near at hand.

From our partner RIAC

1. In March 2022, the Parliament of South Africa already considered a draft motion of confidence to the Cabinet (excluding the Presidency), at the behest of the liberal Democratic Alliance. The draft was then supported by 36% of MPs.

2. Even in the relatively prosperous Ghana, the year 2022 passed under the sign of record inflation (up to 40%), an anti-record for the past 20 years. At the same time, the national currency, the sedi, collapsed against the dollar by almost 52% – more than any other currency (including the Ukrainian hryvnia).

3. Here’s an excerpt from Mr. Lavrov’s answers to media questions following the talks in Mbabane: “The neocolonial mentality and logic based on the ‘divide and conquer’ principle are still evident in most of the foreign policy actions taken by our… Western colleagues. We are in favor of uniting the efforts of all nations … to jointly solve the problems of the global South, primarily African nations, instead of using these countries as a ‘fertile field’ for promoting their unilateral confrontational approaches.”


International Conference Strengthens Multifaceted Relations between Russia and Africa

Avatar photo



The International Parliamentary conference ‘Russia-Africa’ held on 19-20 March has, at least, focused on complexities and contradictions of the emerging new global order, the role of Russia-African alliance against growing Western imperialism, and set the limits of Africa’s expectations from Russia. The conference was to build further on previous comprehensive political dialogues between parliaments of Africa and Russia.

President Vladimir Putin said at the plenary session of the international parliamentary conference ‘Russia-Africa in a Multipolar World’ on March 20, reminded that the first Russian-African summit, held in October 2019 in Sochi, was very productive and made it possible to noticeably revive our ties with African states, intensify business interaction, exchanges in the cultural and humanitarian spheres. That the partnership between Russia and African countries has gained additional momentum and is already reaching a qualitatively new level.

He emphatically pointed out that the states of Africa are constantly increasing their weight and role in world affairs, and are asserting themselves more and more confidently in politics and the economy. We are convinced that Africa will become one of the leaders in the emerging new multipolar world order – there are all objective prerequisites for this. And there is about 1.5 billion people live in Africa, a huge resource base is concentrated – almost a third of the world’s mineral reserves. 

African countries are striving to pursue an independent and sovereign foreign and domestic policy, sometimes difficult, problems on their own. Russia and African countries uphold the norms of morality and social principles that are traditional for our peoples and oppose the neo-colonial ideology imposed from outside. By the way, many states of Asia, the Middle East and Latin America adhere to similar positions, and together make up the world majority.

“We are ready to jointly shape the global agenda, work together to strengthen fair and equal interstate relations, and improve mechanisms for mutually beneficial economic cooperation. We are preparing in the most serious way for the second Russian-African summit and, of course, a rich and meaningful agenda for the summit is being developed. It is planned to hold more than a hundred of the most diverse events,” he said about the forthcoming grand summit planned for July.

Africa has made a “huge leap in its development” in recent decades but its potential is yet to be unlocked, noted Valentina Matviyenko, Speaker of the Federation Council. “Africa is a continent with great potential, which is yet to be fully unlocked. A continent with a population approaching 1.5 billion. A continent which has made a huge leap in its development, not only economic, but also social and scientific, in recent decades,” she said at the Russia-Africa international parliamentary delegation.

According to Matviyenko, Africa’s international prestige is also increasing. “I think that this is an absolutely objective and logical trend which the collective West, led by the United States, does not want to acknowledge. They want to preserve their superiority and role as global hegemon, things that are becoming a thing of the past. They are reluctant to change their mentality of neocolonialism and are using well-known means of deterrence, such as sanctions, threats, blackmail, double standards, and blatant hypocrisy,” she noted.

She stressed that Russia has always been committed to the principles of “equality, mutual respect, the inherent right of each state to choose its own path of development, its own future without interference from the outside. Russia’s cooperation, mutually respectful and equal, with African countries has been built on these principles for decades.”

Russia’s friendship and cooperation with African countries is “time-tested.” That countries of the African continent have always been Russia’s reliable partners and true allies. I am convinced that it will continue like this. Our shared goal is to change the world for the better, to ensure the well-being and prosperity of the peoples of Russia and Africa, to spare no effort to ensure that hunger, dangerous diseases, and regional conflicts are extinguished,” Matviyenko added.

Russian State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin, speaking at the plenary session, highlighted relations between Russia and Africa. “It is necessary to emphasize: Russia and African countries are equal allies and partners. Our relations have always been built on an unselfish basis, on the principles of mutual respect and non-interference in domestic affairs,” Volodin said, stressing that for Russia “the African continent has never been a subject of mercantile interest, use of labor and raw material resources.”

However, according to the speaker, the United States and Europe have a different approach. “Washington and Brussels seek to take control of Russian and African natural resources. In fact, they continue their colonial policy. They go to any measures, including force and terrorist nature, for their own benefit,” the politician pointed out. “It is not for Washington to teach us how to build relationships, be friends and make plans for the future,” Volodin pointed out.

He, however, describes Africa as a continent of freedom-loving people, and that friendship is a two-way street, and that Russia and African countries are at a new stage. Understandably therefore, “Russia and African countries are united by shared goals: We stand together for building a multipolar, just world based on respect for the traditions, culture, and history of the countries with which we are building mutually beneficial cooperation,” Volodin said.

“Today the African continent plays an important role in solving global and regional problems. And it will only grow,” he said, recalled that “despite illegal sanctions from Washington, Russia and African states are developing trade and economic cooperation.” In particular, according to the politician, the trade turnover is growing, which at the end of last year amounted to $17.9 billion.

While Russian and African parliamentarians continue forging solidarity against growing neo-colonial tendencies in Africa, Russia has also expressed readiness to push for Africa’s economic development by offering their legislative support. Legislators were convinced that the parliaments could do a lot for the development of relations on the principles of respect, non-interference in internal affairs of other states and mutually beneficial cooperation.

For comparison, 36 delegations from African countries took part in the first Forum which was held in 2019, this year there were delegations from about 40 countries. Russia, contrary to Western assertions, does not isolate itself from the rest of the world. “The increase in the number of participants confirms the special nature of friendly ties between Russia and Africa. Attempts by Washington and Brussels to isolate Africa and Russia have failed,” earlier during the first day, emphasized Chairman of the State Duma Vyacheslav Volodin. 

That however, undeterred by the pressure from the United States ‘to cancel Russia’ in their relationship, Africa parliamentarians have arrived in Moscow for two-day working gathering to methodically develop Russian-African relations in various fields. In addition, to the political dialogue, they are also focusing on economic, cultural, humanitarian and scientific cooperation.

According to the plan, Russian parliamentarians and African colleagues fixed topical issues of the international parliamentary agenda for discussions: parliamentary support of scientific and educational cooperation, legislative response to economic challenges, indivisible security: capabilities and contributions of parliaments, and neocolonialism of the West: how to prevent the repetition of history.

The objectives of the conference are to strengthen parliamentary cooperation with African countries in the conditions of formation of a multipolar world, to develop relations and develop common approaches to legal regulation in the economy, science and education and security. The following round tables held organized:

— Legislative Response to Economic Challenges: The modern economic challenges are crises caused by Western countries guided by the United States, numerous economic sanctions aimed at destroying the Russian economy, introduced in violation of all international trade rules and foreign economic relations. At the same time, most African countries supported friendly relations with Russia. Russia and Africa’s positions coincided on many issues.

Unlike many Western countries, Russia does not have colonial experience, and the contribution of the Soviet Union to the liberation of African countries from colonial dependence is also well known. Africa stands for an equal partnership: mutual economic interests include investments, cooperation within production chains, cooperation in strategic infrastructure projects, energy, medicine and financial technologies. It is necessary to support the transformation processes of multipolar world.

— Indivisible Security: Capabilities and Contributions of Parliaments. Participants of the round table discussion on the topic “Indivisible Security: Capabilities and Contributions of Parliaments” thoroughly examined importance of sovereignty protection, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, fight against poverty, countering terrorism and military biological threats. Both Russia and Africa have similar challenges, are similar in many ways.

Both Russian and African parliamentarians have join their efforts, contribute to the development of effective proposals, which would help resolve conflicts. “The challenges that our friends from African countries and the challenges that the Russian Federation are facing today, are similar in many ways. The world is developing rapidly, and in this new world we want justice, equal rights and multi-polarity,” said the Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Petr Tolstoy, opening the discussion.

The Speaker of the National Assembly of the Parliament of South Africa Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula noted the importance of maintaining the values of humanity and tolerance towards each other. She recalled that during the Covid-19 pandemic, many countries preferred to care only about their own safety, and as a result African states did not receive enough vaccines and lost human lives.

“There are still issues of climate change, poverty, human rights violations and become a threat to peace and security, economy and the peaceful existence of people around the world. We should support all humanity. And there still be humanness in us and only, in the case, when we treat others as tolerantly as possible,” stressed Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula.

The President of the National Council of the Transition of the Republic of Guinea, Dansa Kourouma, noted the problem of imbalance in diplomatic relations in the context of neo-colonialism. “The unilateral approach has become the rule. It is important take into account and respect the sovereignty of states,” he explained and called for a more active fight against poverty, since such situations when people do not have access to a minimum set of services lead to insecurity in such countries.

— Neocolonialism of the West: How to Prevent the Repetition of History. Here Russia and African countries want equal world without imposition of Western paradigm of consciousness. Leonid Slutsky, leader of the LDPR faction, Chairman of the Committee on International Affairs, opening the meeting thanked African countries, that despite the difficult times, gathered around Russia as a forward in the movement towards a multipolar world.

The First Deputy Chairman of the Committee on International Affairs, Vyacheslav Nikonov, emphasized that there is an overwhelming majority of people supporting those values of sovereignty, respect for each other, democracy, non-interference in the affairs of others. According to the African parliamentarians who spoke at the roundtable believes that by granting independence to African countries, colonialism still exists on the continent, including transnational companies and non-governmental organizations that have become its main instruments. 

According to most of them, it necessary now to promote economic independence and diversify the economies. It is definitely an important factor in countering sanctions is the consolidation of society, pursue concrete development. But unfortunately, after political liberation many African colonies retained the old economic structures and dependence on imports from the metropolises.

President of the non-profit organization Foundation for the Study of Historical Perspective, Nataliya Narotchnitskaya, tried to answer the basic question: Why Russia is countering neocolonialism? In the process, she explained the colossal fluctuations in economy, faith, standards of living, and climate in Africa. The moment of truth for Africa, she continued, is that there must be a change in the economy, that officials should work to ensure that, at least, infrastructure projects are being implemented in Africa.

Chairman of the State Duma Vyacheslav Volodin held bilateral meetings with several heads of delegations, speakers of parliaments and chambers of parliaments of African countries. On March 19, a bilateral meeting of the Chairman of the State Duma Vyacheslav Volodin and the Speaker of the National Assembly of the Republic of Zimbabwe Jacob Mudenda was held at the State Duma.  The State Duma and the National Assembly of Zimbabwe signed agreement in 2022.

“It is very important to do everything to implement this agreement. We propose to create an inter-parliamentary commission which will enable us to work more substantively on issues that are important for both our states,” Jacob Mudenda emphasized at the meeting. 

According to him, relations between countries should be built on the principles of mutual respect, mutually beneficial cooperation and non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states. Russia and Zimbabwe now shared common political interest: both are under sanctions. Frequent interactions, such as conferences, demonstrate the importance of relations at the parliamentary level between Africa and the Russian Federation.

“This will significantly advance understanding and strengthen relations between Russia and the countries of Africa. Such meetings will help share experience between the African states and the Russian Federation and develop solutions. There is also an exchange of views and development of positions on international security. You know, these issues are the most relevant now,” concluded Mudenda.

South Africa’s National Assembly Speaker, Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula supported his suggestion that great capabilities on parliamentary dimension of Russia and South Africa could be used to enhance our cooperation in various areas in South Africa and in Africa. Mapisa-Nqakula thanked Vyacheslav Volodin for sending the invitation to take part in the Parliamentary Conference, before adding “It is very important for us that Russia gives priority to the African continent. Many countries consider Africa as a great possibility to get African resources. But taking into account the history of our cooperation, we, like many other African countries, believe that Russia has other, more genuine interests in Africa.”

“Our cooperation started decades ago. And we felt your support in the worst times for us, during apartheid. We understand that now it is a difficult time for Russia as a country. But I would like to assure you that South Africa will continue cooperation, discuss areas of cooperation that are important for us. We look forward to its start,” said Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula.

Both also discussed issues of cooperation within the framework of the BRICS, as it is South Africa’s chairmanship. “For us, the cooperation between the parliaments within the BRICS framework is very important, as we can discuss issues of common interest,” emphasized the Speaker of the National Assembly of the Parliament of South Africa.

From West Africa, there were Burkina Faso and Mali. And then Central African Republic. Historically French-speaking which implies that France has had them as colonies, but the changing political situation these countries are seeking support and consequently  taking directions from Russian officialdom. President of the Transitional Legislative Assembly of the Republic of Burkina Faso Ousmane Bougouma, President of the National Transitional Council of the Republic of Mali Malick Diaw and President of the National Assembly of the Central African Republic Simplice Mathieu Sarandji.

Central African Republic, Burkina Faso and Mali – these have common expectations. They are suffering a lot from terrorism, so Russia’s support, including logistical support and other different support, is extremely important for them. France is longer needed. “Russia helps developing cooperation, especially on the issues of security. We also want to address together other challenges we face in the field of education and healthcare development. Our people have made a completely clear and obvious choice: we want not only to diversify our international partnership, but also to strengthen cooperation with Russia,” said Malick Diaw.

The President of the Senate of the Parliament of the Republic of Congo Pierre Ngolo noted that the task is to establish a strong and solid partnership between countries based on friendship and fraternal relations, the cooperation at the level of parliaments “involves people in the process” and that both Russia and Africa are involved in some kind of battle for the well-being of the nations and the whole world. 

Russia and African countries should establish an exchange of legislative experience in order to create conditions for building mutually beneficial partnerships. Within the context of strengthening relations in this emerging new world, it is necessary to address challenges and find new forms of cooperation. It always reiterated that Russia remains an important political player, despite the sanctions and pressure from the West. 

The International Parliamentary event serves as a precursor for the second Russia-Africa summit, with African countries amid the emerging multipolar world. More than 40 parliamentary delegations from African countries arrived the conference, which also attended by members of the State Duma, senators of the Federation Council, representatives of the educational and business community. The conference held just few months before the second Russia-Africa summit, which is planned for July 2023 in Saint Petersburg.

Continue Reading


How Russia’s Sputnik Disappears from Africa’s Radar

Avatar photo



Image source:

Until recently, Africa has not been high on Russia’s policy agenda. African leaders have to understand that Russia, for the past three decades, Africa was at the bottom of its policy agenda. After the end of Soviet era, Russia has focused broadly on the United States and Europe, dreaming of becoming part of Europe, part of the configuration of Global North. The low economic presence of Russia from 1991 until 2019 was a testament to the fact that Africa was at the bottom of its priority list. Of course the October 2019 summit was symbolic, but after that Russia has left most of bilateral agreements undelivered across Africa.

With its “special military operation” on Ukraine that necessitated imposition of stringent sanctions from the United States, European Union and their allies, the United Nations Security Council mounting pressure on Russia since February 2022, pushes Russia to begin soliciting aggressively for support in Africa. Last July, an article posted to its official website, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov wrote: “The development of a comprehensive partnership with African countries remains among top priorities of Russia’s foreign policy, Moscow is open to its further build-up multifaceted relations with Africa.”

In his Op-Ed article, Lavrov further argues: “We have been rebuilding our positions for many years now. The Africans are reciprocating. They are interested in having us. It is good to see that our African friends have a similar understanding with Russia.” Lavrov, however, informed about broadening African issues “in the new version of Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept against the background of the waning of the Western direction” and this will objectively increase the share of the African direction in the work of the Foreign Ministry.

Lavrov consistently displays his passion for historical references. Soviet’s support for struggles for political independence and against colonialism should be laid to rest in the archives. The best way to fight neo-colonialism is to demonstrate by investing in those competitive sectors, make a departure away from hyperbolic rhetoric on endless list of economic sectors. In practical terms, it is important rather to face today’s development challenges and what are in store for the future generation. Africa today does not need anti-Western slogans which have become the key content in Russia’s foreign policy, Africa simply needs external players who would passionately and genuinely invest in the critical economic sectors. The fundamental fact is that Africa is making efforts to transform its economy to create employment, modern agriculture and industrialize the continent, especially with the introduction of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). 

Despite criticisms, China has built an exemplary distinctive economic power in Africa. Besides China, Africa is largely benefiting from the European Union and Western aid flows, economic and trade ties. That compared, Russia plays very little role in Africa’s infrastructure, agriculture and industry, and making little efforts in leveraging unto the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Our monitoring shows that the Russian business community hardly pays attention to the significance of African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) which provides a unique and valuable platform for businesses to access an integrated African market of over 1.3 billion people. 

Lavrov’s efforts toward building ‘non-Western’ ties this crucial times is highly commendable especially with Africa. But, the highly respected Minister easily and, most often, forget the fundamental fact that during these three years of global pandemic, the coronavirus that has engulfed the planet, in every corner of the world, Africa was desperate looking for vaccines. Health authorities are still warning that Covid-19 has not completely faced out throughout the world.

Quartz, a global reputable media, reported early this year that “as of the end of 2022, about a quarter of the population of African countries has been fully vaccinated against Covid-19, according to the latest figures shared by Africa CDC. The coverage varies drastically depending on the country. In Liberia, for instance, nearly 80% of the population is fully vaccinated, while only 34% is in neighboring Sierra Leone. Congo, Sudan, Senegal, and Madagascar all have vaccination rates below 10%.

Africa CDC acting director Ahmed Ogwell Ouma announced in a video briefing on December 22 that it will modify the way it reports vaccination rates. Rather than reporting coverage of the overall population, it will only report vaccinations of eligible population aged 12 or more. In his briefing, Ouma said the target for Africa remains to vaccinate 70% of the population. That goal, however, was set by the World Health Organization (WHO) for the overall population. These numbers are about to change – and not because of an increase in vaccinations. 

Due of delays in international vaccine deliveries, Africa lags behind the rest of the world in Covid vaccination rates, and is the only continent where less than 50% of the population is fully vaccinated. Currently, just more than 800 million doses of vaccines have been administered in Africa, or 80% of the total received. About a third of the vaccinations have been made with Johnson & Johnson’s vaccine, followed by Pfizer (22%), AstraZeneca (17%), China’s Sinopharm (15%) and Sinovac (7%). 

Several reports monitored by this authored show that Russia has played a minimal role in the entire health sector in Africa. With the Covid-19 vaccination, Russia randomly sprinkled few thousands as humanitarian assistance among its “Soviet friends” including Egypt, Ethiopia, Guinea, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and South Africa. Nevertheless, the worse was Russia’s sudden failure to supply the 300 million vaccines through the African Union (AU) especially during the times of health crisis.

In an official media release mid-February 2021 said that the Africa Vaccine Acquisition Task Team – set up by the African Union (AU) to acquire additional vaccine doses so that Africa could attain a target immunization of 60% – received an offer of 300 million Sputnik V vaccines from the Russian Federation. It was described as a ‘special offer’ from Russia. In the end, Russia never delivered the 300 million vaccines as contracted.

In an authoritative policy report presented November 2021 titled ‘Situation Analytical Report’ and prepared by 25 Russian policy experts headed by Sergei A. Karaganov, noted explicitly the failure to supply Sputnik vaccines to the African Union. The report criticized Russia’s current policy and lukewarm approach towards Africa.

“In several ways, Russia’s possibilities are overestimated both publicly and in closed negotiations. The supply of Russian-made vaccines to Africa is an example. Having concluded contracts for the supply of Sputnik V to a number of African states, Russian suppliers failed to meet contractual obligations on time,” says the report in part. 

The coronavirus outbreak a pandemic on March 11, 2020. Worth noting that Russia claims that it was the first to find cure for coronavirus. The World Health Organization (WHO), until today has not certified Russia’s vaccines though. Despite the fact that Russia developed Sputnik V becoming the first registered Covid-19 vaccine, the vaccine lacks WHO approval due to lack of transparency of Russian laboratories and getting approvals before mandatory phase III clinical trials. On the other hand, all the vaccines have been registered in Russia – Sputnik V, Sputnik Light, CoviVac and EpiVacCorona – are produced in large quantities by Russian pharmaceutical companies and are currently used for vaccination. 

Director of the Gamaleya National Research Centre for Epidemiology and Microbiology Alexander Gintsburg has several times highlighted aspects of the vaccine production and marketing. He noted to raise the attractiveness of the vaccines on foreign markets, including countries in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. 

The Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), tasked to engage in marketing the vaccines abroad, got messed up especially in Africa. The RDIF is Russia’s sovereign wealth fund established in 2011 to make equity co-investments, primarily in Russia, alongside reputable international financial and strategic investors. Of course, it took steps and speedily registered the vaccines in more than 20 African countries, but terribly failed on delivery deadlines. Worse was the Russian Direct Investment Fund supplied, at exorbitant prices, through middle-men in the Arab Emirates to a number of African countries. 

Sputnik V was registered in several African countries, including Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Tunisia, the Republic of Congo (DRC) and Zimbabwe. However, Russia has not been able to meet the increasing market demand and did not make prompt delivery on its pledges to African countries consequently, – in experts’ simple assessment Russia’s vaccine diplomacy has arguably failed Africa. Interestingly Russia’s Foreign Ministry has held series of talks with African Foreign Ministers, during this Covid-19 period and in fact this desperate moment, reiterated to assist with direct supplies for vaccinating vulnerable groups and people among the 1.3 billion population. That is Russia, considered as a reliable partner in these difficult and crucial times, whose strategic partnership with Africa has become a priority in it’s foreign policy,

The above thoughts on the part of Covid-19 business offered the reasons why Russia absolutely refused to join and be part of the Covax facility, which acts as a global collective bargaining initiative to secure vaccine doses for countries who signed up, including those which are self-financing their purchases, as well as assistance from donors for poorer developing countries. The first vaccines purchased through Covax were indeed destined to reach the Africa. That was, monitored by this author, some 88.7 million doses of the AstraZeneca and Pfizer vaccines distributed to 47 countries including Africa during the first half of 2021. This same year, during the virtual meeting of G7 leaders, the European Union announced it had donated a further 500 million euros to the COVAX program. The World Bank also committed $12 billion as concessional loans to assist African countries access foreign vaccines.

That is not all from several reports monitored. In April 2022, writing under the headline: “How Russia’s Hollow Humanitarian Hurt Its Vaccine Diplomacy in Africa,” – the co-authors, Matthew T. Page and Paul Stronski, both noted in 2020, that Russia touted deliveries of medical and protective supplies to several African countries, while the Russian-developed Sputnik V vaccine offered hopes that African countries would soon be able to launch large-scale immunization drives. Russian efforts to promote Sputnik V in Africa have floundered for a variety of reasons, including regulatory worries, production and logistical shortfalls, bureaucratic inertia, and even sticker shock. There is, however, another key factor behind Moscow’s failed vaccine diplomacy: its traditionally diminutive post-Soviet development presence on the continent.

Compared to Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, and even many foundations, Russia has provided a tiny share of international development assistance to African countries since the end of the Cold War. Unlike India and Cuba, it has provided scanty medical assistance to – or investment in – African countries. 

If Russia wants to be influential on the continent, African political and economic leaders should demand more of Moscow, not simply settle for the symbolic diplomatic engagements or agreements at which the Russian leadership excels. Indeed, Africa has not ranked high on the Russian foreign policy agenda for much of the past three decades, getting barely a mention in the country’s key security documents except as either a partner in an emerging multipolar world or a source of instability.

Indeed the time has come for African leaders to rally together to ensure that no effort is spared in facilitating and supporting the building of large-scale vaccine manufacturing capacity on the continent. The African Vaccine Manufacturing Summit held in April, 2021 was an encouraging start. Currently, no African country is manufacturing the vaccine so far. Therefore, focus needs to be on developing real vaccine R&D capacity which must necessarily lead to health products. This requires substantial investment and a long-term commitment. In a similar vien, under the aegis of the African Union, leaders have to begin looking for inside solutions, rather than base hopes on these geopolitical games, external great powers seeking only support for their peculiar or parochial  interests.

Understandably, while making efforts to maintain and expand its presence in Africa, Russia simply lacks the capability to deliver on its various promises in Africa. Surely, African countries have to begin to re-evaluate their relationship with Russia. African leaders should not expect anything tangible from meetings, conferences and summits. Since the first Russia-Africa summit held in 2019, very little has been achieved. At this point, it is even more improbable that Moscow would commit adequate financial resources to invest in economic sectors, given the stringent sanctions imposed following Putin’s invasion of neighbouring Ukraine. 

In stark contrast to key global players, for instance the United States, China and the European Union and many others, Russia obviously has limitations. Notwithstanding that, for Russia to regain part of its Soviet-era influence, it has to address its own policy approach, this time try to shift towards new paradigms – that is to implement some of its decade-old pledges and promises, and those signed bilateral agreements; secondly to promote development-oriented policies and how to make these strategic efforts more practical, more consistent, more effective and most admirably result-oriented with African countries. 

Continue Reading


Russia’s harmful influence in Africa



Russia’s aggression on Ukraine has been exposing Africa to supply chain destabilizations, financial instability and heightened food insecurity, thus gravely hurting millions of Africans and inflicting an increased potential for instability on some African states. Even so, and from the invasion onward, Russia has had no qualms about uninterruptedly reaching out to the Continent. So, it’s been preparing a Russia-Africa summit, putting forth dubious scenarios for mutual economic cooperation, taking part in joint exercises with African states, and sending Lavrov to such important countries as South Africa, Angola, Uganda, Sudan or Ethiopia.

Russia moved closer to Africa in recent years, with the seeming intent of recreating a strategic presence in the Continent in the post-Soviet era. So, and even though Russia hasn’t succeeded in developing a significant economic weight in Africa in the meantime, the fact is it expanded trade with African countries, it established ties in the energy sector and it attained a number of mining concessions. Russia also signed military-technical cooperation agreements with multiple African countries and, according to the Swedish institute SIPRI (p.7), it actually became the biggest major arms exporter to the Continent. In all this, Russia privileged creating partnerships with autocratic regimes, to which it provides assistance in exchange for political collaboration, economic arrangements or extractive access.

Yet, Moscow’s strategy in Africa also includes influence and disinformation campaigns, which are mobilized to foster sympathy toward Russia and hostility toward the West, but also to interfere in elections, as well as to inflame and exploit social tensions and support autocrats. Additionally, as pointed out by Joseph Siegle writing for the Marshall Center (pp. 81 and 87), such campaigns seek to discredit democracy and foster the perception that it offers no advantages over authoritarianism. The practical application of the anti-democratic worldview which Russia promotes in Africa, continues Siegle, is undermining legitimate governments, fomenting social polarization, propping up unconstitutional power, and tearing at the thin social fabric of many African societies.

From the invasion on, and even while Africa’s been facing supply chain disruptions and heightened food scarcity, Moscow’s been targeting the Continent with disinformation rationalizing the war and fostering anti-Western sentiment. Lavrov gave depth to this exercise when he alleged food markets were not being destabilized by the aggression on Ukraine, but rather by the Western sanctions on Russia. Later, he went on to accuse the West of presiding over a racist and neo-colonial division of the world, an accusation which has also been deployed by Putin himself. This is in logical continuity to one of Moscow’s typical propaganda ploys in Africa, which is to bash the West for alleged neo-imperialism, while attaching modern-day Russia’s image to the Soviet Union’s role in the anti-colonial struggles in Africa—in what seems to be a crude attempt to exploit the appreciation many Africans still have for the USSR, for the backing it provided to African liberation. However, and regardless of the anti-colonial rhetoric, Moscow apparently even went to the point of pressuring African students in Russia to accept enlistment for the war in Ukraine.

One of the key drivers of instability in Africa today is the Russian paramilitary entity known as the Wagner Group, which is of course also involved in the aggression on Ukraine. Even while it’s nominally private, Wagner has been consistently accused of being a foreign policy instrument for the Kremlin: a deniable, informal proxy by which Moscow pursues strategic goals abroad without having to compromise itself through official force deployments. Wagner is now in several African countries. In Sudan, where it went in concurrently with the Moscow-Khartoum approximation, it’s allegedly involved in spreading disinformation and in illicit activities connected to gold mining. In Libya, it’s collaborating with Khalifah Hifter’s faction and it’s entrenched in strategically important oil infrastructures, which gives it the tacit ability to compromise the now crucial supply of Libyan energy to Europe. And, in Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR), where it’s providing assistance to Bamako and Bangui respectively, Wagner seems to be involved in torture, rape, summary executions and massacres, as well as in the abusive exploitation of resources. In addition, Wagner’s presence in the CAR accompanies the Russophile transformation which has taken over that country in recent years, and which is expressed in things like the embedding of Russian citizens in the governmental structure, the adoption of Russian as one of the CAR’s official languages, and even the recruitment of Central Africans by Wagner itself for combat in Ukraine.

Russia has for some time now been looking to expand its influence in the Western Sahel, a region plagued by persistent conflict fueled by jihadi insurgency. So, it’s been deepening ties and developing security cooperation with the military juntas in Mali and Burkina Faso. This has been occurring against the backdrop of a deterioration in relations between those juntas and France, something which Russia itself has been nurturing through disinformation efforts, and which has already led to the end, in mid-2022, of the anti-terrorist assistance missions by France and by its European allies in Mali, and also to the recent cancellation of the French mission in Burkina Faso. Furthermore, it was concurrently with the Kremlin’s approximation to the region that, in late 2021, the Wagner Group went into Mali to provide assistance to Malian forces in the fight against jihadism. More recently, and according to the President of Ghana Nana Akufo-Addo, Wagner purportedly established a similar arrangement with the Burkinabe junta. In Mali, operations involving Wagner are characterized, according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), by a normalization of indiscriminate violence against civilians. Also, and since European forces left that country, there’s been a rise in the extent of ungoverned territory, along with a strengthening of the jihadi insurgency. As pointed out by a recent study for the Terrorism Combat Center at West Point, Wagner is not just incapable of filling the security vacuum which the departure of European forces brought about, but the violence against civilians which it typifies has actually bolstered jihadi recruitment in the area. So, the study adds, Wagner is in fact aggravating the jihadi threat in Mali. To that, you can add that a growth of the jihad in Mali could make utterly intractable the already chaotic security situation in Burkina Faso, and worsen that of the littoral states of the Gulf of Guinea, which are already threatened by the regional expansion of the jihad. Even so, Wagner—perhaps not contented by the havoc it’s inflicting on Mali—is also reportedly working with rebels in Chad to destabilize that country’s government.

Africa should liberate herself from the turbulence Russia brings to her soil. That, however, may not be all that simple. The fact is that Moscow developed relevant relations in the Continent, and many African countries have come to depend either on Russia’s assistance, or on imports of Russian grain or defense equipment. Russia’s ties with Africa even seem to have played a part in multiple African countries’ decisions not to sanction Russia, nor vote against Moscow in UN General Assembly resolutions on the war in Ukraine.

Freeing Africa from Russia’s harmful influence is, of course, a choice belonging to Africans alone. However, and as pointed out by a recent study for the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change (pp. 26-29), the West can and should support such a purpose, by means of policies encouraging the strengthening of democracy in the Continent, promoting regional security, and backing Africa’s economic development.

A democratic, noticeably developing Africa wouldn’t need to depend on Putin’s Russia. Moreover, it would take on a key position in the global economy. As asserted by Joseph Sany of the U.S. Institute of Peace, Africa, being endowed with 60 percent of the globe’s uncultivated arable soil and a vast natural and mineral wealth, has therefore the potential to feed itself and become a global supplier of food and resources, thus solidifying global supply chains—and, adding to Sany, freeing those supply chains from disruptions such as those caused by the aggression on Ukraine.

Even while still afflicted by grave infrastructural and technological gaps, the fact is that Africa has been undergoing rapid economic growth, with that trend being expected to continue. Additionally, Africa is interested in developing its productive power, besides enjoying rapid urbanization and a youthful demography, and also a free trade area encompassing 55 African economies.

Africa’s modernization could be vigorously accelerated via the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, by which the G7 intends to invest $600 billion in Africa and in other regions in the next few years. Moreover, the United States are preparing to invest $55 billion, and the European Union €150 billion, in an African Continent which could easily become a key strategic and commercial partner to the West. It’s important for those investments to be geared toward unleashing Africa’s potential, improving Africans’ lives and fully integrating the Continent in global markets. That is key to realizing the African design for a peaceful, prosperous and dynamic Africa.

Continue Reading