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One Belt, One Road: China’s Initiative to Connect Eurasia and Expand its Influence

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Abstract: One Belt, One Road (OBOR) is a Chinese-led initiative that seeks to enhance Eurasian economic connectivity through the overland Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road. OBOR covers 58 countries and accounts for 65% of global economic production. The initiative is managed by the National Development and Reform Commission and is financed by the Chinese government through banks and financial international institutions. OBOR has brought significant economic benefits to its participants, but some countries have not enjoyed GDP acceleration due to local high construction expenditures. OBOR serves as a strategic pivot to the West for China to improve regional security and raise political influence, as well as to address domestic economic issues such as regional disparity and excess capacity.

One Belt, One Road was launched by Xi Jinping in two phases – during his visits to Kazakhstan and Indonesia in 2013. OBOR consists of the overland Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road, where Belt was to become the qualitative shift towards the Eurasian economic connectivity: according to Chinese leader’s vision networks of railways, highways, energy pipelines, new power plants and other global supply chains as well as crucial infrastructure projects should have stretched westward from China[1].

OBOR’s scope is terrific: nowadays it embraces 58 developed and emerging countries with total population of over 4 bn and economic aggregate of $21 tn – accounting for 65% in land Belt and 35% in maritime Road of global economic production respectively[2]. OBOR is the most prominent initiative that modern Beijing has ever put forward – it is estimated that the total amount of Chinese investments may exceed $1 tn by 2027[3]. In 2020, despite COVID-19 pandemic, China invested overseas $17 bn under the OBOR brand[4]

Unlike Western countries’ projects with the concrete stated numbers, plans of actions and transparency, Chinese OBOR is the initiative. It is an offer to other players to find some win-win cooperation opportunities with China on the pragmatic basis. Since 2013 a plenty of bilateral projects in Asia, starting from trade and finishing infrastructure investment, were implemented under the OBOR label [Shapiro 2017]. On behalf of the Chinese government OBOR is managed by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) – country’s top economic planner body[5].

OBOR is financed by Chinese government through banks – China Construction bank (中国建设银行), China Development bank (国家开发银行), Export-Import bank of China (中国进出口银行). And also, through Beijing-led financial international institutions: Silk Road Development Fund – the total capital $40 bn, BRICS New Development Bank with $100 bn capital and AIIB with the same capital amount [Carrai 2018]. Thus, AIIB is one of the driving forces of OBOR – in 2020 the AIIB’s overall portfolio accounted for $22 bn or 15% of the whole OBOR’s investment[6].

The Eurasian states highly welcomed Beijing’s investment initiative for two reasons. Firstly, Asian countries, especially Central Asian, couldn’t meet their infrastructure demands on their own due to the poor economic performance. Simultaneously, the regional necessity for the new infrastructure sharply increased: Asian Development Bank estimated $1.7 tn infrastructure investment were required yearly from 2016 to 2030 in Asia to maintain its growth, cope with the poverty, and respond to climate change[7]. Secondly, OBOR realization brought obvious economic benefits to its participants: transport infrastructure projects increased national GDPs by 2.8% and coordinated tariff reduction lowered costs. However, some countries-participants didn’t enjoy GDP’s acceleration due to local high construction expenditures[8].

From the Beijing’s point of view, OBOR started in the right place and at the right time. Since the collapse of the USSR Russian influence in the Central Asia was declining and the USA didn’t truly pay too much attention to regional economic connectivity. The Japanese-led Asian Development Bank (ADB) was trying to improve regional infrastructure conditions for years, but its capacities were not enough. For example, the overall ADB portfolio made up only $116.5 bn up to 2020[9].

China carried out OBOR as a strategic pivot to the West on two purposes. First: Beijing-led regional production chain would raise its political influence in the Chinese Western periphery. It is important strategic move against the background of sharpening global competition with Washington and the US proactive attempts to organize anti-Chinese regional QUAD coalition[10]. Also, stronger ties between Beijing and its Western neighbors would improve Chinese regional security – this was emphasized by President Xi in 2013 at the Peripheral Diplomacy Work Conference[11].

Second: to deal with the domestic economic issues like regional disparity and excess capacity. Development of Western China is one of the important government’s economic policy objectives. For instance, in 2019 the incomes of people in East China were almost two times higher than in West. GDP of Shanghai is bigger than the GDP of the whole Gansu province (甘肃省)[12]. The regional OBOR infrastructure construction and integration with neighbors’ economies already increased people’s incomes in Western China by 5.5%[13].

In 2008 China used infrastructure construction as the economic growth acceleration after the financial crisis, however, this led to creation of huge excess capacity in industrial sectors, especially in steel and cement production. In 2015 Chinese overproduction was 300 million tons[14]. Chinese government found another mechanism to partially cope with this issue via OBOR: China finances infrastructure projects, constructed by the Chinese companies which are using domestic materials (90% of all OBOR projects were built by Chinese enterprises[15]), later the host countries have to repay the loans.

Conclusion: OBOR is a significant initiative that serves as a critical element of China’s foreign policy and economic development. The initiative has brought substantial benefits to its participants, including improved infrastructure and coordination, as well as increased economic growth. OBOR also serves as a strategic pivot for China to enhance its political influence in the region and to address its domestic economic issues. Despite criticisms of its lack of transparency and potential debt issues, OBOR represents a substantial opportunity for global cooperation and development. As the initiative continues to expand and develop, it will be important to monitor its progress and assess its long-term impact on the region and the world.


[1] Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015, available at: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1249618.shtml

[2] George Magnus, Financial Times, 2015, available at: https://www.ft.com/content/6e8e7f74-f26d-11e4-b914-00144feab7de

[3] Inside China’s Plan to Create a Modern Silk Road, Morgan Stanley Research on China and trade, 2018

[4] 博鳌亚洲论坛旗舰报告:面对疫情考验 “一带一路”建设展现出强大的韧性和活力, available at: https://www.ccdi.gov.cn/yaowen/202104/t20210418_239843.html

[5] Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Views and Commentary on the “One Belt, One Road” Initiative”, 2015, available at: https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm47ms.pdf

[6] 2020 AIIB annual report and financials, available at: https://www.aiib.org/en/news-events/annual-report/2020/home/index.html

[7] ADB, “Meeting Asia’s Infrastructure Needs”, 2017

[8] Francois de Soyres, Alen Mulabdic, Michele Ruta, “Common transport infrastructure: Welfare effects of the Belt and Road Initiative”, VoxEU, 2019, available at: https://voxeu.org/article/welfare-effects-belt-and-road-initiative

[9] ADB, APPR, 2020, available at: https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/697726/appr-2020.pdf

[10] Derek Grossman, RAND corporation, 2020, available at: https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/07/the-quad-is-poised-to-become-openly-anti-china-soon.html

[11] 央视网, 习近平在周边外交工作座谈会上发表重要讲话, 2013, available at: http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2013-10/25/c_117878897.htm

[12] Annual disposable income per capita of residents in China in 2019, by geographic region , available at:https://www.statista.com/statistics/1184088/per-capita-annual-income-in-china-by-geographic-region/

[13] Julia Bird, Mathilde Lebrand, Anthony J. Venables, “The Belt and Road Initiative Reshaping Economic Geography in Central Asia?”, World Bank report, 2019, available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/31536

[14] Understanding China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Lowy Institute, 2017, available at: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/understanding-belt-and-road-initiative

[15] Jacob Mardell, “Dispute settlement on China’s terms: Beijing’s new Belt and Road courts”, MERICS, 2018, available at https://merics.org/en/analysis/dispute-settlement-chinas-terms-beijings-new-belt-and-road-courts

Oksana Salabai is a PhD candidate of International Relations and Diplomacy at the School of International and Public Affairs, Jilin University China. An alumnus of Ivan Franko National University of L’viv, Ukraine.

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Chinese MFA Report 2023: American hegemony and its risks around the world

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USA China Trade War

An official report issued by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on: “Criticizing the concept of American and Western hegemony and democracy, and defending other and new forms of democracy in the world according to the circumstances of each country around the world,” emphasizing on:

  Criticism of the United States of America intensifying its efforts to stir up divisions around the world by organizing the so-called “summit for democracy”, inciting confrontation between the authoritarian and democratic camps according to its ideology, and attempting to transform other sovereign states in the American style in order to serve the special American strategy.

  To understand how American-dominant democracy operates globally, we will find that the United States classifies other countries for several degrees according to its criterion, that is, its proximity or distance from the concept of democracy, and Washington asks those countries to apply to fill out the “test papers” for democracy issued by the United States of America and its government.

  Those American actions in and of themselves are undemocratic, contradict the current trend, and contravene the will of the majority of the members of the international community, and will inevitably lead to a complete and abject failure.

  Here, the United States must realize that if it does not completely abandon the theory of “the superiority of American democracy”, and if it does not change its behavior of domination and bullying, which often imposes “American democracy” on others, you will find mockery of it in history books and records.

  China, like most countries in the world, searches for the path of development in the first place, not the path of democracy and the policies of hegemony and liberalism in the American way. Therefore, as an affirmation by the Chinese leaders of China’s adoption of the high-quality development model, Chinese Premier “Li Keqiang” presented the Chinese government’s work report at the opening session of the first session of the Fourteenth National People’s Congress, in which it was emphasized that China would follow a development model. A democracy with socialist characteristics in line with China’s real conditions. China has pushed the process of democracy on the basis of national development by taking development as a task of highest priority. Followers agreed, so here remains the final conclusion to evaluate any democratic system around the world, by asking: whether the quality of life of citizens has improved and whether the people are satisfied with the societal situation? It is clear that the model of democracy with socialist characteristics adopted by the Chinese government has succeeded. Chinese socialist democracy is a real democracy, represented by the government’s interest in serving the people, and it has nothing to do with the political system represented by one-party rule or multi-party rule in the American and Western style, which recent experiences have proven to fail to achieve the well-being and prosperity of its people, unlike the ability of the Chinese Communist Party and its leaders to achieve a well-off society model and a high-quality development in all Chinese provinces and cities.

  Therefore, the report on the work of the Chinese government came, which was presented by “Li Keqiang”, Premier of the Chinese State Council, on behalf of the State Council of China, at the opening session of the first session of the 14th National People’s Congress. The sessions of the 14th session of the National People’s Congress this year 2023 are of special importance, as the model of socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics succeeded in outperforming many Western democracies through the success of many delegates in the National People’s Congress in forming many of the main institutions of the Communist Party and the state.  They also tightened control over the bodies supervising the financial sector and scientific and technological work in the Chinese state, with an agreement to “strengthen party work” in private companies, in order to preserve the interests of the Chinese people and achieve a high-quality development model.

  Therefore, the Chinese government’s 2023 action plan is based on adhering to the general basic business idea of ​​making progress by maintaining stability, comprehensively applying China’s new development thinking, accelerating the establishment of a new development pattern, comprehensively deepening reform and opening up, and adhering to development, which is driven by innovation, and the high-quality development.

  Here, we must refer to the report of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, issued on Monday, February 20, 2023, regarding American hegemony and its dangers, with the aim of exposing the United States’ abuse of hegemony in various fields, and attracting the Chinese Foreign Ministry to the attention of the international community for a greater understanding of the dangers of American practices to peace.  And stability in the whole world, by interfering in the internal affairs of other countries, causing subversion and international chaos, deliberately waging wars and harming the entire international community.

  The United States of America has also developed a book on hegemony to organize “color revolutions” and incite regional conflicts and even wage wars directly under the guise of promoting democracy, freedom and human rights, and Washington has sought to impose rules that serve its own interests in the name of supporting a “rules-based international order”, which is  itself is far from it.

  There have been many cases of US interference in the internal affairs of other countries, under the guise of “promoting democracy”, such as the American incitement to “color revolutions” in the Eurasia region, and the “Arab Spring” revolutions in West Asia and North Africa to spread chaos, which led to chaos and vandalism and destruction in many countries in which Washington intervened.

  The United States practices double standards in international rules, as the United States put its self-interest first and moved away from all treaties, charters and work mechanisms of recognized international organizations and placed its domestic law above international law.

 The United States has also been issuing arbitrary judgments regarding assessing the level of democracy in other countries, and fabricating false narratives about “democracy versus authoritarianism” to incite estrangement, division, competition and confrontation. On December 2021, the United States hosted the first “summit for democracy”, which was met with criticism and opposition from many countries because it mocked the spirit of democracy and worked to divide the world.

 Also, “American military dominance has caused human tragedies. The wars and military operations launched by the United States in the name of fighting terrorism have claimed the lives of more than a million civilians and displaced tens of millions”.

 The United States of America also seeks to deter the scientific, technological and economic development of other countries through the exercise of monopoly power and measures of repression and technological restrictions in the areas of high technology. The United States monopolized intellectual property in the name of protection, and reaped huge profits through this illegal monopoly.

 The United States has also used disinformation as a weapon to attack other countries, and for this it has recruited groups and individuals who fabricate stories and spread them around the world to mislead world public opinion with unlimited American support.

 Therefore, all forms of American hegemony and power politics must be opposed, to refuse to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, to force them to abandon their hegemonic and tyrannical practices around the world.

  Here, It becomes clear that the Americans are victorious in a clear way for the pragmatic philosophy in theory and practice, and that their segment of the intelligentsia (intellectuals and intelligence) adopts the principle of “the end justifies the means”. Perhaps the French thinker “Alexis de Tocqueville” explained this in a practical way in his book published in two volumes in 1840, entitled (Democracy in America) and its summary: (Democracy in the United States of America can be as tyrannical as dictatorship when voters decide to vote for themselves with money).

  And (American democracy) did not stop at these characteristics only, because its sources are basically built philosophically at the hands of European philosophers who went to the United States, because they found in it the right soil for ideas and strategies that are based on plunder, occupation, siege, sanctions, overthrowing governments, and most importantly neglecting real and free popular choices to build the country and the human being, these thinkers came to it to perpetuate this behavior based on individualism, power and domination, and this is what is actually happening now.

  In this context, it was natural for President “Biden’s” American Summit for Democracy to be a disgrace and an intellectual, political, and moral defect, as half of the peoples of the earth were absent from it, and China did not invite to it, and the text of the peoples and systems of the world was absent from it, so the summit’s democracy was synonymous with American arrogance, and it raised issues: (Tyranny- corruption- human rights) in it is a purely political proposition far from promoting the values ​​of dialogue, peace, and friendship between peoples, framed by the previous ideas of the theorists of American hegemony and unipolarity, and whoever is not with us is against us, so the American Democracy Summit 2022 focused blatantly in its functional attack on the Chinese experience and on  different in this respect.  In my belief, what happened by Washington will not result in the emergence of any new and stable world order, with those in charge of the American administration adhering to the same old concepts and mentality of hegemony, control, and steering the helm of the world according to their interests.

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China’s “Two Sessions” and the return of one-man rule

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Xi Jinping, the President of China and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, makes a public pledge of allegiance to the Constitution at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, March 10, 2023. (Xinhua/Xie Huanchi)

In this essay, I try to demystify the recently concluded “Two Sessions” in China by giving a brief historical context, as the country slides back into the peril of one-leader-centered politics, reminiscent of a bygone era.

***

With the conclusion of the first annual session of the 14th National People’s Congress (NPC) of China on March 13, Xi Jinping has secured a norm-breaking third term as President of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in a “unanimous” vote, just five months after he was “re-elected” as the General Secretary of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for the third time in a row. The NPC, which is elected for a term of five years, is a largely ceremonial unicameral national legislature of China and “the highest organ of state power” as per the PRC’s Constitution. It also happens to be the largest law-making body in the world on paper.

Since the foundation of the People’s Republic under the leadership of Mao Zedong in October 1949, mainland China has been under the sole rule of the CCP. The deputies (members) of the NPC, elected from the thirty-five electoral units of China, usually won’t go against CCP-endorsed policies, but rather merely rubber-stamp them.While this has been the case for long, there are eight “legally-sanctioned” minor parties in China, on paper, that exists by playing second fiddle to the CCP without posing any serious challenge to its unrestricted authority.

These parties are given a voice to raise their concerns and suggestions through the so-called Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), a national-level political advisory body that meets once in a year parallelly during the annual session of the NPC. About 60.8 per cent of the total membership of CPPCC belongs to non-CCP parties, along with representation from various sectors of the society and the economy, specialised professions and social groups.

Together, these two annual meetings – the NPC and the CPPCC – are referred to as the “Two Sessions” or Lianghui in the Chinese language. This year, it took place between March 4 and 13, with 2977 deputies attending the NPC session and 2,172 members attending the CPPCC session from all over China.

 A brief history

The NPC and the CPPCC are rubber stamp bodies that simply pass the laws or approve the policies that have been already decided upon by the CCP. While the NPC dates back to 1954, when the first Constitution of China was promulgated, the CPPCC traces its origins back to the foundation of the PRC in 1949 when the CCP invited all friendly political parties to engage in discussions on the road to the proclamation of the new CCP-led People’s Republic in Beijing by replacing the nationalist Kuomintang party-led Republic of China at a time when its victory in the Chinese Civil War (1927-1949) was almost certain.

The first CPPCC of 1949 served effectively as the Constituent Assembly of China for drafting and framing the PRCs first Constitution. The meeting approved the “Common Programme”, which was akin to an interim Constitution and Mao Zedong was chosen as Chairman of the Central People’s Government. The PRC was proclaimed soon after the end of the conference in October 1949.

In the following years, the first permanent Constitution of the PRC was drafted. Exactly five years after the passage of the “Common Programme”, in 1954, the first NPC was convened, which unanimously approved the new Constitution. This was the PRC’s first Constitution since its founding. Later, in 1975 and 1978, two intervening versions of the Constitution were promulgated and the current Constitution came into effect in 1982. However, despite these four Constitutions and other political mechanisms of visible separation of power, the CCP had kept the whole of China, except the island of Taiwan, under its control without any opposition for the last seven-and-a-half decades.

Xi Jinping and his coterie of loyalists in the party-state apparatus who were appointed through last year’s 20th Party Congress and the recently concluded annual session of the NPC, represents the fifth generation in the line of succession of Chinese political leadership since Mao Zedong. China has seen the worst of authoritarianism under the Mao era (1949-1976), whose disastrous policies and initiatives such as the Great Leap Forward (1958-62) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) led to the death of more than 65 million Chinese people – either by forced famines, imprisonment or execution.

Following Mao’s death in 1976, his close aide and designated successor Hua Guofeng followed the policy of “Two Whatevers” (liang ge fanxi), which basically meant “whatever policy decisions Mao made and whatever instructions Mao gave” and rejected all calls for reforms. But a breakthrough occurred two years later during the third plenary session of the eleventh CCP Central Committee held in December 1978, when reform-minded Deng Xiaoping emerged as China’s new paramount leader.

Deng, often regarded as the “Architect of Modern China”’, denounced Mao’s hardline policies and set China on a new course of far-reaching economic reforms, even though he has ruthlessly quelled democratic upheavals during his tenure such as the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989.

Moving away from Deng’s “collective leadership” approach

Having seen the worst face of complete centralisation of power in the hands of one leader, Deng initiated key changes in China’s governance system such as the setting of a two-term limit for higher state officials, including the President, Vice-President, and the Premier of the State Council. He never held any post other than chairing two key bodies of power – the Central Military Commission and the now-defunct Central Advisory Commission that existed between 1982 and 1992. Even though the position of CCP General Secretary, the de facto leader of China, has no term limits, there were orderly transitions of power every ten years between 1992 and 2018, in the two generations of leadership (Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao) that followed Deng Xiaoping.

In 2018, when Xi Jinping was re-elected as China’s leader, he removed the term limits for Presidency that were put in place during the Deng era, thereby allowing him to rule for life. He then forced senior leaders into early retirement and incorporated his eponymous ideology, called the Xi Jinping Thought, to the party and state Constitutions, the first leader since Mao to have such an honour while in office. During President Xi’s first two terms, there existed a bare minimum balance of power between the party and the state as Premier Li Keqiang represented a rival faction within the CCP (the Tuanpai or the Youth League Faction).

Xi and his coterie of loyalists’ blur party-state thin line

While the NPC have traditionally tried to maintain an internal balance of power in a way to accommodate the interests of different political factions, now the Xi Jinping faction is the only active faction with exercisable power in the party-state apparatus. The thin line between the Party and the government has been blurred, reminiscent of the pre-1976 era. Xi and his “yes-men” in key positions of the CCP’s Politburo Standing Committee and the PRC’s State Council have completely abandoned the “collective leadership” model pioneered by Deng Xiaoping and all the rival factions within the Party have been sidelined.

Xi has now consolidated his position as the most powerful leader the PRC has seen since Mao, with a firmer grip of control on the party, the government and the military. But, unlike the pre-1976 era, Xi Jinping is leading a more powerful China, which is the second largest economy in the world with a rapidly modernising military. Moreover, China’s humungous industrial base forms the core of global manufacturing and supply chains.

As widely expected, Li Qiang, a long-term ally of Xi Jinping and the former party chief of Shanghai who oversaw the controversial “zero-Covid” policy, was appointed as China’s new Premier in place of Li Keqiang at the recently concluded NPC. With other loyalists such as the new Vice President Han Zheng in the State Council and two other allies being appointed to head the NPC and the CPPCC, Xi Jinping has effectively removed all the rival centres of power within China’s party-state apparatus.

Xi Jinping’s previous two terms were characterised by fueling hyper-nationalism at home and upping the ante on regional disputes and engaging in a global strategic competition with the United States. This is expected to be continued, while some experts believe that the new Premier Li Qiang, having a pro-business image, can exert a moderating influence on Xi, who had placed stricter controls on industries and businesses, during his second term in particular. However, the extent of such an influence remains to be seen.

During the closing session of the 14th NPC, Xi emphasised security as “the bedrock of development, while stability is a pre-requisite for prosperity” and called for building the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into a “Great Wall of Steel” that safeguards national security, sovereignty and developmental interests of China.

The address reflected similar concerns shared during the 20th CCP Congress held in October 2022, when Xi used the word “security” 91 times. Similarly, an often-repeated phrase is “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”, citing China’s “century of humiliation”, and projecting the CCP as the country’s only saviour, especially from external enemies and threats. All these rhetoric is aimed at invoking revanchist sentiments within the Chinese population and thereby using it to sustain its continued legitimacy at home.

After the conclusion of NPC, Chinese state-run media Xinhua wrote, “The (NPC) session called on the Chinese people of all ethnic groups to rally more closely around the CPC Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core, to hold high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, follow the guidance of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, and fully implement the guiding principles of the Party’s 20th National Congress…”

In other words, the Party “guides and leads” everything and now there is a singular source of power for the Party and the government, which seems to look like a return of China to one-leader-centered politics after nearly five decades. Hope, the PRC’s evolving political dynamics won’t take a perilous turn, particularly in the foreign and security policy fronts, which is increasingly witnessing conflictual turn of events in the recent past.

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Organizational structures in formulating China’s decisions to manage international affairs Under Xi Jinping

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Chinese President “Xi Jinping” sent several clear messages, in his closing speech on Monday, March 13, 2023 in the capital, Beijing, in front of the meetings of the two sessions or sessions of the annual “Lianghui” that takes place in March of each year, with the participation of the National People’s Congress of China, that is,  The Chinese Parliament or Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Council, all of which focus on the fact that China is coming. China also expressed its vision in the management of international affairs, through the words of Chinese President “Xi Jinping” himself, by affirming: “China believes that all countries, big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, are equal members of the international community”.  Their internal affairs do not bear any external interference, their sovereignty and dignity must be respected, and their right to choose social systems and development paths must be adhered to independently and justly.

  Chinese foreign policy is generally based on the principle of (Tao Guangyang Wei), meaning “building capabilities and waiting for time”, to make Chinese foreign policy more active and resolute.  China’s foreign policy agenda is witnessing a major shift in institutional power from the ministries that used to lead the traditional diplomacy process to specialized units as a result of the development and intensity of China’s external activity. China is the ruler in setting public and foreign policy, but also supervises the extent of its implementation, but this is done officially independently of the government, unlike most other countries. Likewise, the political decision in China is taken by the supreme political leadership of the party and the state as a center, but after extensive studies carried out by the competent agencies in the state and the party and specialized research centers to study and discuss all available options for implementation.

 We find here the pivotal and vital role of the “Political Planning” Department of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to understand and formulate China’s foreign policy decisions internationally, which undertakes tasks: conducting studies of comprehensive and strategic issues of international situations and international relations, developing policies and plans in foreign affairs, preparing drafts of important diplomatic documents, and raising awareness of policies  Foreign affairs, coordinating research and studies work, and carrying out work related to studies of the history of diplomacy for the new China. We note the role of Chinese foreign policy research centers, as well as academic and university research institutions to contribute and are closely linked to the government, the army and the party partly due to the fact that they enjoy reliable licensed channels to convey their advice to the supreme leadership, and are closely linked to the government, the army and the party, partly due to the fact that they enjoy licensed channels  Reliable to pass on her advice to the top leadership of the Chinese state.      

   And the most prominent formations of the organizational structure, which contribute to drawing the decisions and policies of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and thus contribute to shaping the external decisions of China, as follows:

  (Office of the Ministry “Diwan”- Political Planning Department- Asia Department – Western Asia and North Africa Department- Africa Department- Eastern Europe and Central Asia Department- Europe Department- North America and Oceania Department- Latin America Department- International Organizations and Conferences Department- Arms Control Department- Treaties and Laws Department- Information Department- Protocol Department – Consular Department (Consular Protection Center)- Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan Affairs Department- Translation Office- Coordination Department for Foreign Affairs- External Security Affairs Department- Retired Cadres Department- Cadres Department- Administrative Affairs Department- Financial Department- Committee  Ministry of the Communist Party of China (Department of Party Affairs Committee of the Ministry and Diplomatic Missions Abroad)- Office of the Leading Team on Inspection Work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs- Archives Department- Service Office of Departments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Diplomatic Missions)

  Special interest groups or groups play a crucial role in China’s external decision-making. They provide relevant input and a more specialized viewpoint in all political areas ranging from internal land reform in the Chinese state to relations between the United States of America and China. These groups consist mainly of government institutions.  Centralization and state-owned enterprises, the results of politics in China are often the result of centralized bureaucracies and provincial-level governments.

  China also works within the framework of a long-term strategic plan, which is reviewed at the National Congress of the Communist Party, which is held every five years. Here, the Central School of the Communist Party of China carries out the process of political and party education at the level of all diplomats and representatives of the foreign policy of the state, including state employees, leading and executive officials, from the level of ministers and agents and below, as each of them devotes himself to different periods, varying according to the degree of official, from one month  To a year, to study, train and learn in the Central School of the Party.

  Within the framework of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, China has concluded agreements with more than forty countries around the world, including the economic corridor agreement between Mongolia, Russia and China, the economic corridor between China and Pakistan, work to develop the port of Gwadar in Pakistan, a port in Sri Lanka and another in Myanmar, and the construction of a railway  High-speed rail between Hungary and Serbia, and between Addis Ababa and Djibouti. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which China called for, is developing projects in several Arab countries, including the Gulf Cooperation Council countries.  Negotiations are also taking place between China and Israel at the present time to establish a free trade zone between them, despite the American refusal to do so. A railway has also been established between China and Laos, and between China and Thailand, and between Jakarta and Bandung.  China’s military, naval and diplomatic endeavors have also expanded as part of the “Pearl String Strategy”, which secures China’s strategic positions in the Indian Ocean and Malacca Strait regions.

 China also put forward its vision in the management of international affairs, by emphasizing the issue of adhering to the principle of (indivisible security and the commitment to take seriously the legitimate security concerns of all countries), stressing that “humanity is an indivisible security community”, and that “the security of one country  should not come at the expense of the security of other countries”. With the continuous Chinese warning that the misuse of long-term unilateral sanctions does not solve any international problem, but rather creates more difficulties and complications for everyone, China’s invitation to participate in the formulation of a new international peace program also came.

 China makes its foreign policy based on three pillars: (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the International Liaison Department, and the United Front Work Department).  Each of these institutions plays a supportive role for the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, led by President “Xi Jinping”, who ultimately has the authority to make the final decision and determine Beijing’s position on various global issues. We find that since the establishment of the Chinese President “Xi Jinping” of the Central Foreign Affairs Committee of the Communist Party in 2018, the Communist Party and President “Xi” have a major role in influencing the course of the management of international Chinese affairs, within the framework of personal and partisan influence on the making of China’s foreign policy. This is through what is known as the “International Liaison Department” within the Central Committee of the ruling Communist Party, which empowers the Chinese leadership and its ruling party to make political decisions and promote a separate foreign policy agenda for China.

 The priorities of Chinese foreign policy can be understood through the words of former Chinese Foreign Minister “Wang Yi”, who identified “five major priorities for Chinese diplomacy”, which are:

(fully serve domestic development, resolutely safeguard national interests, constantly deepen partnership with other countries, staunchly defend international multilateralism, and broaden the base of China’s international cooperation more actively in international affairs)

 After the spread of the Corona pandemic (Covid-19), Chinese diplomacy continued to carry out its various functions and roles actively and effectively despite the crisis, by employing modern technology and communications, and it turned to the “cloud diplomacy” mode, through phone calls, exchange of correspondence, and international video conferencing.

 Here, on Tuesday, February 21, 2023, China issued the (Global Security) initiative, which was proposed by Chinese President “Xi Jinping”, through which it aims to eliminate the root causes of international conflicts, foremost of which is the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, which is “aggravated and out of control”.  According to the assurances of the current Chinese Foreign Minister, “Chen Gang” in his statement that his country is “extremely concerned” and Beijing will work to “promote peace dialogue between the parties to the conflict.”  Also, during the launch of the new “global security” initiative within the vision of President “Xi Jinping”, President “Xi” himself affirmed to continue to strengthen peace dialogue and work with the international community to consolidate dialogue and consultation, address the concerns of all parties, and strive to achieve common security among all.

 The (global security) initiative, which was formulated in a 10-page document, is based on 6 main principles that China announced its international adoption. The essence of this new vision of security is the call for the concept of common security, respect and protection of the security of every country, and the adoption of a comprehensive approach to maintaining security in  Both traditional and non-traditional areas, strengthen security governance in a coordinated manner, commit to cooperation and achieve security through political dialogue and peaceful negotiations, and strive to achieve sustainable security and resolve conflicts through development and eliminate the breeding ground for insecurity.

  Here, Beijing denounced what it described as “false accusations” made by the United States of America stating that “China is considering arming Russia in its war against Ukraine”. Through the statements of the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, “Wang Wenbin,” that “we do not accept the United States pointing fingers at Sino-Russian relations, let alone coercion and pressure”, accusing Washington of “spreading false information”. He warned the United States of America of its actions, and to do more to improve the situation and promote peace and dialogue instead of stirring up grudges and conflicts, and to stop evading responsibility and spreading false information about China regarding its relations with Russia. The Chinese Foreign Ministry stressed that “China’s approach on the Ukrainian issue can be summed up in one sentence, which is to urge peace and promote dialogue”.

  The Chinese statements regarding its relations with Russia came in response to the United States of America, after accusing US Secretary of State “Anthony Blinken” in an interview with the American “CBS” station, that China is “now considering providing lethal support” to Moscow, ranging from “ammunition and weapons themselves”. Blinken also made similar statements in a series of interviews while he was in Germany, participating in the Munich Security Conference.

   And through the vision of Chinese think tanks to study the equations of the repercussions of the Russian-Ukrainian war, and its existing and expected transformations at various political and economic levels for China, by drawing the features of a new international system in a way that leads to reorienting China’s foreign agenda to new geopolitical areas according to the principle of “outward displacement” and networking, flexibility with “potential allies”, according to the new Chinese vision, following the study of the results of the impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on China.

  And the most important thing here remains China’s lack of interest in the nature of the ruling political regimes in the context of its relations with the world, unlike the United States of America and the West, and it does not seek to promote its ideology abroad, and it agrees with many countries of the world in its view of American and Western liberal and democratic calls, as they are tools of states.  Western only and should not apply to everyone.

 China aspires to secure the greatest amount of security stability in the region after conducting the Saudi-Iranian reconciliation process as a Chinese security involvement of deep significance in the region to protect the security of sea lanes and straits, as a major requirement for Beijing’s economic development through its Belt and Road initiative, so that Beijing can launch programs to create and modernize  Roads, railways, ports, communication systems and free trade cities throughout the region under a stable security environment. Such a Saudi-Iranian agreement, sponsored by China, is a blow to US influence in the Middle East. On a personal level, the words of Chinese Professor Wang Ewei, director of the Institute of International Studies at Renmin University, i.e. the Chinese people, stopped me for a long time, saying: “The Saudi-Iranian deal confirms the fact that Chinese mediation solves problems that Western mediation cannot solve”.

 Hence, we increasingly understand the new approach of Chinese diplomacy towards foreign policy issues, especially in light of the Beijing government’s current endeavor to redraw maps of its political influence, by activating economic and political tools to expand and acquire more new geopolitical spaces.  So, in line with the increasing breadth and depth of Beijing’s foreign policy agenda, Chinese policymakers expanded their thinking beyond geopolitical understanding of foreign affairs, and therefore many central government institutions specialized in economic policies and domestic industry are now involved in setting China’s foreign policy agenda.

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