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Karabakh in Crisis: Toward a New Road of Life



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Authors: Pietro Shakarian and Benyamin Poghosyan*

Once in a while, certain parallels appear between contemporary global affairs and classical Russian literature. Particularly, looking at the relationship between the post-Soviet Russia and the West, one may unmistakably find echoes of Pushkin’s Eugene Onegin. Just as the heroine Tatyana pined over the indifferent Onegin, so did post-Soviet Russia aspire for acceptance and integration as part of a “united Europe” from “Lisbon to Vladivostok.” However, much like Tatyana’s romantic aspirations, the once romanticized desires of Russia came crashing down on a mountain of ill-considered and unfortunate steps by Washington policymakers to assert “victory” over what it considered a “defeated” Cold War adversary. The decision to expand NATO to the east, a move opposed by even some of the most eminent of American foreign policy analysts, turned out to be the most unfortunate decision taken by the US in a series of unfortunate events.

It was this background that ultimately set the stage for today’s ongoing tragedy in Ukraine, representing perhaps the most dangerous crisis in Russian-Western relations since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The rumblings of the conflict continue to reverberate throughout the post-Soviet space, and in no place are they felt more acutely than in Armenian-inhabited Nagorno-Karabakh (also known as Artsakh), a region faced with a looming humanitarian crisis amidst a backdrop of global upheaval. Azerbaijan’s ongoing blockade of the self-proclaimed republic presents a significant challenge to Moscow. However, it not insurmountable; it simply requires creative solutions to overcome the posed challenges. All the while, as tensions brew, Russia marks the 80th anniversary of the beginning of the end of another historical blockade: The Siege of Leningrad during the Second World War.

Recent Roots

When future historians reflect on the events currently taking place, they will trace the origins of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine to several historical turning points. Undoubtedly, this will include, first and foremost, their first sin: NATO expansion. However, for an Armenian, the current global crisis did not begin on February 24, 2022, but on September 27, 2020, with the beginning of the second full-scale war over Nagorno-Karabakh. In its support for Azerbaijan, NATO member Turkey sought to expand its geopolitical influence deep into Russia’s post-Soviet neighborhood. Its infamous Bayraktar drones covered Karabakh’s skies like black clouds, terrorizing Armenian civilians for 44 consecutive days. Although today Turkey prefers to play the role of “peacemaker”, the demonstrated “success” of the Bayraktars in fact encouraged Ankara to market its drones to Kiev. It was this step that ultimately played a key role in transforming Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky from a “peace candidate” into a “war president”.

Despite the humanitarian tragedy and clear geopolitical setback of a much-diminished Armenian Karabakh, the end of the 2020 Karabakh War appeared to have a silver lining for Russian strategic interests. The deployment of Russian peacekeepers seemingly had the power to do what no Armenian or Karabakh army could—stabilize the fraught Armenian-Azerbaijani frontline. Indeed, the sheer strength of Russian forces alone initially appeared to act as an effective deterrent to any renewed clashes, ensuring a lasting stability in what was once a periodically unstable post-Soviet Eurasian conflict zone. However, the relative peace did not last long; Azerbaijan’s inflated sense of “victory” and a belief in its own invincibility soon set its ambitions on a collision course with Moscow’s stress on quiet diplomacy.

Putting Moscow’s strategic tolerance to the test, Baku launched periodic attacks on Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia proper, especially after the onset of hostilities in Ukraine. These “salami tactics” reached their height with Azerbaijan’s recent assault on Armenia’s eastern borders in September 2022. Such persistent and brazen provocations in the face of substantial Russian forces are clearly calculated to challenge the peacekeeping mission and obstruct its basic mandate, i.e., to stabilize the Karabakh conflict zone. Azerbaijan’s position on the diplomatic front has been no less disruptive, with Baku rejecting Russia’s offer on the settlement of the Karabakh conflict. Instead, President Ilham Aliyev has asserted that there is no dispute at all and that the war had, in fact, “resolved” the conflict completely; it was now “already history”. He has openly derided Ruben Vardanyan, the newly appointed state minister of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, as “Moscow’s emissary” in the region. Such statements continue, even as the Kremlin has gone to great pains to avoid an open confrontation with Baku, as exemplified by the declaration of allied interaction of February 22, 2022.

Many may wonder why Azerbaijan is directly challenging Moscow’s strategic interests. The only logical answer appears to be the conviction on the part of Azerbaijan’s ruling elite that Russia will lose badly in its current confrontation with the West in Ukraine. As Azerbaijan’s newly emerging Western partners continue pursuing additional volumes of gas and oil, they are also undoubtedly working to influence Baku, by emphasizing what they view as Russia’s “strategic failure” in Ukraine. The “Kuwait on the Caspian” has been further emboldened by unconditional support from Ankara in its consistent efforts to undermine Moscow’s strategic interests in the Caucasus.

From Provocation to Blockade

Tensions over Nagorno-Karabakh have been exacerbated by the greatly diminished territorial size of the region as a result of the 2020 Karabakh War and its subsequent November 2020 statement. The Pashinyan government’s cession of the strategic districts of Kelbajar and Lachin to Azerbaijani control severely limited the overland connection linking the mountainous region to Armenia proper and the Russian peacekeepers to the Russian forces in Armenia. All that remained was a single road—the Lachin corridor—the only route connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with the outside world, and even that lifeline became a bone of contention in recent months, involving Baku, Yerevan, and Stepanakert.

The drama culminated on December 12, 2022, when Azerbaijan blocked the Lachin corridor, in an effort led by “eco–activists,” who initially demanded access for the relevant Azerbaijani state institutions to monitor a copper-molybdenum mine in Nagorno-Karabakh. However, very soon, the list of demands started to increase to include the resignation of Ruben Vardanyan and the establishment of an Azerbaijani checkpoint in the Lachin corridor. Indeed, observers following developments in the post-Soviet space since the conclusion of the 2020 Karabakh War should have no doubt that what is going on in the Lachin corridor is connected much more with geopolitics than with any benign environmental concerns.

Through this overt violation of the November 2020 statement, Baku is sending a clear message to the civilian Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh—leave your homeland or face starvation. It is also sending a clear message to Moscow, regarding how it perceives its interests in the region, i.e., that Russia has been “weakened” due to its serious “miscalculations” in Ukraine, so much so that even Azerbaijan can afford to challenge the Kremlin directly. Thus, Baku is now backing the narrative of Russia’s Western critics: the conflict in Ukraine signals the beginning of Russia’s end.

By mocking and provoking the Russian peacekeepers deployed along the Lachin corridor and moreover by its earlier launch of periodic attacks, Azerbaijan seeks to amplify another Western message—that the Russian army is weak. Through such actions, it not only seeks to demonstrate that Moscow cannot deal with great and middle powers, but it can also be de facto humiliated by small countries, such as Azerbaijan. By taking steps to isolate and starve the Armenian civilian population of Nagorno-Karabakh, the Azerbaijani government seeks to promote yet another Western message—that Moscow is incapable of protecting its allies. The idea behind this message is that all states currently maintaining alliances or partnerships with Russia should make the “correct” conclusions—move away from Moscow and join the “right side of history.”

By imposing a blockade on the people of Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan is also helping to create and fuel anti-Russian sentiments in Armenia, where Russia’s image and soft power have seriously suffered as a result of Baku’s periodic attacks on Armenian civilians. An increasing number of politicians, experts, and activists in Armenia are now calling for the withdrawal of Armenia from the CSTO and the expulsion of the Russian military base and border troops from Armenia. Suffice to say, the outcome of such steps would be disastrous for the people of Nagorno-Karabakh, for Armenia, for the Caucasus region, and for Russian national security. Moreover, as the experience of the difficult years of 1918–1920 illustrated, it is exceedingly naïve to expect that Western powers will come to Armenia’s “rescue”. The stark reality is that with no Russian presence in the Caucasus, only Ankara will fill the regional void; not Washington or Brussels.

Toward a New Road of Life

t has been more than a month since the blockade on the Karabakh Armenian civilians commenced. The people of the mountainous republic remain firm in their resolve, celebrating the New Year and Christmas holidays despite facing a looming humanitarian crisis. For its part, Moscow continues to facilitate negotiations in the conflict zone with the aim of removing the blockade. However, resolve and negotiations are not enough. In the present scenario, Moscow will need to think creatively about much more direct solutions that, while not resorting to the use of force, will prevent the onset of a humanitarian catastrophe.

One such possibility might involve Russian peacekeepers working with the Russian forces in Armenia to deliver much-needed supplies to the people, especially through plane and helicopter airlifts. Supplies could include food and much-needed medicines, both of which have been subject to panic buying in Nagorno-Karabakh since the beginning of the blockade. Likewise, toys can be delivered to the children of the beleaguered republic, in the holiday spirit of friendship and good will from those who protect them. The life and safety of every Armenian civilian—man, woman, and child—depends on the success of the Russian peacekeeping mission, working in close cooperation and coordination with Russian and Armenian forces.

This month marks the 80th anniversary of Operation Iskra. The establishment of the Road of Life across the frozen Lake Ladoga marked the beginning of the end of the Siege of Leningrad. 80 years ago today, that siege ended. Perhaps, a new “road of life” will allow the people of Nagorno-Karabakh, just like the people of Leningrad, to overcome this challenge and to live freely once again.

*Benyamin Poghosyan Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

From our partner RIAC

PhD candidate in History at The Ohio State University in Columbus, focusing on Russia, Eurasia and Caucasus, MA in Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies from the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor

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Eastern Europe

Education: Armenia’s Path to Stronger Economic Growth

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Better education and a stronger innovation drive are crucial for achieving higher rates of economic growth and prosperity in any country. Countries that prioritize improvements in education – from the pre-primary to the university level – and innovation are better positioned to adapt to economic change and help raise the living standards for their people.

Education equips individuals with the knowledge and skills necessary to contribute to the economy, with the ability to learn – and unlearn – continuously. Innovation involves the creation of new products, processes, and services that expand the capacity of enterprises and economies. In fact, the most innovative countries tend to be the most successful economically.

Take the case of Estonia. In 1993, Estonia’s GDP per capita was a modest about $6,480. In comparison, Japan’s was $24,000. Fast forward 30 years. Estonia’s GDP per capita was equal to that of Japan in 2022, at nearly $43,000. Estonia now boasts the highest PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) scores in math, science and reading in Europe. A similar ‘miracle’ happened in Korea, a country that moved from developing country status to an advanced economy in just one generation. How can countries replicate Estonia’s or Korea’s success and achieve faster economic growth and standards of living that are like to those of high-income countries?

Through education and innovation.

Here in Armenia, education has been a priority since the country’s independence in 1991. The government has made efforts to increase the number of schools, provide free education for primary and secondary schools, and promote STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) education. As a result, Armenia has a high literacy rate of over 99% and over 60% of adults have completed at least secondary education.

Yet, the education system is not producing the needed outcomes. Children born in Armenia today will be only 58% as productive during their lives as they could have been if they had received quality health and education services available. Armenian children are expected to complete 11.3 years of schooling. This decreases to 8 years if the quality of education is factored in. Pre-primary school and secondary school enrollment is low compared to peer countries in Europe and Central Asia (ECA). It is the quality of education that is the most pressing concern. Armenia’s TIMSS mathematics score – a standardized test for children in grade 4 – is one of the lowest in the region. The quality of tertiary education is below the ECA average: it is nearly 30% lower than Georgia, and half as low as the new EU member states. These outcomes are not surprising, given that public spending on education is just under 2.7% of GDP in Armenia, which is half that of the EU.

The World Bank is helping Armenia improve its education system, including through the Education Improvement Project, which is enhancing the conditions for learning across educational levels by extending preschool coverage, providing laboratory equipment, informing curriculum revisions, and improving the relevance and quality of higher education institutions. The many outcomes of the project include new preschools in rural communities, training of preschool teachers, and grants to higher education institutions through the Competitive Innovation Fund. Under the EU4Innovation Trust Fund, the World Bank is also helping improve the quality of STEM education. By September this year, Armenia will have a fully revised STEM curriculum for middle and high schools (grades 5 to 12), improved learning materials, school-based STEM laboratories and as well as enhanced student-centered instructional methodologies/teaching methods.

Education is essential but alone is not sufficient to drive economic growth. How knowledge is applied by firms, researchers and workers through innovation is critical. In Armenia, there is a disconnect between education, research, and the link to entrepreneurs and markets. For example, academic research in Armenia is dominated by the National Academy of Sciences which comprises more than 30 separate research institutes. None of these institutes are formally integrated with any teaching university in the country. There is also a proliferation of universities in Armenia, with 26 public (state) and 33 private universities; many of the latter, in name only. In Denmark, a country with almost twice the population, there are only eight state-recognized and funded universities offering research-based education.

Consolidating the universities in Armenia, merging them with the research institutes, and focusing government attention on accreditation could help address some of these challenges. It is also essential to reform the university admission process to incentivize talented high schoolers to apply. The government could also support the commercialization of research. In many advanced economies, universities are prodigious producers of knowledge and basic research output, and the private sector, the user of this research, is very vibrant. Without practical application, research may have little impact on the country’s growth potential.

Extensive work by the World Bank shows that human capital is at the core of efforts to strengthen innovation and technology adoption. In Armenia, as in many other countries, human capital is one of the main binding constraints to growth.

While the government has taken significant steps and has initiated important reforms to promote both education and innovation, more is needed to realize their potential. By making a greater investment in education and innovation, Armenia can build a knowledge-based economy that can help the country deliver a development miracle and elevate standards of living to those of high-income countries. The dialogue at the recent panel discussion on “Growth, Education, and Innovation” could help policymakers in their efforts to transform education and innovation in Armenia.

This op-ed was originally published in via World Bank

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Eastern Europe

The dilemma of China’s role as Mediator in the case of Ukraine

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Photo credit: Ju Peng/Xinhua

Since the full-scale Russo-Ukrainian war unfolding after 24 February 2022, China has maintained so-called neutral stance on the conflict, passively calling for a peaceful resolution. But on the anniversary of Russian invasion, Beijing popped up with concrete suggestions on how to end the war: China claimed its readiness to participate in peaceful adjustment.

Beijing’s peacemaking attitude and Xi Jinping’s legitimacy as Mediator were acknowledged by Putin during Xi’s visit to Moscow and the rumors about the following soon phone call between Xi and Zelensky spread, however, it is arguable whether Kyiv is truly ready to welcome China as the broker. The US, in turn, treated Beijing’s position skeptically.   

This piece elaborates on how China became Global Mediator of the 21st century and why now Ukraine is reluctant to accept Beijing’s brokering.

For starters, China is a realist actor across the domain of international relations. Kissinger states that Chinese leaders are making profound foreign policy decisions only when they do not lack the means to achieve the goals [Kissinger, 2010], hereby Xi knew that Beijing’s possible mediation between Moscow and Kyiv during first months of the war would not be realizable. The sides were not sincerely ready for a truce, neither Russia, occupied territories and continued advancements in Donbas, nor preparing counteroffensive Ukraine, backed by vast Western support.

Moreover, from realism perspective, peace achievement lies in accepting and adapting to the irresistible existence of powers involved in security competition [Mearsheimer, 2001] and peacemaking is most likely when there is no hegemon [Morgenthau, 1946].

China adhered tenaciously to aforementioned realist position by declaring that “the security of the country should not be pursued at the expense of others”, obviously referring to NATO’s strengthening and Russian lament about bloc’s eastward expansion. But such Xi’s mediation ceasefire proposition in the heat of the war would be found senseless by Ukraine and the USA, which were publicly committed to peace restoration by beating Russia on the battlefield and reestablishing liberal world order led by predominant power – the U.S.

Beijing had to prepare before ascending as Mediator between Kyiv and Moscow.

Firstly, China gained legitimacy as a global security provider. Ukraine fights for its land, but Washington made a geostrategic mistake by being directly involved in a confrontation with Russia: by imposing enormous economic sanctions on Moscow, tolerating Nord Stream pipeline sabotage and trying to end the Russo-Ukrainian war only by military means, not diplomacy.

While China proposes negotiations, the U.S. is only committed to the war continuation.

As a result, the USA lost worldwide recognized status as the sole provider of economic prosperity and global security; the unipolar liberal world order ideology became an American tool for maintaining the U.S. leadership and Western dominance at any price, despite the economic losses of others.

Therefore, some states, especially from the Global South, did not support American efforts to isolate Russia, perceiving Washington’s strategy as destabilizing. Instead, they opted for cooperation with China as an alternative planetary center within the uprising multipolar world order model; Beijing met the demand by launching Global Security Initiative, posing itself as a stabilizing Mediator.

Secondly, Beijing successfully proved its new status. China became broker between Iran and Saudi Arabia, helping two longstanding Middle East rivals to achieve reconciliation as well as détente, giving them solid security guarantees. Tehran and Riyadh restored relations without Washington’s participation and pleasingly deepened economic interaction with China.

Thirdly, concerning the Russo-Ukrainian war, Xi Jinping can become Mediator and repeat the historical brokering successes of pacification Russia achieved by such famous statesmen like Otto Bismarck and Theodore Roosevelt.

German “iron” chancellor, apologist of realpolitik, frequently played role of mediator among leading European nations in the 19th century, balancing their interests within spheres of influence. Balkans became one of such great states’ competition arenas, where Austria and Russia struggled to gain control over newborn Bulgaria and influence in the region. The war between them was prevented because Bismarck sagaciously established “League of Three Emperors”, through which mediated disputes between two empires, therefore he was known as “honest broker”.

American president contributed to halting the war between Russia and Japan in 1905. His wise brokering helped states to sign the Treaty of Portsmouth. Serving as mediator for combatants, Roosevelt induced two countries to make concessions on the most intense issues regarding reparations and territorial disputes, thereby sides reached peace.   

But while Putin acknowledges Xi as broker, Zelensky probably does not, due to Ukrainian survival dilemma – if Kyiv accepts China as a Mediator, it loses Western vital support.

Thus, there are three reasons why Ukraine is not enthusiastic about Beijing’s brokering, at least publicly.  

First, Zelensky has his own, approved by the West, peace plan. He wants Xi to take part in Kyiv’s “peace formula.” It assumes restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and Russian troops withdrawal from occupied territories. Chinese “peace position”, on the contrary, suggests the immediate ceasefire and peace talks launch: frozen conflict, not total Ukrainian victory. Moreover, it does not stipulate the matter of Ukraine’s territorial restoration.  

Secondly, Ukraine is diplomatically, politically, militarily and economically dependent on the West, i.e. the USA. China, successfully mediating between Moscow and Kyiv, is the worst-case scenario for America, because intensifies Beijing’s global influence at the expanse of the U.S., which has different from Chinese stance on Russo-Ukraine war ending issue. The USA wants to preserve its worldwide leadership. Consequently, Washington will reduce its vital aid to Ukraine if China is chosen as broker. Kyiv needs to consider the stabilization puzzle, given the significantly suffered from the war economy.

Thirdly, Ukrainian ruling elite, opinion leaders and society are ideologically inclined as well as biased to accept West as only one party, which can help Ukraine to stop the war. NATO is seen as the sole security guarantees provider. Besides, there are many West-funded organizations and media outlets in Kyiv, influencing public narratives within Ukrainian society. So, even if Zelensky accepts mediation, economic support and post-war restoration plan from China, elites in Kyiv and Ukrainian society will oppose him, challenging his legitimacy. Zelensky risks repeating former president Yanukovych fate.

To sum up, it should be stated that China’s role as global security provider is inevitable, Beijing will continue to use its economic leverage to reconcile many conflicting rivals in the world. Thus, Beijing mediation option may be considered by Ukraine in the near future, but not today.

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Eastern Europe

Erosion of Russia’s Hegemonic Stability in the South Caucasus and Transition to Risky Instability



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In early nineteenth century, following the wars with Persian and Ottoman empires, Russia completed the invasion of the South Caucasus. The region that hosts present day Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia remained under the control of Moscow until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, though the three countries were independent for a brief period after the World War I. Suppressing the independence movements in these countries along with the other parts of Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Moscow also acted as security provider in the region. In this role, Russia subdued conflicts between the subjects of the empire and also countered the intervention of external powers into “its” territories. This created a stability in the South Caucasus, as in other parts of the empire, dubbed by the theories of international relations as “hegemonic stability”.

In early 1990s, the Soviet Union collapsed and, subsequently, most of the newly independent states in the territories of the former empire ushered into inter- and intra-state conflicts. In the South Caucasus, Russia sought to manipulate and ultimately benefit from these flashpoints in order to preserve its influence over the region. Moscow’s support to Abkhaz separatists in Georgia and Armenia’s occupation of the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan in early 1990s helped the Kremlin recover its control over three countries of the South Caucasus. This translated into resurgence of Russia-dominated security order in the region in the post-soviet period but with more assertive independent states that sought to boost their sovereignty while minimizing Russia’s hegemony.

Armenia joined the Russia-led security and economic integration with a full membership at the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Azerbaijan, on the other hand, managed to build neutral and multilateral foreign policy and succeeded to resist Russia’s pressure thanks to economic independence of the country. The only country of the region, Georgia, that sought to escape Russian orbit and join the Eura-Atlantic political and military structures faced insurmountable obstacles on this path and remained in-between. Russia’s occupation of two regions of Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) in 2008 has served for the Kremlin as the Sword of Damocles over Tbilisi’s foreign policy.

The post-Soviet hegemonic stability in the South Caucasus has been, therefore, more volatile compared to earlier periods. The occasional military escalations between Baku and Yerevan along with the war in Georgia (2008) manifested such sporadic disruptions of the regional security order.  However, in both cases, Russia succeeded to act as hegemon by recovering ceasefire between Armenia and Azerbaijan and putting a de-fact veto on Georgia’s foreign policy.

Even during the full-scale military operations between Azerbaijan and Armenia in 2020, known as the Second Karabakh War, Russia appeared as the only mediator with enough authority to bring the sides to ceasefire. Deploying its troops to the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan under the name of peacekeepers, Russia managed to complete its mission of deploying its troops on the soil of each of the three countries of the region.

Hence, in the post-Soviet period, Moscow managed mostly to preserve the security order in the region under hegemony of Russia. The Kremlin, however, has had to swallow growing security ties between Azerbaijan and Turkiye, but reacted more calmly to these ties as Baku demonstrated deference to Russia’s core national interests and concerns in the region.

In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Moscow’s dominance established over the South Caucasus in early nineteenth century came under jeopardy for the third time after the post-WWI and early years of the post-Soviet periods. Facing an unexpected military debacle in Ukraine and massive economic troubles at home, Russia encounters challenges against its dominance in the South Caucasus, the region that has overarching geopolitical significance for Moscow.

This time the challenge to Russian power originates in Armenia and Azerbaijan, as Georgia avoids provoking Moscow and seemingly drifts away from its pro-Western aspirations. On the one hand, Azerbaijan criticizes Russia’s support to the separatist regime in the Karabakh region, tries to end the mission of the peacekeeping contingent, deepens its strategic alliance with Turkiye, increases its contributions to the energy security of Europe, and relies more on the EU’s mediation in the peace process with Armenia. On the other hand, Armenia defies Russia’s authority by distancing itself from Russia’s military bloc, builds closer relations with the European countries and the United States and invited a mission of the EU to monitor the security situation along Armenia’s border with Azerbaijan. The Kremlin reacted rather furiously to these developments and blamed the West on attempts to squeeze Russia out of the South Caucasus.

To the disappointment of Moscow, this signifies a decline in Russia’s dominance over the region, although it is now premature to say how this process will go on and whether this will end up with Russia’s withdrawal from the South Caucasus. The decline of Russian influence over the region creates a period which can be seen through the lens of the power-transition theory of international relations. According to this conceptual framework, the decline of the dominant power might lead to a conflict or war with the rising power as the latter becomes more assertive seeking to challenge the dominance of the declining power. This can be observed also as the emergence of a power vacuum in the respective region which other powerful state(s) might try to fill in which again leads to a conflict or war between the dominant power and rising power(s).

The present situation in the South Caucasus, thus, resembles the period described by the power transition theory. Other external powers, including Iran, Turkiye, the EU and United States try to benefit from Russia’s diminishing influence over the region and increases their power. Particularly, for Iran, the “encroachment” of the external players into the South Caucasus is inadmissible. The Russia-Ukraine war complicated the regional geopolitics for Iran as the European Union (EU) and United States have increased their influence in the South Caucasus by boosting their mediating role in the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, effectively sidelining Russia therein and deploying a monitoring mission to the Armenia-Azerbaijan border in the aftermath of Prague summit (October 6). Against this background, increasingly closer relations between Israel and Azerbaijan and the emerging possibility of the formation of Israel-Turkiye-Azerbaijan trilateral cooperation platform further enrage the Iranian authorities.

Tehran is determined to use military and other instruments to fill in the power vacuum emerges in the region in the wake of Russia’s decline. In this endeavor Iran effectively enjoys the support of Armenia whose leaders try to use the Iranian card against their common enemies of Azerbaijan and Turkiye. The recently growing ties between Armenia and Iran have provided Tehran a useful chance to get into the South Caucasus more assertively and form a de-facto alliance against the two Turkic states. Towards this end, Yerevan and Tehran are clearly building up their cooperation in various spheres, including military and economy. Apart from aiming to boost bilateral trade turnover from $700 million to $3 billion, Iran is also discussing supplying combat drones to Armenia.

That said, the hegemony Russia acquired over the South Caucasus in early nineteenth century is fading and with it the security order it built in the region is rapidly eroding. This process might be accompanied by violent conflicts and wars amongst different regional and external actors. For now, the major security threat to the regional stability is Iran and the alliance it builds with Armenia.

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