On November 20, 2022, Kazakhstan saw an early presidential election. According to the amendments made to the country’s constitution this fall, the head of state is now elected for a period of seven years, not subject to renewal. According to official data from the Central Election Commission of the Republic, turnout was just over 8.3 million people, or 69.44% of the total number of voters. Six candidates competed for the highest post: incumbent president Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Astana Maslikhat deputy Karakat Abden, representative of the National Social Democratic Party Nurlan Auesbayev, chairman of the Association of Farmers of Kazakhstan Jiguli Dairabaev, economist Meiram Kazhiken and human rights activist Saltanat Tursynbekova.
Since the five candidates competing with the head of state are little-known figures, the outcome of the vote was a foregone conclusion. The presidential election was essentially a referendum of confidence in K.-J. Tokayev in his promotion of political, economic, and social reforms. Still, the weak outcome of the opposition resulted from intra-elite agreements on the need for consolidation to overcome the crisis. Besides, it is an indicator of the opposition’s weakness and a signal that it should go through a path of renewal, much as the entire political system.
The main intrigue of the presidential elections in Kazakhstan in 2022 was the number of votes “against all”, since this graph was added to the ballot for the first time since 2004. This was done to measure the mood among that part of the population, who do not support any of the existing political forces, but are capable and ready to impact political processes in Kazakhstan.
Eventually, the incumbent president, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, predictably won in the first round with 81.31% (almost 6.5 million votes), with 5.8% of the votes “against all”, another little over 4% spoiled their ballots, and none of the opposition candidates secured more than 3.5%. This result demonstrates that the population has given the president a vote of confidence and is ready to support him at a difficult time for Kazakhstan.
The inauguration ceremony of a re-elected head of state K.-J. Tokayev was held in Astana on November 26, 2022. The president-elect signed a decree on measures to implement the pre-election program “Fair Kazakhstan is for everyone and for everyone. Now and Forever.” One of his first orders was to hold elections “with the establishment of the parliament and maslikhats on the basis of the new electoral system, on party lists and single-member districts, by June 2023.
Kazakhstan’s fresh president faces a number of external and internal challenges. It is impossible to build the “New Kazakhstan” without a solution to these challenges. It is worth highlighting the two main external difficulties. First, the Ukrainian crisis and the growing anti-Russian sanctions, which presents serious obstacles to foreign trade, logistics, and transit of goods through Russian territory. Destruction of logistics chains, problems with maintenance and insurance of land and sea freight are all troubling for exports from Kazakhstan. It takes time and large financial investments to create and maintain the appropriate infrastructure to change the direction of commodity flows.
Second, almost 80% of Kazakhstan’s exports go outside the former Soviet Union, namely to Europe and Asia. However, the economic growth rates of the EU and China are steadily declining, first in 2020-2021 due to the coronavirus pandemic, then on the back of a sharp increase in the cost of energy in the first half of 2022. This creates significant risks to the sustainable existence of Kazakhstan’s economy. It is obvious that a further expansion of exports from Kazakhstan is impossible. Rather, it will likely decrease in value and physical terms. Therefore, Kazakhstan’s economic model should be reformed, where exports of minerals and the development of the services sector are drivers of economic growth, engaged in the redistribution of imports and financial flows and providing the lion’s share of jobs in the formal and informal sectors of the economy.
Social fragmentation and challenges
Economic reforms will be accompanied by serious internal challenges, the main of which seems to be the rapid fragmentation of the nation’s society, the emergence and growth of rifts in the sphere of language, economic activity, lifestyle and standard of living. First of all, there is a clear split between the regions into a clear north, south, and west. The north of the country, an industrialized region with a multicultural and Europeanized population, suffers from serious environmental problems, emigration, and population decline. The South is an agrarian region whose residents are more inclined to traditionalism and which is characterized by high natural population growth and a large informal economy. But all of the economic growth in southern Kazakhstan is currently eaten up by a growing population, and residents are suffering from a lack of jobs, fertile land, and water resources. The West has been the driving region of Kazakhstan’s economic development over the past 25 years, where oil and gas enterprises are located. This is where tens of thousands of migrants from all over Kazakhstan and neighboring countries have flocked in recent decades, causing serious social tension, job shortages, and political unrest as it was in December 2017 and January 2022. Notably, it is in this region that Islamic fundamentalist groups, which emerged here back in the 2000s and have repeatedly committed criminal offenses and terrorist attacks, are the strongest.
The second major social fault line in Kazakhstan is urban-rural. The standard of living, accessibility of social services and their quality (education, health care) in cities is much higher than even in the surrounding rural areas. Urban areas have a much higher life expectancy and digital accessibility, while rural schools and hospitals lack qualified personnel. According to the results of national and international testing, the gap in the quality of school education received in the city and the countryside is constantly growing. Today, there are thousands of villages in Kazakhstan with a population of over 500 inhabitants without basic amenities such as schools, paramedic services, or roads that can be used to safely reach a town or regional center in case you need help. All this causes dissatisfaction with living conditions and active urban migration of young people. The share of Kazakhstan’s urban population reached 59% in 2021, but most residents of cities, especially the major metropolitan areas of Almaty, Astana, and Shymkent, are first-generation city dwellers who have not yet fully adapted to the new way of life.
Another fault line is gradually forming between the Kazakh- and Russian-speaking parts of the population. Certainly, Kazakhstan can be classified as one of the countries with the highest proportion of residents who speak Russian (more than 80% of the population), while bilingualism is widespread in the country. According to the 2021 Census of Kazakhstan, 80.1% of the population speaks Kazakh, and 49.3% use it in everyday life. In fact, the country’s population is split in two – half speak Kazakh in everyday life, and the other half mostly use Russian. This split does not clearly run along ethnic lines and is not a division between Russians and Kazakhs. It lies between the Kazakh-speaking Kazakhs and the minority group, which, in addition to Russians, includes representatives of other ethnic groups, as well as a large proportion of Kazakhs for whom Russian is the main communication language.
The differences are not so much about the official status of the language, because the problem is much deeper and more complex. Even many ethnic Kazakhs prefer to use Russian in most areas of life. Kazakhs who know only Kazakh are still in the minority, and Russian-speaking or bilingual people predominate, although the situation is gradually changing. Today 70% of schoolchildren in Kazakhstan already study in Kazakh, and 30% in Russian. However, Kazakh-language schools lag far behind in the quality of teaching. This is confirmed by the results of international testing. In fact, the Russian language in modern Kazakhstan is the only way to get a quality education, a well-paid job and a higher social status. The weak position of the Kazakh language, which has the status of the state language, periodically causes heated political discussions and becomes an excuse for provocations.
The gap between the modernized and Europeanized part of Kazakhstani society and those who are more oriented to traditional norms, largely tied to Islam, is deepening. The appeal to traditions is a defensive reaction of part of Kazakhstani society to the great changes that have been taking place in the country in recent years. Traditionalists argue with supporters of modernization about the role of women in society, attitudes toward minorities, and the future of the Kazakh language. Unlike interregional controversies or urban-rural inequalities, the parties to these disputes may live on the same street, in the same entryway, or in the same stairwell.
Kazakhstan has a difficult and risky path to go through, maneuvering between the interests of the great powers and responding to domestic challenges. The only optimistic conclusion that can be drawn when considering the key social challenges within Kazakhstan is that the fault lines do not run between ethnic groups, although some problems of inter-ethnic relations do exist. These problems are not shared by ethnic groups, but by lifestyles and behaviors that sometimes differ significantly even within the same ethnic group. Perhaps here largely lies the responsibility for the stability of Kazakhstan’s model of inter-ethnic relations and the political system as a whole.
At the same time, the Kazakhstani authorities should not become complacent and think that the threat of political destabilization has passed. On November 18, 2022, in Astana, a closed trial began for the former chairman of the National Security Committee of the Republic (NSC), K. Masimov, who is on trial for treason over the January events. Despite this, it is confident to say that there are very powerful forces within the country that may try to challenge the authorities and seriously destabilize the situation again. K.-J. Tokayev admits it himself: “Unfortunately, even now they are trying to play this dangerous game. This is just a game for them, in which they only care about their imaginary popularity on social networks and their desire to attract the attention of secret sponsors.” The president also added that “ordinary citizens and the interests of the state suffer from this. Therefore, I am sure that such people do not and will not have any political future in Kazakhstan. But it cannot be ruled out that they may become a tool in the hands of various destructive forces trying to destabilize the internal situation.”
A few days before the presidential election, the NSC announced the exposure of another group planning to “seize power in the country.” The march of supporters of the scandalous politician and entrepreneur M. Abiyev in the center of Astana, which took place on the day of inauguration of K.-J. Tokayev on November 26, only confirms that it is still not difficult to collect several thousands of tough young people in the center of any city. I am afraid that January 2022 has opened a Pandora’s box in Kazakhstan, which could be the prologue of big and unexpected troubles.
Under these conditions, stable ties with the closest neighbors, Russia and China, will be critical. Therefore, one should not expect Kazakhstan to drift away from Russia in the coming years, especially since the two countries are largely part of a single economic and social body. At the same time, the policy of multi-vectorism is not leaving the agenda, so the Kazakhstani authorities will strengthen their attempts to get rid of what they consider to be excessive dependence on the Russian economy.
From our partner RIAC
From Disintegration to Cooperation: Kazakhstan’s perspective in Central Asian Integration
The Russia-Ukraine war has underscored the significance of regional integration among the Central Asian states. A cohesive Central Asia could serve as a counterweight to the assertive policies of Russia and the growing influence of China, which regards the region as its sphere of influence. The future of the region hinges on the roles and relations of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan has undergone a remarkable transformation in its foreign policy, shifting from isolationism and authoritarianism to openness and constructive engagement in Central Asia integration. Kazakhstan, on the other hand, has demonstrated a relative indifference towards integration initiatives. Yet, the unity of Central Asia is vital important for the national security of Kazakhstan.
Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Central Asian nations made numerous attempts to establish a cohesive and integrated framework within the region. However, these endeavors proved to be unsuccessful, yielding no tangible outcomes. The failure of Central Asian integration can be attributed to the allure of external actors, most notably Russia, whose involvement has resulted in regional fragmentation. Russia has always opposed the emergence of a centralized and integrated Central Asia. Whenever the Central Asian countries attempted to form an association, Russia either tried to join it or proposed an alternative organization to undermine it. For instance, The Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC) was established in 1993 with the participation of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, and expanded to include Tajikistan in 1998. In 2002, the CAEC transformed into the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO), which admitted Russia as an extra-regional member in 2004, altering the balance of power in the organization. During that period, the member states of the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) concurrently held membership in the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC), which was under the leadership of Moscow. Subsequently, in 2005, the integration efforts among the Central Asian countries, independent from Russia, were terminated under the pretext of duplicated tasks between the two organizations. This development not only paved the way for future challenges but also contributed to disunity within the region. Furthermore, Russia’s strategic maneuvering presented Kazakhstan with irresistible economic and political incentives that overshadowed the potential advantages of intra-regional collaboration. Consequently, Kazakhstan opted to align itself more closely with Russia rather than its neighboring states within Central Asia. As a result of this decision, the other countries in Central Asia gave up their own plans for regional cooperation.
The implementation of this particular policy by Russia has yielded significant outcomes. It is evident that all nations within Central Asia, including Kazakhstan, have become increasingly dependent on Russia. The most critical aspect of this dependence is the import of food products. After Western countries imposed sanctions against Russia, import has dropped slightly: certain goods will now have to be imported from elsewhere. But there are categories of supplies that simply cannot be replaced. On the other hand, Kazakhstan is highly reliant on Russia for its export sector, with 80 per cent of its oil exports passing through the Russian pipeline network. Furthermore, according to experts from Caravan, a Kazakhstani news agency, Russia is the main transit country for the cargo that reaches Kazakhstan. They estimate that more than 70 percent of all cargo that goes to Kazakhstan passes through the territory of Russia. Another 20 percent comes from China. In addition, reliance Kazakhstan’s tenge on Russian ruble is very high. In the first two weeks of Russia’s war in Ukraine, Kazakhstan’s tenge lost 20 percent of its value as the ruble fell against the dollar. In 2022, inflation increased mainly in Kazakhstan. In February 2023, it reached 21.3%.
Indeed, the war in Ukraine has had a significant impact on the perception of Russia in neighboring countries, including Kazakhstan. As Kazakhstan shares a long border with Russia, the deteriorating perception of Russia has raised concerns among the political elite. Additionally, the expanding influence of China in the region poses a serious challenge to the security of Central Asia.
In light of these challenges, Kazakhstan should prioritize the integration of Central Asia in its foreign policy. By forming a united front, Central Asian countries can act as a coherent actor in international relations. The following outlines the upcoming trends in the integration process.
Firstly, the establishment of a robust and autonomous institution, free from the influence of Russia and China, is of utmost importance. This institution should serve as a platform for fostering consistent communication and facilitating cooperation between interstate, intergovernmental, NGOs and SMEs. The current state of mutual collaboration on security issues among Central Asian countries is remarkably limited, resulting in divergent positions on regional security matters, or even an absence of any definitive position. For instance, the countries’ perspectives on the Ukrainian conflict displayed slight variances. Additionally, during the May 2023 summit between China and Central Asian nations held in Xian, China explicitly expressed its desire to improve law enforcement, security and defense capability construction and act as a guarantor against potential threats in the region, yet no official response was conveyed by any of the Central Asian countries. Consequently, it is imperative for Central Asian nations to develop a unified strategy in challenging external pressures posed by Russia, China, and other potential adversaries while asserting their individual sovereignties. By adopting a mutually collective approach, Central Asia can effectively balance and mitigate the risks originating from external sources.
Secondly, intra-regional trade plays a pivotal role in the integration process. Central Asia may not present significant economic attractiveness for Kazakhstan at the moment comparing to EUEA, but in the long term, the region may offer valuable opportunities for Kazakhstan’s development. The development of a common customs tariff among countries can enable them to engage more actively in trade activities. Mutual trade between Central Asian countries has shown positive changes in recent years. Between 2018 and 2022, intra-regional trade grew by 73.4%, rising from $5.8 billion to $10 billion. Kazakhstan is still the leading country in Central Asia in terms of trade, accounting for 80% of the region’s total volume of mutual trade.
Thirdly, the relations between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are crucial for the region’s long-term growth prospects as they shape the regional climate. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have complementary economies. Kazakhstan, with its well-developed industrial sectors, can provide technological expertise and investment opportunities for Uzbekistan, which has a strong agricultural base. On the other hand, Kazakhstan has the opportunity to serve as the primary export market for growing Uzbekistan’s manufacturing products, thereby fostering mutual complementarity in terms of labor supply and demand. By sharing knowledge, resources, and technology, they can promote economic diversification and reduce reliance on a single sector, ensuring sustainable growth for the region. Moreover, the cooperation between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan sets a precedent for other countries in the region. Their ability to work together and find common ground serves as an example for neighboring nations, encouraging them to engage in cooperative efforts as well. Further, this collaboration holds the potential to address regional challenges like water and energy security jointly, establish shared foreign policy positions, particularly towards China and Russia.
Finally, the integration process is significantly influenced by the advancement of transportation and communication systems. Without addressing these problems and establishing mutual access between Central Asian states, efforts for collaboration will prove ineffective. Hence, the countries in the Central Asian region must focus on modernizing their existing transportation infrastructure, including roads and railways. Moreover, they should also prioritize the establishment of new transportation branches such as roadside services, container systems for transportation, and air and rail transport. Additionally, it is essential to develop common points of access to the sea for the Central Asian countries, along with the creation of electronic access infrastructure to facilitate the movement of people and goods.
In summary, the war between Ukraine and Russia has highlighted the need for a shift in the stance of Central Asian countries, particularly Kazakhstan. The deteriorating perception of Russia and the expanding influence of China have raised concerns about the region’s security. Therefore, prioritizing the unity and interests of Central Asia itself is crucial in order to have a stronger presence in international relations and resist assimilation by external powers.
Navigating Kazakhstan’s New Economic Landscape for Foreign Investment
In his recent state-of-the-nation address, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev of Kazakhstan unveiled a comprehensive plan focused on economic reforms and the new economic course for the country. These reforms have vast implications for foreign investment and Kazakhstan’s economic relations with other countries. Among the key points were industrialization, diversification, a move toward green energy, simplification of tax codes, and a focus on transparency and fairness in governance. Collectively, these reform measures signal a proactive approach by Kazakhstan to attract foreign investment and enhance economic ties globally.
The President has wisely understood the necessity of diversification and self-sufficiency. By setting an ambitious task of developing areas like deep processing of metals, oil, gas and coal chemistry, and heavy engineering, Kazakhstan is setting itself up as a lucrative destination for sector-specific investments. At the same time, the stress on accelerating development in the manufacturing sector augments well with global trends where manufacturing is making a strong comeback in the post-COVID period.
Another significant reform targeted at ease of doing business is the simplification of the state procurement process. The focus on the principle of the quality of goods over price and the push toward full automation of procedures will likely reduce red tape and increase transparency, thereby encouraging foreign businesses to participate in state tenders. Simplifying these bureaucratic processes makes Kazakhstan more investor-friendly, a factor often considered by foreign enterprises before venturing into new markets.
The President’s focus on stable economic growth of 6-7 percent with the aim to double the volume of the national economy to $450 billion by 2029 is ambitious but signals a strong commitment to macroeconomic stability, another key indicator scrutinized by foreign investors. Moreover, the proposal to solve the problem of insufficient corporate lending and to unfreeze approximately $5 billion in bank assets for economic turnover indicates a positive move toward increasing the liquidity in the market, which is often a green flag for investors.
Tax reforms aimed at digitalization and simplification, coupled with a reduction in the number of tax types, offer a more straightforward and less cumbersome tax environment. The transition to a service model of interaction between fiscal authorities and taxpayers and the progressive taxation model are steps that align well with the international norms. These adjustments are crucial in creating a conducive environment for foreign investors, who often seek regulatory simplicity and clarity.
Equally crucial is Kazakhstan’s nod toward green and sustainable development. With a focus on renewable energy and even opening up the possibility of a nuclear power plant through a national referendum, Kazakhstan is paving the way for massive investments in sustainable technologies. This is a smart move considering the global trend toward sustainability and the increase in green funds looking for responsible investment opportunities.
Additionally, Kazakhstan’s strategic location as a significant transit hub between Asia and Europe presents an invaluable proposition for foreign investors. The plans to develop the Trans-Caspian route and the North-South Corridor not only help its internal logistics but make it an attractive destination for international companies looking to improve their supply chain efficiencies.
Furthermore, the country’s approach to digitization, with goals to transform into an IT nation, aims to attract high-value foreign investments in technology. The country is looking to increase the export of IT services to $1 billion by 2026 and aims to become a platform for selling computing power to global players. This could attract significant FDI flows into Kazakhstan, especially from countries that are leaders in technology.
To sum up, President Tokayev’s address lays down a blueprint that not only aims for self-sufficiency but also aligns Kazakhstan well with global economic trends. It focuses on making the business environment more straightforward, more transparent, and thereby more attractive to foreign investors. These reforms could very well be a game-changer for Kazakhstan, positioning it as a hotspot for diversified foreign investments and as a key player in regional and global economic alliances.
Navigating Water Conflict in Central Asia: The Amu Darya River and the Qosha Tepa Canal Project
In the post-Soviet era, Central Asia experienced a pronounced upsurge in geopolitical tensions, significantly shifting the focus toward the pressing matter of the water conflict between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. At the crux of this contentious issue lies the Amu Darya River, a pivotal water resource shared by both nations, thereby engendering profound environmental and geopolitical ramifications. The origins of this protracted conflict can be traced back to the historical legacy of centralized water management during the Soviet period, which resulted in disproportionate repercussions for downstream countries. The subsequent emergence of independent nations following the Soviet Union’s dissolution further complicated the situation as each sought to assert sovereignty over water resources, exacerbating existing complexities. The intricate nature of the dispute is compounded by the shrinking of the Aral Sea, divergent irrigation practices, and conflicting plans for hydropower development. These multifaceted factors underscore the urgent imperative to seek a resolution and necessitate heightened international collaboration and diplomatic endeavors between Afghanistan and Central Asian countries.
The Amu Darya, the longest river in Central Asia, originates from the Hindu Kush and Wakhan regions in the Pamir Highlands of Afghanistan. Spanning an impressive 2,540 kilometers, it courses its way to the Aral Sea, traversing through Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan before finally reaching its destination. The section of the Amu Darya Basin above its confluence with the Pamir River is known as Panj. The Panj River meets with the Vakhsh River, which originates in Kyrgyzstan’s Alai region, to form the Amu Darya.
Running along the northern borders of Afghanistan and its neighboring countries, the Amu Darya stretches approximately 1800 kilometers from Zor-Kul to Khamaab. This river serves as a vital water source for agriculture in the region, especially in Afghanistan. It’s estimated that around 6 million hectares of land in total are irrigated by the Amu Darya. Of this, Afghanistan upstream utilizes 1.15 million hectares for agriculture. Downstream, Turkmenistan holds the largest irrigation territory, using the waters of the Amu Darya to irrigate 1.7 million hectares of land, followed by Uzbekistan with 2.3 million hectares. While the Amu Darya plays a crucial role in providing water for agricultural purposes, its drainage varies among the countries it flows through. In Tajikistan, the river drains approximately 0.5 million hectares of land upstream, whereas, in the Kyrgyz Republic, this figure is significantly lower, at just 0.1 million hectares. Overall, the Amu Darya stands as a lifeline for the region, supporting livelihoods and economic activities through its extensive network of irrigation and contributing significantly to the prosperity of Afghanistan and its neighboring nations.
The water distribution from the Amu Darya River, stemming from regulations during the Soviet era, primarily focuses on meeting agricultural demands. A crucial development in this regard was the ratification of Protocol 566 by the former USSR, which outlined the allocation of water among the four Central Asian Republics (Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and the Kyrgyz Republic). Following their independence in 1991, these republics signed a subsequent agreement known as the Almaty Agreement, which retained the water allocation quotas specified in Protocol 566. To manage the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya rivers, the Central Asian Republics (CARs) established several organizations and institutions.
However, it’s important to highlight that Afghanistan was not part of these regional agreements at that time. The exclusion of Afghanistan from these agreements posed a challenge to achieving comprehensive water management in the region, given its significant stake in the Amu Darya basin. As a vital stakeholder, Afghanistan’s involvement in water allocation and management decisions is crucial for ensuring equitable and sustainable water usage across the region. On March 30, 2022, Mulla Abdul Ghani Baradar, the deputy prime minister of the current Afghan government, made an official announcement regarding the commencement of the Qosh Tepeh Canal’s construction. The Qosh Tepa canal is being built in Balkh province and will draw water from the Amu Darya. The construction of the canal is planned to be carried out in three phases, spanning a period of five years. Covering a distance of 285 kilometers, the canal will have a width of 152 meters and a depth of 8.5 meters.
As Afghanistan embarks on developing the Qosh Tepeh Canal to enhance its water infrastructure, concerns arise not only about the potential impacts on the country’s water supply and irrigation but also about the implications for neighboring countries that rely on the waters of the Amu Darya River. The project’s scale and its potential effects on regional water flow and availability are areas of particular attention for both Afghanistan and its neighboring nations, as they strive to strike a balance between their development needs and the responsible management of shared water resources.
The Taliban has set forth a plan to transform an extensive 550,000 hectares of arid desert into fertile farmland to address the pressing need for agricultural resources in Afghanistan. Currently, Kabul receives a significant 7 cubic kilometers of water from the Amu Darya basin, but they aspire to increase this amount to a total of 17 cubic kilometers. However, this ambition comes with potential consequences for neighboring countries, particularly Uzbekistan, whose water supply is predicted to decrease by around 10% to 15%. While Tajikistan may not experience a substantial impact on its primary water source, the implications for Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are undeniable. In a worst-case scenario, the lower regions of the river, such as Karakalpakstan and Khorezm, could face severe hardships.
Uzbekistan’s water availability is already diminishing due to the combined pressures of climate change and widespread drought, resulting in an unfortunate 15% water loss. If the proposed canal exacerbates this situation, Uzbekistan might encounter an additional 10% reduction, leading to a concerning total loss of 25% of their water resources. As such, the project’s potential consequences raise serious concerns about the delicate balance of water resources in the region and the need for careful consideration and collaboration among all stakeholders to ensure sustainable water management.
Although Afghanistan has made rapid progress in creating the canal, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have decided to keep silent about it and have not yet made any public statements. A group from Uzbekistan visited Afghanistan on March 22, 2023, with the aim to discuss problems pertaining to the two countries’ economic relationship. The “Trans-Afghan project,” which includes building the Termez-Mazar-i-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar railroad and installing an electrical line along the Surkhan-Puli Khumri route, was at the center of the negotiations. Although the Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a formal statement noting the negotiations discussing collaboration in the water-related and energy industries, no specific comments regarding the building of the canal were mentioned in the official statement.
Consequently, Uzbekistan wishes to keep its interactions with the Taliban peaceful for the time being. However, Farkhod Tolipov, a political analyst based in Tashkent, warned in the Eurasianet that if a dangerous scenario emerged in relation to the canal’s development, Uzbekistan would undoubtedly defend its national objectives. Furthermore, The World Bank has stated that if no action takes place, severe droughts and storms in Central Asia are predicted to cause economic losses of up to 1.3 percent of its gross domestic product annually, while the yields of crops are anticipated to decline by 30 percent by 2050, resulting in approximately 5.1 million climate migrants by that point in time.
It’s important to keep in mind that geopolitical dynamics may be complicated and that nations frequently take into account a variety of considerations when determining how to react to developments in their region. It is possible to understand Uzbekistan’s negligent attitude toward the construction of the Qosha Tepa Channel in Afghanistan by carefully examining the many factors that influence the country’s actions. Diplomatic, geopolitical, and domestic issues are among the numerous variables that influence Uzbekistan’s attitude toward this cross-border development project and are interconnected with one another.
Amid a widespread consensus among experts about the paramount importance of water as a crucial resource for the future, there is growing concern and speculation about its potential use as a potent political tool. An alarming report from the reputable “Global Water Intelligence” magazine underscores the significance of water in today’s world by revealing that the financial gains within the water market over a single year can rival the staggering sums allocated to military expenses. As global water scarcity and competition for this finite resource intensify, countries with abundant water resources, like Uzbekistan, find themselves increasingly cognizant of the geopolitical implications and potential vulnerabilities surrounding water management.
Additionally, complaints about infrastructure and water supplies are only two examples of international problems that are best handled through diplomatic channels. To prevent worsening relations with Afghanistan, Uzbekistan may decide without making a public statement about the development of the Qosha Tepa Channel. As a result, they may favor undercover diplomacy to have a productive conversation with Afghan officials. Uzbekistan can express its worries about potential effects on shared water supplies, environmental effects, and any violations of earlier agreements about water consumption and administration through diplomatic measures. Maintaining diplomatic channels may promote goodwill and develop an environment favorable to conflict settlement.
Furthermore, given the intricate geopolitical landscape and delicate inter-state relations in Central Asia, Uzbekistan finds itself treading a careful and nuanced path to ensure that its response to the construction of the Qosha Tepa Channel in Afghanistan does not inadvertently give rise to perceptions of interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs. Uzbekistan is keenly aware that any misstep or overly assertive reaction could potentially strain diplomatic relations and undermine the fragile equilibrium in the region. Striking a delicate balance between voicing justifiable concerns about the channel’s implications and upholding Afghanistan’s sovereignty and independence becomes paramount for Uzbekistan’s foreign policy objectives in the context of regional peace and cooperation initiatives.
Another assumption in the context of the situation might be the fact that the country must carefully assess the significance of the Qosha Tepa Channel project in comparison to its ongoing domestic issues to determine the order in which national objectives should take precedence, as Uzbekistan faces lots of pressing challenges and national priorities. Although the project’s potential effects should not be discounted seriously, Uzbekistan may give priority to domestic infrastructure, welfare programs, and economic development initiatives that directly benefit its inhabitants. For sustaining internal equilibrium and taking care of critical requirements within its own boundaries, this practical approach is crucial.
In conclusion, the fate of Central Asia and its water resources lies in the hands of its nations, united in their pursuit of sustainable cooperation. By engaging in comprehensive discussions that transcend borders and political boundaries, Central Asian countries, including Afghanistan, can demonstrate their commitment to a shared vision of prosperity and harmony. Embracing the principles of transparency, fairness, and equitable water management, they can unleash the true potential of these vital waterways, transforming them from potential flashpoints into enduring symbols of regional unity. This transformative endeavor is a testament to the power of collaboration as Central Asia forges ahead, hand in hand, towards a future where water resources flow not as causes of discord but as conduits of shared progress and prosperity for generations to come.
Economy4 days ago
International Forum for China’s Belt and Road and the Six Economic Corridors Projects
Americas4 days ago
Quad foreign ministers meet in New York for the third time
World News4 days ago
India’s Canadian riddle
Green Planet3 days ago
Sustainability in the Age of Climate Change: Demography, Resources, and Action
Defense3 days ago
Pakistan-Turkey Defense Ties and Policy Options
World News4 days ago
UN: A divided world faces a huge number of problems
Terrorism3 days ago
Al-Assad -Xi Jinping: Confronting Turkestan Islamic Party and its relations with ISIS
World News3 days ago
The Alliance of Sahel States