Russia – Iran Bilateral and Regional Relations after the Invasion of Iraq

The convergence between Russia and Iran started in the second half of the Gorbachev era. Gorbachev, who supported Iran and then Iraq alternately during the Iran-Iraq War, openly approached Iran in July 1987. Relations between the two countries strengthened in June 1989 when Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani visited Moscow and signed a series of important bilateral agreements, including one on military cooperation. The military agreement allowed Iran to purchase highly sophisticated military aircraft from Moscow, including MIG-29s and SU-24s.

 At the time, Iran was in dire need of Soviet military equipment because its air fleet was so worn out from eight years of war with Iraq that it could not even ask the United States for spare parts, let alone new aircraft. By the summer of 1995, Russia and Iran had established what the Russian ambassador to Iran had begun to call a strategic relationship. With the first Chechen war ongoing and Washington pushing for NATO expansion, Russian nationalists saw a closer relationship with Iran as a counterweight. As an article in the Segodnia newspaper in May 1995 put it:

“Cooperation with Iran is more than just a question of money and orders for the Russian atomic industry. Today a hostile Tehran could cause a great deal of unpleasantness for Russia in the North Caucasus and in Tajikistan if it were to really set its mind to supporting the Muslim insurgents with weapons, money and volunteers. On the other hand, a friendly Iran could become an important strategic ally in the future.

“NATO’s expansion eastward is making Russia look around hurriedly for at least some kind of strategic allies. In this situation, the anti-Western and anti-American regime in Iran would be a natural and very important partner. Armed with Russian weapons, including the latest types of sea mines, torpedoes and anti-ship missiles, Iran could, if necessary, completely halt the passage of tankers through the Strait of Hormuz, thereby dealing a serious blow to the haughty West in a very sensitive spot. If, in such a crisis, Russian fighter planes and anti-aircraft missile complexes were to shield Iran from retaliatory strikes by American carrier-based aircraft and cruise missiles, it would be extremely difficult to ‘open’ the Gulf without getting into a large-scale and very costly ground war.” [1]

Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, relations between Tehran and Moscow have been analyzed from different perspectives. Some have therefore emphasized the ideological closeness between Russia and Iran to highlight the danger of technological coordination, especially in the areas of security, nuclear, space and military technology. Others have emphasized the fragility of this relationship, suggesting that mutual distrust will continue to have deep roots, although it is unlikely to explode anytime soon. From a regional perspective, there is the possibility of conflicting interests, but in the Middle East and Central Asia, the two actors have an important geopolitical need for each other.

Energy and Economic Cooperation

The easing of sanctions against Iran by Russia in 2015 provided an opportunity for Russia and Iran to strengthen political economy ties in the areas of oil and gas production and electricity generation, and to cooperate in regional integration and transportation initiatives. Iran and Russia are two influential actors in the system in terms of hydrocarbon reserves. In addition, Iran’s largely untapped natural gas reserves rank second in the world after Russia and both countries are among the top ten countries in terms of oil reserves. Given their status as potential competitors, Russia and Iran appear to be two competitive actors in the energy market.

Iran and Russia used to export to different markets. Iran’s oil exports were almost forced to restrict their energy trade to China due to US sanctions, which were reintroduced in 2018. Russia, on the other hand, prioritized exports to Europe, but after the February Occupation, Russia appears to be turning East. Indeed, the Russia-Ukraine Crisis and Iran’s incompatible situation with the West increased the interdependence of the two actors and led to a shift to the East.

In 2021, Europe was the destination of more than half of Russian oil exports, while China accounted for less than a third. Many European countries have moved to reduce their dependence on Russian energy after the invasion of Ukraine. Russia has sought new markets, including China. There is a parenthesis to be opened here, that in Energy Diplomacy, as in Traditional Diplomacy, interests are more at the forefront of global energy relations than in Energy Diplomacy. However, Russia and Iran have dramatically fulfilled the challenge to the West to limit their room for maneuver in the system. While this may further promote their rapprochement, it will be short-lived.

Military and Regional Relations

Perhaps the most significant difference in the recent cooperation between Iran and Russia in the face of historical hostility is in military and defense matters. The USSR’s support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war raises many doubts that still persist today. Russia’s concern about turning its back on Iran in its own interests will persist for some time to come. On the other hand, for the actors opposed to Iran. Iran-Russia military cooperation is a hot topic in the foreign policy agenda of many regional and global actors. Turkey and Israel are the most prominent among them. The militia elements in Lebanon and their support for the Assad regime in Syria pose serious problems for both Turkey and Israel. Therefore, it is possible to say that the two actors are trying to create a regional balance of power against Iran and Russia.  

Without their support, President Assad could not have remained in power. Iran’s ambitions for regional hegemony and to counter Saudi Arabia’s strength in the Middle East require Assad’s survival.[2] The war in Syria has provided the conditions for Iran-Russia relations to evolve from a convergence of interests to a more robust regional partnership. However, while common interests are evolving towards greater goals, they are likely to take on a new dimension with the multipolar approach and the construction of Asian Regionalism.

Conclusion

While the analysis of Iran-Russia relations over the regions is analyzed through the different demands of the actors and regional dynamics, the concern of Saudi Arabia’s strengthening in the Middle East, Israel’s being an effective enemy in the Shiite Crescent, and the risk of Turkey’s presence for Iran’s militia forces in Syria and Iraq allow us to see that Iran meets with Russia as a result of similar common interests. Iran, which suffered a serious loss of motivation with the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, gains from its efforts to rise in the region with the Russian perspective, deepening its losses in its struggle in the Middle East. Tehran, which has strengthened ties with Moscow in the face of Western sanctions, is compromising its sovereignty in bilateral and organizational contexts for the sake of making gains in different areas within the framework of mutual military initiatives. Nevertheless, Latakia, one of Russia’s major ports in the Mediterranean, provides Russia with gains in the region under Iran’s shield. Although there is strategic interdependence, the same situation in the Central Asian geography is different between Russian Eurasianism and Iran’s religious geopolitics efforts. While the common ground of this situation is the effort to prevent the concretization of the idea of Turanism, there are two different fronts for the Turkic States. Turkey’s and China’s actions in the region turn Central Asia into a regional battleground, leading to a clash of interests. The nuclear crisis and their interactions in different dimensions give Russia and Iran significant advantages, but it also raises the issue that they will not be able to achieve equal gains in their regional relations. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the ongoing Mahsa Amini protests appear to be exhausting the two actors’ domestic and foreign policies and weakening their capacities.


[1] Pavel Felgengauer, “Russian society is arriving at a consensus on the question of national interests,” translated in CDPSP, vol. 47, no. 21 (June 21, 1995), p. 3

[2] Nasielski, K. (2017, April 17). Disrupting the Russian-Iranian Rapprochement. American Security Project: https://www.americansecurityproject.org/disrupting-the-russian-iranian-rapprochement/

Erkan Sahin
Erkan Sahin
Selcuk University, Department of International Relations. He is interested in African Politics of Non-Continental Actors, Turkish and Russian Foreign Policy, Historical Sociology in IR and Counter-Terrorism,