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Factors Influencing the World Order’s Structure

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Study the historian before you begin to study the facts” – Edward H. Carr

International relations are unfolding against the backdrop of a war more than ever before. The collapse of US supremacy and Western efforts to consolidate a liberal order following the Cold War brought on a crisis in the globalized economy and the welfare state, making it hard to rely on the international order’s stabilization. This means identifying factors shaping the future world order. For each of the great powers – in our case Russia – the present-day situation requires a foreign policy adaptable to constantly emerging new challenges.

The new global order will not reflect Western countries’ underlying internal order

The emerging international order, in its very structure, shows no sign of a leading power capable of acting jointly as a dominant military and economic force. Great powers like the United States, Russia, China and India, are not cooperating. They never shared the same world order view (let alone their respective domestic ones). So far, the United States and several Western European countries are pursuing a revolutionary policy about the outside world and constitute the biggest challenge to the prospects of international order stability. Such states embarked on a disquieting path of breakthrough changes in fundamental issues that form the social, gender, and consequently political structure of societies. Due to the cultural and mental gap between the West and the Rest, other civilizations consider this path a challenge resulting in rejection.

We cannot claim that other great powers fully share an understanding of the basics of justice at the domestic level. Even if Russia and China seem to agree on principles underlying a “proper” world order, they do not see eye-to-eye on internal arrangements. This also holds true for India and Iran. While their conservative values are at odds with Western ones, they fail to build unity among themselves.

For the first time, the new international order will not reflect the underlying internal order in the leading countries. This is of vital importance since we have no way of knowing how relations between these countries will develop, or how new values will replace traditional ones. If the current unfolding internal order in the West requires expansion in addition to recognition, as was the case in revolutionary France, Bolshevik Russia, or Nazi Germany, the future will be very alarming.

We cannot expect either powerful countries sharing a similar world vision (albeit with conflicts of interest) will emerge, as was the case during the 18th to 19th centuries. Historical analogies are not appropriate here. The new international system will neither resemble the last European balance of power politics, nor the bipolar international order of the Cold War period, and even less so the unipolar liberal world order existing since 1991. This is all the more true given that Western countries have not demonstrated the required flexibility to put up with different ideas about values adopted in other states. Should they show greater signs of acceptance, it could form the basis for relative stability.

The disintegration of international institutions brings new alliance possibilities

The erasure of the West’s power monopoly in international politics will not only cause a change in leadership but a revision of global institutions and rules, with the post-WWII order ceasing to exist. Despite including the Soviet Union and China, the UN system remains a product of Western dominance in global politics based on unique military capabilities. The approaching era will be defined by a new order. Which actors will be a part of it, and to what extent, remains to be seen.
The most optimistic scenario is that there will be several opposing camps on the world stage, each capable of operating autonomously. A Sino-Russian alliance opposing the West is plausible but perhaps unlikely as it goes against the democratization of international politics. However, if this alliance does occur, it will require a long period of redefining borders of influence affecting economic relations, trade, finance, the high-tech industry and global health.

… as well as enhanced nuclear risks

The collapse of the international order’s formal and informal foundations is taking place in an environment where the driving principle between the great powers is not respect for norms, but the possibility of mutually guaranteed destruction (MAD). This supplants every historically known way of maintaining peace. The MAD doctrine is particularly visible between the United State and Russia. Identifying informal rules with the chance that nuclear weapons will be fired will be our era’s most challenging task. The emergence of such a relationship is already perceptible between Russia and the US, and China is likely to join practical efforts in this area. However, it remains to be seen if membership for countries with lower nuclear stockpile levels than Russia or the US should be included in the nuclear club. French or British nuclear weapons do not pose an existential threat to Russia, but can evidently cause significant damage and trigger escalations.

Formalizing the boundaries of the mutual damage inflicted by nuclear superpowers is extremely difficult. The global economic interdependence and the exposure of technology to possible cyber-attacks may be used as a weapon without entering traditional military actions. In the early weeks of the Ukrainian crisis, experts feared Western economic sanctions against Russia would trigger an escalation of the highest magnitude. Another high-risk alternative was the use of cyber weapons on a scale potentially leading to nuclear escalation. Thankfully this has been avoided. Parties are trying to gradually determine a course of action that does not involve threatening mankind’s survival.

Hopes that these rules will stabilize the new international order are far-fetched. It would moreover be wishful thinking to believe that leading states will manage to formally set boundaries. This will greatly reduce the power of diplomacy. It is also worth underlining that Western countries – the most militarily and economically advanced part of the international community – are connected by mutual obligations. Such reliability in times of conflict is subject to interpretation, yet the following question remains unanswered: “Will the US sacrifice Washington for Paris (not to say Warsaw)?” If, for instance, nuclear powers formally agreed that the only reason to strike is because of a direct threat to other’s territory, NATO would lose much of its rationale.

Great powers, inevitably, could potentially be drawn by their junior allies into an escalation as a result. Incidentally, this also applies to bilateral relations between allies. What scale of a military clash between the US and China would prompt Russian intervention? The same question applies to potential conflicts between Russia and America’s European allies, or China and Japan. Not to mention that, over time, Russia and China may also have binding ally obligations. The coming years may show increased regional crises including the great powers on the one hand, and medium-sized powers on the other.

The permissible use of force between nuclear powers and middle-sized states is another complicated matter to consider. US-Iran relations traditionally teetered on the brink of conflict. Fifteen years ago, the United States could defeat Iran militarily, but today, the latter has Russian and Chinese support. Victory with the use of conventional weapons alone is hence very doubtful. Furthermore, the complex relationship between Moscow and Ankara should be considered. Relations so far have been friendly, but should a major military conflict arise, it is unclear whether Moscow can comfortably win without resorting to its unique military capabilities. As the West is becoming less capable of controlling the rest of the world, these conflicts will become more widespread. Especially since Russia or China are not able to offer an alternative in terms of authority and, most importantly, effectiveness comparable to the American one.

The admissible limit of use of force, as the principal condition for a relatively sustainable international order, is quite hard to define, however clear it may be that mutual destruction is both contradictory to human nature and irrational to achieve political objectives. This is the main paradox of international politics with which we will have to deal in the years to come as great powers will have to balance their political ambitions with the possibility of fulfilling them without the risk of mutual destruction. The Russia-NATO clash over Ukraine is one of many including this choice.

The Global South’s interests will be a weighing geopolitical factor in the years to come

In all other aspects, our world’s future looks less daunting than the various concerns so prominent in our time. Most relate to problems of primary importance for the developed Western states but have little effect on the rest of the world when compared to the development objectives of non-Western countries.

First, the continuing democratization of the global political environment inspires optimism. In the future, great powers will need to move beyond the habit of authoritarian governance and its inherent arrogance towards medium and even small countries. The fact that, in the context of the conflict between Russia and the West, the vast majority of developing countries chose to act based on their selfish aspirations is indicative of their confidence in their government’s stability. Participation or non-participation in an ongoing conflict is now determined by countries’ stakes should they choose to weaken one of the opposing sides. For US allies, weakening or defeating Russia is objectively a rational choice. For the rest of the world, the war’s unfolding will mean a shift in the global balance of power rather than a personal bet.

By avoiding conflict with Russia, many countries believe its success will not weaken the West to the point where its actions will become unpredictable and cause direct military clashes between the West and Russia, endangering mankind’s survival. It is unlikely that the West suffers a defeat. However, the fact that the West’s weakening is not a threat for some already indicates internal expectations for such a turn of events and, in some cases, the desirability of such a turn of events.

Restoring Western countries’ ability to partially determine the actions of other states without direct pressure no longer stands. This begs the question of how sufficient the effect of repressive measures can be compared to the goals they pursue.

Second, due to internal and external factors, there has been a reduction in the quantity of the resources available to the West on which it depended to maintain its dominance in the global system. A core reason why most developing countries are showing restraint about Russia’s actions in Ukraine is the West’s inability to respond to these countries’ resource demands for development challenges. The power of resources in the geopolitical competition was notably seen in the success of US relations with China in the 1970s. It was the only country able to offer China economic opportunities giving the green light to Deng Xiaoping’s ambitious economic reforms. Today, in contrast, the West is not able to offer developing countries alternatives. What’s more, in the Indian case, development targets have either been reached or do not pose threats to the survival of the political system.

Are alternatives possible? Which ones?

In the last decade, China began acting as a development player with both the Belt and Road Initiative and the Community of Common Destiny of 2013. The sustainability of these models remains unclear, but proposals are boosting small and medium-sized countries’ level of confidence. As the most populous countries on the planet, China and India reached relatively sustainable growth levels linked to their foreign policy independence. Others now follow that path.

Under a new international order, no single great power will be resourceful enough to use foreign policy as a tool to promote medium and small economies. The ability of countries to engage in development-oriented partnerships and overcome the earlier-mentioned challenges will be the strongest factor in determining their significance on the new global stage. Most likely, Europe will be the only region with clear piding lines and institutional control over medium and small countries. Despite this, however, the future of the European Union can face hurdles, which is now Germany and France’s most important tool of control over their weaker partners. In other world regions, competition will be more democratic and will not predetermine political choices. Western countries, along with China, India and Russia will be on a relatively level playing field, enabling them to maximize their independence from other countries’ ideological positions.

The accelerated degradation of international institutions will be another marker of the post-Western world, perceivable in the global economic shock following the wide-scale economic sanctions on Russia by the West. As economic impact measures keep expanding, governments and companies will lose faith in the very rules and institutions created to maintain and preserve the liberal world order. As a result, the entire global economic infrastructure will be in a dynamic state.

Western countries are likely to rely on direct pressure and sanctions to influence other states, underscoring how economic wars have become a new reality in the same way conventional wars used to be. A country’s ability to manage economic wars to safeguard national stability will soften these wars’ impact.

A collective solution to our climate crisis looks unlikely. In recent years European measures to limit the man-made impact on climate raised doubts as to how they can serve other economic interests of the West. The climate agenda was already combining measures of coercion and goodwill. Now the political basis for cooperation in this area is vanishing. This does not imply actions will not be taken at the national level but will no longer benefit a “common” agenda for self-serving interests. The most pressing issues likely are addressed through national actions and equal benefits going forward.

Smaller countries (which emerged during the decolonization era and the collapse of the bipolar system in 1991) will be key going forward. Their future relied on a US-led liberal world order and the benefits provided by globalization. But they have now come under pressure.

First, over the past decades, many were unable to create sociopolitical systems resistant to internal challenges. Having reaped liberal world order benefits enabled them to hide problems behind a façade of reform and confidence. But such opportunities are drying up. The developing countries in Asia, where political regimes were less susceptible to the disease of imitating Western institutions, are in a more privileged position. This problem is more acute in Africa, some regions of Latin America and the former Soviet space. Middle Eastern countries will face the problem of continued religious revival, for instance in Afghanistan if the Taliban succeeds in stabilizing the domestic situation.

Second, pressure on small countries will come from outside. Superpower competition will benefit them as a result of maneuvering and receiving resources from multiple sources, but will also create political and military risks. Since nuclear powers will want to avoid confrontation, they will likely operate via the territories of small countries to deal with one another. Finally, small countries will become an object of pressure from medium-sized countries, which will find this necessary due to their survival concerns. Under these circumstances, only a few small countries can expect to survive by piggybacking on their strong ties with the great powers.

The future international order will be the least integral of anything we have ever seen. Its integrity will stem from new factors, the specific content of which we are already beginning to see now and will be studying during the tumultuous years to come.

From our partner RIAC

PhD in Political Science, Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club; Academic supervisor of the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies, HSE University, RIAC Member

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International Law

Why International Institutions Survive: An Afterword to the G20 Summit

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Media Center G20 Indonesia/Prastyo Utomo/wsj/hd/22.

We, of course, are extremely critical of the very idea of global institutions and the prospects for their survival amid the emergence of a qualitatively new international order. Basic ideas about how such organisations appear and why they work, as well as the practical experience of the past decades, constantly demonstrate how unprepared such forms of interaction between states turn out to be to solve their most important hypothetical task — limiting selfish manifestations in the behaviour of their own creators. However, the institutions persist and, moreover, their number is increasing due to the formation of new specific regional platforms and global gatherings of powers, which is happening both formally and informally.

Just a few days ago, another G20 summit took place in Indonesia — a meeting of the 20 supposedly most developed powers. These economies first convened 13 years ago to discuss the fight against the global consequences of the financial crisis in Western countries. This association is not a formal international organisation, unlike the UN or the World Trade Organization, and does not have its own secretariat or specialised agencies. However, in its composition, the G20 has turned out to be one of the most promising institutional undertakings of the entire post-Cold War period.

The reason is that the G20, first, is quite objective in terms of participation criteria and, second, is completely non-democratic in terms of the formation of its membership. In the simplest terms, it was created by the leading powers of the West — the G7 countries — at a historical moment when they felt the need to make their decisions more legitimate, to gain a new way to influence growing economies, and, finally, share some of their own economic difficulties with the rest of the world not only in fact, but also organisationally.

Other countries of the world included in the G20 list compiled by the USA and Britain were glad to accept this invitation. First of all, because they saw an opportunity to limit the West’s monopoly on making the most important decisions, or, at least, to get new chances to reflect some of their interests there. Thus, both groups of participants made a very pragmatic choice amid circumstances where the West was still strong enough that no one could expect to survive without its consent.

The G20, as we can see, was created for special purposes in special circumstances, which, by the way, also applies to any international institution set up during the second half of the 20th and early 21st century. Even the United Nations (UN) was an intellectual creation of the United States and Britain, aimed to preserve and strengthen their influence on international affairs after the World War II. Another thing is that the UN still tried to live its own life, and now the presence of Russia and China in its “Areopagus”, i.e. among the permanent members of the Security Council, creates the appearance that the hypothetical pinnacle of world governance relatively adequately reflects the distribution of aggregate power capabilities. However, during the Cold War, as now, we see that all really important issues regarding war and peace are decided by the great powers among themselves.

As for the impact on the main processes in the world that emerged after the end of the Cold War, here it was the G20 that was considered a suitable palliative solution juxtaposed between the omnipotence of the West and the desire of the rest to get at least a part of the “pie” of the global distribution of goods. Moreover, 14 years ago, when the G20 began to meet, none of the major countries of the modern World Majority imagined a direct confrontation with the West and all sought to integrate into the globalisation led by it, even without a special revision of the rules and norms that existed there before. This fully applies to Russia, which quite sensibly assessed its strength. There were still five years left before the ambitious Xi Jingping came to power in China, when most observers considered the strengthening of Beijing’s economic and political proximity to be the most plausible scenario for Sino-American relations.

However, it was the financial crisis of 2008-2013 that turned out to be a turning point, from which everyone seemed to have realised that it is not necessary to count on the existing model of globalisation to solve the basic problems of development and economic growth. The cyclicality of economic development and the accumulated imbalances in trade, global finance and everything else made it clear that a return to sustainable growth in the US and Europe was unrealistic, and saving what had already been created would require a much tougher policy in relation to the distribution of benefits on a global scale. The emerging economies, of which China quickly took the lead, could expect a more sustainable position, but also doubted the West’s ability to act as a benevolent engine of the global economy. In other words, it was at the very moment when the G20 emerged as an institution that the leading states realised that it was no longer possible to save globalisation in its previous form, and economic shocks would very likely lead to violent geopolitical clashes.

Therefore, the extremely informal and, at the same time, representative G20 arose precisely as a mechanism for a “civilised divorce” of countries actively involved in globalisation on the eve of its inevitable crisis.

In this respect, it was indeed the pinnacle of the institutional approach to problem-solving that marked the entire 20th century. What follows should be either the formation of a new balance of power and the adaptation of institutions to it, or their complete disintegration with an unclear prospect for states going beyond bilateral agreements or relatively narrow regional associations and forums.

We see that the most successful multilateral projects of our time are either a continuation of those that have already taken place, like ASEAN or NATO, or completely new regional groupings with uncertain prospects and internal structures. The promising Shanghai Cooperation Organisation should be included among the latter. The latest SCO summit in Uzbekistan revealed that its participants were highly able to single out from the whole set of international problems of Eurasia and their own development issues those that make sense to discuss at the multilateral level. In addition, Sino-Russian leadership in the SCO leaves hope that other participating countries will be able to build their interests into the priorities and integrity limits of the two Eurasian giants. India only adds pluralism, allowing alternatives to the increasingly solidarity positions of Moscow and Beijing to be put forward.

However, the fact that the G20 is, in reality, a tool for the civilised dismantling of the existing order rather than their renewal does not mean its immediate death. After all, we already know examples where organisations created to “divorce” participants retain their vitality beyond solving the most important problems associated with this unpleasant process. The latest G20 summit was overshadowed by the desire of the Western countries, which, together with their satraps from the European Union institutions, make up the majority, to turn the political part of the meeting into a fight against Russia. However, at the same time, we saw that the Indonesian presidency used such intentions to increase its independence in world affairs and rejected all Western claims regarding Russian participation. In addition, an important personal meeting between the leaders of the United States and China took place on the sidelines of the summit, which allowed them to temporarily dispel the expectation of an inevitable clash, which seemed likely only three months ago.

Of course, we are far from thinking that China, India or other developing countries, not to mention Russia, see the G20 as a way to take global leadership away from the West. In Moscow, Beijing, New Delhi and other capitals, they know that those institutions that do not fully meet American interests are easily sacrificed to the current circumstances. However, first, such a radical US approach still has a chance to change under increasing pressure from outside and inside. Second, the G20 is still a platform that can survive as at least a club filled with contradictions, precisely amid the complete decline of formal global international institutions. And it looks like we won’t have to wait very long.

From our partner RIAC

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International Law

Cooperation in a Changing World: A Discussion on New Regionalism and Globalisation

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The two main trends that have shaped the World Economic Order are 1) multilateralism, which sets global rules for international trade without favouritism, and 2) new regionalism, which sets up several zones of regional free trade and cooperation that can apply development and economic growth more quickly and flexibly but have a limited geographic scope.

Hettne (1995) says that “new regionalism” is not a single policy but a set of policies that focus on economics or other factors. “Regionalism” refers to a complex change process involving state and non-state actors at the global, regional, and national levels. Since actors and processes interact at many different levels and their relative importance changes over time and space, it is impossible to say which level is the most important (Soderbaun, 2001).

This article highlights the discussions between the experts on regional cooperation and integration and the supporters of multilateralism and globalisation. The objective is not to extend arguments that can be endless due to rich literature, however, it is to show the major points of contention that can lead to more research and discussions.

Gilson (2002) and other scholars argue that regionalism divides the international system into different and separated competitive blocks, despite arguments to the contrary from authors and analysts like Hettne (1998, 2005), Beeson (2009), and Dent (2004). Regionalism, especially forms of closed regionalism, acts as an obstacle on the path to globalisation (Dent, 2008).

Authors in the first category argue that globalisation and regionalism are not mutually exclusive concepts. Their reasoning rests on the GATT-WTO conception of regionalism and regionalisation as integral to and predating globalisation. As of 2022, the WTO had informed about 356 Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) in force (and its predecessor, the GATT), while several others are thought to be in effect but have yet to be reported (see: WTO, 2022 database).

 Regional trade liberalisation and cooperation arrangements have been considered important intermediate measures, enabling nations to cope with the risks and opportunities of the global market and embrace new multilateral regulations (Katzenstein, 1997). The developing tensions between economic regionalism and economic multilateralism directly result from the mutually reinforcing nature of regionalism and globalisation. As seen with the end of the Uruguay Round, when integration into the EU prompted some member states to adopt the GATT deal, and with NAFTA’s significant impact on the liberalisation of investments, regional cooperation can be a good stepping stone to an accessible international economy. According to Summers (1991), regionalism affects the multilateral international trade system and will increasingly serve as a driving factor towards liberalisation. Summers contends that regional liberalisation is the best approach towards liberalisation and globalisation.

In contrast, the second category of experts’ places greater emphasis on the notion that discriminatory regional and sub-regional accords are a response to globalisation. As an example, Bhagwati (1993) argues that protectionism, mercantilism and other regionalism delay global liberalisation and threaten the multilateral trading system. Bergsten (1997) says that the European Monetary Union (EMU) shows how it sets priorities that differ from those of the world. Furthermore, regional blocs can contribute to geo-economics conflicts, which may have political implications.

Three key issues are raised by those who want complete dependence on the multilateral approach (Bhagwati and Panagariya, 1996):

  1. Trade is diverted by regional cooperation.
  2. The distraction of attention.
  3. The geopolitical consequences of regionalism.

 First, they point out that trade is diverted by regional cooperation that provides members favourable treatment over non-members. Members may also profit from favourable policies and regulations for restricted content in addition to differential tariffs. According to opponents, the disadvantage of regional liberalisation can be more than overcome by the impact of preferences, resulting in a diversion of the trade balance.

Also, they are worried that transferring tariff revenues under a preferential arrangement could hurt the way one member’s income is split. The distraction of attention is the second point raised by critics. They say that if countries get involved in regional projects, they might lose interest in the multilateral system, which could stop its growth and possibly make it less effective.

The United States’ rapid change in trade policy since the early 1980s has drawn particular attention. The international system had previously received top attention from the United States. It declined to take part in regional economic integration. The main reasons the U.S. agreed to the creation and growth of European integration were political and security issues. The U.S. wanted to keep Europe safe and out of war.

The geopolitical consequences of regionalism are the third issue. Regional trade agreements (and economic groupings more generally) may have caused political and even military conflicts between governments in former times. While modern regionalist critics do not expect such severe results, analysts are concerned that close and intense regional links may cause aggravations and even conflicts that extend beyond economics to more generalised domains of global affairs.

Regionalism proponents hold opposing viewpoints on each of these topics (Bergsten, 1996). First, they contend that regional agreements advance free trade and multilateralism in at least two ways: first, that trade expansion has typically surpassed trade contraction, and second, that regional agreements support both domestic and global dynamics that increase rather than diminish the likelihood of global liberalisation. For developing nations, the internal dynamic is particularly crucial since regional agreements, which can be negotiated considerably more quickly than global accords, lock in domestic reforms against the possibility that succeeding governments will attempt to reverse them. Internationally, regional agreements frequently set the stage for liberalisation concepts that can then be broadly applied in the multilateral system.

Second, regionalism critics pointed out that it frequently has considerable, verifiable impacts. Regional integration will likely lead to further multilateral initiatives when officials, governments, and nations adapt to the liberalisation process.

Third, proponents of regionalism argue that it has had more positive than negative political consequences. Because of trade and closer economic cooperation, a new war between Germany and France was almost unthinkable in the European Union. Argentina and Brazil have used it to end their long-running rivalry, which has recently taken on nuclear implications.

APEC’s primary objectives include establishing the United States as a stabilising power in Asia and creating institutional ties between nations that were once adversaries, like Japan, China, and the rest of East Asia. Therefore, the potential of carrying up peace through cooperation is greater than the likelihood of generating conflicts.

Defenders of regionalism point out that regional agreements are permitted explicitly by Article 24 of the GATT and, more recently, the WTO, recognising their consistency with the global trading system. Three requirements must be met for these agreements to be effective:

  1. They must substantially encompass all trade between member nations;
  2. They must not erect new barriers for outsiders;
  3. They must accomplish free trade among members by a specific date (usually to be at most ten years from the starting date).

Although it is generally acknowledged that the most significant regional agreements (the EU and NAFTA) have fully or largely met these criteria, the GATT and WTO have been largely ineffective in certifying and overseeing their implementation. Because of this, the important regions have had many reasons to say that they work well with the multilateral system.

In conclusion, regionalism and globalism are linked, but only if the major countries involved in the process manage it well. History shows they can succeed if they try to improve things for both sides. The outcome in former eras shows that this is also reasonably achievable if they desire to pursue one at the expense of the other. The process’s inherent dynamics are sufficiently balanced for the participants’ policy choices to be decisive.

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International Law

Institution’s evolution

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As the human civilization is evolving, the institutions that were once very relevant and inevitable have been becoming archaic and irrelevant and alarmingly becoming deleterious if remain enacted and rigid. Standing mass armies is one of such institutions, which is losing its relevance that it once earned through conscription of human resource and extraction natural resources. With the emergence of democracy coupled with the dilution of borders by globalization, the armies have lost their stage and much eulogized roles as the defender, protector and invaders. The yardstick to measure the strength of any nation was their military’s might which has now been replaced with other well established indicators.

To shed light upon how and why the role of armies has been dwindled, we have to dive into the modern historical account of the events and reasons that once made the army inevitable and much desirable. As the raison d’etat for establishing the armies and galvanizing their influence   was to acquire the large swaths of land and the quantifiable amount of people to propel the engine of their state machine. Resultantly, the expanded territories were in dire need to be regulated and protected with the iron fist rule, which could not be done without strengthening armies.

Now the hitherto said aspirations have become obsolete and less desirable due to changing dimensions of a society as a whole thereby the military too. To give credence to these assertions it is adequate to allude towards the decline in the tendency of ragging the territorial acquisition wars specifically in the post peace era. Now there is no incentive to acquire the large latifundia or the large amount of people to be slave them as farm workers or to conscript them into armies.

As per the report of the freedom house, there were scant sixty-nine electoral democracies in 1990; today there are more than one hundred and fifteen electrical democracies, which are more than sixty percent. In recently emerged democracies, resultantly, the transition from the centrally planned economies to the economic liberalization spawned the era of entrepreneurship and innovation. Now these budding democracies have recently embarked on the journey towards more opportunities and rising incomes that remained chimera twenty years ago. To bolster this claim, the human security report is enough as it claims that state-based arm conflict has ebbed by 40 percent and which is waning the propensity of countries to wage a full-scale war.

Furthermore, well-established democratic peace theory hits the last nail in the coffin of the aspirations to reinvigorate the military might. The increasing number of democracies are less likely to wage a war with another democratic country, which in result declines the chances of war.

As initially claimed, the ab initio reasons of having standing armies have squarely been replaced; it comes naturally in mind what have replaced them. In a complex and entangled world woven with the fabric of trade, ideas, and innovations, the war-philic countries are the least fit for survival in the Darwinian sense. The countries who are doing wonders in the spheres of economy ideas, innovations inter alia services are less prone to war and aggression.

Many but naming few as the innovation, ideas, trade, and entrepreneurial tendencies have substituted the reasons, which once made the armies relevant and inevitable. Sweden, Norway, UK at the top of global innovation index 2021 and the countries deprived of bloated, mighty, and behemoth militaries, which are also circumscribed in the limited territories, are at the peak of ideas, prosperity, and innovation as compared to those who are bestowed upon with unassailable armies.

Ostensibly, after taking into account the recent shift in the reason of having large standing armies, it is now necessary to discuss about the nature of the future warfare which poses the threats, but here too while dealing with them make everyone wary of the institution of armies and militaries which are too rigid to abreast with the current dynamic nature of warfare, resultantly, they have to bear the brunt of their rigidity everywhere.

Therefore, the Character of the future warfare is dramatically changing which incorporates the novel means to materialize the desired and often mischievous aspirations. In this regard, hybrid warfare is one emerging character, which includes a diverse variety of activities and instruments to destabilize the society, which surely would be desirable for its user. These instruments are like interfering in the electoral processes in which the adversaries can influence the outcome of the electoral processes in the direction, which benefit the adversaries’ political aspirations – Putin’s interference in Trump’s election campaign and Cambridge analytica.

Other instruments are disinformation and false news, Cyber-attacks, and financial influence. Which all of them have already been employing in different dimensions and scales. In this domain, Russia is employing all of these instruments with great dexterity. To better deal with such recent emerging means and tools, it has become a need of hour to introduce the more integrated and sophisticated ways to deal with hybrid warfare and to replace the rigid, archaic and obsolete militarily solutions. In doing so, fostering democracy, inclusion of civil society investment in media literacy are few but viable solutions.

Succinctly, the justifications for raising the large armies, which were to expand the territories, to slave the people or to protect the volatile boundaries, have recently been replaced or become obsolete and irrelevant. Therefore, this institution should be abreast its pace with the dynamic and changing character of the threats posing the great dangers. Moreover, the gauge to quantify the power of any country has resultantly been changed from the strength of armies to the innovation, ideas, entrepreneurial spirit, trade, and socio economic and socio political stability. Contemporarily, it has become futile to strengthen and increase the sizes of armies, which have already lost their relevance, conversely, the changing Character of warfare or better known as hybrid warfare, demands more.

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Imperialism has always been — and always is — control of foreign governments. This is especially control of those governments’...

Middle East6 hours ago

When Mr. Xi comes to town

Pomp and circumstance are important. So are multiple agreements to be signed during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Saudi...

Russia8 hours ago

Russia’s Military Diplomacy in Africa: High Risk, Low Reward and Limited Impact 

The South African Journal of International Affairs, a foreign policy think tank, has released a special researched report on Russia-Africa....

Energy11 hours ago

Renewable and Energy Transition: Towards a Stronger Future

One of the key UN programs under the SDGs is the energy transition and management of the current global energy...

South Asia13 hours ago

Narratives and Discourses: Evaluating 75 years of Indian Foreign Policy

As India celebrates its 75 years of Indian foreign policy and its positioning in the global architecture, it needs to...

East Asia15 hours ago

Historical Issue of Comfort Women and How It Remains a Thorn in Japan – South Korea Relations

Japan and South Korea are the neighboring states who are just 50 kilometers apart from each other from Tsushima to...

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