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Russian Oil and NPPs Re-Commissioned: Japan’s Revised Energy Strategy



On August 10, 2022, Japan’s cabinet, in office since October 2021, resigned in a body following a drop in its approval ratings from 59% to 46%, which resulted in major reshuffles in the Japanese government. This step largely stemmed from problems in the economic situation deteriorating over growing prices on imported primary energy resources as well as from the uncertainty concerning long-term deliveries of said resources from Russia in the longer run. In June, imports of Russian oil dropped to zero, prompting several companies to sign additional agreements with suppliers from the Persian Gulf. Consequently, Japan’s dependency on oil imports from the region has increased to over 90%, which essentially nixed many years of diversification efforts.

Japan’s trade balance deficit has reached record highs in July 2022, with the decisive cause being—alongside the hike in resource prices—the yen-dollar exchange rate drop. Since early 2022, Japan’s currency has lost about 18%, another twenty-five-year record of over 128 yen to the dollar. It resulted in a significant drop in business activity domestically, while export-oriented manufacturers, who form the backbone of Japan’s economy, began to crank up exports to receive more U.S. dollars. Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida mandated additional steps to balance the situation. These included not only resuming Russian oil exports but also re-signing contracts to buy LNG from Sakhalinskaya Energia, the new operator of Sakhalin-2 established pursuant to the Order of August 2022 issued by Mikhail Mishustin, the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation.

In late July 2022, the minister of economy, trade and industry sent a clear signal to Japan’s oil traders, saying that Japan’s government does not call on companies to continue with their refusal to purchase Russian oil as part of supporting Western sanctions since it is up to the companies alone to decide whom to purchase oil from. Clearly, this is a somewhat disingenuous statement as Japan’s government sets quotas on imports of energy resources and knows ex officio where these resources come from. As for the imports of Russian gas, so far, not a single one out of eight Japanese companies getting LNG from Sakhalin-2 said it intended to suspend contracts. To complete the picture, we should mention another fact—when it comes to the purchasing structure of Japanese companies, Sakhalin’s LNG accounts for up to 50% of this structure for Hiroshima Gas, for up to 20% for Kyushu Electric Power and Toho Gas, and for up to 10% for Tohoku Electric Power and Saibu Gas. Japan’s Mitsui and Mitsubishi corporations intend to notify the Russian government in early September that they will retain their shares in the Sakhalin-2 oil and gas project (12.5% and 10% respectively), even if under a new operator.

This has a practical confirmation: even though there were major drops in physical amounts of oil (by 65% compared to the first six months of 2021) and coal (by 40% compared to the first six months of 2021) purchased from Russia, LNG is far less vulnerable to this trend, and its sales to Japan at year-end 2022 are most likely to demonstrate a moderate increase compared to 2021. Curiously, even though Japan joined anti-Russian sanctions, in monetary terms, Russian exports of mineral raw materials and other natural resources to Japan grew by 45% compared to the same period of the previous year (January–July 2021) because of an appreciable increase in global prices.

In July 2022, Takeshi Hashimoto, President of Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, a large transportation company, acknowledged in an interview to the Financial Times that Japan has no choice but to purchase Russian gas saying that Japan cannot stop purchasing Russian LNG owing to soaring energy prices and limited capabilities in nuclear energy. Mr. Hashimoto believes Japan needs the gas it purchases from Russia at relatively low prices under long-term contracts to cover its basic energy needs. While the future of Russian LNG on Japan’s market looks quite bright (at least, until 2025), things are more complicated with oil, which could be directly connected with Japan’s plans to partially restore its nuclear energy raising its share in energy generation to 20% by 2030.

We should note that Japan has for the last few years been exporting from Russia about 6–7 million tons of crude oil on average each year from Sakhalin-1 and under contracts with Rosneft. In 2021, Japan imported a total of 145 million tons of oil, making it one of the world’s largest oil consumers. In 2012–2014, however, Japan imported over 200 million tons of oil annually, and it had to do with shutting all the NPPs down in the wake of the Fukushima disaster and with a view to promptly replace lost energy-generating capacities via, among other things, directly burning crude oil at thermal power stations. Overall, drops in oil purchases and their partial replacement with LNG form the basis of Japan’s energy policy, aside from large-scale plans to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050 by ubiquitously developing new and renewable energy sources (RES, hydrogen, biofuel, etc.). Therefore, a gradual (that is, over a few years) rejection of Russian oil imports that Kishida’s government announced, presenting it as part of putting sanctions pressure on Russia, is essentially a direct continuation of sustained domestic trends, and it cannot be linked directly to the current geopolitical circumstances.

Essentially, Japan’s government looks like it obediently complies with the decisions made by its allies in the West, but it is at the same time solving strictly practical tasks without jeopardizing its own energy security. Certainly, a drop in imports of Russian oil will, for a short while, increase Japan’s dependency on principal exporters from the Persian Gulf, violating the principle of diversification—yet, these quantities of oil are not so large as to become an insurmountable problem should cooperation with Russia be gradually discontinued. Companies from Algeria, Nigeria, Venezuela, Indonesia, as well as other African, Asian and Latin American nations, have already expressed their willingness to replace Russian oil in the future.

Information of the EU intending to cease imports of Russian oil within six months and to stop importing petrochemicals by the end of 2022 was made public back in May 2022. G7 nations, including Japan, supported this decision. Tokyo, however, is in no hurry to assume such commitments, and while it will officially announce in 2022 its refusal to purchase Russian oil, this will include many reservations, and the deadlines will be pushed over to 2023–2024. First, this will give Japanese companies time to prepare and sign contracts with alternative suppliers. Second, the government hopes nothing of the sort might be needed. The special military operation will end, new geopolitical combinations will emerge that will need to be accounted for long-term. Besides, there is no complete certainty of sanctions producing their desired effect and forcing Moscow to make concessions.

Japan cares for its national interests despite its unrelenting support of the U.S. policy in Asia-Pacific. From this perspective, a sharp drop in cooperation with Russia brings Tokyo no benefits, since it will bolster the Russia–China alliance, decreasing Japan’s own influence in the region that holds crucial significance for the country and pushing further off even an illusory possibility of the territorial dispute around the Southern Kuril Islands resolved in Tokyo’s favor. Certainly, Kishida’s revamped government will act cautiously, avoiding shocks in the energy sector that is critical for Japan.

As for NPPs, polls demonstrate an increased approval of plans to partially recommission nuclear power plants over instability on global energy markets prompted by anti-Russian sanctions. Relying on those polls, Fumio Kishida has made a number of careful statements to the effect that several nuclear power units are expected to be commissioned in addition to the ten currently operational (as of June 2022). Overall, currently operational nuclear reactors contribute no more than 2% to the total power generation. Connecting four more to the grid will increase this figure to nearly 3%, which is still not enough to make up for potentially lost amounts of Russian oil and coal. Accordingly, should these several units be successfully recommissioned in the winter of 2022, Japan’s government will continue on its chosen course, especially since this policy is enshrined in the effective strategic documents.

In October 2021, the Cabinet approved the Sixth Strategic Energy Plan through to 2030, with the year 2050 in view. The principal task is to cut greenhouse gas emissions by at least 46% compared to their 2013 level and to double (up to 36% from 18%) the share of new and renewable energy sources in Japan’s overall energy balance as compared to the current level. Already now, Japan demonstrates tangible progress in developing renewable energy: Japan has over 70 GW of solar power and about 6 GW wind power. Moreover, plans involve increasing renewable generation capacities to over 100 GW by 2030. However, to fully understand the situation, we need to take a look at the following data.

As of 2021, the gross installed capacity of Japan’s power stations taken altogether totaled 312 GW, including distributed generation, which yields about 980 billion kW per hour of electric power. Currently, such bodies as the International Energy Agency and Japan’s Institute of Energy Economics predict that power generation will not change much by 2030 and will remain roughly at the present level, mainly because of the ongoing recession in Japan’s economy, because of low business activity, and because of a gradual decrease in population. That is, the necessary generation level will be maintained by replacing thermal power stations with RES facilities. However, renewable energy cannot guarantee uninterrupted and reliable energy supply on the scale of the entire Japanese economy. Additionally, Japan is facing the shortage of lands suitable for building powerful solar stations and wind parks, and very strict laws regulating economic activity in maritime areas stand in the way of building wind power facilities in coastal areas.

It should be noted that not all existing RES capacities are in permanent use: at such stations, power is generated intermittently, which is a major obstacle in the way of using them to power critical infrastructure facilities such as integrated plants, social services facilities, etc. Accordingly, especially with account for the energy transition realities, NPPs become the “helper-outer” in achieving the 30% threshold of energy independence by 2030 (the capability to provide on one’s own for basic internal needs) and in handling seasonal spikes in power consumption with account for reduced imports of crude oil and coal.

The Sixth Strategic Energy Plan entails bringing the NPPs’ share in the gross power generation to 20–22% by 2030. However, this will require recommissioning two thirds of the existing power units (their overall number is 54), many of which are deemed outdated and should soon be dismantled simply because their expected service life is coming to an end. Certainly, there is a practice of extending the service life of individual power units for up to 60 years—Japan, however, faced grave consequences of the Fukushima NPP disaster in 2011, and such an extension scenario appears quite unlikely. As of 2022, only one reactor at the Oma NPP is being completed; construction on it started back in 2010, and it is slated to be commissioned in 2026. Therefore, from a purely technical point of view, the figures envisioned in the Sixth Strategic Energy Plan can be achieved by 2030, but, without new plants built, NPP generation will drop below 10% of the generation structure already by 2040.

In May 2022, Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry claimed that there were no plans to build new NPPs in Japan despite growing challenges to the country’s energy security. Yet, already in late August, Prime Minister Kishida said that Japan would explore the possibility of building nuclear power plants. Apparently, Japanese officials are starting to realize that there can be no hope of reaching a carbon-free status without nuclear energy. Moreover, the turbulence on the global energy markets is highly likely to linger for a long time. Therefore, in the near future, Japan’s government will turn to nuclear energy, striving to develop it proceeding from more rigid safety principles formulated and successfully implemented after the Fukushima disaster.

It took Japan over a decade of hard work on revising its comprehensive energy policy that had essentially gone back to square one after the tragic events of March 2011. It was necessary to strike a balance between abandoning nuclear energy and preserving a favorable environment jeopardized by a sharp increase in burning crude oil, coal, and natural gas at thermal power stations. Another exacerbated problem is the diversification of primary energy resources required for petrochemistry and natural gas conversion, not to mention related industries. Nonetheless, the country today is going back to the situation when it cannot do without NPPs.

Considering the overall situation with long-term implementation of Japan’s energy policy, it is complicated by major competitors emerging on the global market. In 2021, China outstripped Japan as the world’s largest LNG importer, and Chinese companies are actively looking for new LNG projects and developing the existing ones abroad (in Asia, Africa, Latin America, not to speak of cooperating with Russia and building Power of Siberia-2 pipeline), all to make sure they have the necessary supplies today and for the foreseeable future. The same holds true for oil deposits outside China. Europe is contributing, too, as it strives to radically decrease its dependence on Russian oil and gas and, accordingly, is searching for alternative suppliers. Taken together, these developments will only bolster global competition for limited oil and gas resources until new capacities are built and put into operation, which will take several years.

The EU’s advantage, at the very least, lies in the geographic proximity of its member states, which enables them to transfer across borders the energy resources individual national consumers need the most at a particular moment. Japan, clearly, has no such advantage, and it has to rely on itself and to pace itself in interacting with its strategically important suppliers, including Russia. Therefore, Tokyo’s other statements, such as, for instance, possibly capping Russian oil prices (which is absolutely unfeasible without India and China getting involved) should not be taken literally—they should only be interpreted through the lens of Japan’s desire to demonstrate its loyalty to its Western allies. In reality, even if Japan is capable of cutting out Russian energy sources, it is only feasible in some distant future, when the situation around NPPs becomes clear and RES generation reaches about 50%.

From our partner RIAC

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Price Cap on Russian Oil: The Mechanism and Its Consequences

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G7 countries are working hard to coordinate a sanctions regime to cap prices on Russian oil and oil products. The United States is already drafting a mechanism for applying these sanctions, which its allies and partners will use as a guideline. The new sanctions in the form of legal arrangements are expected to be formalised very soon. How will this mechanism work, and what consequences can this lead to?

An unprecedented range of economic sanctions has been used against Russia since the beginning of the special military operation in Ukraine in February 2022. Their primary aim was to deal the largest possible economic damage to force Moscow to revise its policy and to undermine its resources provision. Since energy exports are extremely important for funding the Russian economy, sanctions against its oil and gas sector were more than just predictable. However, the United States, the EU and other initiators had to act cautiously, because Russia is a major player on the global market. US restrictions on the export of Iranian oil had little impact on the global market, whereas blocking sanctions against Russian oil companies could lead to uncontrollable price hikes. This could accelerate inflation, which was growing fast on the back of COVID-19 and other factors.

Nevertheless, the sanctions noose on the oil sector was tightening. Some sectoral sanctions have been applied since 2014, such as restrictions on loans and on the supply of products, services, technologies and investment in the Arctic shelf oil projects. Blocking sanctions were adopted against a number of co-owners, owners and top managers in the fuel and energy sector. In March 2022, Washington prohibited the import of Russian energy resources to the United States. Canada acted likewise. The EU started with banning Russian coal imports and later spread the ban, with a few exceptions, to oil and oil products. The bans are to come into force on December 5, 2022, and February 5, 2023, respectively. The UK plans to stop the import of Russian oil this year. Overall, Western countries are working to gradually banish Russian oil and oil products from their markets.

However, Moscow has quickly redirected its deliveries to Asian markets, where Western countries cannot easily impose similar restrictions, especially since Russian companies are selling their products with large discounts. The idea of a price cap has been proposed to be able to influence Russian oil prices outside Western countries.

The essence of the proposed mechanism is very simple. The United States, G7 and any other countries that join the coalition will legally prohibit the provision of services which enable maritime transportation of Russian-origin crude oil and petroleum products that are purchased above the price cap. The US Treasury has issued a Preliminary Guidance to explain the essence of the forthcoming bans, to be formalised in a determination pursuant to Executive Order 14071 of April 6, 2022. Section 1 (ii) of the executive order empowers the US Treasury and the Department of State to prohibit the export or re-export of “any category of services” to Russia. The upcoming Determination will explain the ban for American parties to provide services which enable the transportation of Russian-origin crude oil and petroleum products above the price cap. The US administration plans to enforce the ban on oil on December 5, 2022, and the ban on oil products on February 5, 2023, simultaneously with the EU bans on Russian oil imports.

But what is the exact meaning of the phrase “services which enable maritime transportation”? The US will most likely offer an extended interpretation. In other words, such services will include transportation, related financial transactions, insurance, bunkering, port maintenance and the like. This would allow Washington to influence a broad range of service providers outside the United States. For example, the US administration might consider dollar-denominated transactions on oil transportation to fall under US jurisdiction, so that very many players outside the US will face fines or prosecution. Punishment for avoiding the price cap, as well as for using deceptive shipping practices, have been set out in the new Guidance.

It is another matter how strictly the other coalition countries will implement this guidance and how large this coalition can be. The level of coordination within the initiator countries will likely remain very high, which means that the allied countries will do this in accordance with their national legislations. The coalition will include the countries that have already adopted sanctions against Russia.

The biggest question is whether the countries that have not adopted such sanctions, including Russia-friendly countries, can be convinced to join the coalition. The answer is most probably negative, but this will not settle the problem. Despite the official position of the friendly countries, their businesses could surrender to the US demand to avoid the risk of persecution.

The G7 statement and the new Guidance of the US Treasury imply that the sanctions are being imposed out of concern for the international community rather than solely for the purpose of punishing Russia. They say that the price cap is designed to stop the growth of oil prices that have been artificially inflated by the conflict in Ukraine. However, this “concern” can lead to unpredictable consequences.

To begin with, the latest attempt at the political mandating of prices will increase uncertainty, which will further drive the prices up. Prices can grow on expectations of problems with signing deals on the delivery of Russian oil and oil products over excessive compliance, which will lead to temporary shortages. Another problem is that the other oil producers will have to lower prices as well. They will not like this.

In fact, the sellers’ market is being changed into the buyers’ market by artificial political methods rather than for economic reasons.

And lastly, Russia is being forced to become the leader of dumping. Demand for its oil could be higher than for the products of other suppliers, and Moscow can make up for its profit shortfall by increasing deliveries. If the Western countries that prohibit the import of Russian oil and oil products buy other suppliers’ oil at higher prices while Asian countries continue to buy Russian products, this will artificially increase the competitiveness of Asian economies.

It is time for Russia to start thinking about adjusting to the Western restrictions, including by developing its own tanker fleet and abandoning the US dollar in oil deals. The latter is the prevalent task of Russia’s foreign trade in the new political conditions.

From our partner RIAC

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Absolute Proof that EU Leaders Are Responsible for Europe’s Soaring Fuel-Prices

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A BusinissInsider news-report on the morning of September 7th headlined “Putin says Russia will restart Nord Stream 1 gas flows ‘tomorrow’ if it gets turbines, and blames sanctions for the shutdown” and opened with:

Russian President Vladimir Putin said Wednesday that Gazprom could restart gas flows to Europe via the key Nord Stream 1 pipeline tomorrow, if it gets the turbines needed. He blamed Germany and Western sanctions for the indefinite halt in operations for the pipeline, according to media reports from his speech at the Eastern Economic Forum. At the same time, he said pressure from the US was behind the holdup in launching another pipeline, Nord Stream 2.

Putin was telling the EU’s leaders that what has been forcing gas-prices in Europe up 300% since Russia’s February 24th invasion of Ukraine isn’t Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (such as they allege) but instead the U.S.-EU-UK economic sanctions against Russia which have caused all U.S.-and-allied — including all EU — nations to terminate imports of fuels from Russia. He was saying that Russia will turn on the pipelines into the EU as soon as EU leaders turn off their sanctions that prohibit their businesses and consumers from buying it.

The ball is now in their court. Let’s see what they do with it. Have they been lying to allege that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine caused this 300% gas-price rise? If so, then Putin has said that the moment they stop lying and start to allow the gas to flow again from Russia, that gas will flow again from Russia and those prices will consequently plunge back down again.

If, however, they have been telling the truth (though it’s hard to see how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24th could even possibly have forced up the prices in the EU of all fuels from Russia), then the ball will immediately be in Putin’s court, for him promptly to get the flows of Russian fuels into Europe restored to what they had been prior to the EU’s sanctions that were imposed in the wake of that invasion.

Because it’s hard to see how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24th could even possibly have forced up the prices in the EU of all fuels from Russia, the headline here is based upon the very reasonable expectation: that the result of Putin’s September 7th challenge to the EU’s leaders will be that they are proven to have been lying when they have blamed these price-rises on him, instead of on themselves.

In other words: On September 7th, Putin laid down the gauntlet to EU leaders, regarding whom is to blame for Europe’s now-soaring energy-prices, and for the consequences thereof. That challenge to them tests whom has been telling the truth about this matter, and whom has been lying about it. It is that test, regardless of whether news-reports about his statement (other than this one), report it as testing whom the liars, and whom the truth-tellers, about this matter, have been. This is a big tree that is falling in the news-forest, and that tree is falling, regardless of whether or not (or the extent to which) it is being reported to the public. The test is a fact — an important fact — even if it won’t be reported (other than here). However, something else will be even more important: what the result of this test will turn out to be. And then the test for the news-media will be: will they report that result? Will they report the finding? Because there certainly will be a finding, from this test. And it certainly will be an important one.

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Coal Diplomacy: Could We Be Free from the Climate Crisis?

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One of the things that is perplexing at the moment is that there is no clarity about how life will be lived in the coming year from an economic standpoint. In 2023, both the Indonesian finance minister and the Indonesian president said that “the world is dark.” Uncertainty regarding many topics, particularly economic concerns, is referred to be “dark.” Recession that affected several of the world’s major economies. The biggest issues now are energy shortage and food ingredient scarcity. Politics is no longer focused on how to achieve power, as well as the world’s attention and authority, but on how to sustain tomorrow’s life and escape the perils of hunger and cold.

Since the implementation of Western sanctions on Russia, not only has the political game grown more attractive in terms of military and economics, but it has also had an influence on the economy. Because of Russia’s high price for oil and gas, as well as the growing issue of energy shortages, various European nations have taken the initiative to generate electricity by burning coal. This has recently received a lot of attention in the media. The transfer of energy sources is plainly the polar opposite of the world’s current commitment to reduce emissions and environmental impacts. In the face of global uncertainty, the availability of coal as an energy source will assist emerging nations with coal reserves, such as Indonesia. However, when the time period and amount of coal burned are considered, this definitely accelerates the environmental impact. According to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021 report, worldwide coal consumption in 2020 was 151.42 exajoules. This figure fell by 4.2% from the previous year, when it stood at 157.64 exajoules. China is the largest consumer, accounting for 54.3% of total worldwide spending, followed by the United States, India, and Japan.

How Coal affects the environment

According to the Encyclopedia Britannica (2015), coal is derived from animal and plant fossils that perished and were buried millions of years ago; coal is currently the world’s greatest fossil fuel when compared to oil. necessitates a number of operations and a rather wide space It generates a lot of pollution and environmental harm from coal mining to processing to consumption to the ultimate cycle of use. The following is an example of a coal processing line:

First, when coal is discovered, people and certain groups will plan to mine it. The plan is then carried out by constructing a mine. At this early stage Coal mines will have a negative influence on the ecosystem, beginning with changes in the terrain, which will reduce soil fertility. Biodiversity is under peril.

Second, a variety of chemical reactions occur in nature during coal processing procedures. When fossil fuels are burned to generate energy, the carbon in the fuel interacts with oxygen to make CO2 gas, the majority of which is emitted into the atmosphere. Not only does coal combustion emit CO2, but it also emits methane into the atmosphere. As a greenhouse gas, methane is twenty times more powerful than carbon dioxide. Not only does coal combustion emit CO2 and methane, but it also emits sulfur in the form of sulfur dioxide (SO2) gas.  If these three chemical compounds are released into nature, they have a severe influence on the environment and humans, producing soil degradation, air pollution, and the sulfur content released is also particularly toxic for water. Although there is a new phrase and breakthrough “Clean coal,” according to Michael Economides, professor of chemical engineering at the University of Houston, Texas), it is highly improbable that clean coal can be created by “Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS).”

Third, following a series of procedures, the mining and burning of coal will also leave visible traces. Past mining locations’ created craters and changing landscapes, of course, damage the ecology, and former excavations frequently cost life.

 Indonesia and coal

Indonesia is one of the countries that has profited from the present global energy constraint. The Center for Mineral, Coal, and Geothermal Resources reported that Indonesia’s coal reserves were at 31.7 billion tons as of January 19, 2022. Indonesia not only utilizes coal for internal purposes, but also exports it to other nations in order to gain foreign currency. When coal prices rise, it contributes to state income, but these gains are only transitory since the government gives additional relief to coal service employees through power subsidies and compensation.

According to data source Carbon Brief, the Indonesian government offers power subsidies and compensation with a budget of Rp. 127.9 trillion. This sum is higher than the previous year’s total of Rp. 74.4 trillion. The government provides subsidies and incentives so that PLN may continue to acquire coal from the firm while keeping power prices stable.  Owners of coal mining enterprises will gain the most during this period of energy shortage. In January-March 2022, one of the coal mines had a 457.6% rise in net profit. Until June 2022, Indonesia’s coal output has achieved 283.57 million tons, or around 42.77% of the target for 2022, which was 633 million tons. Meanwhile, national coal sales through June 2022, which included both exports and domestic sales, were 175.15 million tons.

Climate Commitment Challenge

It is quite difficult to retain environmental commitment in these times. On the one hand, humans are attempting and committed to keeping the environment stable by reducing the greenhouse effect, which can harm the ozone layer, but the current situation has not provided an opportunity to obtain energy that is cleaner and environmentally friendly, and can be produced in large quantities quickly, other than rocks and coals.  Coal processing and utilization as an energy source has been known for over a century, and its influence has been felt in recent decades. However, the usage of coal cannot be minimized or eliminated at this time. Europe’s Germany, Poland, and even India in Asia ordered coal from Indonesia to meet their national energy demands. This has occurred since Russia’s sanctions were implemented.

This circumstance demonstrates how the political system affects the food chain. With the increased usage of coal in many regions of the world, it is possible that the Paris Agreement and the G20 statement, as well as other environmental and climate-related pledges, will be revisited. However, increased worldwide coal usage will hasten the depletion of global coal stockpiles. Keep in mind that nature takes thousands of years to generate coal, but human progress in this century is so rapid.


The human task of sustaining the appropriateness of a place to live in the face of global instability will never diminish. These obstacles might arise from the environment in which humans live or from outside sources such as governmental policy, commerce, and conflict.  The recent increase in the use of coal is a short-term effort for humans to survive and carry out their activities, but in the long run, human dependence on coal must be considered, given that humans’ ability to grow and reproduce faster than nature’s ability to produce coal for humans, and even if coal is still relied on, it will accelerate environmental pollution, which then affects weather and climate. It is vital to review how the commitment to environmental protection has been pursued in both local and international obligations.

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