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Clausewitz and Napoleonic wars in changing characters of war

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Clausewitz[1] was born in Burg near Mag de burg in 1780. He entered Persian army as lance corporal in 1972. He served in campaigns of Rhine’s and studied scientific branch of profession. He entered military school of Berlin later on was selected as military instructor to the king of Prussia and then crown prince, was also appointed as Aide de camp to general phul and later on became major general  in 1818 and director of military school. In 1830, he was appointed as inspector of artillery at Breslau and was nominated as chief of staff to army of observation under Marshal Breslau.

Clausewitz strategy of war[i] will be applied to the Napoleonic wars and napoleon strategy of war. “In order to assess the way in which Clausewitz understands the relationship between war, peace, and politics in their entirety, it is first crucial to define war by Clausewitzian standards and to distinguish between absolute war and total war, as at least a vague understanding of each is certainly necessary in the interpretation of Vom Kriege. Next, Clausewitz’s theories on war[ii] [2]and peace must be evaluated separately from that of politics. While politics is unquestionably linked to matters of both war and peace, it is imperative that each be understood individually before one can fully grasp the concepts that Clausewitz puts forth and assess the strengths and weaknesses in his arguments. While many critics have argued against the validity of Clausewitz’s theories in the modern world, after assessment of the relationship of war, peace, and politics, it will become clear that Clausewitz’s lessons are still highly relevant in the 21st century.”

Clausewitz defined strategy as “use of engagement to attain the objects of war”. Clausewitz is reduced to his famous dictum that “war is continuation of politics by other mean” while he is not just a war theorist, rather he is a “philosopher of modern nation state”. Strategy involves the use of battles to achieve the end of war.  So it means strategy is the plan of war which involves several actions that are linked together.  Some interpreters of Clausewitz work interpret the strategy as “shortest way to connect means with ends”.  If purpose of strategy is to link the means with the political aim of war, so these means are attached with intermediary aims not to the final political purpose. Strategy is a broad concept. For example, US won many battles in Vietnam but at last, US lost in Vietnam. Napoleon defeated Russia many times but finally lost.

 Independent variable: Clausewitz strategy of war

Clausewitz theory of war and strategy?

 For Clausewitz, war is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale or a dual combat. He further elaborates that in war we are supporting two wrestlers and each of them strives physical force to compel the other and force them to submit his will and render him incapable of further resistance. War is the utmost use of force.


Clausewitz in the description of strategy argues that military must make the engagement costly for the enemy by capturing important territories etc. that the enemy is compelled to give up. He described five elements that can be affected to limit the engagement capabilities of enemy including; moral, physical, geographical, mathematical and statistical. Moral element involves the understanding of one’s own and enemy’s aim along with the sensitivities on enemy’s side that can be exploited to lower the moral of enemy’s forces. Physical element involves the clear understanding of enemy’s strengths, vulnerabilities, battle experiences and synergies etc. Mathematical element involves understanding of way of engagement and direction of operation etc. Geographical element is the analysis of terrain and other geographical hurdles etc.  Statistical element is the understanding of one’s own and the enemy’s storage capacities and service abilities in battle field.

Clausewitz defines strategy as the use of means to achieve political objective. He has divided strategy into five types:-

  1. Moral.
  2. Physical
  3. Statistical
  4. Geographical
  5. Mathematical.


It inculcates how the enemy sees into the account of exploiting the enemy. What are the psychological factors which can be used in order to decrease the morale of the enemy forces, how they can be targeted in the areas which are weakest and vulnerable and they can be easily made to surrender.


It involves the analysis of your strengths, weakness as well as the strength and weaknesses of the enemy forces. It includes physical military strategies of the enemy forces and mobilization of the enemy forces. How physical strategy takes account in the strategy.


It involves the understanding of way of engagement of enemy and their operational direction. It involves sufficient storage of ammunition, rations, clothing, storages and strategic supplies etc. it also ensures supplies of these logistics through a system of these forward displaced dumps and supplies points.


It involves commanding positions, tactical points, rivers, lands, mountains and views them through a lens of defensive point of view. It involves layout of the lands and terrains and road networks and soils and master geographical aspects in the case of strategy. This includes all the geographical structure of the defensive point of view.


It involves disposition of forces and their engagement of the enemy forces. It also involves interior and exterior lines of the operation either the forces are divergent or convergent and their mathematical skills in the strategy.

Dependent variable :- Napoleonic wars

  1. Battle of jena-auerstedt (14 October 1806)
  2. Battle of Russia.

Battle of jena-auerstedt (14 october 1806):

This famous battle is also known as twin battle[3] and this battle was fought on October 14th 1806. This battle was fought in today’s Germany. This battle became huge success for napoleons life. This battle was fought between napoleon and king of Prussia Fredrick Williams III and this battle was won by napoleon and the army of Prussia subjugated their kingdom of Prussia. In total the Prussian army lost 10,000 men killed or wounded, had 15,000 prisoners of war taken as well as 150 guns whereas military engagement of the Napoleonic Wars, fought between 122,000 French troops and 114,000 Prussians and Saxons, at Jena and Auerstädt, in Saxony which is called modern Germany now.

Battle of Russia:

The battle of Russia is also known as French invasion of Russia[4]. It is also known as second polish campaigns and also known as patriotic war of 1812. This war was resulted as a blockade put by the United Kingdom and this war was initiated by napoleon and afterwards napoleon lost the war. This war had impacted the human’s life and has affected the massive life of human beings. The battle of Russia was lost by napoleon and this war impacted and effected the napoleon strategy and his life to the core and this was the reason that napoleon later on strategized that he will marry the daughter of Russian king. This was one of the most important wars he lost and he was only left with the armed forces and soldiers of 900 people only. Apart this napoleons [5]whole army was dead and this is termed as the major losses of war he had to face.

Theoretical framework and its relevance:

Clausewitz used the Napoleon in all of his theories. Although, Napoleon lost in the “battle of waterloo”, but for Clausewitz, Napoleon was at the beginning as well as at the end of war. Clausewitz developed the “political theory of warfare” on the basis of three battles which Napoleon lost at Russia, waterloo and Leipzig.

Battles of Jena and Auerstedt

In 1806, Napoleon defeated the Prussia at the “battle of Jena”. Clausewitz concluded it by stating that Prussian military was defeated due to two main reason; weak leadership and the defects of political as well as military institutions. He further argued that the Prussian troops were morally coward as well as intellectually poor which gave superiority to the troops of Napoleon. Clausewitz gave two reasons of the victory of the Napoleon; 1) the revolutionary transformation in warfare brought by Napoleon and the French revolution 2) Prussian military and political leadership was morally coward and could not transform their military and warfare strategies. Further, the role of conscript army was explained by the Clausewitz that the victory of France was made possible by the mobilization of all the people. This mobilization gave them the superiority. Clausewitz talked about the “existential construction of war” which states that war is not only for pursuing “the policy goals” rather it is a mean by which a political entity can be changed, constituted and transformed. He argued that if Prussia desired to resist the Napoleon and French armies then it had to go for transformation of its political identity.

He further commented on the need of “continuous and uninterrupted flight” which causes the enemy to disintegrate. After a march, when soldiers again hear the sound of guns, then this moment according to the Clausewitz is most repugnant. He concluded that Napoleon defeated the Prussian forces because he continuously pursued the fleeing armies of the Prussia which destroyed the Prussian army.

He further contended that not just the moral and political cowardice of Prussia led to their defeat at the hands of Napoleon rather the Napoleon was clever military commander and “military genius”. He talked about the military genius in the Book VIII of his book “ON WAR”.  He argued that Prussia and Austria were not aware that their opponent is the “God of War[6]”. According to Clausewitz, there are several factors that gave the Napoleon an edge over the Prussian and Austrian forces at the Jena and Auerstedt which includes;

  • Boldness and speed of actions.
  • Offensives with unprecedented force
  • Concentration of force at decisive point
  • The planning of the whole campaign in such as way the one battle decides the whole war

According to Clausewitz, being strong is the best strategy and he agrees with the principle of Napoleon that “an army can never be strong at the decisive point”.

In addition to this, Clausewitz criticized the “appeasement policy[7]” of the Prussians toward the Napoleon.  He criticized the public and those in the royal courts who submitted in the hope that “the victors will show mercy”. Clausewitz argued that if he had whip then he would have used it to arouse the Germans and tell them that the “military superiority dominates over the ideals and politics”.

Battle of Russia

In this battle, Napoleon was defeated although his strategy was same as was in the previous campaigns.  He used the same tactics but according to the Clausewitz, the napoleon was defeated because of different way of action of the enemy this time. Russians did not engage in decisive battle. Further, the limitless space of Russia was insurmountable obstacle for the forces of Napoleon.[8] Napoleon was right in all of his strategies such as first destroying the army of Russia, secondly occupying the Moscow and then negotiation with Tsar but Russian actions did not let the napoleon’s strategy to succeed. The tactics of Russian army such as “scorched earth” and the large space of Russian territory meant that the forces of Napoleon would perish here. Clausewitz argued that the factors that could bring success to the French military were ignored. He argues in his book VIII that Russia can only be conquered by internal divisions and the Russian weaknesses.  Clausewitz said that if Napoleon could reach Moscow then he would have shaken the political leaders and public of Russia. Napoleon reached the Moscow but not in a position that could have caused dread in the Russian public and political elite, hence he was defeated. He reached the Moscow with 90,000 troops who were exhausted and little or no ammunition. So instead of dominating in the Moscow, Napoleonic forces became defensive and also they were not prepared for the winters in Moscow. Clausewitz argued that the whole strategy of Napoleon was based on the hope that Tsar will negotiate after he reaches Moscow but this never happened.  Clausewitz argued that the superiority given to the defense and not attack was mistake that Napoleon did and till the time he was attacking, he was on correct path according to the Clausewitz. Clausewitz argued that offensive was the “holies of holy” in all the campaigns of napoleon.  Clausewitz argued that this strategy of defense in the emergency and the defeat must not be focused and the military genius of the Napoleon should not be ignored.  He argued that Napoleon became the master of Europe because he conducted all of his military campaigns in the same manner. Also, the forces of napoleon were not defeated in any battle of the whole Russian campaign rather they lost in the “final reckoning”.

[1] [1] “Carl Von Clausewitz.” Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, May 13, 2022.

[2] Pietersen, Willie. “Von Clausewitz on War: Six Lessons for the Modern Strategist.” Ideas & Insights. Ideas at Work, February 12, 2016.,you%20have%20won%20the%20war.

[3] “Battle of Jena–Auerstedt.” Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, May 23, 2022.

[4] “The Battle of Russia.” Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, May 9, 2022.


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Mobilization Won’t Save Russia from the Quagmire



photo:© Vitaly Nevar/TASS

When Moscow waged war against Ukraine in February, few expected Russia to end up in a quagmire.  The Russian military failed to achieve its goals, while the Ukrainians fought bravely to defend their nation.  The recent pushback in the Kharkiv region further proved that Russia could not achieve its military goals under the current situation. 

The Russian government takes a new procedure.  President Putin has called for partial mobilization, commissioning the reserved forces and those previously served.  Meanwhile, the Russian government has decided to launch referendums for the occupied areas to join Russia.  Any attacks on those territories in the future could be considered total war and potentially trigger nuclear weapon use.  

It is vital to notice this is only a partial mobilization, only recalling reservists.  However, many Russian politicians and nationalists have called for total mobilization.  Yet, a mobilization, whether partial or complete, is not a prescription to improve Moscow’s performance on the battlefield.  The mobilization, in reality, could further drag Russia into a quagmire. 

Russia does not have the political leverage it had before, home and abroad.  Total mobilization will not change Russia’s diplomatic stalemate.  The war united European countries quickly.  While Russia accused Ukraine of attempting to join NATO, Finland and Sweden have applied to become NATO members, bringing NATO close to Saint Petersburg.  A total mobilization is unlikely to threaten Europe and forces it to change its policy.  Instead, it will further push the European countries to unite in facing Russian aggression.

Even the countries with which Russia has a closer relationship have different opinions.  Indian prime minister Modi has told President Putin to take the path of peace and stop the war in a recent meeting.  India has a close relationship with Russia, and Modi’s criticism is a significant blow to Putin.  Even Central Asia countries have also expressed no interest in Putin’s aggression.  Kazakhstan has clearly stated that it will neither send its military to fight in Ukraine nor recognize the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk. A total mobilization and an escalation of the war will further alienate Russia and its allies. 

Domestically, a mobilization could further drag Putin down with his popularity.  Chechnyan president Kadyrov, one of Putin’s close allies, has criticized the war’s progress, reflecting the contrary opinions among Russian elites.  On the everyday citizen level, Putin has also become unpopular.  Immediately after the mobilization was introduced, Russian anti-war groups called for national protests

Militarily, the Russian war machine is not the Soviet Union military that the world trembles.  The Russian army has needed a significant upgrade since the collapse of the Soviet Union.  The chaos after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the economic crisis has dramatically weakened the Russian armed forces.  The failure in the two Chechnyan Wars is the most obvious evidence.  Putin managed to upgrade a portion of the military equipment and provided a better salary to the personnel.  The Russian military still performed decently during its operation in Syria. 

Yet, the scale of upgrade it needs is far from what Kremlin has offered, and the war further dragged the Russian military capacity.  Before the war, Russia chose not to produce and deploy the most advanced tanks because of the lack of money, and the T-14 tank ended up being a showpiece in the military parade.  The corruption within the Russian military is still a problem, leading to the lack of resources directed for military upgrades. 

That’s why Russia still uses the Soviet military legacy in combat.  The Russian armored forces now have to use T-64 tanks from their storage because of the significant loss at the initial stage of the war.  The recruits this summer were only trained for a month before being sent to the frontline.  As for the newly mobilized forces, despite the previously served reservists, it still takes time and equipment to prepare them for operation.  Russia has neither of those, let alone the conscripts are also a part of the reserved forces, making them even more ineffective on the battlefield. 

Moscow’s financial situation to sustain a mobilization remains a big question.  Despite the excellent performance of the Russian Ruble in the currency market, Russia’s economy will still face severe challenges.  Teachers are now required to donate to the war effort, a sign that the war effort is far from successful.  As the announcement of mobilization comes, Moscow’s stock index drops dramatically.  While the sanctions did not work as expected, the Russian economy suffered from the effects.  The banks also reported significant losses in the year’s first half. 

The international price of natural gas and oil has also come down from its peak since European countries finished stacking up their supply earlier.  Meanwhile, UAE and Kuwait are planning to expand their production capacity of natural gas and oil.  Russia’s source of income is far from stable as prices drop and exports and production decline for Russia.

War is a costly activity.  In previous operations in Syria, Russia’s daily cost is around 2.4 to 4 million US dollars.  That was a minor operation with mainly air force participation.  With all forces in action and the war dragging on for more than 200 days, the expenses mounted.  It is believed that the first week of war alone cost Russia 7 billion dollars.  The Kremlin’s decree says that the newly assembled forces will be paid corresponding to the existing personnel.  With that high expense, how will Russia be able to pay for the new troops?  How will Russia be able to replace the equipment and supply its forces?

Moscow believed that by sheer force and lightning warfare, Kyiv would bow down to Moscow.  However, this dream ended with a valiant effort from the Ukrainians to defend the country.  Further mobilization may provide the short-term manpower that Russia needs, but it will not save Russia from the predicament.  The bleak reality in politics, the military, and the economy has made mobilization anything but a save.  

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Rise in mercenary forces trigger ‘rampant’ human rights violations

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Human rights violations committed by mercenaries and private security companies create grave challenges for victims seeking justice and redress, UN-appointed independent human rights experts warned on Tuesday.

Presenting its new report to the Human Rights Council 51st session, the Working Group on the use of mercenaries said that this was due to the particularity of the perpetrators and the way they operate.

They also noted that the proliferation of mercenaries, contractors operating as soldiers for hire and private security companies in conflict, post-conflict and peacetime settings, has increased the number of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.

“Deplorable gaps in accountability, access to justice, and remedies for victims of violations perpetrated by such actors are rampant,” said Sorcha MacLeod, Chair-Rapporteur of the Working Group, who presented the report to the Council.

‘Victim-centred approach’

The experts explained that, in the contexts in which they operate, the impacts of their actions are of grave concern.

Persons in vulnerable situations, women, children, migrants and refugees, people with disabilities, LGBTI+ persons, older persons, minorities, human rights defenders and journalists, are experiencing particularly negative impacts, the experts highlighted.

“Given this bleak situation, a holistic and victim-centred approach is imperative to ensure victims’ effective access to justice and remedy,” Ms. MacLeod said.

Investigate and punish offenders

The report highlights a lack of accountability and the common challenges faced by victims in accessing justice and effective remedies to overcome the damage mercenaries leave in their wake.

It drew specific attention to the secrecy and opacity surrounding the activities of mercenaries, military contractors hired to kill, and private security companies; their complex business and corporate structures, issues related to jurisdiction; and gaps in national and international regulation.

States have obligations under international human rights law to prevent, investigate, and punish violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, and to provide effective remedies and reparation to victims of mercenaries, mercenary-related actors, and private military and security companies,” the experts said.

They concluded by urging States to adopt national legislation to “regulate the activities of these actors, punish perpetrators, and provide redress for victims are part of these implementation efforts”.

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A New Strategic Shifts and A New Strategic Concept of NATO

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The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit, in Madrid at the end of last June, was not just an ordinary summit resembling its predecessors. It looked so different that it might be thought that it might constitute an important turning point in the path of the Alliance.

This summit was held four months after the start of the war that Russia launched against Ukraine. And because it is a war that posed an unprecedented challenge to NATO, due to the exposure of one of the European states nominated for its membership to a direct Russian military invasion, for the first time since the end of World War II, and therefore in the history of the alliance, it is natural that any summit held after that will turn into something like a thermometer that does not only measure the degree of the alliance’s cohesion in facing a challenge of this magnitude, but also the extent of its readiness to respond to it, and to all similar and potential challenges in the future.

Its contract coincided with a time when the Alliance had to issue a new document outlining its strategic concept for the next ten years. Because the last document of this type was issued in 2010, it was assumed that 2020 would be the date of the issuance of the document covering the third era of the twenty-first century, which did not happen due to the outbreak of the Covid 19 pandemic, which disrupted the convening of the summit during 2020 and 2021. Thus, fate decided that the date of a summit with the task of formulating a new strategic vision for the alliance coincided with the outbreak of a major crisis, some of whom do not rule out that it would be the starting point in a third world war, which added to the ‘strategic concept’ document signed by NATO leaders on June 29 the past for the period up to 2030 is doubly important and exceptional.

The 2022 document, which is 11 pages in length, includes 49 items distributed on three axes: objectives and principles, the strategic environment, and the main tasks of the alliance (deterrence and defense, prevention and crisis management, cooperative security) a vision that clearly emphasizes that the strategic concept of NATO has undergone fundamental changes, especially if compared to the concept contained in the document issued in 2010. This is from multiple angles: it reflects, first, a clear change in the alliance’s vision of the sources of threats to its security, because the previous document issued in 2010, which reflected the strategic concept of the alliance for the period up to 2020, Terrorism was placed at the top of the list of sources of threat to peace and security at various levels, while this source took steps backward in the 2022 document, and is no longer seen as the main source of threat to the security and stability of the Alliance.

The Russian Federation advanced to occupy the top position on this list. This document spoke of the Russian Federation as ‘the biggest and most direct threat to the security of the Alliance and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region… because it aims to destabilize the countries of our east and south, in the far north.’

Here, it notes the extent of the direct impact of the war in Ukraine on changing the alliance’s vision to the sources of threats to its security and stability. It is also noted that the alliance no longer views Russia as a potential or indirect threat, but rather as a direct military threat. ‘The Russian Federation’s ability to disrupt Allied reinforcements and freedom of navigation across the North Atlantic is a strategic challenge to it, and Moscow’s military buildup, including in the Baltic, Black Sea, and Mediterranean regions, along with its military integration with Belarus, challenges our security and interests,’ the document says.

On the other hand, it is noted that the 2010 document avoided looking at China as a source of threat to the alliance, only referring to it as an ambitious competitor seeking to enhance its position at the regional and global levels by increasing its economic, scientific, and technological capabilities. As for the 2022 document, it is not only looking at China as an honorable competitor but as a source of threat no less dangerous than Russia. It is true that it does not see China as a direct military threat to the alliance, as is the case with Russia, but it sees, at the same time, that ‘the declared ambitions of the People’s Republic of China, and its adoption of a wide range of political, economic and military tools to increase its global presence and demonstrate strength, and its use of malicious methods it aims to control key technological and industrial sectors, critical infrastructure, strategic materials, and supply chains, and use its economic influence to create strategic dependencies and enhance its influence, etc., which constitute a direct threat to the interests, security, and values ​​of the Alliance.

The most interesting point is that this document considers that ‘the deepening of the strategic partnership between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation and their mutual attempts to undermine the rules-based international order is incompatible with our values ​​and interests,’ and therefore should be confronted with due firmness.

Secondly, it reflects a clear change in the Alliance’s vision of how to confront sources of threats to its security and stability. After the Alliance, in its previous documents, focused on ‘cooperation, building partnerships, and networking with others,’ as effective means of confronting various sources of threat, we find it focusing on the current document focuses on ‘building our own capabilities, mobilizing resources, and increasing military expenditures.’ It is true that the document clearly stressed that the alliance ‘does not seek to confront Russia, and does not want to be a source of threat to it,’ but at the same time, it was keen to highlight ‘the alliance’s determination to strengthen the deterrent and defensive capabilities of all its members and that it will respond to threats in a unified and responsible manner.’ And it will keep it’s channels of communication open with the Russians to prevent escalation.

On the other hand, it is noted that the document did not recognize any role of the NATO states or the ruling regime in Ukraine in provoking Russia, and pushing it to use force in Ukraine, under the pretext of ensuring the protection of citizens of Russian origin, nor did it refer, from near or far, to feelings of concern. President Putin, after Ukraine, signed a strategic partnership agreement with the United States on November 10, nor to the demands contained in his message to NATO member states, in response to this agreement, which included: A pledge that Ukraine would not join the alliance NATO, not placing offensive weapons on Russia’s borders, and withdrawing NATO forces from Eastern Europe to Western Europe, demands that the United States refused to even discuss, which eventually led to the outbreak of war. Instead, the document proceeded to affirm the right of all countries in the region, especially Eastern European countries, to determine their fate and future, including joining NATO and the European Union and rejecting any interference by the Russian Federation in the internal affairs of these countries.

If we link what was stated in this document and the path taken by the ongoing war in the Ukrainian arena, we will reach a set of conclusions: The first, regarding how to slip into the currently raging military confrontation in the Ukrainian arena, it is not at all unlikely that the United States, through Its organs and institutions that express the thought and orientations of the deep state, have deliberately lured Russia into a confrontation on the Ukrainian arena, and it has been seriously preparing for this confrontation since Russia occupied the Crimea in 2014.

The second: Relates to the essence of the current conflict in this arena. All the parties involved in it realize that its main goal revolves around putting an end to the unilateral Western hegemony over the current world order and establishing a multi-polar world order or, at least, a tri-polar system in which Russia and China participate, which is rejected by the West led by the United States, and explains the return of NATO cohesion After he was threatened with collapse, he explains, at the same time, the West’s insistence on inflicting a military defeat on Russia in the Ukrainian arena, because its victory means, immediately, the collapse of the unipolar international system.

The third: Is related to the tools used in this conflict, as Western countries realize that Russia is the first nuclear power in the world, forcing it not to engage directly in the ongoing conflict with it in the Ukrainian arena, and then to limit itself to the weapon of comprehensive sanctions against Russia, on the one hand, and to submit The maximum possible military, political and economic support for Ukraine, to enable it to win the war, on the other hand.

Fourth: Concerning the future of this conflict. The path taken indicates, on the one hand, that the economic sanctions have not yielded the desired results, and that Russia may be on its way to winning this round of conflict, but it indicates, on the other hand, that the support provided to Ukraine It not only enabled it to hold out and prevent Russia from achieving a quick and decisive victory, but also to recover the many lands it had lost, and to begin to liberate what remained of them, including Crimea. Because it is impossible to imagine that a nuclear Russia would accept a military defeat in Ukraine, escalation and the use of tactical nuclear weapons are no longer excluded, especially since the events of recent months have proven that the United States has harnessed all its technological and intelligence capabilities in the service of Ukraine, which Moscow may interpret as direct American involvement in the conflict.

So I think the whole world may be about to go into a dark tunnel in the next few months. Unless all of its leaders realize that all of humanity, not just Russia or NATO, faces many sources of threat, not the least of which are climatic changes and infectious diseases, and therefore is in dire need of a new world order that confronts all sources of threats to its common security, it will not be able to Anyone surviving the specter of nuclear war is slowly getting closer.

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